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ABSTRACT 
Power struggles and trade in the Gulf 1620-1820 
Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi 
Between the death of Nadir Shah, in 1747, and the establishment of the Qajar dynasty 
in 1795 there were 48 years of Zand rule in Persia, during which time Gulf trade 
declined and European factories closed down in several ports. Historians have 
offered varied and insubstantial reasons for this decline. In this thesis an attempt has 
been made, through the detailed use of primary sources, to offer a more logical and 
more reasoned interpretation of these developments in place of the older, ill-founded 
arguments. 
In our view, the prime cause of the decline in trade and the withdrawal of the trading 
settlement from Bandar Abbas was the 'commotions', or power struggles in the 
region. On one hand was tlie struggle for overall control of Persia whose con-
sequence was the ruin of trade. On the other, the commotion in the area of Bandar 
Abbas, brought about by Mulla 'Ali Shah, t.'le Banii Ma''in Shaikh, Shaikh Rashid and 
the Charak Arabs, which was the main cause of the withdrawal from that port. 
The cessation of trading at Bandar Riq and Khark island was caused by disturbances 
fomented by Mir Muhanna. According to the English, the main cause of the with-
drawal of their settlement from Bandar Riq was the conflict between M"rr Muhanna 
and Karim Khan about Bandar Riq. But it was Mir Muhanna's suspicion that the 
English were his enemies and that they were the allies of Karim Khan which caused 
their expulsion. The Dutch, for their part, were expelled from Khark island after they 
had joined iorces with Bushire in attacking Mir Muhanna on the orders of Karim 
Khan. 
In Bushire the case was different. Although the English acted neutrally in the con-
flicts they could not evade the dangers. They had suffered losses at Mir Muhanna's 
hands but Karim Khan believed that the English were refusing to help him against the 
M"rr. The anger of Karim Khan, his determination not to receive the English in 
audience, and the fear that his brother, Zaki Khan, would detain the English Agent in 
Bushire all motivated the withdrawal of the English settlement from there. 
At last, when the Qajar dynasty took control of all the Pe~ian provinces at the 
beginning of ·the 19th century, the value of English trade with Persia increased 
enormously. 
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
A conventional, simplified but consistent system of transliteration has been used in 
this study for Arabic and Persian words or proper names. The 'ain is represented by 
['] and the ham:zah by [']: the ham:zah is omitted at the beginning of words. The tli' 
marba{ah appears as [h] except in ifjiifah, when it is [t]. The usual exceptions have 
been made where authors use a preferred spelling for their names, and for words 
which are well known to non-specialist readers: thus, Afghanistan but Dashtistan; 
Bandar Abbas but Shah 'Abbas. The mainly primary sources used in the study used 
wildly inaccurate ways of writing Arab or Persian names: for . the sake of od1er 
researchers it therefore seemed particularly necessary to be precise about the names of 
the main actors and places. Reference is made in Chapter 1 to the variations of 
English language and spelling found in the original documents, and foreign names 
were obviously the most distorted elements, especially after two or three cycles of 
copying. Some names still defy absolute certainty about their spelling and these have 
been left as found. 
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CHAYfER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research objectives 
It is now several centuries since the phenomenon of the rise and fall of European trade 
in the Persian Gulf, and the withdrawal of Dutch and English trading settlements 
which spanned the period 1620 to 1820. In all that time no scholars have offered a 
detailed account or a logical and reasoned interpretation of those events. The basic 
aim of this thesis is to provide such an explanation and correct the erroneous accounts 
in the Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 'Oman and Central Arabia, compiled by 
Lorimer between 1908 and 1914, and so to guard later writers from continuing to 
repeat the same mistakes by over-reliance on that very important source of history and 
geography of the Persian Gulf. 1 For example, Lorimer recounts certain events which 
occurred between 1716 and 1763 and described them as leading up to the withdrawal 
of the English factory from Bandar Abbas in 1763, but he establishes no connection 
between the events and the withdrawal. He mentions the 'commotion' at Bandar 
Abbas without saying that it caused the withdrawal, noting only that the English 
Agency was 'suddeniy' withdrawn at that juncture. This thesis will show tltat the 
'commotions', which were essentially struggles for power among peoples of the Gulf, 
were the main cause of the withdrawal from Bandar Abbas. 
As for Bandar Riq, Lorimer records the English expulsion in 1756 and accepts the 
views of Wood, the English Agent, that it was engineered by the Dutch, who were 
keen to take over Bandar Riq for themselves. The Dutch expulsion from Khark island 
in 1766 was incorrectly attributed by Lorimer to the unprofitability of the Khark fac-
tory and the dangers it faced. The responsibility for the withdrawal of the English 
factory from Bushire in 1769 was placed by Lorimer on Morley, the Resident there. 
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In reality, the main cause was the hostility of Katim Khan and the imminent threat 
from Zaki Khan. 
John Perry, the author of Karim Khan Zand,2 used Lorimer's Gazetteer as one of his 
main sources and regards the English withdrawal from Bandar Abbas as merely a 
repercussion of the Anglo-French Seven-Years-War, and this is totally incorrect. As 
regards Bandar Riq, Perry accepts the contemporary English blame of Dutch 
'machinations' but thinks also that Mir Muhanna's opposition may have been a cause. 
He offers no reason for the Dutch expulsion from Khark island, but is again mistaken 
in attributing the English withdrawal from Bushire to the 'jealousy' of Moore, the 
English Agent in Basrah, of the supposedly greater commercial importance of 
Bushire, and the personal antipathy .he apparently nursed towards both the Persians 
and the English Ambassador, Skipp. 
Although John Kelly follows Lorimer in recounting the history of what was broadly 
called piracy in the Gulf, he argues that 'piracy is generally thought to have a depress-
ing effect upon trade. •3 But this thesis will show that trade began to flourish precisely 
during the period (1804 to 1820) when piracy was said to be active (see page 6 for 
further thoughts on this issue). An earlier thesis focusing on trade in the Gulf was 
Jila Sajadi's 'The East India Company's Trade with an Iranian Port at the End of the 
18th and Beginning of the 19th Century: a Geographical Study' (1985). In it the 
author examines the trade being carried on through Bushire and reviews the various 
factors which seemed to have determined its character. Unfortunately, the thesis says 
no more about the withdrawal of the factory from Bushire than:4 
After six years of operations at Bushehr, the Company abandoned its 
residency there in 1769. This was due to the deterioration in trade, 
as well as to a dispute between Karim Khan and the Company. 
Among the reasons for this was that it is obvious that the Khan was 
neither satisfied commercially nor politically with the Company's 
activities within his dominions. 
A further thesis on the same broad issues equally strangely stops short in the critical 
year of 1747: this is Khalid Khalifa AI Khalifa's 'Commerce and Conflict: the 
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English East India Company Factories in the Gulf 1700-4 7'. s What follows in this 
thesis is therefore ground-breaking work. 
1.2 Research methods 
By far the most important documentary sources for this study are to be found in: 
a) The Gombroon Diaries and Bushire Residency Records in the India Office 
Library and Records, London. 
b) The Archives of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and Aanwinsten le 
Afdeling in the General State Archives, The Hague. 
c) The Basrah Diaries, the Commercial Department Diaries, and the Political and 
Secret Department Diaries in the Bombay Archives (now the Maharashtra State 
Archives). 
In any research into the affairs of the English East India Company one is forced to 
focus on a starting date for the research, since many of the records and accounts of 
the factories established by the Company at Gombroon, Isfahan and in the interior of 
Persia during the reigns of the Safavi Shahs are lost. Even if it were thought worth 
investigating the earliest years of English trading with Persia from purely British 
sources, the attempt would fail for want of enough authoritative material, either on 
this subject or on any other aspects of trade in the Persian Gulf from 1620 to 1746. 
On the other hand, research in the archives of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) 
in the General State Archives in The Hague provides us with a mass of authentic pri-
mary source material for the same period. 
It is worth noting that the Gombroon Diaries offer no information about the annual 
quantities of imports and exports made on the English East India Company's account 
during the period when the port was at its most flourishing. For the few months 
before the arrival of orders from Bombay to withdraw the factory, however, there is 
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no lack of material on the trading position, which makes it clear that English trade in 
Persia was declining. 
The Basrah Diaries (1763-1811) are an important source of information about trade in 
the Persian Gulf. These documents, contained in 12 volumes, are in a very bad con-
dition and can be found only in the Bombay Archives: there is no copy in the India 
Office Library in London. This primary source is extensively used in this thesis. 
Other primary source materials from the Bombay Archives used in this study are the 
East India Company's Commercial Department Diaries, Public Department Diaries, 
and a manuscript selection containing the 'Report on the Commerce of Arabia and 
Persia'. The Bushire Residency records in the India Office Library were also among 
the valuable primary sources used: they have been used before by researchers, mainly 
for historical studies, but in a less detailed manner than here, and not in conjunction 
with other primary materials. 
The reader will notice that where quotations are used there is more than one system of 
transliteration of proper names in this thesis, if indeed there is any system at all. In 
the early 19th century and before, transliterations varied from one person to another 
and sometimes the same writer would even spell the same name differently in the 
same letter. In all cases of quotation no attempt has been made to correct even the 
most obvious mistakes and the style of the original author has been followed exactly. 
For the rest of the work an attempt has been made to apply a correct and uniform 
system of transliteration (see page xxvi). Attention should also be drawn to the fact 
that the English language, both grammar and spelling, were very different in the 18th 
and 19th centuries. Moreover, the standard of literacy, especially among the naval 
officers of the British Empire does not seem to have been particularly high, and, per-
haps because of the volume of work, secretaries making the copies of documents etc 
were bound to compound the mistakes made in the originals. These literary oddities 
have been left as they were in order to avoid yet more errors. 
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The many errors by the historians are revealed in this thesis, and a brief review of the 
previous literature shows a general shortage of specific attention to the study of Gulf 
trade in the period of its greatest challenges. The problem is epitomised in Philips' 
careful history The East India Company 1784-1834 which (in 374 pages) mentions 
Persia eight times, and the Gulf not at all: all references focus on the political or mili-
tary problems for India posed by Persia. 6 Other works bring the Persian trade into 
their ambit, but only from the viewpoint of the Muscovy and Levant Companies, or 
discussing the East India Company's trade from the interior of Persia to the north 
(Russia). 7 Some other studies provide useful insights, without having trade in the 
Gulf as a major consideration. Among these, Israel's Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 
1585-1740 attributes the Dutch primacy (referred to again in Chapter 3) to the struc-
ture of the Dutch East India Company and the interventionist policy of the Dutch 
state. Disney's Twilight of the Pepper Empire covers only the very beginning of our 
period, but offers the interesting thought that the English were helped in the Gulf area 
by the conclusion of the 1635 Anglo-Portuguese treaty. 8 In fact, the Portuguese had 
been broken by then, and this is well brought out in the excellent works by Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam. In an intriguing reflection of the fmdings of this thesis, Sub-
rahmanyam attributes the Portuguese decline mainly to the locally disturbed or hostile 
political context in India: secondary factors, he believes, were the power of the 
Dutch, the need felt by Shah 'Abbas to control and tax the silk route, and the estab-
lishment of the English in India and the Gulf. 9 Subrahmanyam also stresses the 
prevalence of force being a tool of European trading in the area. 10 
That the tool was not only for European use is brought out by Calvin Allen, who 
attributes greater Muscat activity in the Gulf in the late 18th century to its new com-
mercial policy - designed to increase Muscat trade by dominating neighbours and 
eliminating competitors. 11 The interlinkage of trade and political factors is well estab-
lished in the literature. Only one author has given much space to the East India Com-
pany's presence in the Persian Gulf and that is Laurence Lockhart. His books on the 
career of Nadir Shah12, and the fall of the Safavi dynasty at the hands· of the 
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Afghans, 13 touch on the fortunes of the East India Company during troubled times and 
provide an excellent wider background. It is not their purpose, however, to look at 
the detail and draw conclusions accordingly. The detail, in any event, was not used 
by him: as he notes in the bibliography on Nadir Shah, 'There is doubtless a vast 
amount to be gleaned from the archives of the Dutch East India Company; I very 
much regret that I have been unable to examine these Dutch records.' 14 By the time 
of his later book he had looked at the Dutch records relating to Isfahan only (and 
covering just six months) and still regretted 'that I have been unable to make a 
thorough exploration of the material that has been preserved at The Hague' .15 
1.3 Choice of subject 
During earlier historical studies I noticed that the withdrawal of Dutch and English 
settlements from the Persian ports was recorded, but without adequate and convincing 
attention to the main reasons or causes of the withdrawal. The reasons adduced by 
Kelly, for example, for the decline in English trade with the Persian Gulf are 
dubious: 16 
The Company was not wholly to blame for the decline in its trade 
with the Gulf. A general fall took place throughout the region in the 
last forty years of the century, brought about by a variety of causes: 
piracy, especially by the Ka'ab and later the Qawasim, the extinc-
tion of the Dutch settlement on Kharaq, the ravages of plague in 
Turkish Arabia in 1775, the siege and capture of Basra, the dearth 
of specie in 'Iraq and Persia, and the civil wars that raged in Persia 
from 1779 onwards. 
The causes cited were short-lived, except for the accusation of piracy. In the case of 
the Ka'b piracy charge Lorimer remarked 'There is nothing to show whether the 
motives of the Ka'ab in this case were merely piratical, or whether the tribe had 
come, in consequence of the Khargu operations, to regard the British as the allies of 
the oppressor Karim Khan. '17 In the case of the Qawasim the accusation is fallacious. 
The charge of piracy by the British against the Qawasim was first made in December 
1804, and continued up to 1820.18 But in the period from 1801 to 1821, imports 
from the Persian Gulf to Bombay more than doubled and exports from Bombay to the 
Gulf almost trebled.19 
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The various reasons cited by Kelly were not the main causes of the phenomenon of 
declining trade and the withdrawal of English trading settlements in the Persian Gulf. 
Therefore, a study seemed to be called for to clarify uncertain issues and to correct 
outright fallacies. The period chosen for the study is a long one (1620-1820). This 
covers the period of 53 years (1747-1800) comprising the decline and withdrawals; 
the period from 1620 to 17 46 covers the establishment of both the Dutch and the 
English settlements, and the relative flourishing of trade before the decline; and the 
period of 1800 to 1820 illustrates the increase attainable by trade in peaceful times. 
1.4 Research context 
At the beginning of the 17th century Persian silk was being exported overland to 
Turkey, and the centre for the trade was Aleppo, in Syria: it was estimated that 6,000 
bales (each of 280 lbs) entered Europe by this route annually. The English East India 
Company tried to divert the silk trade to the Persian Gulf, and thence to London via 
India, but lacked sufficient funds to buy such a quantity of silk, estimated to be worth 
£540,000 per annum.2o The Dutch followed the English in trying to get their share of 
Persian silk, and both East India Companies were exporting Asian products to Persia, 
receiving in return cash and silk.21 The Dutch and English attempt to divert the Per-
sian silk trade from its Gulf/~1editerra.t1ean route {after the eviction of the Portuguese 
from Hormuz in 1622) was a longer-term failure. The silk trade down the Gulf was a 
temporary phenomenon: by the second half of the 17th century most Persian silk was 
again going to Europe through Aleppo, and this situation remained the same in the 
18th century. 22 
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1.4.1 The establishment of the English and Dutch settlements in the 
Persian Gulf 
I. Bandar Abbas 
In 1622 the English and Dutch tried to establish their Companies on Hormuz island 
but the Persians refused ·permission: instead, they allowed the Europeans to establish 
their settlements at the port of Gombroon (Bandar Abbas).23 
II. Khark island 
In October 1753, M"rr Na~ir of Bandar Rlq offered Khark island to the Dutch Resident 
at Basrah, Kniphausen, for the establishment of a factory there. The Dutch 
Governor-General in Batavia approved Kniphausen' s initiative and sent him back to 
Khark to found the settlement. 24 
III. Bandar Rlq 
The Court of Directors of the East India Company in London gave discretion to the 
Governor of Bombay in April 1754 to settJe a.11y of their employees in Bandar Riq, 
and he decided to send Francis Wood there in order to open a factory. 25 
IV. Bushire 
Alexander Douglas, the English Agent at Bandar Abbas, was directed to visit Bushire 
in April 1761 in order to give his opinion on a suitable place between Bandar Abbas 
and Basrah for trade.26 Douglas recommended that the only suitable place in that 
stretch of coast was Bushire. 
The factories in all of the above four locations were abandoned as a result of political 
disturbances or 'commotions'. Although there was also maladministration by 
Kniphausen on Khark, and by Jervis in Bushire, this was in no way responsible for 
the failures. In times of peace and tranquillity there was a realistic prospect of prof-
itable trade in the Persian Gulf, as shown by the figures cited on page 6. 27 
1.4.2 Anglo-Dutch rivalry 
European trading was conducted in a general atmosphere of calumny: wherever pos-
sible the Dutch and the English were ready to tell the Persian authorities damaging 
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stories about the other party in order to obtain favours and hinder the trade of com-
petitors. The first important date in the perennial conflict was as early as 1625, when 
the Governor of Farsistan, Imam Quli: Khan, decreed that the Dutch should pay 
customs duties to the English only for trade with Hormuz (the English had been given 
the right to half of all customs duties in recognition of their part in chasing the 
Portuguese from Hormuz). Since the Dutch did no trade with Hormuz they were able 
to avoid paying anything to the English.2B 
The Dutch carne into direct rivalry with the English in 1636 when they changed their 
trading methods from selling their goods in Isfahan to selling in Bandar Abbas. In 
1645 the Dutch sent a fleet of eight laden merchant ships to Bandar Abbas and almost 
ruined the English trade there by reducing their prices, and making an arrangement 
with the harbourmaster which enabled them, again, to avoid paying customs duties. 29 
The Shah wrote, in 1649, that he had received accusations from the English against 
the Dutch the previous year but that, after investigation, he had found them to be 
untrue. The accusations related to fraud over the payment of customs duties and the 
handling of goods for local merchants, contrary to the terms of the Dutch privileges. 30 
In 1653, during the Anglo-Dutch war, the Dutch brought a fleet of 15 laden merchant 
ships to the Gulf, and at the same time captured three English ships before they could 
enter the Gulf. In the next year, 1654, before news of the conclusion of peace 
between the two countries had reached the area, the Dutch fleet blocked off naviga-
tion in the Gulf, and English trade almost ceased: by 1656 the entire Persian trade of 
the English East India Company was nearly ruined. 31 The second and third Anglo-
Dutch wars of 1665-1667 and 1672-1674 followed, but a more serious turn (in trading 
terms) occurred in 1685 when the English arrested local vessels being used to ferry 
cargo to the larger Dutch ships. The Dutch replied in kind by arresting the Indian 
ships used by the English: the English thereupon promised the Persians help to expel 
Dutch troops from the fortress of Qishm. The Dutch advanced matters by complain-
ing to the Persians about English piracy in the Gulf. Some English pirates had cap-
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tured a Portuguese ship and killed part of its crew, using the ship to pursue their 
piracies until 1687 when they brought a captured ship from Sind to Bandar Abbas. 
Here they found themselves paying a heavy fine imposed by the Governor. 
There were local repercussions when William of Orange, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Dutch armed forces, landed in England in 1688, deposed his father-in-law James II 
and accepted the British throne for himself as William III. English representatives in 
the Middle East repeatedly claimed that the Dutch were now subjects of the English 
King, but the reality was that William, although the sovereign of Britain, was for-
mally only an appointed official of the Dutch state. In 1693, the English started 
trying to bribe Dutch sailors to enter their service: these attempts ceased only after an 
agreement was reached in 1730. The Dutch also complained, in 1723, that the 
English were following the practice of the Portuguese by trying to oblige local ship-
ping to carry English passports (which would impair the freedom of the Dutch to use 
local craft).32 
Between 1728 and 1729 the Dutch and English competed for control of the islands 
near Bandar Abbas: when the Dutch gained control over Hormuz the English 
intrigued with the invading Afghans against them. In 1737 the two rivals were vying 
with each other in offering help and concessions to the Persians to assist their military 
operations in Oman~ and circulating slanderous stories about each other.33 From 
1753-1754 the English were involved in problems with Kniphausen on Khark island, 
and it seems that the English were very much behind Kniphausen's difficulties with 
the Miitesellim (Governor) of Basrah. 34 
There were some differences between the English and the Dutch in terms of policies 
and practices in their Gulf trade, although both of them were constrained by the Per-
sian faramiins which gave them their trading privileges. At the time of the Afghan 
occupation of Persia (1722-29), the Dutch remained close to the Safavi dynasty while 
the English recognised the Afghan occupiers. The Dutch maintained friendship with 
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the Arab tribes, but the English were antagonistic towards them, owing to Arab com-
petition with the 'country' trade carried in Indian-owned ships under the English 
flag. 35 Strategic decisions for the Dutch were taken in Batavia, whereas the English 
received theirs variously from Bombay, Madras and Bengal. 
1.5 Organisation of the thesis 
The thesis is arranged in seven chapters, with the present chapter covering the context 
of the research; research methods; the choice of subject; research context; organisa-
tion of the thesis; and the currencies in use during the study period. Chapter 2 out-
lines the historical geography of the Persian Gulf and Chapters 3-6 examine the power 
struggles and trading results in the Gulf as they relate to four factories: Bandar Abbas, 
Bandar Ri:q, Khark island and Bushire. The final Chapter 7 offers an overview and 
conclusions to the whole study. Many appendices and maps supplement the thesis: 
the appendices are included partly for their rarity value (being hitherto mostly 
unpublished), their relevance to the text, and their usefulness to other researchers in 
this field. Most of the maps form part of the writer's private collection, while others 
are rare maps in various archives which are difficult to access. 
1.6 Currency 
1.6.1 Local currencies 
The values of currencies (and also of weights - see the Glossary, pages ???-???) 
varied widely during the period of this study, and their inter-relationships were cor-
respondingly intricate. In the Persian trade the most commonly used unit of account, 
rather than a currency, was the Toman. Its value declined from about £3 7s to less 
than £1 (only about 10 shillings according to one report in 1817-20) but, for account-
ing purposes, it was still regarded during most of the period as worth about £3 or 30 
Rupees. Its value fell outside of Persia: at a time when it was worth about 20 Rupees 
in Gombroon it fetched only 15 Rupees in Basrah, and 13 Rupees in Ras al-Khaimah. 
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The Toman remained fairly constant against the favourite gold coin of the Ottoman 
territories, the Venetian ducat, which rated at about half a Toman. Against the Maria 
Theresa Dollar (German Crown or Rial) the Toman was worth about eight. 
The division of the Toman was usually into 200 Shiihis, or 100 Ma}J.miidis. Where 
they existed as coinage the MaQ.miidi was silver and the Toman gold, but the 
Ma}J.miidi, like the Toman, was usually given a conventional value in the East India 
Company's accounts, normally about 8d. The Shahi, in consequence, entered the 
accounts as 4d. The entry for MaQ.miidi in the Glossary shows how its real value, like 
the Toman's, declined over a period. 
After the Toman, the most commonly used unit of accounting was the Rupee, but its 
varieties were numerous. Where the primary sources show cross-rates which make no 
apparent sense (and the same applies to weights) we can be sure that a local Rupee, or 
other unit, is being used. The Bombay Rupee evolved out of the Surat Rupee from 
about 1800, but there were still many other local Rupees in usage. The Rupee was 
more constant against the £ sterling than was the Toman: it was customary in the East 
India Company to regard the Bombay Rupee as worth a florin (the old 2s coin, not the 
Dutch guilder). The Rupee and the Maria Theresa Dollar were still the coins used in 
the Gulf in living memory, with the £ sterling fetching about 13 Rupees or 3 to 4 
Maria Theresa Dollars. Towards the end of the period under study, however, the 
MTD was worth about 21h Rupees. 
1.6.2 European coinage 
Actual European coins were brought into the Gulf by both the English and the Dutch 
in the first half of the 17th century to pay for silk. The commonest coins used for this 
purpose at that time were gold ducats, silver rixdollars (Dutch Rijksdaaler = 21h 
Guilders), and silver pieces of eight (the Spanish Real) with the same value. Trade 
accounts were always kept in guilders by the Dutch, and pounds by the English; in 
both cases these were merely units of accounting. After 1650 the Dutch and the 
12 
English no longer brought cash to the Gulf; instead, they took cash in payment for 
merchandise (mostly local coins and Venetian ducats). Over the centuries the rate of 
exchange between the guilder and the pound changed only slightly: £1 = 10 Guilders 
in 1621 and 11.5 Guilders at the end of the 18th century. 
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CHAPTER2 
THE IDSTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE PERSIAN GULF 
2.0 Introduction 
Geography has played a significant, and at times determinant, role in shaping the 
nature of trade in the Gulf. This chapter summarises the nature of the wind regime, 
the currents and the coastal geography, all of which dictated the rhythms of trade and 
the location of the main trading centres. The Persian coast was much better favoured 
in this respect than the Arabian coast. The global location of the Gulf has ensured 
that trade exchanges flourished there. It was a meeting-point for European, Asian, 
and Far Eastern trade. Relative ease of communication by land (in times of peace) 
brought goods to the coast, and away from the coast to the interior. The age-old 
exploitation of pearls in the Gulf created a trading and seagoing tradition, and brought 
revenues to local people. Local trade flourished because the Gulf was small enough 
to encourage short-distance commerce in locally-made vessels. The Gulfs seagoing 
tradition and the system of monsoon winds also combined to enable these local craft 
to trade as far west as the Red Sea and the East African coast, and as far as India and 
China in the east. 
This chapter cannot include a comprehensive geography of the Gulf but it highlights 
certain key features. There are, however, several geographical texts available which 
are suitable for background information. There are useful appendices on geographical 
topics in Cottrell's The Persian Gulf States. 1 For authoritative information on winds, 
currents and tides, and brief notes on all the islands, The Persian Gulf Pilot remains 
unequalled2 except, perhaps, for the United States Hydrographic Center's equivalent 
Sailing Directions for the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.3 Much of the geographical liter-
ature on the Persian Gulf draws on the classic Admiralty Handbook which, in its day, 
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was the best geographical text by far and remains well worth consultation today. 4 For 
more general marine geography, The Times Atlas of the Oceans covers aspects of 
environment, security, and maritime trade in a series of excellent maps and illustra-
tions with concise text. s 
2.1 Naming the Gulf 
The actual naming of the Gulf has become a problem for researchers in the field of 
Gulf studies in recent years. We can attribute this difficulty to the disagreements 
from 1958 onwards between the Persians and the Arabs on either side of the Gulf 
about nomenclature. If asked why they were changing the name from Persian Gulf to 
Arabian Gulf, Arabs would reply that they had always called it the Persian Gulf until 
the Persians began citing the usage of the term 'Persian' as a justification for Iranian 
power politics in the region in the 1950s. 
The name 'Persian Gulr goes back beyond the year 150 AD when Claudius 
Ptolemaeus (Ptolemy) wrote his Guide to Geography. His knowledge of the Gulf was 
based on Indika by Flavus Arrianus (died about 180 AD), a cont~mporary of his who 
was a high Roman official, and Strabo's Geography (Book 16). Strabo lived ca 63 
BC to 25 AD. 6 The lndika contains an account of the travel from- India to the 
Euphrates of Nearchos, the admiral of A!exa'lder the Great, in about 324 BC. 7 
These Greek and Roman geographers commonly applied the term 'Erythraean Sea' 
(which means literally Red Sea) to the whole of the Indian Ocean, the modern Red 
Sea and the Persian Gulf. They used the term 'Arabian Gulr for the modern Red 
Sea, and 'Persian Gulr for the modern Persian/Arab Gulf.B But because 'Erythraean 
Sea' meant all of the sea area between Africa and India there are sometimes very con-
fusing references to the Persian Gulf as the Erythraean Sea: some early translators 
then made the mistake of translating these references as 'Red Sea'!9 
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It is not certain that the maps we attribute to Ptolemy were really made by him or 
whether later scholars added them to the text of his book. His first map dates from 
147710 (see the Atlas, Map no. 1) and it seems that the map's creators were 
influenced by the earlier Arab historians, who called the Persian Gulf baiJr ftiris, 
meaning 'Sea of Persia' or 'Sinus Persicus' (see the Atlas, Map nos. 1-2).11 
Although some Arab historians of the 1Oth century called the Persian Gulf al-baiJr al-
akh~ar (the Green Sea)12 or al-khallj al-akh~ar (the Green Gult)13 these terms were 
not commonly adopted (see the Atlas, Map no. 3). 
In 1546, the Ottoman Turks, who had occupied Baghdad a few years earlier, attacked 
Basrah and captured it. In the same year they invaded the Arabian coast as far as 
Qatif, which they occupied after expelling the Portuguese, and cleared a passage for 
themselves through the Gulf to the Indian Ocean.14 From that time (1546) onwards, 
and up to 1712, the Ottomans sta...rted to call the Gulf the 'Gulf of Basrah', the 'Gulf 
of Qatir, or the 'Gulf of Arabia'. This was confusing for the cartographers, who 
were accustomed to using the terms 'Sinus Persicus' or 'Gulf of Persia', and they 
began to employ Ottoman as well as earlier titles in the same maps (see the Atlas, 
Map nos. 4-16 and The Gulf in Historic Maps by this writer). 15 These terms, 'Gulf of 
Persia' and 'Sinus Persicus', were adopted by the European cartographers as a result 
of their contacts with the Portuguese. The most important 16th century Italian cartog-
rapher, Giacomo Gastaldi, owed the names used in his map' Arabia Felix' to the early 
Portuguese traveller, Duarte Barbosa (see the Atlas, Map no. 4).'6 He used the name 
'Golpho de Persia' but in 1572, after the spread of Turkish influence in this region he 
added 'Mare Elcatir, making 'Mare Elcatif Golfo di Persia' (see the Atlas, Map no. 
5). The other cartographers did the same and produced a collection of different com-
binations designed to please the two enemies, Persians and Turks. 17 The various 
combinations were: 
i) Mare Elcatif I Sinus Persicus 
ii) Mare Elcatif I Sinus Arabicus 
iii) Mare Elcatif 
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iv) Sinus Arabicus 
v) The Sea Elcatif I Arabian Gulfe 
vi) Golfe De Balsera I Mer D'Elcatif 
vii) Golfe de Balsera D'Elcatif I Golfe De Persia 
viii) Gulph of Balsera I Sea of Elcatif or the Gulf of Persia 
ix) Golfo Di Bassora 6 D'Elcatif 6 Sinus Persicus 
x) Sino Persico 6 Golfo di Bassora 6 d'Elcatif 
xi) Golfo di Bassora 
xii) Persian Gulf 
(see the Atlas, Map nos. 4-16) 
The English cartographers, Christopher Brown and Samuel Thornton, started using 
the name 'Persian Gulr in 1712 and 1716 respectively, and from then on the other 
na.mes began to disappear .18 As most of the documents to be used in this study call 
the Gulf the Persian Gulf, and sometimes refer to the Red Sea as the Arabian Gulf, it 
becomes necessary to use the term Persian Gulf henceforward to avoid confusion. 
Our immediate object here is to describe those geographical aspects of the Persian 
Gulf which help explain some of the patterns of trade and communications, and the 
location of towns and ports in the following pages. 
2.2 Surveys of the Persian Gulf 
In the eighteenth century no adequate chart of the Persian Gulf existed, until the map 
published by Carsten Niebuhr appeared in 1772 (see the Atlas, Map no. 17). 19 In 
1785 a brief survey of the Persian coast was made by Lieutenant John McCluer of the 
Bombay Marine and his materials were published in 1786 by Alexander Dalrymple. 2o 
Dalrymple augmented that publication with extracts on the topography of the Persian 
Gulf from the works of Niebuhr, Thornton and others (see the Atlas, Map nos. 18-
38).21 The most generalised topographical knowledge of the Persian Gulf came from 
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the drawings and observations of Captain Wainwright, of the East India Company's 
Marine, in 1809 and 1810. The chart constructed from his work was the most 
detailed one of the Persian coast: the Arabian coast was unknown to the Captains of 
the Bombay Marine at that time, except for Bahrain and Ras al-Khaimah (see the 
Atlas, Map no. 39). Following on from this chart, Arrowsmith's chart was made in 
1813 from materials collected by Captain Ritchie, and Lieutenant Bartholomew's 
chart relied heavily on McCluer's work (see the Atlas, Map no. 40).22 
From 1821 to 1829 a complete survey of the Gulf was carried out by four Captains of 
the Bombay Marine: Captain Guy in the Discovery, Captain Cogan in the Psyche, 
Captain Brucks in the Teignmouth and Lieutenant Haines in the Benares (see the 
Atlas, Map no. 41).23 From these surveys, Captain Brucks in 1830 constructed a 
chart of the Persian Gulf, in English and Arabic (see the Atlas, Map no. 42). The 
Berghaus, a Germa.'l cartographic fmn, published a more detailed chart of the Persian 
Gulf in 1832: the original surveys for that chart are not known, but there is a note on 
the map that they were carried out in the years 1821-1825, and that the data had come 
from the offices of the Bombay Marine. This is a rare map: only two copies are in 
existence, one in the British Library and the other in this writer's collection (see the 
Atlas, Map no. 43). One of the last of the important works of the officers of the 
Indian Navy (as it now was) came in 1860 when Commander Constable and 
Lieutenant A.W. Stiffe carefully revised the oider surveys and compiled two charts of 
the Persian Gulf. The positions of the principal points, islands and landmarks had 
been determined by the two officers between September 1857 and March 1860: the 
intervening coasts and soundings came from the surveys by Captains Guy and Brucks 
(see the Atlas, Map nos. 44-45).24 
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2.3 Surrounding topography, coasts, depths, islands and shoals 
The area of the Persian Gulf is nearly 70,000 square miles. Its length, in a straight 
line from Sharjah on the United Arab Emirates coast to the Shan al-'Arab, is about 
450 miles, whilst its breadth varies from 100 to 180 miles between the two coasts. 25 
2.3.1 The Arabian coast 
The Arabian coast is low, with reefs and shoals fronting it to a great distance offshore 
and forming the pearl banks, with the exception only of the Arabian shore on the left 
hand of the Gulfs entrance, where the mountains of Ras Musandam are found.26 
This coast can be divided into three sections, according to the perceptions of eight-
eenth century navigators. 
a) The coast from Ras Musandam to Abu Dhabi 
At the very entrance to the Gulf are the great Quoins, three rocks near one another, 
and so named by European navigators: the Arabs call them Salamah wa Banatuha 
(Salamah and her daughters). The water around them is 40 fathoms deep. From the 
Gulf entrance towards Abu Dhabi, a course keeping 21h miles off shore passes over 
seabed from 25-35 fathoms to only 5 fathoms. Off Umm al-Qaiwain ships are recom-
mended to keep in 7 fathoms until clear of Umm al-Qaiwain reef. From there to Abu 
Dhabi the rest of the course is in 5 fathoms. The beginning of the Musandam coast, 
from Ras Musandam to Sha'm, is a succession of coves and inlets in front of high· 
mountains. From Sha'm onwards the mountains begin to tum inland, and the coast 
becomes low and flat with sandy soil as it runs southward (see the Atlas, Map no. 
44). Date groves grew near townships as far as Abu Dhabi. 27 
b) The coast from Abu Dhabi to Ras Rakkan (Qatar) 
From Abu Dhabi the coast runs for 250 miles to Wakrah, about 60 miles south of Ras 
Rakkan, and in the seventeenth century was uninhabited. The whole of that stretch is 
low and sandy, and the coast has shoals with great reefs extending for miles where the 
pearl banks are. The depth averages 10 to 15 fathoms offshore except over the pearl 
banks, where it reduces to 3 to 9 fathoms. Many islands lie off this part of the coast, 
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some high and some low, but all of them barren and lacking water. Europeans never 
visited this part of the coast before 1864 except for Ras Rakkan itself (see the Atlas, 
Map nos. 44-45).28 
c) The coast from Ras Rakkin to Shatt ai-'Arab 
The coast now runs southwards into Daw}Jat Salwah and then to the north-west 
towards Kuwait. It continues low and sandy with just a few small hills and some 
vegetation near Qatif. Except for Qatif this part of the coast, again, was not visited 
by Europeans before 1864. The entire coast is fronted by extensive reefs until within 
70 miles of Kuwait and then meets the islands of Failaka and Bubiyan before the 
entrance to Shan al-'Arab. The inlet of Khor Abdullah lies on the left of the entrance 
(see the Atlas, Map no. 45).29 
The island of Bahrain, formerly called Awal, is situated in Daw}Jat Salwah, between 
the west coast of Qatar and lite coast of mainland Arabia. It is 27 miles long, from 
north to south, and just 10 miles across. Its shores are low but, in the centre of the 
island, there are volcanic hills rising to about 400 ft. It was fertile at the time of our 
study, with abundant fresh water springs and covered with date groves. Bahrain's 
capital was already the large town called Manamah. Most of Bahrain's trade was in 
pearls exported to India, which were valued in 1824 at 1,200,000 German crowns.Jo 
2.3.2 The Persian coast 
The Persian coast, being mostly mountainous, had deep water close in and was safe to 
approach. 31 Like the Arab side, it too can be divided into three parts. 
a) The coast from the entrance to Ras Bustinah (near Lingah) 
From the Gulf entrance the coast of Minab runs north-west 26 miles to Bandar Abbas. 
This coast is low and swampy, and the depth when 2 miles offshore is only 3 fath-
oms. Behind the coast there are two remarkable peaks in the mountain range which 
rise to about 3,000 ft. Towards Bandar Abbas, Hormuz island stands in the way. 
This is about 4 miles long and wide: it has 7 fathoms close to the edge of its reefs, 
while at 2 to 3 miles it has 12 fathoms. The island has no water except what was 
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stored in cisterns in the hills. In approaching Bandar Abbas, ships had to navigate 
between Hormuz and the mainland, where they could find 6 fathoms along the coast. 
Bandar Abbas itself was a large settlement at the bottom of a bay in the northernmost 
part of the Gulrs eastern end. 
Then came, on the left for ships following the coast, the largest island in the Gulf, 
Jazirat al-TawTiah (Long Island) as the Arabs called it, or Qishm. This is 60 miles 
long and 19 miles across, and it lies parallel to the coast, separated from it by a pas-
sage named by Captain Brucks as Clarence Strait (see the Atlas, Map nos. 21, 44). 
This strait was navigable for ships. Off the southern flank of Qishm are the islands of 
Larak and Henjam (see the Atlas, Map nos. 46-47). Behind the opposite coast there 
is a great chain of mountains where Khamir, with its hills of sulphur, lay. At the end 
of the strait Basidu lies on the tip of the island. From Khamir to Ras Bustanah the 
mountain ra.-tge continues westward, with the towns of Kung and Lingah on the coast 
and inhabited by Arabs. The anchorages in front of these towns were in 5 fathoms 
(see the Atlas, Map no. 44).32 
b) The coast from Ras Bustinah to Bushire 
Ranges of mountains continue along this part of the coast, rising up close to the sea in 
parts and providing deep water of 40-50 fathoms close to. In this stretch there were 
many townships of Arab inhabitants. Offshore lay the islands of Sirri, the two Tunbs, 
Furiir, Sir Abii Nu•air and Abii Miisi. Further aiong come ihe islands of Qays, 
Hindurabi and Bushaib. The inhabitants of these islands and the facing coast were the 
Huwalah Arabs (see the Atlas, Map nos. 44-45).33 
c) The coast from Bushire to Shatt ai-'Arab 
The mountain ranges here are at some distance from the coast, with only the 1,000 ft 
Mount Bang close to the shore. Bushire was the principal seaport of Persia at that 
time but had only 3 fathoms a mile offshore, and ships drawing more than 20ft had 
to anchor 41h miles out (see the Atlas, Map no. 48 and Chapter 5.1). The shore is 
low, except for Bang, and this part of the coast contained Bandar Riq with its small 
creek, and Ganawah with a few date-palms. and other trees. Opposite them lie the 
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islands of Khark and Kharku. The inhabitants of Bushire, Bandar Riq, Ganawah and 
Khark island were Arabs. From Bang to Shan al-' Arab the anchorage was in 2% 
fathoms, or in soft mud 21h miles off Dailam. Dailam's inhabitants were Persian· 
mainly, although some were Arab. Before finally reaching Shan al-'Arab there is the 
great salt water inlet of Khor Musa (see the Atlas, Map no. 45). 34 Leaving Khor 
Musa on the right, ships sailed west until they reached the Shan al-'Arab. On the 
right bank of the Shan, a hundred miles inland, was Basrah; on the left bank was 
Muhammarah, dominated by the Banii Ka'b (see the Atlas, Map no. 49). 35 
2.4 Climate 
On the map, the Persian Gulf region for our purposes is bounded for convenience by 
lat!tudes 26° and 32° north, and longitudes 46° and 58° east (see Figure 2.1). Climati-
cally, this region is conditioned by geographical factors. The Gulfs global location 
can be defined by its latitude, and thus its distance from the equator; in this case 
beginning at only 26° north. The whole of the Gulf area is therefore situated in a very 
hot and dry region of the earth. In the context of sea-borne trade, the winds, tides 
and currents are obviously of paramount importance and these are considered in the 
next section. The other climatic factors which weigh more heavily than any other are 
heat, humidity and rainfall. These may be explained briefly as follows. 
2.4.1 Tet.npenatune 
The highest temperatures in the Gulf rise to a range of 52-67°C, and the lowest reach 
l5°C. This has affected every aspect of life in the Gulf from architecture to public 
health. From our point of view it partly explains the trade in woollen goods as well 
as cottons and silks. The summer conditions of heat and humidity (see the next sec-
tion) were so trying that most activities diminished or ceased at that time: on the Arab 
side of the Gulf, however, pearl diving took place during the hot season. 
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Within such a hot area the important feature is the lowering of temperature caused by 
a rise in altitude. The Persian coast provides a very clear example of that effect: the 
east coast from Minab to Lingah, and the north-west coast from Kangun to Dailam, 
have a coastal plain at sea level where the temperatures are very hot. The central 
coastal area, however, between Lingah and Kangun is elevated along most of its 
length, reaching a height of 10,000 ft towards the interior, and temperatures are 
therefore lower than those of the other stretches. 
The areas adjacent to the sea experience little fluctuation in temperatures between day 
and night, as also between winter and summer, whereas the interiors can experience 
considerable ranges in temperature. 
2.4.2 llu~.nut~ 
Discomfort caused by high temperatures is compounded by humidity, which is very 
high in the Persian G!Jlf throughout the year. The average humidity reading in winter 
rises to about 70-80% and exceeds 90% in summer. A notable phenomenon is that the 
north-west of the Gulf, surrounded by dry, hot deserts, will sometimes register 
humidity of 50% while, at the same time, the south-east will have 80%, being near 
the Indian Ocean. Similarly, coastal locations tend to be more humid than inland. 
2.4.3 Rainfall 
In the eight hot months of the year there is no rain. In winter, however, the rainfall 
on the Arabian coast reaches nearly 10 em, while the Persian coast with its higher 
relief receives up to 20 em. 36 The most important rain-bearing wind is the south-
easterly, caused by the effect of the sun on the Persian mountains which produces a 
heated layer of air above the sea to the south-east or north-west (the north-westerly is 
colder and is the more prevalent). It often happens in southern Persia and the Gulf 
that the two currents meet (see page 27, under Seasonal winds), with the result that a 
north-westerly gale may be raging at Bushire, while a south-easter is shaking Bandar 
Abbas. This latter wind is the rain-bearer throughout the greater part of Persia. 37 
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2.5 Winds, currents and tides 
2.5.1 Wind 
This was the factor of greatest importance in the Persian Gulf to the sailing ships 
which carried large quantities of goods, with the wind either facilitating the passage of 
the ships or causing losses to both men and vessels. The winds of the Gulf can be 
divided into three kinds: 
Seasonal winds, which blow from the north and south towards the centre of the Gulf, 
where the temperatures rise higher than those of the Persian mountains or the Arabian 
desert, and continue on to blow parallel to the coasts from north-west to south-east. 
The local winds, including the sea and land breezes on all coasts of the Gulf, flowing 
from the land to the sea during the night and turning onshore again during the day. 
Significant local winds are: 
i) The shamlil (meaning north in Arabic) which begins to blow in winter for 
nine months from the north-west to all Gulf coasts, bringing dangerous condi-
tions. 
ii) The north-easterly wind which blows to the Persian coast in winter, espe-
cially towards Hormuz, bringing clouds and rain. 
iii) The kmvs (Persian for east), a summer wind from the east, which brings 
high humidity as it crosses the sea. 
The suhaili, which is more of an occasional whirlwind, bringing dust storms as it 
erupts from the south-east and causes great damage. 
2.5.2 Cummts 
At the entrance to the Gulf the prevailing currents run inwards, from May to Septem-
ber; and outwards during the rest of the year. Within the Persian Gulf itself, between 
the entrance and the Shatt al-' Arab, the current sets down the middle of the Gulf. It 
is often very weak and, at times, may set towards the north. 38 
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2.5.3 lldes 
Tidal range in the Gulf is negligible, thus removing one of the uncertainties experi-
enced by navigators in many other parts of the world. 
2.6 The effects of geography and meteorology on navigation in the Gulf, 
Persian coast and Arabian coast 
There are many factors which make navigation along the Persian coast faster and 
safer, beyond the points already made above. 
a) Distance: The Persian coast is shorter than the Arabian shore, with fewer capes 
and indentations. 
b) Depth: The Persian coast is deep enough for navigation whereas the Arabian 
coast is shallow, and treacherous in places. 
c) Sea bed: Close to the Persian shore the sea bed has a muddy bottom with good 
anchor holding, while the Arabian side presents many dangers from the reefs. 
d) Current and wind: When sailing along the Persian coast vessels could take 
advantage of the north-west setting currents, as well as the land breezes; further out, 
vessels became becalmed and drifted with the currents. 
e) Shelter: In every part of the Persian coast ships could find anchorages in the 
different bays, or in the lee of several islands lying offshore which gave shelter from 
direct assauit by the gaies. The bays on the Arabian side were shallow, and strong 
winds blew directly onshore. 
t) Landmarks: The Persian coast being mountainous, its peaks and capes were 
used by navigators as reference points, but the Arabian coast is mostly flat and fea-
tureless. 
g) Settlement: Along the Persian coast there were many towns and villages where 
water and wood could be obtained: on the Arabian side there were no easily acces-
sible settlements nor fresh water.39 
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Figure 2.2 Location map of the Persian Gulf 
In short, the British view was that the Arabian coast was 'little known and considered 
unsafe' ,40 and they were attracted to the Persian shore, as were other European mer-
chants and navigators. 
2. 7 The preference for the Persian Gulf route over the Red Sea 
Navigation up the Red Sea was not practicable for vessels of European construction 
from May until October, the season of the south-west monsoon. It was claimed that 
the small craft of the natives of both coasts kept up a constant communication between 
Mocha and Suez, but the English could get no confirmation of this and thought that 
the voyage 'must be very precarious and at best very tedious' .41 Because of the natu-
ral forces opposed to navigation up the Red Sea for six months of the year, it could 
not be relied upon as a general channel of communication between India and Britain. 42 
Over the long distance from India to Mocha and Suez, vessels had to carry water and 
wood at the expense of goods. 
From every point of view, the British held that the Persian Gulf presented the most 
permanent and safe channel of communication between Britain and India. 43 Vessels 
navigating through the Persian Gulf did not have to carry large quantities of water and 
wood because there were so many ports along the Sind coast and the Persian coast 
within the Gulf (see Figure 2.2). Given th.e easier navigation by the Gulf route, com-
pared with the Red Sea, it would appear to have long preceded the Red Sea as the 
preferred route for communication. 44 
2.8 Ports and harbours in the Gulf 
The commercial situation in the Gulf during the pre-Islamic period differed totally 
from its character in early Islamic times .. In the pre-Islamic period (i.e. until the 7th 
century) the Chinese and other Far Eastern people used to carry their goods to 
Ceylon, where they were picked up by Persian ships and carried to ports in the Per-
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sian Gulf. Trade within the Gulf was in the hands of the Persians, and they were the 
intermediaries for the silk trade between China and the West. After the Islamic con-
quests, however, the Arabs occupied all the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Islamic 
empire was homogeneous. Trade was now in the hands of the Arabs and it flourished 
between the Persian Gulf, India and China. 4S 
2.8.1 Pre-Islamic settlements 
Only a very general view of the earliest trade can be given through a brief description 
of its settlements. 
a) Bahrain: The centre of the pearl fishery, under its old name of Awal. The 
inhabitants were described in 420 AD as idolators, but the Persians occupied the 
islands in 615 and remained there until the Islamic era. 
b) Rishahr· (Reshire): Just south of Bushire, and founded about 500 BC. Its trade 
later transferred to Bushire but there is no record of the nature of its trading history. 
c) Gerrha: An ancient port on the Arabian coast, the site of which was probably 
near the modem port of Qatif. It flourished from very early times until after the 
Christian era. The main trade of Gerrha was with the land of incense (South Arabia) 
by sea and with Seleucia, on the Tigris, by land. 
d) Obollah (Apologus): On a delta of the Shan al-'Arab, it was the great centre of 
Persian commerce. It superseded the older, great Babylonian port of Teredon. 
2.8.2 Islamic settlements 
a) Basrah: The fmt Islamic port on the Persian Gulf, on the west bank of the 
Shan al-' Arab. It superseded Obollah after its foundation, in about 636 AD, by order 
of the Caliph 'Umar.47 
b) S"Irif: In the tenth century Siraf was the main port in the Gulf - its chief 
emporium for India and the Far East. The ruins of the old city of Siraf lie to the west 
of the village of Bandar Tahiri on the Persian coast. 48 
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c) Qays: At the beginning of the twelfth century the island of Qays succeeded 
Siraf as the emporium for trade with the Far East and India. Qays lies off the Persian 
coast, separated from the mainland by a navigable channel 9 miles wide. In the four-
teenth century Qays was replaced in turn by Hormuz as the market for trade between 
the East and the West.49 
d) Horm.uz: Thi~ was originally a city on the coast of Makran. In Marco Polo's 
book (the story of the travels of the Polo family begins in 1260) he mentions Hormuz: 
When you have ridden these two days, you come to the Ocean Sea, 
and on the shore you find a city with a harbour which is called 
Hormos. Merchants come thither from India, with ships loaded 
with spicery and precious stones, pearls, cloths of silk and gold, 
elephants' teeth, and many other wares, which they sell to the mer-
chants of Hormos, and which these in turn carry all over the world 
to dispose of again. In fact, 'tis a city of immense trade. There are 
plenty of towns and villages under it, but it is the capital. so 
In the first third of the fourteenth century the merchants of Hormuz occupied Jariin, 
the island opposite their capital, and supplanted the kingdom of Qays, which had con-
trolled the Gulf for 200 years. The name of Hormuz was then given to the island. Sl 
The island of Hormuz lies at latitude 27~, ten miles or so from the Persian mainland 
and about 34 miles from the Arabian coast (see the Atlas, Map no. 44). Its circum-
ference is barely more than 9 miles and it is so sterile that it possesses no naturally 
occurring green plants. Its sole products were from the salt and sulphur mines. The 
city itself was situated on a point of the island, with two very good harbours within 
bays, one on the east and the other on the west. At one time the city of Hormuz was 
the most celebrated entrep6t and sea port in the world: there were more merchants 
and more trade there than in all the markets of the East. It was a particularly large 
port for the many horses taken from Arabia and Persia to all parts of India (see the 
Atlas, Map no. 50).52 
2.9 Trade in the Persian Gulf 
2.9.1 General trade 
Within the Gulf there had long been an internal trade in dates and dried fish, also 
exported to some extent but mainly from Muscat, outside the Persian Gulf. These 
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commodities, however, were essentially for consumption by the inhabitants of the 
Gulf itself and were traded by them. Trade to and from India, and through India to 
Europe, is detailed in Chapter 6 as far as Bushire is concerned, although the importa-
tions to the Gulf mentioned in that chapter hold good for the Gulf as a whole. The 
main exports from the Gulf in general during the period of this study were recorded 
as: 
alum, arrack, articles of clothing, arsemc, asafoetida, bezoar, bdeUium, bitter 
apples, brimstone, brass-leaf, canvas, carpets, cassia, cloves, chinaware, coir rope, 
cardamom, copper (and old copper), copper nails, copperware, camphire, cotton, 
cotton thread and yarn, dates, red earth, ghee, ginger, grain, garlic, galbanum gum, 
galls, gogul, jqjube, gum ammoniac, gum arabic, gold work, horses, hyacinth, iron, 
kishmish, leather, mats, labdanum, myrrh, medicines, mother-of-pearl shells, 
naphtha, lapis lazuli, lapis tutle or tutty, onions, otto (attar) of roses, rose-water, raw 
silk, olibanum, scammony, saffron, shark-fins and fish maws, shell beads and coral, 
soap, sweetmeats, tortoise shell, vermeU, wine, and wormseed. S3 
2.9.2 Pearl frshing 
Notwithstanding the long listing of general trade, by far the most important element 
of trade was pearl fishing. A description of the Gulf pearl fisheries is appropriate at 
this point. It is well enough known that the main pearl fishery stretched from Cape 
Musandam to the island of Bahrain and Qatif, ·and included also several islands on the 
Persian side of the Gulf, among them Shuaib and Khark. 
The pearl oysters were of three kinds. The first were called ma~IJ.iir by the Arabs. 
These were small, hollow and had thin shells. Few of them did not contain one or 
more pearls but most were seed pearls or a little larger. This kind was found on the 
Bahrain banks and they were the most sought after by the Arabs because they were 
almost sure to cover their expenses when diving for this variety. 
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The second kind of pearl oyster was known as ~adaf. It was large, flat and had a 
thick shell providing beautiful mother-of-pearl; some of them had a diameter of seven 
to eight inches. From a hundred of this variety hardly five or six would contain any-
thing: but its pearls were the largest and the most perfect. 
The best kind of oyster was the zennl. Divers brought it up from water as deep as 15 
to 18 fathoms (1 fathom = 6ft) where it was attached, like fruit, to small tree- or 
bush-like growths resembling coral. When this oyster was freshly fished from the sea 
it had a beautiful carmine colour, but after dying and drying the colour was lost. Its 
contents were similar to those of the ~ada! and both of these latter two types were 
found near Khark and Kharku islands in some quantity, the former to a lesser extent. 
The pearl divers throughout the Gulf were the Arabs who lived on the coasts and who 
could dive from three to eight fathoms. Only very few among them dared go down to 
a depth of 12 to 18 fathoms and, when they did, it was an act of daring to be done 
only once and against a good reward. The fishery took place between mid-May and 
the end of September. With the Dutch in Khark (see Chapter 4), a diver received his 
food and Rs 50 to 60 while the men who rowed the boats, and pulled the divers up 
when the sign was given, received Rupees (Rs) 25 to 30 each. 
The common, and more usual, form of agreement in use eisewhere in the Guif ran as 
follows: the owner of the boat would take on six to eight divers and a number of 
sailors, and equip himself with ropes and provisions for the whole season before set-
ting off for the fishery. The oysters which were fished during the day were opened in 
the evening in the presence of all the men (unlike the Dutch practice), and everything 
found in them was kept in a piece of linen and tied up until the end of the season. 
Then the entire catch was sold in the presence of all the participants on board at the 
pearl banks, or at Bahrain, Qatif and certain other towns on the Arabian coast. S4 
From the proceeds 10% was levied by the Government. At the time of Nadir Shah, 
Ruler of Persia from 1736 to 17 4 7, the annual revenue from Bahrain and its pearl 
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banks was Rs 240,000, making the value of the Bahrain pearl fishery some Rs 
2,400,000.ss Thereafter, the cost of the equipment was first deducted and the 
remainder was divided into five shares, of which the boat's owner took one, and the 
rest was split between the divers and the sailors - the divers taking double the sailors' 
portion. 
By the beginning of the 19th century the value of the pearl fishery for one season 
throughout the Persian Gulf was calculated at Rs 4 million. Table 2.1 shows the 
estimated numbers of boats and men employed during a pearling season at that time. 
Table 2.1: Employment of men and boats in pearling, 
early 19th century56 
Home Ports Number of boats Number of men* 
Bahrain and 
dependencies 2,430 21,870 
Shaijah, Ras al-Khaimah 
and dependencies 350 3,150 
Abu Dhabi and other 
towns of the coast 350 3,150 
Persian coast 100 900 
Totals 3,230 29,070 
*The average number of men per boat was estimated at 9. 
2.10 The arrival of the Europeans in the Gulf 
From the time of Alexander the Great's appearance in the Gulf area (327 BC) until 
the arrival of Vasco da Gama (1498 AD), Europeans had no direct trade with the 
East. Commerce was carried on through Egypt, via the Red Sea, or across the Per-
sian Gulf and Syria to the Italian city-states on the Mediterranean. s1 
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2.10.1 The Portuguese 
In 1497, the King of Portugal, Dom Manuel I, sent Vasco da Gama with men and 
ships to sail from Portugal to India via the Cape of Good Hope, finally reaching India 
in August 1498 and returning to end his expedition at Lisbon in September 1499.58 
The early Portuguese ship-masters were not traders but their function was to open up 
a direct commerce with Asia. In 1505 the King of Portugal deeided to overthrow the 
monopoly held by the Arabian merchants by occupying the ports which controlled the 
trade routes of that time; Honnuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf and Aden at the 
entrance to the Red Sea, as well as capturing Malacca, an important trading centre. 59 
An expedition of 16 ships was sent from Lisbon in 1506 under the leadership of 
Afonso de Albuquerque and Tristio da Cunha. Albuquerque occupied Honnuz in 
1507 and Malacca in 1510, but his last objective, the capture of Aden, was frustrated 
after a failed attempt in 1512.60 From Hormuz the Portuguese controlled most of the 
Gulf: they carried on their trade through Bahrain and Qatif within the Gulf and 
through Muscat outside it - all of them under their domination. At Hormuz there was 
a very considerable trade in drugs, silk, silk cloth, Persian carpets and all kinds of 
spices. Pearls came in great numbers from Bahrain, and horses from both Persia and 
Arabia for use in India. The weight of the Indo-Honnuz trade was estimated at 
10,000 tons annually. The Portuguese allowed merchants from other nations to trade 
at Hcrmuz, since th.e trade was directed at Turkey and Europe, as it had been 
previously, when passing through the hands of the Venetians. 6I The Venetians had 
been given a free hand in trading with the Byzantine empire, in return for their 
assistance to Byzantium in its wars with various enemies. At the same time, the 
Venetians had been on good terms with the Arabs and had been granted the freedom 
to trade by the French as a result of paying high taxes to Charlemagne. 62 Throughout 
their tenure in Hormuz the Portuguese faced revolts from the subjugated natives and 
hostilities between themselves and the Turks or Persians, a pattern which would 
become familiar to other European traders in the Gulf. 63 
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2.10.2 The English 
In 1599 Sir Anthony Sherley, an English adventurer, came to Persia via Baghdad and 
secured a faramiin from Shah 'Abbas I facilitating trade between Persia and other 
nations. Following his departure on a mission for the Shah, Sir Anthony's brother, 
Robert, remained at the Shah's Court and either established or re-affirmed friendly 
relations between Persia and European countries during a period of nearly 14 years of 
travels. Between 1600 and 1612 twelve English trading voyages reached India. The 
first English ship to arrive at Surat came in 1608 under the command of William 
Hawkins, who brought a letter of recommendation from King James I to the Great 
Mogul. He was followed by the embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India in 1615-18. 
During a mission to Persia in 1615-16, Richard Steel, with the help of Robert Sher-
ley, obtained a faramlln from Shah 'Abbas addressed to the governors of seaports in 
Persia, instructing them to receive and assist English vessels. Arrangements were 
made for trading at the port of Jask (see the Atlas, Map no. 22): King James sent a 
letter to Shah 'Abbas thanking him for the favour shown to the English merchants and 
for granting them a factory at Jask (see Appendix 1). The first shipment to Jask 
arrived in the James in November 1616, carrying a large cargo of goods and the 
English staff of the Company factory. A year later, the Company established a fac-
tory at Isfahan. 64 
2.10.3 Tile Dutcli 
The Dutch United East India Company was brought into being in 1602 by Dutch 
statesmen amalgamating those small trading companies which had penetrated as far as 
the Far East by 1595, when the work of amalgamation began. At first the Dutch 
were pre-occupied in building up their strongholds in Java and the Spice Islands 
(Molucca), and the frrst Dutch ships in the Persian Gulf arrived only after the English 
and Persians had occupied Hormuz (see pages 38-9).65 
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2.11 The decline of Hormuz 
2.11.1 The conflict between the Pottuguese and English 
The English traded successfully through the port of Jask and thus seriously affected 
the Portuguese trade at Hormuz. When five English merchant ships arrived at Jask 
in 1620 the Portuguese decided to stop this trade, with the result that when the Hart 
and the Eagle, two of the English Company's ships, arrived at Jask in November 
1620 they found it blockaded by the Portuguese fleet. The English ships returned to 
Sural to seek reinforcements, and sailed again for Jask in the company of the London 
and the Roebuck. They met the Portuguese fleet in front of the port of Jask and 
fought an action which ended favourably for the English, albeit with the loss of their 
Commander, Captain Shilling. 66 
2.11.2 The occupation of Hormuz. by the English and the Persians 
Shah 'Abbas, unable finally to tolerate the attacks and provocations of the Portuguese, 
asked the English to assist him in expelling the Portuguese from Hormuz. Alexander 
Hamilton records that Sir Thomas Roe, the Ambassador of King James I at the Per-
sian Court, asked for certain arrangements to be agreed between the two parties: 
a) The Shah would pay the costs of the ships which would be sent to assist him. 
b) Free trade would be established for the English throughout all Persian 
dominions. 
c) The English would be exempted from customs duties and would be granted half 
of all customs collected on merchandise in the Gulf. 
The two parties agreed the terms described, Hamilton writes, under the seal and sig-
nature of the King of Persia. 67 But, in reality, Sir Thomas never was the Ambassador 
in Persia, and he had, in any case, left the area in 1618. What really happened was 
that the Company's senior representative in Persia, Edward Monnox, negotiated 
locally with the Governor of Shiraz and agreed less favourable terms: the Persians 
would pay for half the cost of the ships; the customs duties of Hormuz (only) would 
be shared between the parties; and English trade at Hormuz (only) would be forever 
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duty-free. 68 The Persians later agreed to apply the customs privileges at Gombroon 
(Bandar Abbas) in lieu of Hormuz.69 
An expedition comprising five English ships and 40-50,000 Persian soldiers was then 
sent against Hormuz in February 1622. The English destroyed the Portuguese ships, 
after which Hormuz was occupied. The Portuguese officers were sent prisoner to 
Surat and the English received half of the plunder. In April 1625 Hormuz was again 
besieged by the Portuguese fleet, but the combined Dutch and English fleet repulsed 
the Portuguese in a battle which cost the English 29 men, and the Dutch as many 
again, including their Commander. But the Portuguese lost 800 men and were com-
pletely defeated. From that time, European commercial rivalry in the Gulf was 
primarily between the Dutch and the English. 
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3.0 Introduction 
CHAPTER3 
BANDAR ABBAS 
(1623 - 1763) 
After the destruction of Hormuz, the representatives of the East India Company were 
given permission to settle at Bandar Abbas in 1623.1 Bandar Abbas was not a com-
plete replacement for Hormuz, however: Hormuz, as can be seen in the reports of the 
Venetian Consuls in Syria, was an important link in the trade between the Ottoman 
empire, Persia, the Mediterranean countries and Asia. The turnover of Venetian 
spice and silk trade with Aleppo by caravan route from Persia and the Gulf was 1 mil-
lion gold ducats in 1593 and 2 million in 1594 (6-8 million Dutch Guilders).2 
Immediately after the expulsion of the Portuguese from Hormuz, Bandar Abbas was 
not much more than an anchorage where merchant ships and caravans met. The 
caravans carrying silk were sent from the European representatives in Isfahan, where 
deals were negotiated between the European merchants offering merchandise, and the 
Shah's agents. The early English and Dutch trade in the Gulf in the 1620s and 1630s 
was for the most part contract trade with agents of the Shah in Isfahan for the buying 
of silk.. 3 
The only importance of Bandar Abbas was that it was the residence of the deputy of 
the provincial Governor (or Khan) in Shiraz: he was the military and general author-
ity, as well as the Shiihbandar of the port. Practically all trading operations were 
conducted with the agents of the Shah in Isfahan, or even directly at the Shah's court 
(which often resided at Kazvin). It should be noted that contract trade with the Per-
sian government was not subject to customs duties. At first, trade in Bandar Abbas is 
rarely mentioned. It seems that Bandar Abbas started as an Arab mart because, 
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already in 1623, a Dutch report mentions that the Dutch had plans to keep mer-
chandise which was not good enough for Isfahan in Bandar Abbas, to be sold to the 
Arab traders there. 4 
The English had opened Persia up for the European trading companies by virtue of 
the help they had given to the Persians at Hormuz. After the arrival of the Dutch in 
1623, however, they immediately supplanted the English as the most important 
power. In that year they bought 600,000 Guilders worth of silks, whereas English 
silk exports had fallen to 120,000 Guilders in 1625. The Dutch East India Company 
could offer a larger quantity of spices and had more cash available: this made it more 
attractive for the Persians to make contracts with the Dutch, who had the buying 
power which the much smaller English East India Company lacked. As the English 
Company had little capital, most English trade took the form of small private ventures 
by ships' captains and the Company's own servants, exporting tin and woollen cloth 
from England, while the Dutch did not trade much in European products. 6 
The frrst suggestions were made in European circles in 1628, and again in 1633, that 
the contract trade in Isfahan, whereby large lots of merchandise were sold to the 
Shah's agents in return for silk in the winter, should be replaced by selling to Ban ian 
merchants in Bandar Abbas in the autumn. In this way the huge caravan costs could 
be avoided. 7 
Relations between the representatives of both Companies became tense: the English 
maintained that the Dutch had to pay customs duties to them while the Dutch refused 
utterly. s A serious problem was that the Persian market was itself relatively small, 
and most spices sold by the Europeans had to go through Persia to the Ottoman Mid-
dle East. The wars between Persia and the Turks closed that route and therefore 
diminished the demand for spices in Bandar Abbas. 9 
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Within the Persian economy the European traders had become very important. Per-
sia's most important export commodity was raw silk and by far the biggest proportion 
of that was exported by the Dutch and English. In 1637, the total production of good 
silk was 2,500 packs: of these 1,000 were for internal use, 1,000 went to the Dutch, 
373 to the English and 100 through the Isfahan Armenians to Aleppo.1o This means 
that the main export item and source of hard cash for Persia was valued at no more 
than about 3 million Guilders (the price of one pack was 50 Toi1Ulns or 2,000 
Guilders). 
Round about 1640 it appears that contracts made with the Shah became less important 
for the Dutch, as problems in the silk-producing region (close to the embattled bor-
ders with the Ottoman empire) made it difficult for the Shah's agents to deliver 
enough silk to match the money and merchandise offered. It seems that, for the Per-
sians, the Dutch were the wealthier and therefore more important trading partners: 
already in the 1630s there were lengthy interruptions in the English contracts. The 
Europeans tried increasingly to sell their products on the open market and to buy silk 
in the same way. The Persian authorities reacted by increasing the contract price for 
silk and, at the same time, penalised open market trading with extremely heavy 
taxes. 11 The Europeans retaliated by opening up a trading link with Basrah from 1638 
and began exporting cotton cloth there. 12 New Asian products replaced cash in the 
cargoes sent by the Europeans, and cotton cloth also appeared on the Bandar Abbas 
market. In the same year the Dutch started to bring in large quantities of sugar from 
their newly-acquired colony of Taiwan.13 
The Persian trade was now completely changing its character. The Europeans were 
exporting Asian products to Persia and receiving in return cash and silk. But a 
change was under way from the early 1640s: in 1644 the value of silk exported from 
Persia was less than the value of the cash exported clandestinely .14 Trade in Bandar 
Abbas became as important as trade in Isfahan. The English trade almost dis-
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appeared, but their establishment in Bandar Abbas survived on the share of customs 
revenue accorded the English in 1622.15 
Two other minor introductory notes remain to be made: 
i) The carrying trade 
This activity began to appear in the late 1630s as a way of earning money by Euro-
peans for buying silk. Both the Dutch and the English offered relatively safe passage 
for goods belonging to Banian or Muslim merchants in Surat or their agents in Bandar 
Abbas. The advantage in this system was that the Europeans could transport goods 
which would spoil in Bandar Abbas, in return for the products they brought in on 
their own account. The non-European port activity of Bandar Abbas also seems to 
have started in the 1630s, with seven ships from various Indian ports arriving in 
1638. 16 
ii) The continuing activities of the Portuguese 
Soon after their loss of Hormuz, Portuguese smugglers of pepper from southern India 
were causing problems for the spice trade in Bandar Abbas in 1624. In 1630 the 
Portuguese made a treaty with Persia allowing them to establish themselves in Bandar 
Kung, but the Shah did not ratify the treaty and the Portuguese continued to look else-
where.l7 Later in 1630 they established a post at Jul:fir (Ras al-Khaimah) on the 
Arabian coast.18 
The English factory at Bandar Abbas (Gombroon) existed over a long period of nearly 
140 years, for most of it (1624-17 47) in a reasonable state. The rest of the period, 
which primarily concerns us in this study, is the last 16 years, 1747-1763, which saw 
the struggle for power sparked by the assassination of Nadir Shah and ends with the 
establishment of Karim Khan. During these years Persia was plunged into a deeper 
state of confusion and distress than it had ever experienced before. 19 In his Gazetteer, 
Lorimer describes southern Persia at this time as 'a pandemonium of indecisive war-
fare among petty chiefs who had little real power'. 2o 
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3.1 Geographical background 
The fishing town of Gombroon, later to be called Bandar Abbas, lay on the Persian 
coast at latitude 27° 1 0' 29", longitude 56° 15'. It was situated on level ground on a 
bay about 12 miles to the north of the eastern end of the island of Qishm, and 9 miles 
from Hormuz. It was the port for Ur and Kirman21 -(see Figure 3.1). The 
Portuguese traveller, Gaspar de Sao Bernadino, visited the town in 1606 and 
described it as a small village called Gombroon. Christians, Hindus and Muslims 
lived there; about 200 inhabitants in all, in houses made of mud bricks - as was the 
Portuguese fort, situated on the sea and the only Portuguese fort in all mainland Per-
sia. He reported that in 1602 it was besieged by 5,000 Persians, and defended against 
them for two months by just 30 Portuguese soldiers. Three quarters of the Persians 
died in the field, mostly from sickness, before the siege was lifted.22 The town was 
named Bandar Abbas after Shah 'Abbas I who built its reputation and it was, in his 
time, a reasonably well-built town with a long line of mud houses, backed by barren 
hills. The Italian traveller, Pietro della Valle, visited in 1622 and described the 
streets and bazaar as narrow and small, and the shops badly supplied. There was no 
drinkable water within three miles of the town, apart from a few cisterns, and nothing 
to support life except fish and mutton.23 The climate of Bandar Abbas was so hot that 
foreigners could not live there except in the months from December to March: after 
that the natives of the area would retire to the cooler mountains, about two or three 
days journey away, where they would spend the summer.24 
In his account of the Persian ports in 1615, Robert Sherley - the head of an English 
mission to Persia - called Bandar Abbas the 'best and strongest among the Persian 
King's dominions' ,2s and Thomas Herbert, who visited in 1627, echoed him in 
reporting that Gombroon was more valuable than all the rest of the King of Persia's 
possessions.26 Captain Child, of the English ship James which visited Bandar Abbas 
in December 1616, said that the port was secure beneath a castle to guard against 
threats from Portuguese frigates but that the Portuguese had blocked access to the 
49 
port. 27 Another early visitor was Comeille Le Brun (Cornel is de Bruyn) in September 
1705, who described the town as having very poor buildings and the four forts as fall-
ing into ruin. The only good houses belonged to the Dutch and English Companies.2s 
Bandar Abbas was a safe harbour, guarded by the mainland of Persia to the north, the 
island of Hormuz to the south and the island of Larak to the south-west. It was the 
most secure landing-place along the whole coast. Its anchorage was between two and 
three miles from the land and was too difficult for ships drawing more than about 13 
feet. 29 Trade was established at Bandar Abbas rather than at Bandar Kung (where the 
air was good and the water excellent) because of several islands between Hormuz and 
Kung, which made the passage for ships hazardous30 (see the Atlas, Map nos. 46-47, 
51 and Figure 3.1). Altogether, its geographical site and location made Bandar Abbas 
extremely attractive to traders, and European merchants were quick to see the 
opportunities there. 
3.2 The establishment of European Factories at Bandar Abbas 
3.2.1 The establishment of the English Factory at Bandar Abbas 
At the beginning of 1623 The East India Company directed the attention of its officers 
to supporting commercial endeavours to establish the Persian trade in Hormuz (newly 
captured from the Portuguese), a.."'ld to obtain permission from t!1e King of Persia, 
Shah 'Abbas I, to have full rights to the silk trade. In O~tober 1623, Shah 'Abbas 
received a letter from King James by the hand of two of the Company's commercial 
agents, and the Khan of Shiraz went to Isfahan to assist the Company's representa-
tives in their petition for additional privileges from the King. The Company's Agents 
obtained an order to allow the English to trade freely, exempt from all duties in per-
petuity, and to enjoy free passage through Uristan. At the meeting with the Shah, 
the Company's representatives countered the Persian refusal to allow a settlement at 
Hormuz by asking for permission to establish the Company's factory at the port of 
Gombroon/Bandar Abbas. The Shah agreed, and two houses in Gombroon were 
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given to the Company to be used as a factory.31 Lorimer records that the Persians 
agreed to the English having half of the customs revenues of Bandar Abbas in lieu of 
those of Hormuz. The Persian trade was declining in 1624 and no business was done 
by the English until the beginning of 1625, when Thomas Kerridge (the Surat Factor) 
arrived at Bandar Abbas to act as an agent for the East India Company in 're-settling 
or dissolving' its Persian trade. On his advice, trade was continued in Bandar 
Abbas. 32 
3.2.2 The establishment of the Dutch Factory at Bandar Abbas 
The first Dutch ships, Weesp and Heusden arrived in Bandar Abbas in June 1623. On 
23 October of the same year the Dutch Agent, Hubert Visnich, reached an agreement 
with the Shah which granted the Dutch free trade in Persia and exemption from 
customs duties in perpetuity. Visnich was able to make a contract with the Persian 
government to buy silk at 45 Tomans (697.5 Maria Theresa Dollars) per corge, while 
the English had to buy silk privately at 55 Tomans per corge. But the Dutch soon 
began to suffer from the unreliability of Persian promises and finally took the silk at 
55 Tomans. 33 
3.2.3 The establishment of the French Factory at Bandar Abbas 
An East India Company was formed in France in 1664 and in the following year a 
They \Vere 
Lalain, Mariage and Beber; of these it should be noted that Beber was a Dutchman. 
Their purpose was to ask for free trade on the same basis that the Dutch enjoyed, but 
they were able to obtain no more than a faramiin from the Shah allowing them free 
trade for a term of three years: after that, they would have to pay the same customs 
duties as other merchants in Persia. They tried hard to gain perpetual freedom from 
customs duties but failed: they perforce continued on the same footing and, in co-
operation with the English, did everything possible against the interests of the Dutch 
East India Company. They helped the Indian and other merchants to smuggle mer-
chandise out under the French aegis (which meant that for three years it was tax-free) 
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to Surat; when the Dutch protested the French denied everything. This was a period 
of history, until 1686, when England and France were allies: Kings Charles IT and 
James II of England were friends of the French King Louis XIV. 
In 1677 the Shah told the French frankly that because their trade was of insufficient 
importance, and could not be compared with the Dutch or English, they would in 
future be treated as private traders, enjoying no privileges. 34 By that time, the French 
were in possession of a factory at Bandar Abbas. 35 By 1682 the Persians were claim-
ing 13 years arrears of customs duties from the French because they had traded for 16 
years without paying duty, and their privileges had been valid for three years only. 
The French resisted energetically and gave many presents, but to no avail; the 'little 
Persian', as they called the Shah, wanted to be paid and he put both their Agents and 
merchandise under arrest. As well as this, the Persians had made them pay heavily 
from time to time for their smuggling activities, and this caused them so many prob-
lems that they finally lost heart. In 1689 they brought a small ship from Surat and, 
from the sale of its cargo, paid the customs debt on which they had made an agree-
ment with the Shahbandar for 5%; they then closed their establishment and were not 
seen again until 1696, when they once more brought a merchant ship from Surat and, 
on the orders of the Persian Court, were treated as ordinary private merchants - which 
much displeased them. 36 
In 1698 the English made the accusation that any French ships attempting to approach 
the Gulf were 'privateers' ,37 while John Bruce, historian of the East India Company, 
went further, saying ' . . . the event of the capture, of the English and Dutch Turkey 
fleet [i.e. trading to Turkey], by the French, in 1693, became a new incentive to the 
encouragement of the Persian trade, and to the reliance of the Court on this market 
being rendered profitable. ' 38 In the same year as the English accusation (1698) the 
French Court sent Jean Billon de Cancerille, a Marseilles merchant, to Persia as sec-
retary to a religious mission, but working to a commercial brief. 39 He stayed there 
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until returning to France in 1705 to present his interim report on trading affairs in 
Persia, and visited Persia for a second time in 1707 to complete his report. 40 
From 1720 the French were out of favour with the Persians and their trade in Bandar 
Abbas was of little consequence. When a French brigantine arrived at Bandar Abbas 
on 3 July 1727, it could not sell its cargo and had to sail for Basrah, with the intention 
of touching first at Basidu to see if it could dispose of its cargo there. 41 Not sur-
prisingly, the French factory at Bandar Abbas was eventually closed down. Lorimer 
gives no date for this, leaving it unclear by saying only that it was early in the period 
he was at that time writing about:42 al-Qasimi records that the French factory first 
closed in the 1720s. 43 In December 1735 a French ship arrived at Bandar Abbas and 
sold part of her cargo after paying customs duty of 4%% . The French received an 
invitation from Nadir Shah to resettle at Bandar Abbas, and another of their ships, the 
Herene, Captain Beaumont, arrived from Bengal in 1736 to complain of the treatment 
to which a French subject, Boisroll, had been subjected in the previous year and to 
enquire about his situation. The Governor of Fars, who was in the town at that time, 
made many promises to refund what was due to Boisroll out of the customs duty pay-
able by Beaumont, but the cargo which was sold was very small and there was little 
advantage to the French out of it.44 Nevertheless, there was again a French Agent in 
Bandar Abbas in 1740, named Beauchamp.4S 
3.3 Bandar Abbas at peace 
After the opening of factories at Bandar Abbas by the English and Dutch East India 
Companies in 1623, Bandar Abbas became the centre of English enterprise in the Gulf 
until 1743. English and Dutch fortunes can be considered in six periods of time, 
divided by decisive events. 
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3.3.1 Period I, (1623-1630) 
In this period the English started to establish themselves firmly at Bandar Abbas by 
obtaining successive faramiins from the King of Persia and the Khan of Shiraz, 
chiefly after 1627. For example: 
1. The Shah's undatedfaramiin to the Shah's Wakil at Bandar Abbas fixing 
the rates at which he was to receive goods in exchange for silk. 
u. June 1627- The Shah'sfaramiin confirming all former grants. 
iii. June 1627- The Shah'sfaramiin to the Wak:il ordering the implementation 
of the commercial contract with Mr Burte, the English Resident at Bandar 
Abbas. 
tv. June 1627- The Shah'sfaramiin to the Khan of Shiraz directing that the 
English should have their full share of customs duties. 
v. June 1627- The Shah'sfaramiin to the Khan of Shiraz that he should pro-
tect the East India Company's goods and debts. 
vi. Juiy 1627 - Tne Khan'sfaramiin to the customs officers at Bandar Abbas 
ordering that all customs dues should be received in the presence of the 
English, that the latter should have their full share of them, and that no bribes 
should be given without permission. 
vii. July 1627- The Khan'sfaramiin permitting Mr Burte to build a house. 
viii. July 1627 - The Khan's faramiin to his officers for the security of the 
Company's employees and effects; an escort to be given to them if necessary. 
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1x. July 1627 - The Khan's fara1nan to all Governors that they assist the 
Company in recovering goods, debts etc. 
x. January 1628- The Shah'sfaraman confmning all former trade privileges 
to the English and Dutch. 
xi. August 1629 - The Shah's faramlin to his Wakll at Bandar Abbas that the 
Persians deliver silk in exchange for three-quarters of the money due, as per 
contract. 
xii. October 1629 - The Khan's faraman to the Sultan of Bandar Abbas for a 
just division of customs duties with the English. 
xiii. June 1630 - The Shah's faraman to establish the East India Company's 
factory house at Bandar Abbas. 46 
After only one year, in 1624 English trade with Persia had been at a low ebb (see 
page 51), and it was reported later that the trade had been wrongly planned - since 
broadcloth could be better sold at Surat than Bandar Abbas. In 1628, the Company 
sent a fleet of five ships to the Gulf to confront the Portuguese and enhance trade with 
Persia, but the trade was constrained by two-ihirds of the goods being presents for the 
Shah, with customs thus being evaded. 47 
The Dutch, on the other hand, became immediately involved in the Persian trade, 
meeting with rather more success than the English. For example: 
1. In 1623 the Dutch exported goods to Bandar Abbas to a value of 210,000 
Guilders, on which they made a profit of 170,000. 
u. In 1624 they exported to a value of 169,000 Guilders and returned a profit 
of234,000. 
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iii. The Dutch brought goods valued at 103,000 Guilders to Bandar Abbas in 
1625, made a profit of 235,000 Guilders on the merchandise, and bought silk 
at a local price of 515,000 Guilders. 
1v. In 1626 the Dutch office in Bandar Abbas, hitherto subordinate to the 
Director in Surat, was made directly subordinate to Batavia. 48 
v. In 1626 there was a conflict with the Governor of Bandar Abbas, whom 
the English had incited to claim 11 % customs duties from the Dutch. When 
the Dutch refused he confiscated two boxes of cash from the Dutch caravan 
and took from them the amount of 800 Riyals which he was claiming. The 
Dutch managed to obtain satisfaction from the Shah, who later also decreased 
the price of silk to them by 2 Tomans.49 
vi. In January 1628 the Dutch obtained thefaramlin given also to the English, 
confirming all former trade privileges. 
The main products being exported from Bandar Abbas at this time were silk, tur-
quoise, carpets, gold cloth, alum, gal/nuts, copper, dyeing roots, wine, rosewater, 
aimonds and horses. so TI1e chief imports were cloL'l, kerseys a."ld tin. 51 
3.3.2 Period 11, (1630-1657) 
During this period the English East India Company's affairs suffered a good deal 
from Dutch intrigues and their competitive trading. In order to protect their trade 
from the Dutch, the English established a factory at Basrah (see pages 57-8), but from 
1643 to 1657 the Dutch became the dominant power in the Gulf and the English were 
obliged to carry on a desperate power struggle with them. 52 The rivalry took many 
turns: 
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1. In 1630 the English Company's representatives in Surat consulted the 
Bandar Abbas factory about improving the Company's trade in competition 
with the Dutch, and decided to make Persia, rather than Surat, the last port of 
call for ships departing for England. 53 
u. In 1631 a new treaty was concluded in The Hague between Persia and 
Holland which gave Persia free trade in Holland and freedom of religion, and 
remarkably gave the Dutch the same in Persia. The English had no such free-
dom. 
iii. It was found in 1636 that it was almost impossible to get the Persians to 
pay for merchandise they bought from Dutch traders in Isfahan so the Dutch 
changed their trading methods. Up to then the goods were brought by caravan 
to Isfahan and sold there; now the goods had to be sold in Bandar Abbas, 
where they were in direct rivalry with the English. 
1v. From 1637 the Persians began asking for large sums in customs duties 
from the Dutch (160,000 Guilders in 1637), contrary to their treaty. 
v. The Persian Prime Minister alleged in 1638 that the Shah had suffered a 
reduction in customs income because the Dutch had bought 593.5 corges of 
silk from private traders; he claimed 140,000 Guilders from them, while forc-
ing them to accept a large quantity of silk at 50 Tomans per corge. 54 The 
English were spared this pressure. 
vi. With a view to protecting its trade from the Dutch, the English East India 
Company sent two of its staff to Basrah in 1640, where some counter-
influence could be exerted (Lorimer's belief that a preliminary visit was made 
in 1635 was mistaken)55• They obtained a licence from the Pasha to land 
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goods but the establishment of a factory was difficult because of the civil war 
in Iraq.s6 
vii. In 1644, the Batavia High Government sent Carel Constant as Director to 
Persia in order to restore the balance. Instead, he was beaten ignominiously 
with sticks at Court and forced to pay 31,500 Guilders which the Persians 
claimed, on the grounds that the Dutch had allegedly carried goods belonging 
to private merchants in their caravan, which was covered by tax-exemption. 
Batavia sent a small squadron of warships to Persia and attacked Qishm, but 
the attack was stopped on receipt of a conciliatory letter from the Shah. In the 
following years Dutch envoys were unable to reach a final agreement with the 
Persians, although they made no further trouble for Dutch trade. S7 
viii. In 1645, the Shah gave a licence to the Dutch to buy silk anywhere in Per-
sia and export it free of customs. In the same year, the Dutch sent a fleet of 
eight laden merchant ships to Bandar Abbas and thereby almost ruined the 
English business there. At about the same time the English removed the Com-
pany's property from Bandar Abbas to Basrah to avoid any attack from the 
Dutch. Dutch trade was now increasing and English trade decreasing. ss 
1x. The two Companies obtainedfa;an-u2ns from t..'te Sha..lt in 1646, the Dutch 
by force but the English by perseverance. The farami1ns from the Shah pro-
vided for a) rebuilding the factories at Bandar Abbas which had been destroyed 
by earthquakes {the event is not recorded); b) releasing the Companies from 
payment of 4% on goods sold at Isfahan; c) regulating the payment of customs 
at Bandar Abbas. Trade at Bandar Abbas had revived, but only for that year 
because Dutch ships had unloaded their cargoes without payment of customs 
by arrangement with the harbour-master: trade for the English thereupon 
became precarious again in view of the cheaper Dutch goods. S9 
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x. Dutch trade became more precarious in 1647 than at any former time as 
the supply of pepper and spice imports from Surat, so necessary to fund the 
purchase of Persian produce, had become the monopoly of the English. The 
Dutch were anxious to secure exemption from customs duties and found that 
the Persians were ready to make concessions. A new treaty was concluded in 
1647 and ratified in 1652. From that time on, a convention existed that the 
Dutch could trade with Persia without paying customs, subject to the obliga-
tion of making a substantial annual purchase of silk from the Persian 
government. In 1655, 108 corges of two bales each were accordingly bought; 
in 1656, 831h; 1657, 1001h; 1658, 15; 1659, 115; and in 1660, 191.60 
xi. In 1649, the Dutch obtained additional faramD.ns. As for the English, 
their customs revenue at Bandar Abbas remained deficient, thanks to the Dutch 
exemption from paying the duties. The Agent attributed the decline also to the 
rumours of civil war in England and the execution of King Charles, which had 
disgusted the Persians. The Persian government tried to abrogate relations 
based upon treaties made with the King of England. 61 
Dutch reports on the English trade in the year 1649, however, appeared rather more 
favourable: 
a) 15 Mav 1649: There had been considerable Ene:lish trade: over 1.200 bales of 
J - • • 
cotton cloth, a large quantity of spices and indigo - which they sold at an acceptable 
profit and which would help their 'ailing' Company.62 
b) 1 July 1649: There was a serious quarrel between the English and the Persians 
over the sharing out of customs duties at Bandar Abbas. The English received only 
700 Tomans from a revenue of 2,200 Tomans, but in the previous year they had 
received only 600 Tomans. The slight increase indicated that the English, although 
weakened, were still feared by the Persians. The English sold the remainder of their 
goods (300 bales of cotton and 15,000 pounds of pepper) in Isfahan. 63 
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c) 16 October 1649: The English ship Loyalty arrived, carrying goods valued at 
40,000 Spanish Reals. 64 
d) 16 October 1649: A small English ship Lenoreth arrived with a private cargo of 
500 bales of coffee from Mocha: the English derived little profit from the sale of their 
cotton cloth on this occasion. 65 
e) 28 October 1649: The English ship Eagle brought secret cargo, said to be worth 
500,000 Reals. The Dutch found this unbelievable and thought the English were 
trying to gain some credit with the story. 66 
f) 1 December 1649: The Lenoreth sailed for Surat with a cargo of coins for the 
English Company valued at 20,000 Guilders (guilders and pounds were merely units 
of accounting at that time; they were not used as currency), 66 bales of raw silk, 140 
bales of dye roots, 2 boxes of silk carpets and 2 boxes of rhubarb; all on private 
account. Its other cargo was coins valued at 130,000 Guilders, 8 bales of leather, 20 
bales of raw silk for local merchants, 192 packages of coins each of about 3,200 
Guilders in value, 30 bales of dye roots, 7 boxes of gold cloth, 4 bales of woollen 
carpets and 60 passengers. 67 
The Dutch factory received large trading stocks in 1650 while, for the English, 
customs revenues at Bandar Abbas remained inadequate for the same reasons as 
before.6s A Dutch report of 15 January 1650 claimed that English trade was now 
going badly and ihey were being forced to sell their merchandise in Isfahan at very 
low prices. The English said they were expecting six ships from Coromandel, Java 
and Surat, but that these would be small ships, unable to carry much trade for the 
Company but rather for the local merchants in Coromandel and Surat. 69 In 1651 the 
Dutch sent eleven ships to Bandar Abbas where their trade increased. English trade, 
on the other hand, remained in decline through a shortage of imports. The Agent 
recommended that the Dutch example of sending numerous ships should be fol-
lowed.70 
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In 1652, the Persians forced the Dutch envoy into a deal by which the Dutch would 
be able to import goods to the value of 20,000 Tomans duty-free, under certain condi-
tions. These were that a Persian claim to old customs duties and a Dutch demand for 
restitution of money extorted from them by the Persians would both be dropped, and 
the Company would be obliged to buy 300 corges of silk at 48 Tomans per corge. 
The Dutch were unhappy but the Persians were, in practice, occasionally flexible, 
allowing additional duty-free trade and offering less silk for enforced purchase. 
Thereafter, relations improved, with the Persians not checking the quantity of duty-
free goods imported by the Dutch. Later, the Dutch tried to buy off the obligation of 
purchasing silk because this commodity gave little profit in Holland. 71 
In 1653, during the war between England and Holland, the Dutch brought a fleet of 
15 ships and goods worth 40,750 Tomans to the Gulf and bought a large quantity of 
Persian products. A Dutch fleet also captured three English ships off Jask; these 
events damaged English prestige in Persia. In 1654, before news of the conclusion of 
peace between England and Holland had arrived, the Dutch fleet blocked off naviga-
tion in the Gulf and English trade nearly ceased, and by 1656 the Persian trade of the 
English East India Company was almost ruined. 72 
3.3.3 Period Ill, (1657-1698) 
During this period the Engiish sent armed ships to serve in the Gulf to protect their 
trade, and that of their Persian partners. They insisted that the charge made to the 
Persians for the ships should be paid separately from the half share of customs duties 
due to the English: otherwise the protection of Bandar Abbas would be withdrawn and 
any Persian refusal of the demand for payment would be considered equivalent to a 
declaration of war. Some other features of this period were: 
i. Trade in Bandar Abbas was at a standstill in 1657, thanks to the invasion 
of Mogul territory by the Persian King. 73 
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n. In 1660, the Court of Directors in England noted a decline in the Bandar 
Abbas trade and recommended a blockade of the port, or the Persian coast. 
The Surat Council replied that there was a shortage of ships: at least eight 
ships were required to carry the Bandar Abbas trade whereas only two were 
available. 
iii. The Court of Directors in England advised the Surat Council in 1663 to 
leave two or three 'honest and able servants' at Bandar Abbas to trade and col-
lect the half share of customs revenue: the rest of the establishment should be 
removed. The President at Surat, however, thought that such a measure 
would be both useless and expensive and the advice was ignored. 74 
1v. A conflict arose in 1669 between the Governor of Bandar Abbas and the 
Dutch. The Dutch broker, called Kimsi, had died and left many debts. The 
Shah agreed that the Dutch could take Kimsi' s house in compensation for the 
debts, but the Governor of Bandar Abbas wanted the house for himself and 
took it by force. 
v. Given their increasing problems with the Persians, in 1670 the Dutch 
made their first priority to get rid of the obligation to buy silk from the Shah. 
They were unable to reach agreement and in t.lte meantime there were several 
new incidents. 7S 
In 167 4 the English at Surat began discussing sending armed merchant ships to the 
Gulf to assist the Persian Government, and in 1675 two armed ships were duly sent.76 
John Fryer, a Fellow of the Royal Society who visited Bandar Abbas in 1676, said 
that the ships were sent to stimulate trade in Persia, not to guard the Gulf. 77 During a 
period of declining trade in 1678, the Governor of Bandar Abbas tried to force the 
Dutch to pay him 37,200 Guilders. The Dutch refused, their factory prepared for a 
siege and the cargoes were taken back to their ships. The Dutch protested in Isfahan 
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where a writ by the Shah was issued ordering the Governor of Bandar Abbas to leave 
the Dutch alone. Meanwhile, there was a persistent loss of 3-6% on the silk the 
Dutch were forced to buy (see page 57): they were having to buy 300 corges yearly at 
48 Tomans in a period of low silk prices in Holland. 78 
Sales and purchases for the English in Persia were depressed in 1680-81 while Table 
3.1 shows improving figures fo:r the Dutch during the same period. 
Year 
1680 
1681 
1682 
Table 3.1: Dutch Trade with Persia, 
1680-168279 
(in Guilders) 
Purchases Sales 
261,000 
306,000 
318,000 
294,000 
347,000 
637,000 
It must nevertheless be borne in mind that these figures were low in relation to other 
Dutch trading outposts. 
In 1683, t..'le English Court of Directors decided to send an armed force to the Gulf to 
recover arrears of the Bandar Abbas customs (estimated at 150,000 Tomans or 
£450,000), and to make the King of Persia observe the treaties between England and 
Persia. On its arrival off Bandar Abbas in 1684, the expedition found a powerful 
Dutch fleet blockading the port, and a strong Persian land-force defending it: being 
unable to carry out its instructions, the expedition returned to Bombay. 80 
Because of the decline in trade, the Dutch tried to secure a reduction of 50% in the 
amount of silk they had to buy, but without success. The Batavia High Government 
therefore decided to send Commissioner Casembroot with a squadron of four large 
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ships and a smaller vessel to force the Persians to agree to the Dutch demands. 
Casembroot blockaded Bandar Abbas, captured ten local ships and, when the Persians 
replied that they were not impressed by a few pieces of wood, he attacked the island 
of Qishm and captured the fortress. The Persians thereupon changed their tune and 
invited the Director of the Dutch factory at Bandar Abbas, van den Heuvel, for 
negotiations. The Dutch responded by evacuating Qishm and releasing the ships but, 
once in Isfahan, the Dutch negotiators were treated as hostages. 
Finally, the Persians demanded that the Governor General in Batavia should send a 
special Ambassador to Isfahan or the Dutch would be forced to trade without 
privileges like private merchants. Subject to these conditions, trade that had been 
stopped in 1686 restarted in 1687, and the Ambassador, Jan van Leene, arrived in 
1690. He obtained nothing but vague promises, and made the mistake of going home 
before he had firm confirmation. Batavia then had to send another Dutch official, 
Jacobus Hoogcamer, in 1692 to obtain the required confirmation. The Shah died at 
this point but his successor, Shah Sultan ijusain, made some concessions to the Dutch 
against a very considerable sum in presents: the price of silk was reduced to 45 
Tomans per corge. 8I In his Arabs of the Gulf, Slot records that Hoogcamer had been 
sent by the Directors in Holland to Asia specifically to investigate the pearl trade and 
to organise trade in the most advantageous way. 82 
In 1695, the Persians were unable, because of an epidemic in the area, to deliver the 
silk and proposed exchanging the obligation for a yearly payment. The Dutch 
agreed.83 
In 1697, the new Shah conferred privileges on the English on the basis of the 
faramiins granted by previous Shahs. Included with the 19 faramllns formerly con-
ferred by the Shah there were two additional ones: first, that they should not be com-
pelled to give presents to Khans or Governors, and that no customs duty was to be 
paid in future on sugar and asafoetida; second, that the arrears of customs duties due 
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to the English should immediately be assessed and paid by the Governor of Bandar 
Abbas. 84 
3.3.4 Period IV, (1698-1708) 
In this period there were differences between the English in India and the East India 
Company in London, but it was a period of comparative progress for English trade in 
Persia and declining trade for the Dutch (see Appendix 2). 
1. In 1700, the Persian trade was on the whole good for the English. 8S 
11. In 1701, the quantity and price of silk were reduced to 100 corges at 44 
Tomans: if the Persians did not offer then the Dutch did not ask, because silk 
gave little profit. 86 
3.3.5 Period V, (1708-1736) 
In this period the Afghans occupied Persia (1723) and trade suffered considerably. 
1. A new conflict arose in 1714. The Persians claimed 17,907 Tomans as 
compensation for the Dutch smuggling out hard cash and committing customs 
frauds. Batavia decided to send Ambassador Ketelaar, who gave presents to 
the value of 275,000 Guilders and obtained free trade (see Appendix 3), but 
the ban on exporting gold ducats remained until 1735 (see Appendices 4 and 
5). 
11. In 1722, the Persian government in its last days before the Afghan 
occupation had borrowed more than 800,000 Guilders from the Dutch. There 
were many problems caused by the Afghans, and Dutch trade declined: there 
was a long-standing loss of 16,000 Guilders on th~ short occupation of 
Hormuz many years before. The Persian state debt with the Dutch Company 
had now reached 1,850,000 Guilders. 87 
iii. In 1727, Shaikh Rashid al-Qasimi (one of the Qawasim of Kung who had 
migrated to Basidu about 1720) established a port at Basidu (a town on the 
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northern coast of Qishm island) in opposition to Bandar Abbas (see the Atlas, 
Map no. 60). The English Agent at Bandar Abbas sent an expedition in April 
1727 under the command of Draper, consisting of the frigate Britannia, the 
gaUey Bengal and two trankeys, claiming that the Shaikh had affected the 
customs receipts at Bandar Abbas. The Commander of the English expedition 
captured one of Shaikh Rashid's ships at Basidu, demanded from the Shaikh 
4,000 Tomans as the English share of customs duties, and ordered all mer-
chants there to return to other places. If they refused the English would burn 
Basidu down. A few merchants left Basidu and Shaikh Rashid himself sent 
most of his possessions to Julflir. He concluded an agreement with the English 
to pay 700 Tomans and, after that had been paid, the English promised not to 
harry him further. 
The very powerful Arab Shaikh, Ral).mah al-Qasimi of Julflir, was said to have 
advised Shaikh Rashid not to pay, preferring that Rashid should fight and promising 
him for that purpose 300 armed men from his people. The money that Shaikh Rashid 
had to pay comprised 700 Tomans to the English Company, 100 to Draper privately, 
30 to their interpreter, 20 to their MulUi and 30 to their sailors: he paid 200 Tomans 
in sulphur, 700 in Mahmudis, and 200 in red copper coins. sa 
The principal products sold in Persia during t.ltis period were: cotton cloth from 
Bengal, Coromandel and Surat; Mocha coffee; Malacca tin; Japanese camphor, cop-
per, brass, lacquer-ware and porcelain; Chinese porcelain; sugar from Batavia, Bengal 
and Taiwan; pepper from Vengurla (west coast of India) and Sumatra; cardamom, 
zappan wood, ginger, woollen cloth, sandalwood, amber, coral, benzoin, iron bars, 
steel, Vietnamese flowered cloth, arak from Ceylon, ivory, nutmeg, mace (the dried 
outer covering of nutmeg, used as spice) and cloves. All this merchandise was being 
sold in Persia by the Dutch at a total annual price of 7-800,000 Guilders, on which 
there was a profit of 60-70%.89 This may seem to be high, but the only costs taken 
into account here were the local costs in Persia; other more important costs such as 
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ships, wages of sailors and interest were never brought to account and profits were 
therefore in reality a good deal lower. 
3.3.6 Period VI, (1736-1747) 
This was Nadir Shah's reign, during which the English East India Company's affairs 
prospered on the whole, although Nadir Shah himself was engaged in invasions of 
Turkey, Afghanistan, Tartary, Oman, and India as far as Delhi. 90 Some of the chief 
features of this period were: 
1. In 1736, Nadir Shah renewed the East India Company's privileges and 
asked the Company to supply ships for his fleet. 91 Since most English ship-
ping and trade was in the hands of private traders, the East India Company 
was not able to comply. 
u. From 1736 to 1743, the situation in Kirman was so favourable for politi-
cal stability and economic prosperity that goods sent from there were increas-
ing by the year; most of it being copper ingots and wool. 92 
iii. From 1737-47 Persian forces occupied Oman and Julfar (Ras al-
Khaimah). 93 
The fragility of the trade was illustrated in 1747 when the Company's affairs in Persia 
were so finely balanced, as a result of the very disturbed conditions in the north, that 
orders were sent to the Agent to withdraw the up-country factories and to send 
officers to Kirman in order to take care of the Company's affairs and effects there. 94 
3.4 The Struggle for Power (1746-1763) 
The period of 17 years from 1746 to 1763 was one of turmoil and anarchy in Persia, 
beginning with a widespread revolt of the people against the tyranny of the King, 
Nadir Shah, and the subsequent murder of this monarch in June 1747. Serious dis-
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unity then set in, with a variety of contenders for ultimate power across the country, 
some from the line of the ancient Kings but most from among the Generals and 
provincial leaders. The armed conflicts and associated brutality which ensued ravaged 
the land and affected all forms of trade, to the point of Persia's ruination. 
External threats from the Afghans were maintained throughout those years, and large 
areas of Khurasan province in the north-east of Persia fell under their control. The 
Arabs, as well, took advantage of the internal strife in the country to throw off Per-
sian authority and influence over their shores and, in tum, tried to gain influence for 
themselves over the coastal areas of mainland Persia and its off-shore islands. The 
Arabs of the Persian coast inevitably became involved in the inland politics and con-
flicts of the country, but their own disunity caused them to achieve less influence than 
they might have done in collaboration with each other. 
The events of this period are here arranged into separate, though related topics, as fol 
lows: 
3.4.1 The beginning of the insurrection, 1746 
In its early stages, the widespread insurrection of the Persian peoples and subject 
Arab territories against the King, Nadir Shah, came as a consequence of the 
extortionate demands for taxes, cash and property he made upon them. The King met 
the revolts with brutal force - employing mass murder, blinding, rape, severe beatings 
and increased financial burdens, both to enforce his authority and to fund his escalat-
ing campaigns against his people. The various revolts are listed below -
3.4.1.1 Revolt at Slstlln 
Sistan is situated about 365 miles north-east of Bandar Abbas on the Afghan 
border. The revolt at Sistan in September 1746 was led by FatQ. 'Ali Khan 
(the Chief of Sistan), but the King's forces captured and blinded him. His fol-
lowers then surrendered, but his brother continued a stout resistance from their 
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castle at Sistan in the middle of a river, out of reach of cannon shot. In 
November the King executed his favourite General, Tahmasp Wakil, because 
he had no success against the rebels in Sista.n. 95 The brother of Fatb 'Ali Khan 
came out from his fort in February 1747 and was joined by large numbers 
from all parts; a large tribe in Khurasan also revolted. The King had sent 'Ali 
Quli Khan, his nephew, with 50,000 men against the Sista.n rebels, but he and 
his men had rebelled and strengthened the revolt at Sista.n. 96 
3.4.1.2 Revolt in the 'hot countries' 
The 'hot country' is the area between Bandar Abbas and Ur. The initial suc-
cess of Fatb 'Ali Khan at Sista.n in September 1746 had encouraged numbers 
of disaffected people in the 'hot countries' to declare for him. Reis Shah 
Wardi Baliich (Chief of a large Baluchi tribe at Minab) had put 5,000 soldiers 
at his disposal and was appointed Governor of the 'hot countries' with 2,000 
men to assist him in the take-over. This was clearly a direct challenge to the 
King's authority. 97 
In March 1747 the people of Lar revolted against a new Governor and an 
Admiral sent there to extract taxes: the people had gathered 3-4,000 men and 
marched against the King's forces, upon which the new Governor and his fol-
lowers fl_ed and the Admiral was turned back. The people in Bandar Abbas 
were reassured by the arrival of 2,000 soldiers led by M"rr 'Ali Sultan from 
Jultir. He gave assurances to the Company that they would not be molested, 
but on the same night the soldiers plundered Bandar Abbas and burnt many 
houses. The Agent at Bandar Abbas, fearing for the Company's security, sent 
for assistance to Mulla 'Ali Shah, the Wakll for the King's ships; after a few 
days, however, the soldiers headed off for Lar to help the King's army. This 
army was composed of 4,000 Tartar and Afghan soldiers, the latter being the 
favourites of the King and the backbone of his armies, who had killed over 
500 of the Ur men in the first battle, which was nevertheless won by the 
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rebels. The second battle was won by the King's forces and the rebels 
retreated to a stronghold near Lar. In Bandar Abbas, meanwhile, Mulla 'Ali 
Shah's men occupied Gombroon castle. 98 
3.4.1.3 Revolt at Kirmlin 
The people of Kinnan revolted in November 1746 and captured a large vil-
lage. A military commander from Bandar Abbas set out with mines and artil-
lery and reduced them: as a result a report spread that the King was near 
Isfahan and was marching on Sistan via Kirman. This news made the rebels 
desist. In March 1747 the Company Resident in Kinnan, Danvers Graves, 
fled to Bandar Abbas after the arrival of the King. He brought first-hand 
information about the King's atrocities and reported the death of the Dutch 
Agent at Kirman during a severe beating. 99 
3.4.1.4 Revolt on the Persian coast 
The people of Dashtistan (the area behind Bushire) rebelled in November 
1746, and in May 1747 the King's fleet at Bushire mutinied, sinking some 
ships and sailing off with others. The mutineers split into two parties, one fol-
lowing an Admiral and the other a group of Arab Captains. Great confusion 
followed in the Gulf. Mul)ammad Quli Sultan, the leader of the Persian troops 
who landed at Kung from Juiia.r, made iinks with the Dashtist3..."'l rebels and 
sent a message to Mulla 'Ali Shah, warning him to join the revolt under pain 
of reprisals against his family, property and business interests at Bushire if he 
refused. Mulla 'Ali Shah forthwith sailed for Kung, joining Mul)ammad Quli 
Sultan - who was to assist the Dashtista.nis in their attack on Bushire, where 
the King's forces could not resist for long. The rebels attacked in June 1747 
and Bushire fell to them, the Europeans being carried off for ransom. Mulla 
'Ali Shah returned the valuables taken from Company trankeys captured at 
Bushire and sent a message to the rebels saying that he was no longer co-
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operating with them. He returned to Bandar Abbas, thereby preventing any 
further landings from Julfir, but by mid-1747 the whole coastline was in 
revolt.lOO 
3.4.1.5 Revolt in Oman 
The Arabs in and around Muscat refused payment of the Persian King's taxes 
in October 1746 and rebelled, inflicting a defeat on the King's considerable 
forces. People on the whole Arab shore rose in increasing strength. In Julfir, 
the Arabs joined together in great numbers at the beginning of 1747 and made 
a night attack on the Persians, killing their horses and a good many men, 
including one of the Persian Sultans in Julfir. After hearing the news of the 
Persian defeat at Julfir, the Commander of the King's forces started transport-
ing grain and soldiers from Bandar Abbas to the Arab shore. However, he 
made no other move towards going there himself and it was believed that he 
had no intention of doing so, unless a fresh contingent of soldiers was sent to 
him. The Khan of Lar, hearing of the hesitation of the Commander at Bandar 
Abbas, deposed him and replaced him with another, although the deposed 
Commander had already embarked for Julfir a week earlier. When news 
arrived at Julfir that he had been dismissed, the Commander himself joined 
the revolt, together with the military Captains there, and got in touch with the 
rebels in Ur. 
Four or five ships arrived from Julfir in Bandar Abbas in Apri11747 and dis-
embarked soldiers who marched towards Ur under the command of the dis-
missed Commander. Julfir came under the control of Mir 'Ali Sultan, who 
had led the first wave of troops to land there and sent a message to the King, 
assuring him that he was not in revolt.lOl 
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3.4.2 The death of Niidir Shiih 
The people in and around Meshhed, the capital of Khurasan, rose in revolt in April 
17 47. At the beginning of June Nadir Shah arrived there and began repressive 
measures. While there he heard that the Governor of Kalat, a city north of Meshhed, 
was refusing the King's forces entry to his city. Nadir Shah thereupon marched on 
Kal~it with his whole army; once there he ordered his personal guard and the Afghan 
soldiers to jointly attack the fort; his own guard failed to attack and the Afghans, 
going in alone, were cut to pieces and lost half their number. The enraged King 
handed his personal guards over to the Afghans for punishment and replaced them as 
his bodyguard by the Afghans. His personal guards, equally enraged, entered his tent 
on the night of 10 June 1747, cut him to pieces and sent his head to Meshhed. 102 
3.4.3 Struggles for the throne 
With the death of Nadir Shah, there began a period in the history of Persia which 
proved to be most eventful and significant, as it signalled the beginning of extreme 
anarchy throughout the land. This anarchy, in tum, led to the most serious disruption 
of all forms of trade and a resultant famine. The seeds of the anarchy were the strug-
gles for the throne involving: 
'Ali Quli Khan, Nadir Shah's nephew 
Ibrahim Mirza Khan, the brother of 'Ali Quli Khan 
CO:h -h lt-h U':' - th d f N-d· Sh=1.. ~--a!.!U.-- .!.v.t!!Za1 _e gran son o a 1r cu1. 
The most reliable information on this period comes from the Secretary of Nadir Shah, 
Mahdi Khan, whose Histoire de Nader Chah is an eyewitness account.I03 
3.4.3.1 'An Quli Khan: when the 17 Safavi Royal Princes were executed by 
soldiers of the garrison to prevent their accession to throne, 'Ali Quli Khan 
took the throne in Khurisan under the title of 'Ali Shah on 25 June 1747, and 
coins were minted in his name. The treasures of Nadir Shah were brought to 
Meshhed, where 'Ali Shah distributed them among great and small without 
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distinction, as if they had no value. He appointed his brother, Ibrahim Mirza 
Khan, as Governor of Isfahan. 
3.4.3.2 Ibrihim Mirza Khan: finding that his brother was living in an 
effeminate manner and giving absolute authority to his ministers in all matters, 
Ibrahim Mirza Khan attacked 'Ali Shah's army and defeated it. The Shah was 
captured and lost his eyes. Like his brother before him, Ibrahim Shah distrib-
uted gold and silver indiscriminately, reportedly worth millions of Tomans, 
and fostered an impression of generosity by giving presents and honours to 
various unworthy people.l04 
3.4.3.3 Shibrukh Mirza: while Ibrahim M"rrza Khan was attacking the 
fortress of Kalat, north of Meshhed, many of his soldiers deserted, some to 
Shahrukh Mirza and others simply to return to their families. The inhabitants 
of Kalat managed to capture Ibrahim Mirza Khan and send him in chains to 
Shahrukh M"rrza, who ordered him and his brother, 'Ali Shah, to be executed. 
M"rrza Sa'Id Mul)ammad, who had been appointed Governor of Khurasan by 
Nadir Shah - and been involved in state affairs under both 'Ali Shah and 
Ibrahim Shah - now intrigued to have Shahrukh Mirza blinded, but was in tum 
taken and blinded by 'Ali Khan Gelair, one of Shahrukh Mirza's Com-
manders. Shahrukh Mirza was piaced on the throne but becat'"Ile Sha.'i in name 
only, since blindness made him unfit to rule. In the following period, 1755-
61, the chiefs of several provinces would proclaim their independence. lOS 
3.4.4 The struggle for o11erall control of Persia 
Little is recorded of the· internal disturbances in Persia which had worsened beyond 
hope of recovery by the last quarter of 1750, leaving Isfahan and Shiraz under the 
control of local war-lords. The province of GTian was in the hands of the Qajars, 
Meshhed was held by the Kurds, Khurasan was divided between the Persians, Kurds 
and Afghans, Y ezd and Kinnan had declared their independence, and the Baluchis 
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were making frequent incursions into the country for plunder (see Figure 3.2). The 
economic problems, fear and oppression caused many important people to emigrate, 
some using the pretext of visiting Mecca in order to make their escape. 106 
The struggle for overall control continued, centred primarily around the possession of 
Isfahan. The main contenders were Azad Khan Afghan, the Chief of Azerbaijan; 
Karim Khan, the Zand tribal leader; ij:usain Khan Qajar, the Qajar tribal leader; with 
Al)mad Shih, the Afghan leader and reputed son of Sulaiman Shih Safawi, in the 
background. The struggle remained confused but some critical events can be 
identified, as follows: 
i) August 1755 to July 1756 
At the beginning of this period Azad Khan controlled Isfahan but lost it to 
Karim Khan, from whom it was wrested, in turn, by ij:usain Khan Qaji£.107 
ii) August 1756 to July 1757 
During this year the struggle for central authority in Persia centred on ij:usain 
Khan Qajar and Azad Khan, the activities of Karim Khan and Al)mad Shah 
being a side-show. At the beginning of the period ij:usain Khan Qajar was 
besieging Karim Khan at Shiraz, but lifted the siege on hearing that Azad 
Khan was marching on Isfahan (which ij:usain Khan Qajar had seized earlier 
from Karim Khan). In all probability, Azad Khan entered Isfahan before 
ijusain Khan Qajar reached there since he did, for some time, actually occupy 
the city. Nevertheless, ij:usain Khan Qajar was victorious in this encounter 
and Azad Khan fled to Baghdad, where he sought the protection of the 
Pasha.Ios 
iii) August 1757 to July 1758 
Karim Khan was reported to have taken· the city of Behbehan, near Isfahan, 
and later repossessed Isfahan. His success at Isfahan was short-lived as this 
city was retaken by ij:usain Khan Qajar, who later marched on Karim Khan at 
Shiraz and besieged him.I09 
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iv) August 1758 to December·1759 
Karim Khan was now in the ascendancy. ij:usain Khan Qajar had met his 
death and, although Azad Khan had re-appeared on the scene he was now of 
less importance than his General of previous times, Fall) 'Ali Khan.tto 
v) January 1760 to November 1761 
During this period there are few records of the inland struggle for power in 
Persia, but what there is confirms that confusion still reigned. ill The situation 
was aptly described by the Agent in Bandar Abbas, Alexander Douglas, in a 
letter dated 28 February 1761 to the Presidency: 
The Kingdom seems to be hastening very fast to its destruction, the 
men in power have little or no consideration for their subjects, they 
only think how to gratify the soldiers and those who immediately 
serve them, the consequence of which must be the ruin of trade. 112 
3.5 Capture by the French of the English Factory at Bandar Abbas 
As a result of the state of war between England and France from 18 May 1757, the 
number of French warships and privateers in the Gulf increased. On 14 January 1758 
a French 24-gun ship crewed by 95 Europeans and 15 lascars anchored under Larak. 
Her orders were unknown to the English, but the English Agent sent the East India 
Company ship Success to Hormuz, fearing that she might be attacked if she remained 
at Larak. It was later learned that the Frenchman had been at sea for three· months 
and had at frrst been accompanied by three other vessels from which she had parted 
company at the entrance to the Gulf. Later, she was bound for Basrah to escort a 
French merchant ship down the Gulf: the merchant ship had been afraid to leave Bas-
rah, which was a neutral port. The Frenchman was seen under sail off the island of 
Henjam on its way up the Gulf and arrived at Lingah on 21 January, leaving on the 
next day and passing by Charak, bound for Basrah.ll3 
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In a letter from Shaw, the English Resident at Basrah, it was learned the French ship 
was called the Bristol and that it ·had arrived· there on 20 February. She was to escort 
the French merchant ship St Catherine, which had been there since the war began, 
down the Gulf. On 5 April, Alexander Douglas, the Agent, and the Council at 
Bandar Abbas received Shaw's letter dated 14 March saying that the French ship 
would probably stay there for three months as she was repoqedly awaiting a cargo of 
grain for Pondicherry, the chief French settlement in India, and the harvest would not 
be ready until the end of that period.ll4 The Presidency gave orders on 11 May 1758 
for the Revenge, together with the Drake, to attack the Bristol. The Revenge and 
Drake left Bandar Abbas on 23 June to cruise in the Gulf in the hunt for the Bristol, 
after which time they were to proceed to Bombay. The Bristol, however, did not load 
her grain and set sail until about 10 July; she therefore missed her appointment with 
the Revenge and Drake.11s 
In the evening of 12 October 1759, four ships flying Dutch flags arrived at Bandar 
Abbas: one carried 64 guns, another 22 guns. The other two vessels were the Mah-
moody and Mary, belonging to the local merchants Shalab1 and Mu}J.ammad Sufi. 
Early the next morning the vessels, which were in reality French privateers and their 
two prizes, landed two mortars and four cannon to the west of the English factory and 
started a bombardment. At high water, about 11 o'clock, the 22-gun ship hauled 
within about a quarter of a mile of the factory and, in conjunction with the mortars 
and cannon from the west, launched the attack. In the evening the English received a 
call to surrender from the French camp whereupon they signed a capitulation docu-
ment (see Appendix 6). The French occupied the English factory while the English 
sheltered at first in the Dutch factory. The French sent the Europeans and topasses of 
the factory garrison (16 seamen) on board their ships and gave their sepoys liberty to 
go wherever they liked. Douglas, the Agent, and his staff remained in Bandar Abbas. 
After embarking a quantity of copper which was in the warehouse and setting fire to 
the factory the French left Bandar Abbas on 30 October, bound for Muscat. The two 
forces were by no means well matched since English strength consisted of a small 
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number of Europeans, topasses and sepoys, whereas the French numbered about 450 
Europeans and 150 negroes_116 
3.6 The 'Commotion' in the vicinity of Bandar Abbas 
After the death of Nadir Shah in 1747 the whole area of Bandar Abbas (Figure 3.1) 
fell under the influence of various powers. To begin with, IJusain 'Ali Beg was sent 
by Reis Shah Wardi Baliich, the Baluchi tribal leader from Minab, to be Governor of 
Bandar Abbas but took fright on hearing of Mir 'Ali Sultan's approach (see below) in 
August 1747. Being afraid to return to his master, }Jusain 'Ali Beg sold his few pos-
sessions and headed for the islands or the Arab shore. 117 Next, M"rr 'Ali Sultan, the 
Commander of the troops at Julfir, received an order on 17 August 1747 that he was 
appointed Governor of Bandar Abbas by 'Ali Quli Khan, and on 25 August he arrived 
in Bandar Abbas. us 
Uze Bashi IJajji was the Headman of Tarom (a town 70 miles north-west of Bandar 
Abbas) who claimed that he had been appointed by Shahrukh Shah as Governor of 
Lar. Uze Bashi IJajji had little or no respect for the monarchy and during Nadir 
Shah's time he had terrorised and plundered the area around Lar from his fort at 
Tarom. He arrived at Lar in mid-17 47 but was unable to stay there and was forced to 
escape. He a."ld his followers bega.YJ. attacking Mir 'Ali Sulti-'!' s forces at the end of 
August; on hearing of Uze Bashi IJajj"i's approach and fearing capture, M"rr 'Ali 
Sultan left for Al,ma~, his own village about 60 miles north-east of Bandar Abbas, 
after plundering Assin (a village near Bandar Abbas). In October 1747, M"rr 'Ali 
Sultan, his son Haidar Beg and 'Ali Beg, a General of Fars, moved from A}Jmadi 
with 4,000 men against Uze Bashi }Jajji. Whilst chasing Uze Bashi IJajji in March 
1748, M"rr 'Ali Sultan, his son Haidar Beg and 19 others of his family were murdered 
by his son-in-law, Coodan Beg.l19 In the following month, Uze Bashi IJajj'i and 
'Abdul Shaikh, the Governor of Qishm, headed for the Baluch region on the pretext 
of recruiting soldiers, returning to Bandar Abbas having recruited only 70 Baluchis. 
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Back in Bandar Abbas, Uze Bashi IJajji told the head of the Dutch factory that he 
wanted the friendship of the Europeans and, as a sign of good faith, would attack 
Mirza Abii Talib, the new Governor who had arrived in Bandar Abbas in March on 
appointment by the King. He would drive out the Governor and himself keep posses-
sion of the fort and protect the place until a new governor arrived. He was not 
believed, and was suspected of simply plotting to take the fort, which he was unable 
to do unilaterally as his only approach was within range of the Dutch cannon. The 
Dutch and English replied that Mirza Abii Talib had been appointed by the King and, 
however bad he was, they would not intervene. If he, Uze Bashi IJajji, however, 
attacked the Europeans they would assist each other. In the following month, May 
1748, Uze Bashi IJa.iJ1left for Tarom where his fort was under siege, and 'Abdul 
Shaikh left for Qishm.12o 
M"rrza Abii Talib was appointed Governor of Bandar Abbas in January 1748 by SaiilJ. 
Khan, the Lord of Shiraz. He arrived in Bandar Abbas in March with 300 followers 
but in the following month he received orders to go to Shiraz from the King, who had 
discovered that Mirza Abii Talib and the people of Ur were in revolt. In May he and 
his followers left Bandar Abbas for Ur in order to join the rebels there. However, 
when his followers heard that the King had ordered his seizure they deserted him, and 
he was captured near Ur.l21 
Mulla 'Ali Shah arrived in Bandai Abbas on 8 October 1747 with seven large topsail 
vessels and several smaller ships of the Persian fleet. He was said to have run away 
from Luft fearing that the Charak and other Arabs were combining and wanted to cap-
ture him. He later heard that Mirza Abii Talib was plotting to kill him, seize the 
fleet, subdue the people of Bandar Abbas and attack the English and Dutch factories. 
He therefore remained on board ship.l22 The disorder in the Bandar Abbas vicinity 
provoked the Governor of Shiraz into planning to go to Bandar Abbas himself: the 
Arab tribes were fearful of his arrival and met Mulla 'Ali Shah on board ship on 17 
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May 1748 to make peace. At the same time, Mirza Abii Ta.Iib left Bandar Abbas (see 
previous paragraph) and Mulla 'Ali Shah brought the remainder of the Persian fleet 
there, where he disembarked the families of his sailors. 123 
Although Mulla 'Ali Shah had designs on seizing the European factories in Bandar 
Abbas, he was obliged in August 1750 to make an accommodation with them when 
Bandar Abbas was in fear of the arrival of 'Ali Mardin Khan, a Bakhtiari chieftain. 
The English East India Company at Bandar Abbas sent a letter to Sa.IilJ Khan, 
Shahrukh's General at Shiraz, complaining about Mulla 'Ali Shah. The General 
replied with a letter to the Company enclosing an order to Mulla 'Ali Shah to treat the 
Company favourably .124 
While he was controlling Bandar Abbas, Mulla 'Ali Shah was subject to twin pres-
sures. First, from N~ir Khan of Ur whose objective was to gain at least half of the 
revenue which Mulla 'Ali Shah extracted from Bandar Abbas; and, second, from the 
Arabs who sought to capture the Persian fleet. He was, in addition, caught up in the 
enmity between the Charak Arabs, with whom he was friendly, and the other Arabs in 
the Gulf. 125 
3.6.1 Mullii 'Ali Shiih, Na~ir Khiin, the Arabs and the English, 1750-1763 
During a period of 13 yea...-s, Ba..'ldar Abbas passed t.ltrough severe disturba.'lces, or 
'commotions', which centred in the enmities between the different Arab tribes, the 
bad relations between N~ir Khan and Mulla 'Ali Shah, and the threats or attacks 
coming from the English. 
3.6.1.1 1750: In August of this year an English Board meeting at Bandar Abbas con-
cluded that Mulla 'Ali Shah was not well disposed to the Company, and was in revolt. 
The Company expected an attack from him, and possibly also an attack by N~ir 
Khan from Lar: Mulla 'Ali Shah's people actually attacked the Company's camels 
carrying water and provisions to the factory, and the Company's Linguist complained 
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that MulHi 'Ali Shah had threatened him with death if he continued to complain about 
matters, saying that his men could do as they wished. The Dutch, also, complained 
about Mulla 'Ali Shah and both European factories decided to keep a powerful ship of 
their own in the port for their protection. They decided to anchor their ships in the 
Strait of Hormuz if the Arabs arrived at Bandar Abbas. 126 
In September, Mulla 'Ali Shah said in public that he intended to attack the Europeans 
when their ships, with their great firepower, were leaving harbour, when they would 
be weaker. He threatened far-reaching measures against their trade which would 
yield him as great an advantage as if the English had paid customs. If he was later 
obliged to leave Bandar Abbas he would first loot both factories and then withdraw on 
board his ships. 127 
3.6.1.2 1751: In February Mulla 'Ali Shah voiced his great displeasure with the 
Company for not off-loading the Shaftesbury, which had arrived on 26 January from 
Bombay, since he thereby lost the customs dues and held that this action was contrary 
to the agreement and to the promises of friendship. He threatened that if the English 
were determined to quarrel with him he would have no difficulty in getting enough 
soldiers to make them repent of it (see also page 95).128 In the next month he told the 
Agent that he expected Company assistance in the event of an Arab attack and the 
Agent replied that the Engiish had no quarrel with the Arabs. 129 A reiative of N~ir 
Khan, who had arrived in Bandar Abbas two months earlier and was seized and held 
prisoner by Mulla 'Ali Shah, managed to escape in June. He had come to Bandar 
Abbas on N~ir Khan's behalf, to demand half of the port dues, and Mulla 'Ali Shah 
feared the arrival of N~ir Khan himself when he heard how his relative had been 
treated. 130 
The Arabs arrived at Bandar Abbas in September, on board 12 trankeys and number-
ing 3,000 men under the Shaikh of Julfir, Shaikh Qa'id al-Qasimi. The Dutch Resi-
dent told the English Agent that the Arabs intended to seize the Persian fleet and to 
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ransack the town; he asked for English protection. The Agent threatened Mulla 'Ali 
Shah that, as the Company had authority from their Presidency in Bombay to do so, 
they would leave at the first sign of fresh trouble. N~ir Khan wrote to the Agent 
saying that he was coming to Bandar Abbas to confront Mulla • All Shah, who had 
been the one to bring in the Arabs}31 
3.6.1.3 1752: N~ir Khan threatened Mulla 'Ali Shah in January in again demanding 
half of the port dues, but Mulla 'Ali Shah refused to pay. N~ir Khan therefore 
threatened to plunder and bum Bandar Abbas the following morning: the next day he 
entered the port with a small retinue, and Mulla 'Ali Shah came out of the fort to 
receive him in a friendly manner. On the following day N~ir Khan removed all 
Mulla 'Ali Shah's men from the fort and replaced them with his own garrison}32 In 
February, N~ir Khan's brother-in-law, Mas'U]. Sultan, was appointed Governor of 
Bandar Abbas, and N~ir Khan visited Mulla 'Ali Shah in the Armenian church where 
he was being held in close custody to demand Rs (Rupees) 60,000, and threatened to 
use force if necessary. Mulla 'Ali Shah asked the Khan's permission to collect the 
sum demanded from the brokers of Bandar Abbas.133 In the next month N~ir Khan 
left Bandar Abbas and took Mulla 'Ali Shah with him. Mas'U]. Sultan was left behind 
as Governor, with enough soldiers to control the town.l34 In July there were reports 
from trankeys passing to-and-fro between Bandar Abbas and Luft that the Arabs from 
t.~e ct.~er side cf t.~e Gulf were again intending to invade Ba.'ldar Abbas.I3S 
3.6.1.4 1752 to 1754: The Gombroon Diary records for this period have, 
unfortunately, been lost and events can be determined only with the help of deduction 
or conjecture, along the following lines. 
Mulla 'Ali Shah apparently secured his release from N~ir Khan at Ur. What 
induced N~ir Khan to release him is unknown but a Diary entry of 29 May 1757 
(Vol.1 0, p.132) gives the terms of his release and some indication of its timing. On 
that date N~ir Khan wrote to the Agent, Alexander Douglas, remarking that it was 
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five years since he had appointed MulUi 'Ali Shah as Governor of Bandar Abbas and 
Hormuz. Since Mulla 'Ali Shah was still in captivity in Ur in July 1752, it could be 
deduced that he was released shortly afterwards, thus confirming the rumours circulat-
ing in Bandar Abbas towards the end of June 1752. In the same letter of 29 May 
1757 the terms of MulHi 'Ali Shah's release and re-appointment as Governor of 
Bandar Abbas are clearly set out. Mulla 'Ali Shah would retain all the import and 
export duties of Bandar Abbas, out of which he would meet the expenses of main-
taining the Persian fleet. N~ir Khan would receive 1,000 Tomans annually from the 
revenues of Hormuz, together with the revenues of Assin and Tauscun (both near 
Bandar Abbas), each estimated at 500 Tomans a year. He would also receive the 
brimstone mines, previously the property of Mulla 'Ali Shah, and would hold the 
children of Mulla 'Ali Shah as hostages to ensure compliance with the agreement 
(there is no mention of the wives). Following his release, Mulla 'Ali Shah 
understandably retained his hostility to N~ir Khan and moved closer to some of the 
Arab tribes, to which he had become related by marriage. It is not known whether 
the Arabs from the opposite shore had attacked - as they had threatened - in 1752 or 
whether such action, or its threat, had played any part in the release of Mulla 'Ali 
Shah from Ur.I36 The Arab Shaikhs overall gained more influence, especially in the 
coastal areas, and became involved in the internal struggle for power in Persia. 
3.6.1.5 1754: Na~ir Khan had been fighting against the Arabs but in September he 
made peace with them, after suffering a series of defeats at their hands, in order to 
save face with the Persian Govemment.I37 
3.6.1.6 1755: In May, Shaikh Ral}mah al-Qasimi and his troops attacked 'Abdul 
Shaikh of Qishm and Luft; in June he was before Luft with 3,000 men. For two 
months Mulla 'Ali Shah attacked the fort at Luft by sea and Shaikh Ral}mah besieged 
it by land, without success until 'Abdul Shaikh died on 10 October. Those in the fort 
-
then informed Mulla 'Ali Shah that they would surrender to him if he undertook not 
to plunder them, and he took possession the same day. After his success at Luft, 
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MulHi 'Ali Shah demanded money from its people in order to pay the Arab Shaikhs 
who had assisted him.I38 
3.6.1.7 1757: N~ir Khan claimed in May (see page 83) that MulHi 'Ali Shah had 
paid him none of the revenues from Hormuz, Assin and Tauscun since being 
appointed five years before and estimated the overdue amount at 7-8,000 Tomans.I39 
Shaikh Ra.l)mah al-Qisimi arrived at Bandar Abbas in September with 400 men. He 
visited the Agent and told him that MulUi 'Ali Shah had written to N~ir Khan agree-
ing to pay the 1,000 Tomans currently demanded. Shaikh Ra.i)mah apologised for 
MulUi 'Ali Shah's past behaviour towards the English, and said that he personally 
would ensure that affairs would be settled to the satisfaction of the English. 140 
3.6.1.8 1758: N~ir Khan released Mulla 'Ali Shah's children in November and they 
arrived in Bandar Abbas. 
3.6.1.9 1759: During the Seven-Year War between Britain and France, the French 
attacked and seized the English factory in September (see page 77). 
3.6.1.10 1760: Shaikh R.aQ.mah became dissatisfied with Mulla 'Ali Shah for marry-
ing one of his daughters to Mulla ijasan (one of N~ir Khan's military commanders) 
and seized Hormuz in December i i59, moving on to lake the fort at Gombroon in 
January 1760 and staying there about two weeks. He captured Mulla 'Ali Shah and 
kept him prisoner at Hormuz. R.aQ.mah then took the ship Rahmania, sailed it to Luft 
and embarked his men from both Bandar Abbas and Hormuz, after they had looted 
Bandar Abbas. He set Mulla 'Ali Shah free in Hormuz141 but some of the Hormuz 
garrison arrested Mulla 'Ali Shah again and crossed over to Bandar Abbas where they 
seized the Gombroon fort. The soldiers supporting Mulla 'Ali Shah fled to Qishm to 
seek assistance from Shaikh Ra.i)mah and the AI ijaram tribe (a tribe on the Persian 
coast who had joined with the Shaikh in his raiding). The brother of N~ir Khan, 
Ja'far Khan, heard of the seizure of the fort and sent forces to Bandar Abbas to 
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demand its return from the Hormuz people in the name of N~ir Khan. He gave the 
Hormuz soldiers assurances of their safety to take their belongings from Bandar 
Abbas and return to Hormuz, and they handed the fort over to him. 
Shaikh Ral)mah and the AI ijaram had gone from Qishm to Hormuz to retake that 
fort, and came under its fire: they plundered everything outside its walls but had to 
return to Qishm without capturing it, fearing attack by the Charak Arabs, the Banii 
Ma'in and the Hormuz soldiers who had allied themselves with Ja'far Khan.l42 The 
Banii Ma'in and Charak Arabs pressed Ja'far Khan for support in March, reporting 
that there was a party of 500 Qawasim on Qishm and that they were afraid of being 
overpowered. The Banii Ma'in's main cause for concern over Qishm was to protect 
many of their families there from being plundered by the Qawasim. Ja'far Khan 
replied that he could not help because he had too few troops to defend Bandar Abbas; 
the Qawasim also sent several threatening letters to Ja'far Khan warning him not to 
join in any attack on them.l43 
In April the Banii Ma'in and the Charak Arabs returned to Charak after failing to 
raise sufficient strength to match the Qawasim on Qishm. Shaikh Rashid al-Qasimi, 
the brother of the now-deceased Shaikh Ral)mah, proposed a peace between himself 
and N~ir Khan; his envoys returned from Ur in May saying that N~ir Khan had 
agreed to ma..lci.ng peace on t.lte strict condition that MulHi 'Ali Shah should have no 
management of public or government affairs. 144 Mulla 'Ali Shah, himself, escaped 
from Hormuz in May and reached Bandar Abbas; there he took a number of trankeys 
and went to join Shaikh Rashid at Lingah. The following month (June) he sent a let-
ter from Lingah to the English Agent at Bandar Abbas, telling him that in a few days 
he and Shaikh Rashid al-Qasimi would attack Bandar Abbas: he advised the Com-
pany's people to stay near their houses and not to mix with Ja'far Khan's men.l4S 
On 24 June, at 5 p.m., a great fleet of trankeys was seen between Qishm and Bandar 
Abbas, and at 2 in the morning of the 25th the Qawasim landed a little to the west of 
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the town, unopposed by Ja'far Khan's men. The two sides exchanged fire throughout 
the day, with the Qawasim about a quarter of a mile from the town and the defenders 
occupying the walls. In the evening the Khan ordered his men to withdraw from the 
walls to the fort and the Qawasim took possession of the western part of the town at 
about 9 p.m. About 100 of them took control of the east gate and a house on the 
shore 150 yards from the Dutch factory. The next day all was quiet until 4 p.m. 
when the Qawasim in the house by the shore opened frre on the Dutch factory and a 
house occupied by Ja'far Khan's men. The gun fight lasted all night. 
On the 27th the Qawasim looted several houses and at about 9 a.m. they entered the 
English house but soon left; as they were getting over the town wall, Alexander 
Douglas and William Nash, with the sepoys, 'saluted' them with grape shot from a 9-
pounder, just to let them know what to expect if they touched or entered any place 
~elonging to the English. The Agent received an apology for the attack on their 
house from Shaikh Rashid al-Qasim'i and Mulla 'Ali Shah. Ja'far Khan's men, mean-
while, plundered the town's inhabitants and stored their booty in the Dutch factory. 
At about 4 p.m. the Persians and Qawasim exchanged fire as usual from behind walls 
and this continued until sunrise.I46 On the 28th, also, nothing much happened and the 
Khan's soldiers continued to rob the inhabitants, while the Arabs left the town at 
about 10 p.m. unmolested by the plundering soldiers. When they arrived in Bandar 
Abbas the strength of th.e Qaw~~im was estLmated betwe.en 800 and 1,000 men, with a 
fleet of 50 trankeys.I47 
A few days later, on 2 July, three gaUivats and three trank.eys from Muscat arrived at 
Hormuz, bringing back the Banii Ma'in Arabs and the Hormuz people. The Imam of 
Muscat explained his inability to restrain the Banii Ma'in, Charak and Hormuz people 
because he was at war with the Qawasim on the opposite shore. 148 On the following 
day the Imam asked Ja'far Khan for 2,000 troops to attack the Qawasim at Julfir, 
after which, victorious, he would make the whole of his fleet available to assist the 
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Khan. 149 The Imam had given the gallivats and trankeys to the Charak Arabs, and 
they landed the Banii Ma'in at Charak on 6 July.tso 
N~ir Khan sent 5 cavalrymen and 50 infantry to Bandar Abbas from Lar on 11 July 
when he heard about the attacklSl and then, on 18 July, left to join forces with the 
Shaikh of Charak, supported by the Imam of Muscat, for an attack on the Shaikh of 
Lingah, a member of the Qawasim family who was supporting Shaikh Rashid al-
Qasimi.lS2 On 21 July N~ir Khan arrived at Charak and Shaikh Rashid al-Qasimi, 
who was at Luft, went to Lingah, where the two adversaries met in an engagement on 
the 23rd. News came from Qishm on the 26th that the Qawasim had defeated N~ir 
Khan at Lingah and forced him twice into retreat with casualties.lS3 
N~ir Khan sent a messenger to Ja'far Khan on 29 July ordering him to send all the 
cavalry he had at Bandar Abbas to his assistance; all except about 30 men left Bandar 
Abbas the next day .154 The Faidh Rabbani and another vessel belonging to the Imam 
of Muscat arrived at Bandar Abbas on 2 October and anchored; they were there to 
help N~ir Khan, the Banii Ma'in and the Charak Arabs against the Qawasim. 155 The 
next day, N~ir Khan was encamped at Khamir (a town on the coast between Lingah 
and Bandar Abbas) and from there had sent troops to lay waste to Qishm island: this 
they had done and only the two Arab forts had escaped. N~ir Khan was now keen to 
conciude a peace with Kaiim Khan and wanted to leave the area for Ur, in accord-
ance with an agreement between them. However, he wanted to leave the Bandar 
Abbas area secure by making peace with Mulla 'Ali Shah and suggested that Ja'far 
Khan should marry one of Mulla 'Ali Shah's daughters. They would live in Bandar 
Abbas and receive half the port's revenues for their maintenance, the other half being 
paid to N~ir Khan. Shaikh 'Abdallah of Qishm would also control the fort at Luft 
and receive half of Qishm' s revenues, the remainder going to N~ir Khan. 
The Baluchi Chief at Minab, Sha.riari, had been very active in trying to bring about 
the release of Mulla 'Ali Shah's family imprisoned at Hormuz. Several letters passed 
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between him and Honnuz on the subject and, when it was the season to gather dates, 
he tricked two senior officials of Hormuz to Minab on that pretext. He imprisoned 
them and demanded the release of Mulla 'Ali Shah's family in return for them but he 
was refused by the Honnuz people. N~ir Khan sent trankeys with Banii Ma'In and 
Charak Arabs to help the Honnuzians, and kept the vessels there on permanent sta-
tion. Forty of these Arabs were left to garrison the fort at Honnuz and this suggested 
a pact of some sort between the parties. Further trouble also broke out between the 
Banii Ma'In and the Persians, who had been treating the Arabs badly. 
N~ir Khan had to leave Bandar Abbas on 3 October without making any peace with 
Mulla 'Ali Shah, 1S6 but the Imam of Muscat sent an ambassador on 4 December to 
Bandar Abbas, and from there to Qishm, with a view to making peace between Mus-
cat and Jultar. The ambassador went to Honnuz on the 9th to make peace between 
the Banii Ma'In and Charak Arabs on one side, and the Qawasim: he returned, 
however, without succeeding. By December, Ja'far Khan was oppressing the people 
and merchants of Bandar Abbas, and the English were not exempt. He stopped provi-
sions from reaching the English Residency, occupied their propertY and demanded 
money. Mulla 'Ali Shah had agreed to live in Bandar Abbas but Ja'far Khan rejected 
his proposals, with the result that people went over to Shaikh Rashid al-Qasimi at 
Julfar.lS7 
3.6.1.11 1760: During the hot season of 1760, William Nash, Assistant Agent, and 
most of the European soldiers died; Ensign Nock was invalided. More staff were 
requested but only two Writers were sent, one of those dying a few months after his 
arrival. ISS 
3.6.1.12 1761: Shaikh Rashid agreed in January to make peace with Ja'far Khan on 
the basis that half the revenues of Qishm island went to Mulla 'Ali Shah and the other 
half to N~ir Khan. When no reply to his proposals was received, Shaikh Rashid 
decided to attack Honnuz and Charak first, and then move on to Bandar Abbas.lS9 
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The Qawasim fleet, consisting of 30 gallivats, dhows and trankeys, with 2,000 men 
anchored off Qishm fort in October, before heading off for Hormuz with the intention 
of finishing the war with the Banu Ma'in. The Chief of the Banfi Ma'in, Shaikh 
'Abdallah, sailed out to meet the Qawasim with five gallivats and a three-hour battle 
ensued, after which Shaikh 'Abdallah retreated to the protection of the battery of 
Hormuz castle. The Qawasim fleet sailed off to an unknown destination and Shaikh 
'Abdallah let it be known that he had defeated the Qawasim. The Qawasim's fleet 
later appeared around Hormuz, however, and the Imam of Muscat came to help the 
Banfi Ma'in with four ships. The Qawasim sailed out against them and a sharp 
engagement took place near Larak. island in which the Imam's ships disgraced them-
selves by leaving the battle. In this last sea battle Shaikh 'Abdallah had lost three 
Shaikhs but had seized a Qasimi trankey .160 The situation in December was that the 
Imam's ships had returned to Muscat, Shaikh 'Abdallah arrived at Hormuz with 
several Banfi Ma'in families from Charak, Shaikh Rashid al-Qasimi was at Luft, 
Mulla 'Ali Shah was at Qishm fort, while the Shaikh of Charak and some Banfi Ma'in 
were at Muscat trying to make an agreement with the Imam about their war with the 
Qawasim.161 
3.6.1.13 1762: In February, and to everyone's surprise, Ja'far Khan entered Bandar 
Abbas to re-occupy the position of Governor. The Banfi Ma'in, for their part, agreed 
tc settJe in Bandar Abbas provided t..h.at Ja'far K.h.a.n was not the Governor: opposition 
to him extended to Bandar Abbas itself where there were fears of his severity ,162 The 
Banfi Ma'in in March seized a trankey from Muscat on which there were several mer-
chants from Kirman; their justification for doing so was the state of war between 
Kirman and N~ir Khan, to whom they owed allegiance. The trade between the Banfi 
Ma'in and the Qawasim by boat had now ceased.163 
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3. 7 The withdrawal of the Dutch Factory from Bandar Abbas 
The first reference to the withdrawal of the Dutch factory from Bandar Abbas was in 
July 1747, when news came from Bushire that the Dutch Company's employees at 
Bushire had been robbed of everything, and that rebels had carried off the Europeans 
and senior employees, demanding a ransom of 6,000 Tomans from the Head (Myn-
heer) of the Dutch establishment and Council at Bandar Abbas. It was more than dif-
ficult for the Dutch at Bandar Abbas to raise that amount since they could scarcely 
buy enough to keep themselves alive. The Mynheer talked of leaving Bandar Abbas 
and going to Basrah, which could be made their main settlement, by the next ship 
from Batavia. However, the market would not be able to take the large quantity of 
woollen goods they already had in the warehouse at that time at Basrah. They had not 
been able to dispose of any woollen goods at Bandar Abbas. 164 
In 1749 the Dutch complained bitterly to Mulla 'Ali Shah of ill treatment by him and 
decided to detain the ship which arrived from Batavia in August for their protection. 
In January 1751 they determined to remove to the island of Khark (see Chapter 4), 
where their Resident formerly at Bushire had retired.l6S This decision grew from the 
tripartite agreement with the English and Mulla 'Ali Shah described on page 94. The 
Dutch assured the English on 5 February 1751 that the bad news they were getting 
from the interior had made them long since determined to leave the country: they 
were only waiting for one of their Europe-bound ships to arrive from Basrah to take 
whatever remained in the factory and go. They asked the English if the Shaftesbury 
and the Drake could take on the 25,000 mtlunds of pepper, freight and other things 
remaining which their ship could not manage; if so they would go immediately with it 
to Surat. On the basis of the good understanding between the two factories, the 
Eng~ish agreed.l66 
The English were unwilling to join the Dutch in leaving Bandar Abbas without 
permission from their superiors167 (see page 94), but the Dutch finished loading their 
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goods on 19 February 1751, leaving only a small quantity of sugar and pepper to 
cover the expenses of two Writers and their Linguist, who were to be left behind to 
take care of the factory and to recover some debts from up-country .168 The two 
English ships sailed on 21 February, bound for Sural, 169 and the English Agent at 
Bandar Abbas wrote to the Presidency of the East India Company explaining: 'The 
reason of their leaving the place is the unsettled state of the country, in which they 
found it was impossible to remain with security unless they always kept a ship here, 
which the profits of their trade would not answer so took the opportunity while they 
had it in their power' 170 (see Appendix 7). The few remaining Dutch did some trad-
ing at Bandar Abbas, but in a small way171 (see Appendix 8). 
3.8 The withdrawal of the English Factory from Bandar Abbas 
Any discussion of the withdrawal of the English Factory from Bandar Abbas must 
include the many attempts to withdraw which preceded the fmal event. 
3.8.1 Withdrawal to Bahrain, 1750 
In a letter dated 9 October 1750 to the Presidency in Bombay, the East India Com-
pany representatives in Bandar Abbas claimed that their situation on the mainland of 
Persia was so precarious that they should seize the Persian fleet and take possession of 
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saying that it seemed to them the best place for trade, being opposite Bushire and near 
Basrah. There was a very good fort, built by the Portuguese, the revenue of the 
island was at that time between 3-4,000 Tomans- very capable of improvement, and 
there was a fine harbour for ships. Bahrain formerly belonged to the King of Persia 
but at that time was in the hands of the Huwalah Arabs, who lived between Bandar 
Abbas and Bushire and were always quarrelling amongst themselves: they treated the 
inhabitants of Bahrain poorly. 
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The Arabs had no forces of any consequence there (about 400 men) and what strength 
they had at sea was in trank.eys. There were only two places to land on the island: 
100 sepoys and 150 soldiers with two small vessels would be necessary at the first 
landing, after which only a small vessel and a gallivat would be sufficient. If the 
English did not take that place, they said, the Dutch would. 172 In December 1750 the 
Company learnt from an Arab familiar with Bahrain that the fort was in good condi-
tion 'as to its outward walls and battery', though some of the warehouses needed 
minor repairs, for which the materials were both plentiful and inexpensive. The tax 
on date trees yielded Rs 30,000 a year and the Huwalah Arabs raised a further Rs 
50,000 in various 'impositions'. In addition to the local people there were about 500 
'strangers' who had settled there and would join with the English to drive out the 
Huwalah Arabs.I73 
In a further letter about Bahrain to the Presidency dated 5 February 1751, the Factory 
Board wrote that in their humble opinion the removal scheme appeared to be more 
feasible than previously thought. Bahrain now offered greater advantages than they 
had first realised, particularly as regards the abundant fresh water to be found in run-
ning streams in every part of the island. Clover was so plentiful that the natives 
derived a good income from raising cattle to supply other parts of the Gulf, and the 
best breed of horses to be found in the Gulf. Horse rearing could be done cheaply, 
since it was not necessary to give the animals bariey when clover provided better 
nourishment.I74 
The Presidency replied in a letter dated 26 February 1751 that the Agent and Council 
at Bandar Abbas should not leave the port unless an immediate danger to life neces-
sitated their departure. In such a case, they ordered the Agent to withdraw by ship 
with the most valuable of the Company's effects, and to despatch the Company ship, 
Drake, immediately to Bombay with their specie and news of what was happening. 
After that they were to try to come to some form of understanding with the dominant 
local faction to preserve the Company's privileges, and to resettle themselves at 
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Bandar Abbas when things became quiet again. If they should find it impracticable to 
come to any agreement or to return to their factory before the government became 
settled under one head, and if they had any encouragement to do so, they should settle 
on any island up the Gulf near Bush ire or Bandar Riq .11s 
Lorimer goes on to say that the attempted withdrawal from Bandar Abbas was due to 
the taking of Shiraz by the Afghans.176 However, the English circumstances had no 
links with either the Afghans or Shiraz: the main factor in that attempt was fear of 
'Ali Mardan Khan, the Bakhtiari, whose tribesmen had treated the few remaining 
Europeans in Isfahan very badly. The Europeans in Bandar Abbas were in a panic 
over the possible arrival of 'Ali Mardan Khan's forces there.177 
The Agent at Bandar Abbas again mentioned the advantages of seizing Bahrain from 
the Huwalah Arabs in a letter dated 18 January 1751 to the Presidency at Bombay. 
He mentioned that many Armenian merchants had said they would reside there with 
them: he again advocated seizing the Persian fleet- four large ships at Bandar Abbas, 
two more at Bushire and many smaller vessels178 - but he had taken no steps either to 
seize the fleet on his departure or to withdraw the factory from Bandar Abbas.179 
Lorimer notes 'The matter was then dropped for a time' ,1so without giving any reason 
for the attempt being abandoned. The main reasons were 
,,, ~"··11"' 'A1• Sh=L•s nnhl;, th.._. ... s dpczcribetf on naoe sn 
.a i"\i..&.U Q. .l..l u.i1li }'WU&.&." W.&.&.'W'W."' _., a.& - a .1"' b -., • 
ii) The Agent received orders on 26 January 1751 from the Presidency not to 
seize the Persian fleet on any account, nor to go to Bahrain until the Presi-
dency was better acquainted with all the facts, since they had heard that 
Bahrain was a most inhospitable place. The Presidency nevertheless sent 27 
men for the garrison of Bandar Abbas.1s1 
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3.8.2 Withdrawal to Qishm, Hormuz or Bahrain, 1751 
A messenger from Bushire informed Mulla 'Ali Shah on 3 November 1750 that 'Ali 
Mardan Khan, having taken Shiraz, would proceed to Bushire and then Bandar 
Abbas. N3.$ir Khan had been ordered by 'Ali Mardan Khan to seize Mulla 'Ali 
Shah. 182 The English Agent, the Head of the Dutch factory, and Mulla 'Ali Shah met 
at the request of the last, who was in a panic over the arrival of N3.$ir Khan in Bandar 
Abbas. He now wanted to patch up his past differences and the three parties decided 
to send their goods, valuables and families, and those of the people of Bandar Abbas, 
to one of the off-shore islands. They hoped that when that news reached Shiraz it 
would deter 'Ali Mardan Khan from going to Bandar Abbas as all the wealth would 
have been removed.l83 
Mulla 'Ali Shah and 'Abdul Shaikh visited the Agent who confirmed that the Com-
pany would move to an island. They suggested that the Company, the Dutch and 
themselves should go to either Qishm or Hormuz and that all of them should act 
together for their mutual defence. 184 They chose Qishm as the island to which they 
would repair if necessary, as water and supplies were plentiful and the factories' 
seamen would live under the rule of 'Abdul Shaikh. The Agent ~d the Dutch Chief 
said they had no preference for either island but expressed their view that the two fac-
tories should begin loading their stock on board their ships forthwith to save them 
their ships to the full but still had valuable goods in their warehouses. The Dutch 
informed the English Agent that they intended leaving Bandar Abbas as soon as they 
had finished loading their ships which had just arrived from Basrah. They asked if 
the English intended to leave with them, in accordance with the agreement between 
them: the English replied that the agreement covered only joint action if they were 
attacked by 'Ali Mardan Khan but, in any case, they could leave only with permission 
from Bombay . 186 
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At this stage Mulla 'Ali Shah complained about the Shaftesbury and made threats (see 
page 81). The Agent replied that the threats carried no weight with the Company, but 
it was anyway unreasonable of Mulla 'Ali Shah to expect them to off-load the ship in 
such troubled times simply to pay him customs duties. He was also told that he him-
self had first broken the agreement by agreeing to submit to N~ir Khan at Ur. 187 
The Dutch Agent was also visited by Mulla 'Ali Shah who asked why the Dutch were 
leaving when the danger from Ur had passed, and 'Ali Mardin Khan had gone back 
to Shiraz. He also asked, since the English had loaded their ships, if the Dutch were 
leaving as well, and begged them to stay. The Agent replied that the Dutch had been 
disposed to go for some time because of the unsettled nature of the country, adding 
that Mulla 'Ali Shah had not been the best Governor and that they had suffered more 
from him than from any other. The Agent remarked that if both European factories 
left that would be an economic disaster for Bandar Abbas, which would reflect badly 
on Mulla 'Aii Shah with any new King.1ss 
The Dutch left Bandar Abbas on 27 February 1751 with two ships, bound at first for 
Surat. A ship belonging to Mulla 'Ali Shah left with them, bound for Bombay with a 
cargo of pearls, dates, brimstone, horses and red eanh. The English Agent received 
a letter from N~ir Khan on 5 March asking him not to leave Bandar Abbas as that 
would be the ruin of the piace. iS9 The Agent aiso received a ietter from the Presi-
dency on 21 May, but dated 15 March and brought by the warship Syren, ordering 
again that the Company was forbidden to seize the Persian fleet and once more post-
poning any decision to take Bahrain.l90 
Mulla 'Ali Shah visited the Agent on 23 September 1751, saying that the Arabs 
wanted him to attack Bushire with them and, as he was their near relation by mar-
riage, he felt obliged to do so. The Agent opposed this by pointing out that he would 
be leaving Bandar Abbas unprotected and would prejudice his standing with the Per-
sian authorities. The Agent further advised him to secure his family on board ship or 
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at Hormuz for their safety. Mulla 'Ali Shah insisted that he had to go but would 
leave Shaikh Qa'id al-Qasimi to look after Bandar Abbas as his deputy. Again the 
Agent countered by saying that to all of Persia it would look as if the Arabs had 
seized Bandar Abbas, but if he was compelled to go, he should deputise Sharian of 
Minab, who was a Persian. The Agent then revealed that the Company at that time 
had authority from the Presidency in Bombay (received on 17 July 1751 by the Mah-
moody) to leave at the first sign of fresh trouble and to take possession of Bahrain or 
any other island up the Gulf. The English proposed to do just that if Mulla 'Ali Shah 
did not act as expected of him by keeping things quiet and the sea routes open, rather 
than embroiling the whole country by introducing a large number of unmanageable 
Arabs. This threat seemed to impress him and he promised to do his best to follow 
the Agent's advice.l91 
3.8.3 Withdrawal to Qishm or Henjam, 1752 
There seemed to be little doubt that the English were happy with the ascendancy of 
Na~ir Khan, but they still maintained firm reservations about mainland Persia and 
made surveys of the offshore islands. The English Agent returned from a visit to the 
islands of Larak, Henjam and Qishm on 26 March 1752, and reported that, if com-
pelled at a later date to leave the mainland, the Company should go to Qishm, where 
'Abdul Shaikh had asked the English to take possession in return for their protection 
a.'ld a pension for him. He also reported tl:!at Qishm abounded in fresh water, wood, 
barley, flax, dates and all kinds of provisions, besides a great deal of good land for 
animal husbandry. The Shaikh, moreover, was a civil and hospitable person, well 
disposed to the English. 192 The Company had made surveys of Qishm the year 
before, when the survey team led by Captain England and Lieutenant Ward reported 
that the fort was in mediocre condition, with 12 of its 21 guns incapable of being 
used, but boasted a good, deep ditch around it which could easily be defended by the 
guns and soldiers taken there from the Bandar Abbas factory. Close to the walls of 
the fort there was a fine anchorage for the Company's guardship. 
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At the eastern end of the island, in the spot also called Qishm, there was an area 
where there would be enough room to erect a fme settlement for the people and where 
there was good water. That area ran for about four miles from the eastern point of 
Qishm island, westward to a hill which stretched all the way from the northern to the 
southern shore of the island, so that a European-style fort and three guard towers to 
defend the three passes .through the hill would make the area well protected. 
However, the area was infertile and it would therefore be necessary to control the 
whole island, which would require a garrison of 400 men, and would necessitate the 
destruction of the Persian fleet.I93 
In describing Henjam, the Agent mentioned that when he was there in March 1752 he 
noted that it was an island somewhat larger than Bombay (Henjam is 11h x 3 miles), 
entirely covered by rocks and devoid of any inhabitants or animals of any kind. It 
was sandy and barren, with no vegetation except two trees and tufts of hard grass; the 
water was insufferably bad, except for a small amount contained in two or three old 
tanks standing towards the Qishm side of the island. 194 
At that time the internal situation in Persia had worsened almost beyond hope of any 
recovery and the Agent had made application to the President and Council in Bombay 
for permission to withdraw from Bandar Abbas, either to the island of Qishm or to 
Henja.rn. 19S Based on his previous account, t.lJ.e Agent informed t.lJ.e Presidency on 17 
September 1752 that he regarded Henjam as a very unfit place on which to settle, and 
had chosen the south-eastern point of Qishm island; a grant of it from the King of 
Persia or from Ni$ir Khan, at that time the Governor of the Garmsirat (the 'hot 
regions', i.e. the coastal strip), was therefore needed. 196 But ten days later the Agent 
wrote another letter to the Presidency saying that the Agency at Bandar Abbas was 
now perfectly safe; he saw many objections which could be made against withdrawal, 
and the benefit to be expected from it was double-edged, perhaps leading to a rupture 
with the Persians. 197 
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3.8.4 Withdrawal to Hormuz, 1760 
On the receipt of orders from the Presidency in October 1760 to take possession of 
the island of Hormuz, the Agent and Captain Baillie went there and met the Chief of 
the fort. The Agent wrote to Bombay that Hormuz was quite barren and its supplies 
came from the mainland. The fort would cost Rs 80,000 to put in proper order and 
altogether Hormuz was not a suitable place for moving to.l98 
3.8.5 Withdrawal to any place of security, 1761 
After receiving the report referred to above, the President and Governor of Bombay 
wrote back to the Agent and Council at Bandar Abbas on 2 April 1761, noting that 
the report focused only on removing to the island of Hormuz, whereas the President's 
requirement was the Agent's opinion on any secure place in the Gulf which he might 
regard as suitable for the purpose. He gave the Agent the power to withdraw to 
wherever he thought best. 199 The Agent therefore set off to Basrah to start viewing 
all of the islands, some of which, he imagined, would be better than the mainland, 
where there were daily impositions and a lack of safety for the Company's prop-
erty. 2oo On his return to Bandar Abbas the Agent reported to the Presidency that he 
had visited Bushire and met the Shaikh; he recommended sending a Resident there as 
a trial201 (see Chapter 5). 
3.8.6 Trllll of the Bushire market before commitment, 1762 
The Agent reminded the Presidency in a letter of 24 December 1761 that if they 
wanted to remove to one of the islands a sea force would be necessary to protect both 
the factory and the merchants who traded with it. He commented that if the 
Government of Bandar Abbas was settled, Bandar Abbas was still the best place but 
'... those who hold it in Government are of a bad disposition & not to be relied on ... 
nor is much regard had for the merchants' .202 
A letter from the Presidency dated 9 February 1762 ordered that either the Agent, 
Alexander Douglas, or Dymoke Lyster, Assistant Agent in Basrah, should give the 
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Bushire market a trial before a commitment was made to moving there. There was to 
be no new settlement made in the Gulf without the Presidency's permission.203 Mean-
while, the Presidency on 16 January 1763 recommended removing the Agency from 
Bandar Abbas to Basrah, and later, on 26 February, sent further commands by the 
Prince of Wales and Drake, to which the Agent replied by giving details of all devel-
opments since the Presidency's recommendation: 
i) The Company's woollen goods remaining at Bandar Abbas had amounted 
to 326 bales and cases; these, to a value of Shiih'is 1,374,532 (Rs 114,544), 
had been loaded on board a trankey and consigned to Basrah 
ii) Two trankeys loaded with a great variety of the Company's other goods 
(between 8-900 cases) were despatched to Basrah. 
iii) A quantity of Mahmudis, not very common in India, had been sent to the 
Agent in Basrah by the Swallow, to the value of Shaliis 45,500. 
iv) The Prince of Wales was sent to Bombay carrying cash amounting to 
Shahis 1,361, 161. 
v) The Agent had been unable to sell two cf t.l-te Ccmpa.'ly' s t.t·ankeys a.'ld 
planned to send one of them with the ketch Drake, with instructions to Jervis 
at Bushire to dispose of it at any port on the Persian coast. He planned to send 
the other under the escort of Captain Court of the Prince of Wales, to be sold 
at Muscat when he called there for water. 204 
On his own responsibility, Douglas decided on 4 March 1763 to attack the Persian 
fort and the old Dutch factory in Bandar Abbas before his departure. He alleged that 
the Deputy Governor of Bandar Abbas had publicly declared his intention to impede 
the withdrawal of the factory, and was refusing to pay any compensation for the 
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extortion which he and others in the local government had practised on the Company 
in the past few years. Douglas also claimed that he had to secure a safe passage for 
the English from their house, which was some distance from the sea. The Agent 
decided to take possession of effects belonging to the Deputy Governor and others in 
the government, in the house formerly belonging to the Dutch. On the same day, 
therefore, the English made an attack, which was eventually successful after an hour 
and a half, during which time the Deputy Governor's wife and family (whom Douglas 
had hoped to capture and hold as hostages) escaped through an embrasure at the 
western end of the house, carrying most of their valuable possessions with them. 
The next attack was made on the fort, with European military landed from the Prince 
of Wales. The Drake and Swallow anchored about 3/4of a mile from the shore and 
bombarded the fort until the next morning, the 5th, when the English captured it but 
found nothing of value there. It was clear that the Persians had evacua~ed the fort by 
night and withdrawn to a village called Serou, about llh miles away. On the English 
side those killed included three Europeans from the Prince of Wales' crew, four of the 
military, one of the ships' gunners and five sepoys. On the morning of the 7th the 
English discovered that reinforcements of about 250 horsemen had arrived and 
Douglas therefore ordered the Captains to embark all their people, taking whatever 
they could with them. 
Douglas was greatly disappointed not to gain any compensation for the past three 
years at Bandar Abbas. He thought of attacking MulHi 'All Shah in his fort at Qishm, 
but the latter had spent all of his money for Shaikh Rashid al-Qasimi and his tribe of 
Arabs in the conflicts of the Persian coast so there would be nothing to be gained by 
attacking him. He then thought of capturing the ship Rahmany, but his Captains 
advised him that the risk and dangers were very great. Douglas fmally decided to 
send the Drake with the two trankeys to Basrah while he returned to Bombay on 10 
March 1763 aboard the Prince of Wales. There he wrote his application to retire, 
100 
saying that he preferred to return to his position in the Presidency and not move to 
Basrah under a junior officer.2os 
3.9 The.Recession 
The position enjoyed by the East India Company up to now had been one of great 
privilege; it now changed radically to one of some gravity in terms of both security 
and economic viability. Because of the 'commotions' in the vicinity of Bandar Abbas 
trade had begun declining from March 1760. Even prior to that, Edward Ives visited 
Bandar Abbas in 1754 and reported that the two factory houses were the only build-
ings of importance remaining: apart from them the entire town was in almost total 
ruin. 206 The Agent, Alexander Douglas, had documented the downturn for the Presi-
dency at Bombay and the Court of Directors in London in a succession of reports. 
There is ample evidence of the decline in trade at Bandar Abbas. 
i) 31 March 1760: no wool was received from Kirman.207 
ii) 29 June 1760: because of the struggles between the Khans near Kirman 
the inhabitants were in a state of fear and business had come to a complete 
stop; no caravans had come from that area for many months past and little or 
no trade was carried on at Kirman.2os 
iii) Disturbances in Khurasan affected the Company's trade in 1760, when 
much less business was done than Douglas had expected, because woollens 
were normally in demand in such inland areas.209 
iv) 11 February 1761: for a long time, no merchants had been at Bandar 
Abbas and the English had not received any orders from inland. At Bandar 
Abbas there had been no trade for some time past, and merchant vessels were 
not frequenting the port as they formerly did. Trading was being carried on 
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through Minab (50 miles east of Bandar Abbas), and caravans with various 
kinds of Indian goods were travelling to Kirman and other inland places.21o 
v) 9 April 1761: no merchants had been at Bandar Abbas for sometime and 
there was no trade whatever going on. 211 
vi) 28 June 1761: the caravan from Kinnan arrived, but without merchants or 
goods.212 
vii) 10 December 1761: no trade was being carried on at that time with 
K. - 213 rrman. 
viii) 24 December 1761: broadcloth was in demand in the inland areas but dis-
turbances, especially in Kinnan, had prevented any merchants going to Bandar 
Abbas.214 
ix) 19 February 1762: no trade was going on at Bandar Abbas at that time. 215 
x) 21 February 1762: goods shipped for Bandar Abbas had to be sent on to 
Basrah.216 
xi) 9 March 1762: the boat trade out of Bandar Abbas was entirely stopped 
because of the wars between N~ir Khan and Taqi Khan on the mainland, and 
between the Qawasim (the ruling family on both sides of the western part of 
the Gulf) and the Banii Ma'fu.217 
xii) 13 April 1762: the poor state of the market since 1761 had made most 
ships by-pass Bandar Abbas port. 21s 
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xiii) 19 April 1762: as inland areas were far from being settled, Douglas asked 
his superiors not to send any more goods until the troubles ceased, the roads 
were open and trade was flourishing. Because the Kirman government was 
stopping caravans passing through its territories to the Garmsirat (coastal area) 
merchants were unable to get to Bandar Abbas. 219 
xiv) 20 July 1762: a local vessel from Bengal called at Bandar Abbas but 
carried the goods consigned there on to Basrah. 
For the previous 12 months few people from the interior had come to Bandar Abbas, 
and the whole extent of purchases by inland merchants was not more than Rs 25,000; 
the Company's total sales to them and to others during that period would not come to 
Rs 36,000. 
The government of Kirman was very bad: Kirman was the mart where all the goods 
for Khurasan, Kandahar (Afghanistan) and Meshhed used to be bought. The Multan 
(northern Pakistan of today) merchants who used to deal there in the woollen trade 
had made no purchases. The people running Kirman were taking goods carried by 
merchants from Bandar Abbas at their own imposed prices, giving in return any rub-
bish they pleased. There was stagnation in trade at Kirman thanks to the oppressions 
and banditry, and the declaration by the local government that caravans would not 
pass; if any one tried to use local routes without paying, Kirman would send people to 
plunder the caravan.22o 
On 4 September 1762 no trade was reported at Kirman and no merchants were going 
there as before.22I On 11 September 1762 woollen goods were in demand in the inte-
rior but no merchants were making their appearance at Bandar Abbas. 222 By 7 
October 1762 the rule of N~ir Khan's Government had reduced most of the 
inhabitants to poverty. 223 
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In 1743 the entire expense of the English settlement at Bandar Abbas, exclusive of 
charges for the Marine (the cost of ship services), had not exceeded Shahis 250,000. 
But that was before the 'commotions', whereas the costs for the five years of dis-
turbances (1755-1760) make a telling comparison (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2: Expenses of the Engllsh settlement at Bandar Abbas, 
1755-1760 (in Shahis)224 
a) General charges 1 August 1755 - 31 July 1756 
(exclusive of Marine charges) 
Average daily costs 
b) General charges 1 August 1756 - 31 July 1757 
(exclusive of Marine charges) 
Average daily costs 
c) General charges 1 August 1757 - 31 July 1758 
(exclusive of Marine charges) 
Average daily costs 
437,039 
1,197 
425,652 
1,166 
552,915 
1,515 
NOTE Account books from 1 August 1758 to 31 July 1759 were destroyed by the 
French and accounting began again on 12 February 1760 
d) General charges 12 February 1760- 31 July 1760 
(exclusive of Marine charges): 
Average daily costs 
i.e. an annual rate of 
337,444 
1,985 
724,512 
The increase in expenditure was caused largely by garrison and stabling costs, needed 
for the additional security forces (see Appendix 9). 
3.10 Conclusion 
In the detailed Table of Contents to his Gazetteer, Lorimer lists the events leading up 
to the withdrawal of the English headquarters from Bandar Abbas as: 
a) Events before accession of Nadir Shah 
b) Events during reign of Nadir Shah 
c) Events after reign of Nadir Shah 
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1722-1736 
1716*-1747 
1747-1763 
d) Capture and destruction of the British 
factory at Bandar Abbas.22s 1759 
*(sic), but should be 1736. 
But in Lorimer's work no connection is established between these four groups of 
events and the withdrawal, and no mention is made of a longstanding English inten-
tion to leave Bandar Abbas. A review of the sub-chapter on the withdrawal of the 
English factory from Bandar Abbas reveals only intentions to withdraw to places 
which offered security, or good facilities and no threat. Lorimer has indeed explained 
the events themselves, but has not established any linkage with the drift towards with-
drawal (see an example of faulty linkage on page 93). After explaining what was 
happening in 1760-1763 at Bandar Abbas between MulUi 'Ali Shah, the Banii Ma'in, 
Shaikh Rashid, the Charak Arabs etc, Lorimer simply states '... but at this juncture 
the English Agency was suddenly withdrawn. '226 The implication of a sudden deci-
sion is clearly mistaken. The possibility of withdrawal had been considered and 
explored for a dozen years and included: 
1. Withdrawal to Bahrain in 1750. The root of this proposal was the view 
of the East India Company's representative in Bandar Abbas that their situation 
on the coast of Persia was very precarious. No measures were taken to imple-
ment the move. 
2. Withdrawal to Qishm, Hormuz or Bahrain in 1751. This proposal 
stemmed from the arrival of 'Ali Mardin Khan in Bandar Abbas to seize 
Mulla 'Ali Shah. Mulla 'Ali Shah, 'Abdul Shaikh, the Dutch and the English 
decided to leave Bandar Abbas to one of the islands, but nothing happened. 
3. Withdrawal to Qishm or Henjam. in 1752. This was simply a sugges-
tion by the English Agent at Bandar Abbas: after a few days he wrote again 
saying that the Agency at Bandar Abbas was perfectly safe. 
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4. Withdrawal to Hormuz in 1760. This came as an order from the Presi-
dency, but the Agent wrote to Bombay that Hormuz was not a suitable place 
for moving to. 
5. Withdrawal to any place of security in 1761. This was a contingency 
power given to the Agent to withdraw to wherever he thought best. 
6. Trial of the Bushire market before commitment, in 1762. Before this 
decision was taken the Agent wrote to the Presidency saying 'Was the 
Government of Gambroon in proper hands it would be the greatest port in the 
Gulph of Persia for the Inland trade' and added ' . . . the greatest inconveniency 
attending the place at present is that those who hold it in Government are of a 
bad disposition & not to be relied on, nor are oaths or anything else of any 
weight, nor is much regard had for the merchants. '227 
The 'commotions' were thus very clearly the main cause of the withdrawal of the 
settlement from Bandar Abbas. The English Agent wrote, in a letter to the Court of 
Directors in London in October 1762, that 'Gambroon is in the hands of a set of men 
who have neither honesty or shame and may properly be called a nest of freebooters. 
As they do not know how long their Government may continue, they only look to the 
present time. ' 2211 
Although this Chapter ends with the withdrawal of the Bandar Abbas factory and a 
decision to try the market in Bushire, the chronological sequence will be broken in the 
next Chapter in order to introduce parallel developments in Bandar Riq and Khark: 
the Bush ire story will resume in Chapter 5. 
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4.0 Introduction 
CHAPI'ER4 
BANDAR RiQ AND KHARK ISLAND 
(1753-1766) 
At the beginning of 1753, the Dutch, in dispute with the Turkish Government at Bas-
rah, closed their factory there and began to establish themselves ort Khark island. The 
English in the Kingdom of Persia had been labouring under the 'commotions' around 
Bandar Abbas since 1753, and decided in 1755 to establish themselves at Bandar Riq, 
but leaving Bandar Abbas open to continue its struggle for existence. I The chapter 
traces the fortunes of Bandar Riq and Khark island over the following 13 years. The 
English were forced out of Bandar Riq in 1756, and the Dutch were forced out of 
Khark in 1766. The reasons for the failure of European trading in these places are 
revealed from the record of primary documents, and important light is shed on the 
different approaches of the English and Dutch. This seems, therefore, a suitable point 
at which to comment on the main differences of organisation, resources, attitudes etc 
between the Dutch and English East India Companies. 
1. Organisation 
The Dutch East India Company was centrally organised in Asia, with only one main 
office (Batavia/Jakarta), to which all establishments in the octrooigebied (the area in 
which the Dutch Company had received the monopoly for all trade from Holland with 
the Indian and Pacific Oceans), were subordinate. Orders to Dutch establishments 
were always given by Batavia, never directly from Holland. The English Company, 
on the other hand, had three centres - in Bombay, Madras and Bengal. 
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2. Approach 
The Dutch Company, unlike its English counterpart, had a large number of very big 
ships, and was able to trade with its own ships: it did not need to issue passports for 
ships to trade between Europe and Asia. Only to a very limited extent did the Dutch 
tend to issue passports to private traders for routes inside the octrooigebied, and then 
only to former Company staff who had established themselves in Asia on the expiry 
of their contract of employment. This latter arrangement obtained, for example, in 
the sugar trade between Java and Muscat in 1766 (outside the scope of this study). 
The English Company had a more limited number of ships and acted, to a large 
degree, as a Consular body, providing passports and protection to private ships, sub-
ject to payment of taxes. 
Generally, the Dutch Company had more establishments in Asia, and these were 
larger because they were not merely a species of Consulates, but regular trade and 
shipping offices, often protected by a considerable military garrison. In Bandar 
Abbas, and later in Khark, there were about 100 or more soldiers. The English fac-
tories in the Persian Gulf were not nearly as large. 
3. Shipping 
Because the Dutch usually limited themselves to the Company's own large ships 
(generally 130-170 ft overall and displacing upwards of 1,000 tons), they tended to 
limit themselves to a lower number of sailings to the larger ports, and employed local 
shipping to concentrate their merchandise in those ports when necessary. There were 
many smaller private English ships which also traded to the smaller ports, and since 
the English East India Company did not have the monopoly enjoyed by the Dutch it 
had difficulty in filling its own ships. 
4. Trade 
The Dutch normally sent ships with merchandise directly from the main stores in 
Batavia, whereas the English goods came from their nearer sources in India. Both 
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Companies were, of course, mainly concerned to earn money in the Persian Gulf by 
selling goods there: in this way they would have the cash in hand to buy products for 
Europe from elsewhere in Asja, thereby diminishing the huge annual cashflow from 
Europe to Asia. Originally, both Companies had come to the Gulf to buy silk, but 
the importance of the silk trade had greatly declined in the 18th century. The 
products bought by both the Dutch and the English were of the same kind, mostly 
Asiatic products such as spices, sugar and Indian textiles. The English spice trade 
was virtually limited to pepper, because the Dutch had an effective monopoly of nut-
megs and cloves, which gained them a considerable profit. Cotton cloth was sold by 
both of them, mainly obtained from their establishments in Bengal and Coromandel. 
In the 17th century the Dutch also brought textiles from Vietnam. Indigo and other 
dyes figured largely in the trade of both Companies, increasingly so in the 18th 
century. From the late 17th century onwards, with the expansion of production in 
Java, sugar became ever more important for the Dutch, while the English had access 
to less of it. In the later periods, especially, the English sent brightly-coloured wool-
len cloth to Persia and Basrah. The Dutch were less active in this field, partly 
because they normally had no direct shipping between Persia and Europe, and partly 
because the trade was not popular with the Dutch Directors. They were anxious to 
avoid spoiling the very profitable Levant trade, part of which took place internally in 
the Ottoman empire and was carried on to Basrah and the Gulf. 
5. Staff 
The Dutch East India Company employed many foreign staff, the Gulf included, even 
in quite high ranks, where Germans, Scandinavians, Russians and even French, 
Italians and Ottoman Christians figured. Two heads of establishments in the Gulf 
during this period of study were Germans: Koenad (c. 1736) and Kniphausen (1750-
9). The English Company was almost entirely English in composition. 
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6. The legal position 
The two Companies did not share the same legal status. The English had a contract 
which granted them a half share of all the customs duties received in Bandar Abbas 
(as a reward for their help in ousting the Portuguese from Hormuz). In reality, they 
never received their share to its full extent - usually a small proportion only. The 
Dutch had a contract that they would pay no customs duties on condition that they 
would buy a defined amount of silk from the Persian Government, at rather a high 
price. 
7. Revenue 
The Dutch Company's revenues were far more favourable than the English Com-
pany's from their factory at Bandar Abbas, until the withdrawal of the Dutch factory 
from Bandar Abbas (1623-1747: see Chapter 3.3 - 3.3.5). During the period of the 
commotions (1747-1795) the English Company managed to gamer some revenue, 
whereas the Dutch Company's revenue at Khark was almost nothing (see preceding 
and following chapters). 
4.1 Geographical background 
On the mainland and to ~e north of Khark island, Bandar Riq was an Arab colony 
inhabited by an Arab tribe called the Za'ab, who also lived on the isla.~d near Ras al-
Khaimah called Jazirat al-IJamra' as well as in Kalba; it did not have as good a har-
bour as Bushire - large ships having to lie in the anchorage, which was reasonably 
good. A long narrow island right in front of the town offered shelter to smaller ves-
sels close in to the town itself. At the ebb during high tides there was a depth of 
seven to eight feet of water between the island and the town (see the Atlas, Map nos. 
19, 25 and Figure 4.1). 
Three hundred and fifty years ago (1647), there were very large numbers of vessels 
and seafaring people at Bandar Riq. At that time, the inhabitants of Khark island, 
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who had always remained independent after the departure of the Portuguese from the 
Gulf, submitted themselves to the protection of M"rr :ijamad, then the ruler of Bandar 
Riq, and promised him a tribute of Rs (rupees) 240 a year on condition that he pro-
tected them from the plundering of the seafaring Arabs. The first part of the agree-
ment was well observed: the second part was not. The unfortunate inhabitants of 
K.hark island were, until the coming of the Dutch, always exposed to the extortions of 
the trankeys which passed there daily.2 
Some interesting references to Bandar Riq, and the importance of its port,. occur in 
books by European travellers. In the 17th century, Teixeira, de Thevenot and 
Barthelemy Carre all mentioned the wheat trade of Bandar Riq and the calling of 
English and Dutch ships at the port, where many important merchants from Shiraz 
had gone to settle after the Afghan conquest of their city. 3 Carre visited Bandar Riq 
twice, in 1670 and 1671. On his first visit he described the complaints of the Al 
:ijaram Shaikh that the Arabs of Riq, Khark, Dawraq and Bushire sailed every year to 
the pearl banks of Bahrain and tried to make themselves masters of the pearl trade. 4 
Apparently, the resentment against the upper Gulf Arabs had intensified when Carre 
visited the region for a second time for he heard that the Huwalah (Arabs from the 
Persian coast) had attacked Bandar Riq with 400 vessels and massacred the entire pop-
ulation, women and children included. When he finally managed to get to Riq he 
found the Shaikh of the place, whom he had met previously, and had a very friendly 
meeting with him. Carre left Bandar Riq on a Dutch ship because, following the 
recent atrocities, Arab ships no longer dared to go there. s 
After the death of M"rr :ijamad (Dutch sources have him still ruling in 1705), Bandar 
Riq went into a deep decline as a result of the murders and wars between his succes-
sors, until Mir N~ir came into power. By virtue of his good rule, strict control over 
his tribesmen and his amiability and generosity to all the merchants and foreigners, 
Bandar Riq began to recover. A large ship from the fleet of Nadir Shah (Shah of Per-
sia who died in 1747 and had built a navy for warfare against the Arabs of Oman-
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carrying its wood across Persia from the Caspian Sea to the Gulf) still remained at 
Bandar Riq at that time, its hull seeming to be strong and in good shape. There were 
more than 30 other vessels, large and small, and about 300 able-bodied sailors in the 
port. Mir N~ir's father had by then gone over to the Persian religion (i.e. he became 
a shi'ite) and his family had married into the families of nearby Persian governors so 
they could hardly be considered as Arabs any longer.6 
This same Dutch document gives the story of Mir N~ir' s temporary rule over 
Bahrain (see Figure 4.2). It describes how Shaikh·N~ir of Bushire, who was no less 
ambitious than he was money-grubbing, planned to profit from the remains of the 
Bandar Riq fleet to conquer the island of Bahrain. He had found that his own forces 
were insufficient for the purpose; he had at that time at most 400 men from his own 
people. He therefore combined forces with Mir N~ir of Bandar Riq who had some 
500 armed men. They armed three ships and two gaUivats and conquered the AI 
IJaram (a Huwalah tribe from Asilu, closely connected with the Qawasim) on Bahrain 
island, with only slight losses. By the use of certain pretexts M""rr N~ir was able to 
persuade the Bushire ruler to be the first to return home, whereupon he became sole 
master of Bahrain and never gave his ally the least part of its revenues. He did not 
even want to pay him his expenses on the expedition, and this became one of the 
reasons for their deadly enmity. M""rr N~ir, in the meantime, was obliged to keep 
with him the best and largest element of his army for the occupation of Bahrain, and 
the man he had left as Governor of Bandar Riq in his absence, Kayid IJaidar, the lord 
of Ganawah (a small place not far north of Bandar Riq), sought to use the situation to 
establish himself as lord of Bandar Riq. When Mir N~ir heard the news he was 
forced to leave Bahrain and was just in time to save his already beleaguered fortress 
of Bandar Riq. 7 Shaikh N~ir immediately occupied Bahrain and it remained under 
his rule thereafter (see the Atlas, Map no. 52) 
The island of Khark is situated at latitude 15° 29'N, longitude 50° 20'E about 30 miles 
north of Bushire and 22 miles from Bandar Riq. 8 Piggott, one of those accompanying 
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Edward lves on his travels through the Gulf in 1753-4, describes Khark as being 
nearly triangular in shape, about 41h miles in length, 21h in breadth and 12 or 13 in 
circumference (see the Atlas, Map nos. 19, 64). The central part was high land, very 
rocky and barren, as were all parts of the island except a plain of about three miles 
between the central hill and the fort, situated on a sandy point close to the water's 
edge. 9 This central hill, called Daidaban and rising 285 ft above sea level, gave its 
name to the island - khark meaning 'rock' in Persian. As the writer himself noticed 
when visiting Khark island in 197 4 it resembles a rock sticking out of the water when 
it first comes into view (see the Atlas, Map no. 38). The smaller island of Kharku 
lies two miles from Khark (see the Atlas, Map no. 45). The Muslim geographers 
from the 9th century onwards differ in their spelling of Khark. Abii Isi}.aq al-Farisi 
called it Khark. Similarly, the unknown author of IJ,udad al- 'lilam min al-mashriq illi 
al-maghrib; Ibn ijawqal; Ibn Khurdadhbih, the 9th century geographer; Abii Rayi}.an 
al-Biriini, the astronomer; and Ibn al-Balkhi, the author of flirs nlimah: all of them 
wrote it as Khark. But Yaqiit al-ijamawi, in his book mujam al-buldlin, and al-
Jawaliqi, in his book al-mu 'a"ab min al-kallim, wrote Kharak, as the English pro-
nounce it. 10 
De Thevenot visited the island in 1665 and observed that it had a Governor dependent 
on the Governor of Bandar Riq: all of its people were fishermen.ll Abraham Par-
sons, who visited Khark in 1775, mentioned that the island was uninhabited before the 
arrival of the Dutch. 12 De Thevenot recorded that the island was producing wheat, 
barley, dates and good grapes, while there was fresh water to be found there also.IJ 
The island had a bay at its north-eastern end where there was a safe anchorage, I4(see 
the Atlas, Map no. 28). 
As regards navigation around Khark island, research shows some slight differences in 
the prescribed sailing routes. On a comparison of different nautical charts this writer 
observed that some routes go between Khark and Kharku, while others go between the 
two islands and the mainland of the Persian coast. The oldest charts, the Dutch chart 
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of 1645-6 (see the Atlas, Map no. 57) and the English chart (n.d., but 1638 or later) 
in the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris (see the Atlas, Map no. 66), both show the 
route between Khark and Kharku only. Dutch and English nautical charts of the 17th 
century all show this route between the two islands but later on a route along the Per-
sian coast was added, as is the case with the Dutch chart VEL 221 (undated, as manu-
script maps usually were, but about 1690: see the Atlas, Map no. 58). The charts by 
John Thornton (1703) and John Friend (1764) (see the Atlas, Map nos. 32, 38) show 
the route between Khark and Kharku, but Samuel Thornton (1716) has a route along 
the east of the islands, not between them (see the Atlas, Map no. 32). A French man-
uscript nautical chart in the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris, SH 209/2/12 (based on 
the Dutch expedition of 1645-6: see the Atlas, Map no. 65) is slightly different and is 
the oldest with one route between Khark and Kharku and another around the eastern 
side of these islands. The two editions of Neptune Oriental (1745 and 1776) both lack 
the route between the islands (see the Atlas, Map no. 33). It is not easy to fmd an 
obvious reason for these divergences: some geographers have thought the cause to be 
the depth of water, but one can see from the depths on both old and modem charts 
that these variations cannot be the reason. Other geographers thought that the route 
between Khark and Kharku was easier because it pointed straight at the entrance to the 
Shan al-'Arab; this would make a favourable course for 17th century ships which 
were difficult to manoeuvre. 
In studying the charts, however, the writer discovered an anchor sign on the route 
which lies on the eastern side of the islands, opposite Bandar Riq (see the Atlas, Map 
no. 19), which means that the ships going to Basrah and calling at Bandar Riq took 
the route between the islands and the coast, while the ships going to Basrah and call-
ing at Khark took the route between the two islands. As Piggott observed, 'these 
ships, as was the custom, stopped at Kharg for a pilot' .ts At the beginning of this 
chapter attention was drawn to the calling of many ships at these ports. Through find-
ing the oldest detailed sailing instructions by Davenport (an Englishman, apparently, 
dating from about 1720 or earlier) in a French translation in Delisle's papers in the 
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Archives Nationales in Paris16 - the English original not being found - we learn that 
for the route to Basrah a pilot should be taken on in Khark and that one should sail 
between Khark and Kharku. Davenport also gives another route, along the eastern 
side of the islands, via Bandar Riq to Basrah. This discovery is very helpful in 
explaining the relationship between the different cartographic traditions, and will 
probably solve some difficult questions posed by geographers. 
4.2 The Dutch Establishment on Khark Island 
On the withdrawal of the Dutch factory from Basrah their Resident, Frederik von 
Kniphausen, passed via Khark in February 1753 on his way to Batavia (Jakarta).l7 
Kniphausen was Prussian by birth, and brother of the Ambassador to U>ndon at that 
time: after leaving the Prussian Monarch's service he went to the East Indies and was 
appointed Resident for the Dutch Company at Basrah. He anchored, made a survey 
of the island and went to Bandar Riq, where he met M"rr N~ir who offered him 
Khark, then belonging to his family. The Dutch Governor-General at Batavia 
approved Kniphausen' s plan and sent him back to Khark with several ships loaded up 
with large quantities of European and Indian goods, as well as building materials to 
erect a fort there. 18 On 15 November 1753, Kniphausen arrived back at Khark with 
two ships, Getrouwt and Fortune, full of men, ammunition and timber. A few days 
later two small Dutch vessels alw at-rived, full of merchandise.!9 By Janua.t-y 1755 
the Dutch had completed a regular fort on Khark composed of four bastions, each 
mounting ten guns, and several Armenian and Persian merchants had gone to live on 
the island20(see the Atlas, Map nos. 62, 64). 
The Dutch Residents, Kniphausen and van der Hulst (the Dutch official on Khark 
itself), had asked Mir N~ir of Bandar Riq to assist them with his ships if the 
Governor of Basrah refused to settle with the Dutch (see page 116) but Shaikh N~ir 
of Bushire, out of his enmity towards Mir N~ir and his allies, told the Governor of 
Basrah that the Dutch had no naval power of any importance and the Pasha therefore 
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decided not to pay. But Mir Ni$ir agreed to help the Dutch with his gallivats in a 
blockade of Basrah river as soon as the dates became ripe and shipping to Basrah 
started again. When the Pasha of Basrah heard that the Dutch were busy building 
their fort on Khark island he wrote to ~rr Ni$ir saying that he was ready to pay back 
the money he had taken from them. 21 This account comes from Dutch sources, 
whereas the English had a different story. In the Gombroon (Bandar Abbas) Diary it 
is recorded that the Dutch, after completing their fort on Khark, sent two of their 
ships to block both mouths of the Basrah river and seized several ships which were 
sent to Khark. Two of the ships which were taken belonged to Shalabi, a well-known 
Basran merchant of that time, and were carrying a rich cargo from Surat, now fallen 
into the hands of the Dutch at Khark. The Dutch recalled their two ships from the 
Basrah river and proposed making a prize of Shalabi' s vessel unless they received 
immediate payment of the Turkish government's debts.22 The Dutch Resident, 
Kniphausen, may have been irresponsible in acting in this way, and how far he might 
have been able to answer to his government for his actions, in seizing the Grand Seig-
nor's subjects and Turkish vessels, could only be determined in the event of the Turks 
taking revenge. 
As it was, by January 1755 the Dutch had resolved their dispute with the Turkish 
government at Basrah, which had paid them the moneys previously extorted from 
them. 
debts, and to export their effects. On receiving satisfaction from the Turkish 
government they released Shalabi's and other vessels.23 In his book, The Arabs of the 
Gulf, Slot describes the authorities in Basrah as the losers in the affair. They were 
fearful of the competition from Khark and sent expensive presents to Kniphausen, 
urging him to return to Basrah.24 The Dutch therefore diverted a ship (when used in 
contradistinction to other kinds of craft this indicated a large, European-style vessel) 
and a sloop from their destination in the Gulf, the latter laden with spices, sugar, 
iron, lead and piece goods, and sent them to Basrah with two of their officials, with a 
view to re-establishing their factory at the specific request and invitation of Sulaiman 
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Basha of Baghdad. Kniphausen, however, having gone there for that purpose and 
fmding the place involved in troubles and offering no prospect of quick and profitable 
sales, thought it better to postpone the re-establishment to a more favourable 
opportunity. 2s 
From the time of Kniphausen's arrival in the Gulf, the English had kept a watchful 
eye on his proceedings in order to prevent any encroachment on the East India Com-
pany's privileges in the Gulf. If he had any designs in that sense the English hoped it 
would be within their power to stop him. The English Resident in Basrah, being so 
close to Khark, was in a position to give the Company a detailed account of Dutch 
affairs and was under continuous instructions to report fully on the subject.26 Persia, 
meanwhile, continued as before to labour under 'commotions', whereby every ruler 
on the Persian coast acted according to his own wishes. 27 
4.3 'Commotion' at Bandar Riq 
On 4 or 5 July 1754, Mir N~ir was ready to go to Khark island with his ships and 
gallivats, as he had agreed with the Dutch, and to follow their ships to the Basrah 
river. All the preparations for the voyage had been made and he had already sent 
three gallivats to Khark so the Dutch were expecting him at any time. On 6 July, 
however, news came that :Mir N~ir had been killed the day before by his youngest 
son Mir Muhanna, with the help of some criminal elements, at the moment when his 
oldest son M"rr ijusain was busy readying the ship and the two other gallivats on the 
anchorage. M"rr l;lusain, accompanied by very few men, fled in a small native craft 
and arrived at Khark island. The murderers, using a mixture of violence and bribery, 
had induced most of the inhabitants of Bandar Riq to accept Mir Muhanna as their 
ruler, and the two gallivats which had arrived at Khark fled away at night, attracted 
by promises from the new ruler. 28 The killing of Mir N~ir by his son, Mir 
Muhanna, was said to originate in the father taking one of his son's favourite 
Georgian women from him and giving her to the Dutch on Khark. 29 
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Mir ijusain, who had received help from the rulers of Dashtistan after writing to 
them, and received money also from the Dutch, landed secretly between Bushire and 
Bandar Riq on 25 July and went to visit the rulers of the area. On 6 August, he 
arrived before Bandar Riq whereupon most inhabitants rallied to his side. His evil 
brother and his adherents fled, so M""rr ijusain became master of Bandar Riq and its 
dependencies on I 0 August 1754. This was a good development for the Dutch 
because he was a sincere man and no less devoted to the interests of the Dutch East 
Indies Company than his father was.3° On 11 December, however, Mir Muhanna, 
supported by a native ruler related to him on his mother's side, Kayid ijaidar of 
Ganawah (who lived from robbing and plundering caravans, and was mentioned on 
page 123), made a night attack with a force of about 300 men against his brother M""rr 
l;lusain. Thirty men were killed in Mir l;lusain's house and l;lusain himself, seriously 
wounded, was taken prisoner. Mir Muhanna thus brought Bandar Riq under his con-
trol but M"rr l;lusain managed to escape from prison on 16 December and went to the 
Dashtistan army, by which means he was re-instated in government. Mir Muhanna 
was taken to Tang-i s-rr, whose ruler was a friend of Mir l;lusain and an enemy of the 
ruler of Bushire. M"rr ijusain went to Khark island and presented the Dutch with a 
gallivat in return for their assistance. 31 
Tne Governor-General of the Dutch East indies took note of the assistance given and 
issued an order to the Dutch Resident on Khark not to interfere in conflicts between 
local peoples, but received the following reply: 
Your honor should understand that we are unable to maintain our-
selves here [on Khark] without entertaining close friendship with 
some of the local rulers, especially those nearby. This friendship 
can only be obtained by gifts or hope of military assistance. We 
deem that by giving 3 barrels of powder and bullets we served the 
Company better than by giving presents that only stimulate the other 
rulers to ask for the same. The imprudence you accuse us of in sup-
porting Mir Hussain with the sloop 'Pasgeld' with 8 European men 
and two three-pounder guns has not caused the evil consequences 
you expected but given us great prestige among the Persians, 
because they have seen that a sloop with 8 Europeans can do more 
than they achieve with 4000-5000 soldiers.32 
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The Persian Government had sent Path 'Ali Shah, a Persian officer, with a body of 
men to subjugate Cazaroon (a district between Shiraz and Bushire) ·where they had 
massacred a number of innocent people. The inhabitants of Dashtistin joined with 
Mir "ijusain of Bandar Riq who began making the necessary preparations to defend 
himself in the event of an attack. Upon hearing reports of FatQ 'Ali Shah's plan to 
march towards Bandar Riq and Bushire, most of the principal Armenian merchants 
retired with their effects to Khark island. 33 
4.4 The English Settlement at Bandar Rig 
Ever since 1753 the English had been looking for a place in the Gulf in which to settle 
before departing from Bandar Abbas. Mr Ellis, lately the Resident at Basrah, had 
told his superiors in Bombay that it would be advantageous for the East India Com-
pany to have an employee residing at Bandar Riq. 34 The writer has found no mention 
in the English records of the English asking permission of the Mir to open an estab-
lishment in Bandar Riq but the Dutch records tell us35 'The English had originally 
asked permission in a letter to Mir Nasir, but they had received no reply because of 
Mir Nasir's death'. The Dutch believed the request to be just an intrigue to make 
trouble between the Dutch and the ruler of Bandar Riq. 36 
The Court of Directors of the East India Company in England, in an order dated 5 
April 1754, left it to the Governor of Bombay to settle an employee at Bandar Riq 'in 
the Gulf of Persia', and he decided to establish a factory there under the charge of 
Francis Wood. Instructions were issued to Wood to promote the consumption of 
English woollen manufactures, and to hinder the merchants from dealing in French or 
any other foreign woollen manufactures. He was empowered to levy a duty on all 
imports and exports by people trading under the East India Company's protection. 
He was further advised that upon his arrival at Bandar Riq he should notify the pur-
pose of his coming to the Shaikh or the government in the plainest and most open 
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manner, so that there should be no dispute or misunderstanding with either the 
government or the Dutch who, at that time, had great influence in the Gulf. 37 (see 
Appendix 10) 
Francis Wood departed on his way to Bandar Riq after a long wait for a suitable ship 
from Bandar Abbas to Bushire.38 He arrived there on 16 March 1755 and enquired 
about the situation in Bandar Riq. He was told that the place was in such a state of 
confusion and poverty through civil strife that to go there would be very dangerous as 
well as unprofitable.39 On 22 March Mir Muhanna was set free by the ruler of Tang-i 
Sir on the recommendation of the local rulers and arrived in Bushire, where he held 
secret talks with Francis Wood and with the ruler of Bushire, the contents of which 
no-one knew. Shaikh N~ir of Bushire induced some local chiefs of Dashtistan to co-
operate with him for the re-instatement of Mir Muhanna and a force of about 500 men 
set off. A day's travel from Bandar Riq, however, they were bribed by the forces of 
other Dashtistan rulers, friends of Mir ijusain, to desert the cause of Shaikh N~ir and 
Mir Muhanna and these two were obliged to retire to Bushire in a hurry. Mr Wood, 
seeing little progress in plans to re-instate Mir Muhanna, decided now to go to Bandar 
Riq but Shaikh N~ir ordered all local vessels to refuse to carry him; he was therefore 
practically a prisoner in Bushire. 40 That, at any rate, is what the Dutch reported but 
on 9 April 1755 Wood wrote to Alexander Douglas, the Agent at Bandar Abbas: 'In 
the midst of these disagreabie considerations, not to mention the int1uence of the 
Dutch, and the danger in such perilous times of dwelling in an open town without 
wall or fortification, I have judged it most advisable to remain at this place till your 
worship's further orders' .41 
Wood added that since Mir N~ir' s death many rich merchants had resorted to Bushire 
so that the place had become a mart for all the commodities appropriate to the Persian 
trade. This attraction had encouraged him to make the same sort of proposals to the 
Shaikh of Bushire as his instructions had required him to make at Bandar Riq, if he 
could have gone there. He said that the Shaikh of Bushire readily agreed to the 
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proposals with many a profession of friendship, but could not help remarking that for 
the Europeans, who were held to be among the most reasonable and shrewd people in 
the world, the privilege of trading custom-free ought to be considered a sufficient 
indulgence, he thought, without expecting the additional advantage of levying duties 
at a port where it had never been customary. Wood said the Shaikh assured him that 
it would give him the greatest satisfaction to have his town honoured with an English 
settlement, but that the customs duty proposal would, he feared, cause the merchants 
to take their goods elsewhere. Even if it did not give rise to that drawback, the ship-
ping people would demand higher rates in proportion to the increase in their charges 
so, unless he made an equivalent allowance in the inland customs to the up-country 
merchants, the markets for all commodities, either imports or exports, via the English 
would become that much percent worse than they were before. 42 
Since there was nothing in the Shaikh's arguments with which Wood could disagree, 
he neither agreed nor dissented, but in discussion pressed the Shaikh to bring the 
negotiation to a fair and speedy conclusion so that no disputes might arise later. After 
Wood's mention of several Dutch precedents the Shaikh at last agreed to accept Rs 
1,500 per annum, but, Wood having warned him that nothing could be finally settled 
without the endorsement of Alexander Douglas, the Shaikh granted a trial year during 
which the East India Company would see whether it would suit the Company's pur-
pose to maintain a Resident in Bushire or not. If it did, the Shaikh wouid expect to 
receive the agreed consideration to recompense him for the loss he would incur by the 
Company's customs levy.43 
When Alexander Douglas received Francis Wood's letter he was surprised to read 
that, on a mere report of trouble at Ban dar Riq, Wood had deviated from the instruc-
tions given him by the President and Council of the East India Company. He wrote 
back, saying: 
Had you, as without doubt you ought, proceeded thither and found it 
impracticable or unadviseable to settle a Factory there you should 
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then have tried Bushire and advised us thereof, when we should 
have given you such directions as we might deem most beneficial to 
the Interest of the Honble Company but what could induce you to 
enter into any agreements with Shaik Nasseir, e're you were con-
vinced Bunderick was ruind. We know not, however, as the princi-
pal cause of you being orderd to Bunderick was of sending a large 
quantity of Woolen goods, you may after making a Tryal at 
Bunderick and finding it impossible or imprudent to settle, return to 
Busshire, where you are to follow the same instructions as given you 
by the Governour and Council. 44 
On 4 June 1755 Wood arrived at Bandar Riq, which was completely devoid of mer-
chants or any other inhabitants except fishennen. He found M"rr :ijusain surrounded 
with soldiers and on the point of departing for Shiraz: :ijusain nevertheless postponed 
his journey for three days out of courtesy to Wood and freely granted him all the 
privileges which the Governor of Bombay had charged him to obtain. After Mir 
:ijusain's departure the Arabs at Bandar Riq became so threatening that Wood was 
forced to leave and made his way to Khark, where Kniphausen received him very 
civilly but Wood, not wanting to inconvenience him, went on to Basrah, where he 
stayed until July. Since M"rr :ijusain had still not returned from Shiraz, Wood then 
proceeded to Bushire where he would have waited until Mir :ijusain returned and 
resumed the government of Bandar Riq. Katim Khan, meanwhile, summoned Mir 
Muhanna, Shaikh Kayid :ijaidar of Ganawah, Shaikh N~ir of Bushire and a large 
number of the people of Bushire to Shiraz and threatened them as to their future 
behaviour. He then let them leave, quite devoid of provisions, clothes and money, 
for Bushire, where Wood made them a gift of rice and piece goods to the value of 
nearly Rs 360. Shaikh N~ir of Bushire remained in prison in Shiraz for not render-
ing the account for his lease of the late Nadir Shah's ships, and not paying the 5,000 
Tomans due for the past three years of revenue from Bahrain. During his stay in 
Bush ire Wood obtained a raqam from Katim Khan permitting a factory at Bandar Riq 
and went there on 9 September, reporting that the- inhabitants expressed great satisfac-
tion at his arrival. He also secured a raqam from Katim Khan by which all the chiefs 
of the adjacent areas were strictly forbidden to give him the slightest trouble: M"rr 
Muhanna and all the Shaikhs of both opposed parties assured him of the most con-
siderate treatment. So Wood began building a house for the East India Company and 
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had high hopes of establishing a profitable settlement for the selling of English 
manufactures. He was certain that the credit enjoyed by the English would soon draw 
all the merchants back again and restore the port to its fonner flourishing state. 45 
Nevertheless, within seven months of his arrival in Bandar Riq Wood expressed to 
Douglas his fears that little could be done at Bandar Riq, and seemed of the opinion -
after the overtures made to him by the Shaikh of Bushire - that a settlement there 
would be much more suitable. 46 
4.5 The Dutch activity on Khark Island 
On 6 April 1756, Wood, now the Resident at Bandar Riq, crossed over to Khark 
island and toured around it with van der Hulst, the Dutch second-in-charge, who 
showed him the lands allocated for cultivation by the Chinese; he confinned the 
Dutch intention to settle 80 Chinese families there and to expel the Arab inhabitants. 
Kniphausen, he learnt, had eight or ten small trankeys with pearl divers in constant 
employment, whenever the day was calm, fishing for pearls - there being an 
abundance of oysters around the island. He sent the natives of the island out in the 
boats to take the oysters from the divers and deliver them to Kniphausen, just as they 
came from the sea. In this way, unless a man saw the oysters being opened, and this 
was always done in private, no-one could judge what particular success he had 
1 • • A.., acmeveo ... , 
Kniphausen thought it worth making a trial of the Khark pearl fisheries because he 
had observed that its inhabitants, albeit unable to dive, were able to gather oysters at 
the lowest tides. The year before, therefore, he had taken on divers from the main-
land coast and brought them to Khark: these did not include most of the best divers 
who were tied by the pressure of debts to their boat owners. 
The divers having been hired and adequately equipped, Kniphausen ordered them to 
dive daily around the islands, but he found that it was impossible to make any profit 
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this way unless he was present himself, because the sailors were not moving and the 
divers were going no deeper than two or three fathoms - and that scarcely five or six 
times a day. He saw that it would be impracticable for Europeans to incite the local 
people to greater activity without the violence and beatings they themselves used. But 
Kniphausen had convinced himself that the fishery around the two islands might offer 
considerable profits if other means could be employed. He accordingly wrote to the 
Governor-General of the Dutch East India Company to elaborate his proposals. The 
first arose from the fact that the mediocre divers who had served him so badly barely 
compensated for their cost: the experts estimated the value of the pearls he had sent at 
Rs 865, whereas the sum paid to the divers and the sailors, and for the vessels and 
provisions was Rs 854. Kniphausen thought that if divers who could dive, according 
to reports, very much deeper could be brought from the Coromandel coast, Ceylon or 
Toticorin, the heart of the pearl fishery in the Tamil areas, considerable profits could 
be made. And Europeans working as rowers on the gallivats would further reduce 
expenses. 
The second proposal which Kniphausen thought might be used in the pearl fishery 
with less expense but no less gain was to bring some glass diving bells from Holland 
for experiment. The invention, he said, had been made in England some years 
previously and had been used with great success on sunken ships. According to 
reports in ihe English press a diver was thus enabied to go into very deep water and to 
stay there a long time doing whatever was necessary. These characteristics promised 
great advantages in pearl diving because the divers could thereby reach deep areas 
which had never before been visited by the Arabs. Moreover, because apparently the 
best catch was in those depths and because the diver would not be driven to the sur-
face for lack of breath so quickly, he would have the time to look carefully around; 
he would be able to fill large baskets with oysters and so be able to achieve more than 
four of the best ordinary divers. These reasons had impelled Kniphausen to add six of 
the glass bells, with clear instructions for their use, to his normal requests for mer-
chandise. 48 
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Kniphausen' s plan to us.e diving bells for pearling in the Gulf was also noted by the 
English traveller, Edward lves, who passed by Khark in 1753. lves said that 
Kniphausen was very inquisitive about the diving bell and about other recent discov-
eries made in England for enabling men to stay a long time under water. He commis-
sioned lves to buy and send him from England various books and instruments.49 The 
Dutch tried every means to divert trade into their own hands and, according to Wood, 
if an obstinate perseverance in selling their goods at low prices in order to encourage 
the merchants, taken with their steady resolve to carry on with fortifications and 
buildings at almost incredible expense could be considered means of achieving that 
success, then the Dutch were well on their way. But Wood could not see any trade 
going on nor did he believe that Khark would in any way repay the costs the Dutch 
had incurred till Persia in general became settled. Then, he thought, its very location 
would make it both populous and flourishing. 
Although 100 Europeans was the military establishment allowed by Batavia for the 
defence of Khark island, Wood saw about 60, including seven or eight petty officers, 
'neat handsome men', maintaining the strictest discipline. Beside these Kniphausen 
had more than 100 native slaves who were well armed in the style of the country with 
swords and shields. From his mariner of dealing with them they seemed likely to 
remain ioyai and content, aithough under bondage, since he took care to supply them 
with plenty of dates, fish and bread, decent clothing and, to 'cool the natural fervor of 
their dispositions', he allowed a large number of native women to live among them in 
common. Nor did he ever interfere in their religion. When they committed a fault, 
however, he severely punished them: whenever he had occasion to beat any of the 
Arabs or the local people he ordered two or three of the slaves to take the matter in 
hand- which, Wood observed, was particularly suited to them. 
The manne strength officially allocated to the island comprised a sloop of ten 
carriage-guns and six swivel-guns; a gallivat mounting six three-pounders and four 
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swivel-guns; and three new trankeys. Wood tried to discover whether the Dutch 
really intended to take possession of Bahrain, as Kniphausen was apparently planning, 
but could glean no dependable information. If there were such a scheme in their 
heads, he said, it was very secret and he thought they would not put it into execution 
until the Chinese were well settled on Khark. Kniphausen' s superiors, in fact, dis-
approved of such a venture. so 
The town itself had no wall around it but had instead a deep ditch with drawbridges, 
which was capable of admitting and providing a safe harbour for the gallivats and 
trankeys. Kniphausen told Wood that he had ordered it to be dug and estimated that 
the cost would amount to about Rs 45,000.51 The Dutch warehouses were full of 
goods - particularly sugar, sugar candy, pepper, other spices of all kinds, tin, zinc, 
iron, lead, rice, leather, double-width perpets and different kinds of broadcloth. 52 
In June 1756 M"rr :ijusain, ruler of Bandar Riq, had gone to Karim Khan in Shiraz in 
order to complain about the help Shaikh N~ir of Bushire planned to give to ijusain's 
brother M"rr Muhanna. Karim Khan had written to the Dutch several times about this 
and to inform them that he had appointed M"rr :ijusain as ruler of Bandar Riq, asking 
them to help ijusain against his enemies as much as they could. The Dutch replied to 
these letters in a friendly way but without committing themselves to anything. Then, 
in August 1756, the Dutch were invited by a special messenger from Karim Khan and 
Mir :ijusain to send a competent surgeon to Shiraz. They sent the chief surgeon, 
Fitch, from Khark and used the occasion to send Karim Khan a letter of complaint 
against Shaikh N~ir of Bushire. 53 Notwithstanding all this activity, the period 1755-
61 saw no increase in Khark island trade for the DutchS4 (see Appendices 11 to 16). 
4.6 The Withdrawal of the English Settlement from Bandar Riq 
On 8 June 1756, Wood received a letter from Kniphausen warning him to be aware of 
the danger of an impending attack on Bandar Riq by Mir Muhanna. From this Wood 
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concluded that Kniphausen had at last decided to punish Mir ijusain and that Bandar 
Riq might be involved in troubles very suddenly: he immediately pondered what 
advantages the Dutch could expect from an open rupture with Mir ijusain other than 
to prevent an English settlement being established there. Since he could not think of 
one of any significance he panicked and thought it advisable to leave for Basrah, 
returning after the trouble was over. From Basrah, Wood wrote to Douglas asking 
him to satisfy the needs of his people for arms, and both timber and stores, to fmish 
the building - which he was anxious to give a defensive capability. He accused the 
Dutch of having helped M"rr Muhanna.ss but Slot holds that there is no firm proof for 
these accusations.s6 The Resident at Basrah, Shaw, met Wood, who expressed his 
fear that little could be done at Bandar Riq and seemed to be of the opinion, by virtue 
of the overtures made him by the Shaikh of Bushire, that a settlement there would be 
much more suitable. Shaw wrote to the Governor of Bombay about the situation 
without copying his letter to Douglas, the Resident at Bandar Abbas, who complained 
to Shaw and ordered Wood to return to Bandar Riq.s7 
Wood returned to Bandar Riq on 2 July 1756 to find the plot had been fully realised. 
Mir Muhanna, together with a 'pack of drunken, idle wretches', who had been his 
accomplices in the murder of his father, entered Bandar Riq and killed his· brother, 
Mir ijusain, along with several others. The East India Company's house, on which 
Rs 20,000 had aiready been spent, had been ieveiied to the ground and the Engiish 
flag had been struck. At the same time, the troubles there had prevented the consign-
ment of woollen goods and tin from the Betsey being taken ashore and she had been 
sent on with her cargo to Basrah.ss Mir Muhanna refused to allow Wood to collect 
duties from merchants trading under English protection unless he agreed to pay 
Muhanna Rs 2,000 a year. By his harsh treatment of them he also drove away the 
few merchants and useful inhabitants who were there and he was reduced to great 
poverty. In spite of everything, his allies in Khark supported him and, playing upon 
their support, he became extremely insolent to all his neighbours, who were ready to 
destroy him the moment he was deserted by the Dutch. Wood reported that the Dutch 
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gave Mir Muhanna Rs 2,000 and Shaikh 'Ali Ma'$iim (one of the Shaikhs who had 
joined Mir Muhanna) also received Rs 1,200 and four shawls - a customary and 
valued gift at the time.s9 Finding the troubles still in progress, Wood secretly carried 
all his valuable effects back with him to Basrah on the very same day, 2 July 1756, 
and, on the day he left, Mir Muhanna employed a large number of labourers to carry 
off the materials of the Company's house to build a wall around his town.60 Whilst 
Douglas, at Bandar Abbas, was getting ready to embark William Hughes, whom he 
had appointed Assistant Resident at Bandar Riq, along with two carpenters and to load 
the medicines, stationery, stores and materials on board a ship proceeding to Bandar 
Riq, he received a letter from Wood informing him of the troubles at Bandar Riq and 
of his departure from there. 61 Douglas was greatly concerned by this news and 
criticised Wood as pusillanimous, writing: 
You ought to represent to Meer Manna the advantages it will be to 
Bunderick our Hon 'ble Masters having a settlement there, on the 
other hand that he may depend the Hon 'ble the President and Coun-
cil of Bombay will take satisfaction for any insults offered the 
Hon 'ble Company or their Servants. 62 
In April 1756 the vessel Pasterenia, under English protection, ran ashore and was 
stranded at Kangun. Douglas accused the Shaikh of Kangun of having plundered the 
consignments and sent the Swallow and the Drake of the Bombay Marine in the Gulf 
to demand satisfaction of the Shaikh. Since Wood was well acquainted with the cir-
cumstances of the case, having already approached the Shaikh about it, Douglas asked 
him to use the expedition to establish the factory at Bandar Riq, or at least to obtain 
satisfaction from M"rr Muhanna for his recent behaviour in demolishing the Com-
pany's house, and from there to take the expedition to Kangun. The expedition left 
Bandar Abbas on 15 October and arrived at Bandar Riq at the end of that month. 63 
As far as the Swallow and Drake going to Bandar Riq was concerned, Wood's opinion 
was that their forces were inadequate for their purpose since he had consulted their 
Captains and found that they could not land more than 65 or 70 men from both ships. 
Moreover, the town of Bandar Riq was situated in such a manner that a large vessel 
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such as the Bombay ships could not approach nearer than two miles to it. Mir 
Muhanna had upwards of 500 men of his own tribe within one hour's notice and they 
were tolerably good soldiers when employed in houses or behind walls in their normal 
way of fighting. Wood thought it distinctly ill-advised to arrive at an open rupture 
with the people of Bandar Riq because the Mir himself was miserably poor and the 
inhabitants had only salt-fish and dates to lose, unless the English could lay hands on 
a few old boats and three ships belonging to the ~rr. In that event the Company's 
hopes of settling there again would be totally destroyed. 64 
As regards the Shaikh of Kangun, Wood wrote that many of the freighters as well as 
the Captain and officers of the Pasterenia had signed an agreement with the Shaikh to 
share equally anything that could be salvaged: what the Shaikh had done, therefore, 
bore the appearance of justice to some extent. He added that this was not his main 
objection; the village was very straggling and had been extended along the coast 
among date gardens so that, if the English bombarded it from the sea, they would 
cause it very little harm. Moreover, the village was situated near the mountains and, 
in the event of the English landing, the Arabs could easily remove their valuable pos-
sessions to safety in less than half an hour. So, after killing a number of innocent 
people and risking the loss of many of the English, the remainder would be forced to 
retire without obtaining any satisfaction, while the Arabs would be so hostile towards 
the English that there would be unhappy consequences for any of the latter who might 
later fall into their hands. 65 For these reasons Wood delayed beginning hostilities 
against the Arabs of Bandar Riq and Kangun, and while he was planning to despatch 
the two vessels on 8 November 1756, along with the East India Company's Dragon, 
an unfortunate event took place. 
Between 10 and 11 p.m. on 6 November, ~rr Muha.nna sent a guard of Arab soldiers 
under Shaikh Ghanim, one of his relatives, to tum Wood and all the Europeans out of 
the place immediately. They insisted very forcefully on the Europeans leaving in less 
than half an hour but without giving any reason other than Muhanna's suspicion that 
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the English were his enemies. A Mr George Purn~ll, who spoke Arabic, helped 
Wood to persuade the guard that the English were friends but he could not prevail 
upon Shaikh Ghanim to let them stay until morning. Wood then offered Shaikh 
Ghanim Rs 40 if he would bring ijajj'i ijusain Saffery, the chief of the tribe and a 
calm, well-disposed man. Shaikh Ghanim told Wood, however, that the M'ir's orders 
were so positive that he, and all the soldiers with him, ran a great risk in talking with 
him for so long and that, if they did not leave immediately, he might oblige them to 
do so by force. He thereupon ordered his men to surround the gateway, their powder 
matches already lit, and peremptorily asked again whether they would go or not. The 
English thought it unwise to argue any further and went on board the Dragon, leaving 
behind everything save the clothes on their backs. The Arab soldiers then disarmed 
the soldiers of the detachment, took possession of Wood's effects and the specie, and 
took away three months' provisions. 
The next day M"rr Muhanna sent Agha Mal:tmiid, an Arab officer, to bring Wood and 
Hughes ashore again but Wood detained Agha Mal:tmiid and made him send one of his 
servants with a letter to M'ir Muhanna, saying that he would not release his prisoner 
until his money and goods were restored. The M'ir asked for gunpowder as part of 
the deal, whereupon two barrels were supplied, and within ten days Wood received 
everything on board the Swallow which could conveniently be brought off. Agha 
Mal;lmud was released after t.lte embarkation cf the detachment of soldiers and then 
the whole party left Bandar R'iq.66 
4. 7 The Siege of Bandar Riq 
In January 1757, Kar'im Khan was provoked to anger against the Dashtistan Shaikhs 
and the Dutch Company by their assistance to M'ir ijusain (see page 130). He 
brought all of the Dashtistan Shaikhs as far as Bandar R'iq under his control and took 
them as hostages: he made threats against the Dutch on Khark island, animated by the 
prospect of winning great booty there from the Company and from the Armenian, 
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Banian and Muslim merchants. 67 Nine months later Katim Khan marched again to 
the coast to besiege the ruler of Ganawah, Kayid ij:aidar, who had refused to submit 
to him, and was accompanied in the expedition by three gallivats from Bandar Riq 
under the authority of M"rr Muhanna. This put Kniphausen on his guard, knowing the 
M"rr as unreliable and the murderer of both his father and his brother. On its way to 
Basrah, a ship belonging to Kniphausen carrying merchandise bought on Khark and 
the property of local merchants, met adverse winds and strayed out of the sight of the 
Dutch gallivats: M"rr Muhanna, without any orders from the Khan, pursued and 
robbed it of its cargo, leaving it empty. A brother of Karim Khan, and other Persian 
dignitaries, went on board the ship to see what was left and quarrelled with him 
before going away to report to the Khan. Mir Muhanna meanwhile fled with his three 
gallivats and the stolen ship. The Khan immediately sent 4,000 men to Bandar Riq 
and informed the inhabitants that if the Mir did not submit himself within three days 
he would plunder the place and bum it to the ground. 
Kniphausen thought that if the Dutch took revenge for the Mir' s aggression they 
would gain the favour of the Khan. They therefore sent the sloop 't Loo with the gal-
livat Draak, reinforced with soldiers, against M"rr Muhanna's vessels, which were 
then lying under Cape Bang (part of Bang mountain, rising to 1,000 ft above sea 
level, on the coast 30 miles north of Khark island). A strong NW breeze and the 
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for three days and, during that time, he disembarked and went to the Persian army. 
There he was arrested and the Dutch concluded that by ordering their ships back they 
could expect satisfaction from Karim Khan. He, in fact, wrote them a friendly letter 
explaining that the ship had been taken without his permission; that the bad behaviour 
of Mir Muhanna had caused most of the merchandise to be lost in the confusion; that 
he would arrange the matter of their merchandise with the merchants who were his 
subjects; but that he could not make restitution of the goods which belonged to the 
Dutch. The Dutch answered with complaints about the damage to trade and the fact 
that some of their merchandise valued at 2, 704 Guilders had belonged to Kniphausen. 
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Following on from this the stolen vessel was returned to the Dutch with the promise 
of restitution of the merchandise. Kniphausen took the precaution of arresting the 
inhabitants of Bandar Riq who were on Khark in order to have security for his goods: 
the advantage of this was that M""rr Muhanna was kept as a prisoner and, in his place, 
his youngest brother, Mir 'Ali, had been appointed ruler of Bandar Riq and the Dutch 
expected good things of him. 68 
Before leaving Shiraz at the beginning of 1758 to fight against Mul)ammad Khan of 
Isfahan, Karim Khan had released Mir Muhanna from prison against promise of pay-
ment of a certain sum, and had appointed him ruler of Bandar Abbas. 69 With the 
army of Karim Khan marching north in March 1758, Mul}.ammad Khan's forces bes-
ieged Shiraz with Karim Khan for a few months and this gave Mir Muhanna the 
chance to leave Bandar Abbas and go to Bandar Riq, where he gave orders to execute 
his brother, Mir 'Ali, and two of his cousins. Muhanna behaved well towards the 
Dutch and they worked to maintain this situation. 70 Kniphausen asked Mossel, the 
Governor General in Batavia, to release him from the Residency of Khark and, in 
1759, he left for Batavia: his assistant, van der Hulst, was appointed Resident at 
Khark in his stead. 71 
During the whole year of 1759 navigation in the Gulf was impeded by the depreda-
tions of M""rr Muha..rma. Duri..11.g tlte month of November he was up the Basra.lt river 
with three gallivats pursuing the Qawasim of s-rr (s-rr was the coast from Ras al-
Khaimah up to Sharjah) who used to sail from there with their vessels laden with 
dates. Mir Muhanna made the pretence of believing that the Qawasim had done him 
some harm, whereas it seemed in reality that his pretexts merely hid the intent to 
plunder. The Qawasim, however, had gathered all their vessels together and 
Muhanna did not dare attack them. Instead, he captured a ship belonging to Luft (on 
Qishm island) with a moderately rich cargo. Soon after, he captured another ship 
from Basrah and let it be known that he had now captured enough to be able to lead a 
rich and prosperous life in Ban dar Riq. 
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The distribution of the two ships' cargoes among the Mir's people attracted a crowd 
of thieves and desperadoes to Bandar Riq, with the result that every week one or two 
gallivats left for three or four days and returned with trank:eys they had encountered, 
releasing only those that were empty. This state of affairs caused the Dutch some 
anxiety because the gallivats' success attracted even more bandits and villains to 
Bandar Riq. Several letters had been written to Mir Muhanna by Kniphausen when 
he was residing on Khark island, asking for merchandise belonging to people from 
Khark island to be returned, but without reply. The Mir's gallivats now captured 
trank:eys even within sight of Khark, as was the case with a vessel belonging to the 
ruler of Ganawah. The Dutch felt obliged to do something so they· decided not to 
allow his vessels access to Khark any more and, if his gallivats came in sight, to pur-
sue them with the gallivats of the Dutch Company. This had little effect, in fact, 
because the Arab gallivats were full of men and could row correspondingly fast. 
The Mir's gallivats continued to attack ships in 1759 in the upper part of the Gulf 
until they captured a large trankey from Basrah between Khark and Basrah, and came 
unexpectedly in sight of Khark. The Dutch sent the gallivats Draak and Tiger in pur-
suit and, because the stolen trank:ey was too heavily laden to cross the shoals off 
Bandar Riq, it was left there. The Dutch gallivats dared not cross the shallows 
because they did not know u'le area, and found only 4 ft of water, so anchored near 
the trank:ey. Mir Muhanna's gallivats observing this, and believing that the Dutch 
were in disarray with rigging problems, thought that this was an opportune moment to 
capture the Dutch vessels. They therefore approached the Draak at great speed, down 
to musket range, but were then met with artillery as well as small arms fire which 
caused such confusion that the Mir' s sailors jumped overboard and tried to drag the 
Dutch gallivats over the shallows by ropes. The Draak lifted its anchor and blocked 
their way, overpowering M""rr Muhanna's best gallivat. Meanwhile, before the Tiger 
could get near, the other gal1ivat escaped but the Tiger was able to take the stolen 
Basrah trank:ey, and both returned to Khark. 
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This sea action prevented Mir Muhanna from putting to sea again although he daily 
employed his people on shore in stealing com. All the merchants and seafarers of the 
Gulf and the Red Sea expressed their satisfaction and gratitude saying that the Dutch 
establishment on Khark was the greatest support for their navigation in the Gulf and 
was a benefit for them in all respects. The captured gallivat was kept by the Dutch 
Company for a sum of 3, 750 Guilders and the cargo on it was sold at auction for 
1648 Guilders, after deduction of a quarter for the Dutch Company: that money was 
distributed among the sailors from the Dutch East India Company's gallivat. At the 
request of the merchants of Basrah, the Dutch decided to return the stolen trankey. In 
this way the Dutch came to a complete rupture with Mir Muhanna and decided to 
enter upon a close friendship with his neighbour, and worst enemy, Kayid ijaidar, to 
whom they offered gifts to the value of 713 Guilders. The advantage to the Dutch 
was that Mir Muhanna would now have to be on his guard to landward, and that they 
could easily obtain provisions for Khark island from the mainland. 72 
In 1760 the Persian kingdom was in turmoil and Karim Khan was the main cause of 
this, being at war with his enemies to the north of Shiraz and leaving M""rr Muhanna 
free on the south coast. The M""rr besieged Kayid ijaidar in Ganawah on 29 December 
1759 but the .Company's gallivats secured the coast and, thanks to some lucky artil-
lery hits on the besiegers, Muha.11na was obliged to lLft the siege on 15 Ja.11ua.ry and 
retire to Bandar Riq, where he continued to plunder the surrounding area. The ruler 
of Bushire and the Shaikhs of all Dashtistan marched against him on 7 August 1760, 
but quarrels among their leaders and a small victory gained by Muhanna over a group 
of their horsemen made them retire. M""rr Muhanna remained at war with all of his 
neighbours during the year73 and his continued robbery forced the rulers of Dashtistan 
on the mainland to complain about him to Karim Khan. At the beginning of January 
1761, an envoy from Karim Khan arrived on Khark island asking the Dutch to block-
ade Bandar Riq from the sea while the Khan besieged it. The Dutch promised to do 
so. The Khan therefore sent Wali Khan, in early January 1761, with some troops to 
145 
join the Dashtistan forces in the siege of Bandar Riq, but he was shot dead on 25 
January and another Persian commander continued the siege until 10 February, when 
he was surprised by Muhanna's soldiers at night and chased away from Bandar Riq. 
Sa'arn Khan arrived with fresh troops before Bandar Riq on 18 March, accompanied 
by Ra'is Mu~affar, the principal ruler of Dashtistan, and the siege was resumed. For 
two months they camped before Bandar Riq and reduced it to great hardship, but 
Muhanna then made a deal with Ra'is M~far, and Sa'arn Khan was forced to break 
off the siege. He retired to Cazaroon, where he reported to Karim Khan and asked 
for either orders to retire or fresh troops to resume the siege. It was to be expected 
that Karim Khan would opt for fresh troops in order to maintain his authority in that 
part of Persia, whilst towards the Caspian Sea everything was quiet and he had no 
enemies, as well as to make Bandar Riq submit and to punish Mir Muhanna. 
Muhanna, for his part, had lost many men and was clearly weakened. He did his 
utmost to repair the damage and to become even stronger than before. His renewed 
depredations on land made Shaikh Kayid ijaidar of Ganawah decide to abandon his 
domain because he had been unable to cultivate his land for three years, and many of 
his people had left him. Unable to withstand M""rr Muhanna's constant harassment, he 
retired with his family to Khark, where the Dutch could not deny him asylum because 
he had been a good ally of theirs. 74 
After reaching his agreement with Ra'is Mu~affar and forcing Sa'arn Khan to raise 
the siege, M""rr Muhanna had captured two important caravans, worth over Rs 20,000, 
travelling from Shiraz to Bushire. This increased his strength and he was able keep 
the roads in an unsafe state: from mid-1761 no caravans went from Bushire to Shiraz, 
and none came from Shiraz. There was great damage to trade since the Shaikh of 
Bushire was unable, on his own, to keep the roads secure and protect the caravans 
against the attacks of Mir Muhanna. The M""rr was also still at war with Shaikh 
Sulaiman of the Ka'b (an Arab tribe living in Khuzistan, on the east bank of the Shan 
al-'Arab in Persian territory). The conflict between Muhanna and the Dashtistan 
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shaikhs started up again although the Dutch kept out of it. Several of the merchants 
said that they had reliable news ~f the Khan with a large army on his way to 
Dashtistan: the Mir's gallivats stayed in port without venturing out to sea during this 
period. In September 1761 he had secretly sent out some small craft but they had 
been captured by two armed ships from Bushire. 75 
On 29 March 1762, however, a misfortune befell the Dutch when the Company gal-
livats, Draak and Tiger, at the Khark anchorage, were attacked by some of Mir 
Muhanna's armed vessels and the boatswain in charge of the gallivats was killed in 
trying to defend them. The sailors with him jumped overboard without offering any 
further defence and some made for the island, swimming or in the gallivats' launches. 
In this surprise attack the Dutch lost two gallivats, their boatswain and 16 sailors 
dead: with them they lost their power at sea and were left with only the gallivat Dar-
wiesh. Muhanna's men, with their own gallivats and the captured ones, retired out of 
range of the Dutch artillery, disembarked 200 men and advanced nearly to the plain 
where the fortress had been built. The Dutch sent a force of 31 soldiers and the same 
number of African slaves, with two pieces of field artillery, and quickly chased the 
invaders back to the sea cliffs. In that action several of the Mir' s men were killed or 
wounded while the Dutch had only five lightly injured but, because of the weakness 
of their garrison, could not expose their forces in a pursuit of the ~rr's men among 
the cliffs a..nd caves a..nd so expel them entirely from t.~e isla.'1d. Mir Muhanna's 
people remained on the island for five days, not daring to go within range of the 
Dutch artillery but sometimes showing themselves on the plain by night and being 
each time repulsed with losses. They finally re-embarked on 5 April and crossed to 
Bandar Riq, having achieved nothing but the plundering of houses on the mountain. 
Shaikh Ghaith, brother of the Shaikh of Bushire, arrived on Khark island on the fol-
lowing day, 6 April, with two gallivats, one dinghi and seven other vessels equipped 
for war, and accompanied by Kayid }Jaidar, the former ruler of Ganawah, with 100 
men. On the first day that M""rr Muhanna's men landed on Khark the Dutch had sent a 
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vessel to Basrah asking the Dutch sloop Cornelia to come to their assistance; the 
Cornelia duly arrived on the 7th, in the company of a small English ship, the Mon-
mouth, whose Captain, Joseph Price, had left his cargo in Basrah in order to offer the 
Dutch his services. The Dutch thus regained their mastery of the sea with the gallivat 
Darwiesh, the two sloops from Basrah, and the vessels from Bushire. In the event, 
the Dutch sloop, Cornelia, was of poor quality and could render little service so it 
was allowed to return to Basrah on 15 May but the English sloop, Monmouth, was 
retained until 20 July, when the new gallivat, under construction since shortly after 
the disaster of 29 March (see next paragraph), was brought to sea and equipped. 
With that gallivat and the Darwiesh the Dutch could keep the sea around Khark secure 
for the time being and, up to August 1762, ~rr Muhanna had not tried to take to the 
sea agmn. 
Nevertheless, a serious outbreak of disease in the autumn of 1761 had cost the Dutch 
the lives of 27 soldiers and sailors. Taken together with the loss of 17 sailors from 
the gallivats and the number of wounded in that action there was, therefore, a con-
siderable diminution in the strength of the Dutch hold on Khark island. Through the 
medium of a message carried by an English ship passing on its way to Surat at the 
time that Mir Muhanna's men were on the island, the Dutch Director and Council in 
Surat were informed of the situation and asked to send a sloop or gallivat. Failing 
t'hat t'hau ......... asL-a..l 4-",. .. t'he "eceSS"" ... ' ···~_nd ..... b .. :l.:l ...... ,_:_..a _ .... n: •• a~ on V\..arl- '~-­
... ~ ... ..,] ""'~"' D-""-' ~u~ .. ~ u G.J.] wuu ~V UU.U CL UlllU ~CLlliY L I All A. \::St:t: 
previous paragraph), since Mir Muhanna at that time had six gallivats and, in the 
longer term, the Dutch could not keep the sea safe with only two. 76 On land, the 
Dutch had been obliged to recruit some local soldiers to man the fortress and the 
emergency trenches they had dug. For these they could find none better than the men 
of Kayid ij:aidar, ruler of Ganawah, who were the sworn enemies of M"rr Muhanna 
and Bandar Riq and so the most reliable. 77 All the rulers of Dashtista.n and neigh-
bouring areas were also the M"rr' s inveterate enemies and were convinced that they 
would never be secure in their possessions as long as he was alive. 78 
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Van der Hulst was recalled by the High Government in Batavia because he had been 
remiss in his duties. He left Khark on 20 October 1762 but, instead of going to 
Batavia he returned to Europe. 79 Niebuhr wrote that van der Hulst had been recalled 
because of his misfortune not to be in favour with the Governor of Batavia80 but this 
is incorrect: more probably, he was removed for poor management. 
Since his expedition to Khark in March, M"rr Muhanna had never been at sea with his 
gallivats, because of his land-wars with his neighbours and Persian threats. Shaikh 
Sa'di, an inhabitant of Khark island, had made himself suspect because of his 
behaviour during the time that the M"rr' s Arabs from Bandar Riq had been on the 
island and an enquiry into him was launched. The enquiry showed that he had a great 
affinity with the people of Bandar Riq but that he was not guilty of treason, and he 
was banished for life from all lands of the Dutch Company. Ten sailors had escaped 
at risk to their lives from prison in Bandar Riq and had resumed their service on 
Khark.81 
In October 1762 it became widely known that Karim Khan had defeated his last 
dangerous enemy Kalb 'Ali Khan (his Persian rival in Bandar Abbas) some months 
before and had become master of Tabriz (a town to the north of Tehran) and, con-
sequently, of all Persia. He had therefore decided to exterminate M"rr Muhanna that 
winter a..&d had sent out t.i.e Khaa&s leadi.."lg his main force from Shi.."""aZ towards the 
mountains behind Bandar Riq. Another Khan was moving with an army corps and an 
artillery train to the coast by way of Cazaroon. Earlier plans to eliminate M"rr 
Muhanna had failed each time because the armies sent against him had been poor and 
their commanders in dispute with one another. This time, however, it was believed 
that better troops and more experienced commanders were going against him and the 
merchants expected the M"rr's end to be imminent. They thus hoped for a state of 
security for profitable trade in which they could send large quantities of merchandise 
to all the stable areas of the Persian kingdom. 82 In the event, the expectation that Mir 
Muhanna would be eliminated that winter was dashed because Karim Khan was 
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defeated by Fat}). 'Ali Khan (in revolt in Kinnan) and was in trouble in Upper Persia. 
In February 1763, the few troops sent against the Mir by Karim Khan had fled away 
and now almost the whole coast of Dashtistan, with the exception of Bushire, had 
submitted to Muhanna who constituted a daily threat to Bushire, and there was a fear 
that he would conquer it. The roads around Bushire were cut by Muhanna and in 
Khark this caused a scarcity in provisions such as sheep, much of which was 
transported to Khark from there. 
Van der Hulst had not been a good manager and, as noted on page 149, had left 
Khark, to be succeeded by his deputy, Buschman. Buschman, the new Resident, 
realised that the circumstances were critical, with a danger of Bushire falling into Mir 
Muhanna's hands; he therefore looked for a different solution. Muhanna had sent his 
congratulations to Buschman upon his promotion to Resident and continued to propose 
peace with the Dutch Company, saying that he was not unwilling to return the two 
captured gallivats if, instead, he could have the Dutch gallivat Darwiesh. This gave 
Buschman the opportunity to change course and to iron out the difficulties. After 
receiving a polite reply Mir Muhanna sent two plenipotentiary envoys to negotiate 
peace and the restitution of the gallivats. He also wrote to the Dutch Resident noti-
fying him that, in order to forward the cause of peace, he renounced all pretensions to 
the islands and all contracts which he claimed to have been concluded with his father, 
:Mir Nfu?ir, and that he was ready to return t..'u~ gallivats. The affair could not be 
decided as quickly as that, however, because he also wanted to exchange the silver 
swords and daggers which had 'been on the Darwiesh against artillery and ammuni-
tion. In the meantime some Khark vessels were able to cross over to Bandar Riq and 
returned with sheep and all other kinds of provisions: in addition, Muhanna sent back, 
of his own initiative, a ship belonging to the people of Khark which he had captured 
and in which were about 9, 000 lbs of dates. 83 
Mir Muhanna made two attacks on Bushire in May 1763. Both failed but did not per-
suade him to give up his plans to overcome Bushire at any cost. Fears had mounted 
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in Bushire, in view of Muhanna's determination, and he would have reached his goal 
but for the intervention of a ship of the English East India Company. 84 From mid-
1763 there was little improvement in the situation along the Gulf coast. M"rr Muhanna 
was allowing caravans to pass without molestation between Upper Persia and the 
Gulf, but he could not so easily improve his bad reputation and the merchants 
hesitated to risk their capital by going down to Bushire. At the end of 1763 Karim 
Khan had his hands free once more and decided to employ all his resources against 
Mir Muhanna: he went on the m~ch with a large army and, according to reports, he 
made steady progress. In mid-1764 Karim Khan requested the Governor and Council 
at Bombay to assist him with a vessel or two to prevent M"rr Muhanna from escaping 
him by sea in his gallivat, and declared that he himself would attack Mir Muhanna in 
November or December 1764. Mir Muhanna, for his part, brought himself to a high 
level of readiness by laying in large stores of provisions and forcing all the inhabitants 
of Bandar Ri:q who had no work to collect the provisions necessary for their self-
sufficiency for one year. 
As the year 1764 was closing the Dutch on Khark island were in harmony with the 
surrounding rulers: ~rr Muhanna maintained a prudent policy towards them and kept 
the peace. The merchants among his subjects regularly went to Khark in order to 
trade on his behalf.BS Muhanna's neighbours still hoped that he would be destroyed 
by Karim Khan, to whom he had never cared to submit, but every siege of his town 
had been lifted: a positive result to the coming attack would be very beneficial to 
trade. At the end of May 1764, a Khan with 15,000 soldiers was sent to besiege 
Bandar Ri:q again and, at their approach, Muhanna fled with his boats (six gallivats 
and many other vessels) to Kharku. He asked the Dutch for permission to establish 
himself on the other side of Khark, which had belonged to his father. Buschman felt 
rather embarrassed by the request but refused it in the friendliest possible manner, 
giving the scarcity of provisions as the reason. Muhanna was dissatisfied with the 
reply and entrenched himself on Kharku, which seemed dangerous to the Dutch given 
his unreliability and capacity to molest them at will. The Dutch, however, having 
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only two gallivats now and a few European soldiers could do little to stop him, 
although Buschman did all he could to avoid a break with him. Muhanna was now 
ensconced behind trenches and huge baskets filled with sand, especially at the north 
bay, the only part of the island which was not unapproachable because of rocks and 
shallows. He had large quantities of provisions with him and also plundered the ships 
which passed by. 86 
4.8 The End of the Dutch Establishment on Khark 
An envoy of Karim Khan arrived on Khark in March 1765: he was Kalanthar 
Serkies, head of the Armenian community in Persia, who was well-regarded by the 
Khan and who brought a letter from him saying that, after an absence of seven years, 
Karim Khan would visit the coast and 'exterminate the well-known troublemaker', 
M"rr Muhanna. The M"rr' s fall would, the letter said, be a blessing for all inhabitants 
of the area and the Khan would then be master of the whole Persian kingdom. He 
wished to preserve friendship with the Dutch Company, like all previous kings of Per-
sia, and asked only that the Company should help him against the rebellious M"rr, 
whose rebellion impeded the whole nation's commerce. Karim Khan said that he had 
entrusted several matters to his envoy and asked the Dutch to give him credence. 87 
The envoy brought three proposals for Dutch action: (i.) to co-operate with Bushire in 
attacking Muhanna on sea when he fled from the Persian onslaught; (ii.) to send all 
the Armenians living on Khark to Julfa, an Armenian suburb of Isfahan; and (iii.) 
since Khark belonged to Persia and the Dutch had traded there for so many years, 
Karim Khan should be paid customs duties of 5% since the start of trading. On this 
last point he was particularly insistent, not seeming to doubt that the Dutch would 
agree and would allow him to buy merchandise, using those duties as security. 88 
On the frrst point, a written proposal from Karim Khan, Buschman replied that it 
would be desirable to subdue M"rr Muhanna but that the meagre Dutch sea-power 
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could be effective only if combined with the sea-power of Bushire and the English, 
because the Dutch ships were manned mainly with local people. Otherwise, the 
Dutch would suffer a renewed loss of face and would again be troubled daily by 
renewed hostilities from Muhanna. The Dutch could not stop him landing at the back 
of the island in the last attack (see page 147) and their Europeans were now very tired 
from their day. and night efforts, and suffering from the seasonal diseases. In order 
not to reject the proposal entirely Buschman suggested postponing the action to a bet-
ter time.89 
The envoy's second proposal was not written in Kanm Khan's letter, but Buschman 
replied that it was not reasonable for people who had their houses and their income on 
Khark to be expelled against their wishes. When Serkies started to demand money 
from the Armenians and threatened them, Buschman had to order him not to interfere 
before receiving the answer to his master. 90 
Buschman expressed astonishment at the third point, which was also presented only 
verbally. His master should know that the duties on all merchandise carried from 
Khark to Bushire and elsewhere had already been paid by the merchants but the Com-
pany, by virtue of privileges granted by previous Shahs, had never paid any duties. 
Karim Khan, himself, seven years before, had officially and unconditionally recog-
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tude like this. Buschman would report this matter to his masters but they would draw 
no other conclusion than to terminate once and for all the trade with Persia. Since the 
Khan had not mentioned this point in his letter Buschman would reply only orally.91 
Serkies remained on Khark for two months waiting for a reply and claiming that he 
had orders to wait there for Karim Khan to arrive in the region. The daily cost to the 
Dutch of his embassy was 405 Guilders, not counting the wine, and, given the 
envoy's eminence, Buschman felt obliged to offer him a gift of 444 Guilders on his 
departure and regarded these expenses as unavoidable. Serkies did not insist further 
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on his third point, saying that he had received letters from Karim Khan in which he 
asked for nothing more than assistance against M""rr Muhanna during the Khan's 
presence in the region. While the envoy was on Khark, Muhanna was attacked by the 
Bushire people and by the English (who were now settled in Bushire; see the next 
chapter) on Kharku. The envoy showed Buschman repeated written orders seeking 
Dutch help to the English in the attack on Kharku and threatening that, otherwise, the 
Dutch would not be allowed to send merchandise to Persia and Persian merchants 
would be forbidden to visit Khark. The Dutch saw no chance of the attack succeeding 
and maintained strict neutrality. The anger of Karim Khan and the Bushire people at 
the Dutch refusal led to their trade coming to a complete standstill. From then on no 
important merchants went to Khark or ordered goods, although this was also partly 
owing to the general insecurity at sea. 92 
After having blockaded Kharku for 20 days, the English and Bushire ships returned to 
Bushire. During that period they fired a few shots at Kharku and M""rr Muhanna's gal-
livats. During this sea action two baghalas were secured to the shore below the 
Dutch fortress on Khark island: a batil from Bushire captured them, killing a man 
who was on board, and sailed back to their sister ship which was on the anchorage. 93 
In these circumstances a group of men and women from Kharku crossed over to 
Khark. In order to obviate possibly dangerous consequences Buschman toid the new 
arrivals that, owing to the shortage of provisions, those who had no income on Khark 
would have to leave, and wrote in the same vein to M"rr Muhanna. His object was to 
block any hostile intentions of the Bandar Riq people, so many of them being on 
Kharku at that time, which could be very dangerous in that they could surprise the 
Dutch at night and capture the batteries: their greatest strength was in the surprise 
attack. Mir Muhanna himself was trying to recover his position and was less reliable 
than ever when the Dutch had an enemy within as well as without. 94 
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After the English and Bushire blockade of Kharku had finished M"rr Muhanna resumed 
his old ways and claims, making all kinds of unjustified requests and proposals. 
Through his plundering, and he had no other source of income, he stopped all trading 
activity on both land and sea. His vessels regularly took groups of armed men to the 
mainland to rob the passing merchants; the merchants no longer dared to go over to 
Khark and the Shaikh of Bushire also prevented them from going there, unless under 
escort by the Dutch gallivats, reinforced with soldiers. But the absence of those 
soldiers from the garrison of Khark caused it to be weakened, in the face of fears of a 
surprise attack by M"rr Muhanna. Following the arrival of the Dutch ship Walcheren 
in Khark the Dutch heard of his plan to board it at night while it was still not ready to 
sail and overpower it; they accordingly took preparatory measures and readied them-
selves for defence. 95 
This was now August 1765 and matters remained in this state without any initiative 
from M"rr Muhanna, until the Walcheren's cargo was almost all unloaded and the ship 
was ready to depart in a few days. 96 Ori 31 August the Dutch ship Kronenburg 
arrived at Khark, bearing the new Resident, Houting. 97 Trade. continued to stagnate, 
with merchants fearing to come to Khark and being stopped in Bushire by order of 
Karim Khan. The Persians continued ~o press the newly-arrived Resident, who had 
two ships present at that time, to join forces with them, saying there were only a few 
fighters on the small island (Kharku) and it would not be too difficuit to destroy the 
cause of all the disturbances, who was looking only for an opportunity to take Khark 
by surprise. 98 
The outgoing Buschman had briefed the new Resident, Routing, in a written 
memorandum and immediately embarked in order not to delay the ship. The 
memorandum mentioned the stagnation of trade and the scant hope of improvement, 
as well as the requests from Karim Khan and Bushire, and their consequences. On 
the other hand, Buschman also warned Routing of the danger that Mir Muhanna had 
not yet received any satisfaction from him and might try something during the winter. 
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If things went wrong they could have fatal results and he recommended prudence 
because the Dutch had not yet broken with the ~rr. Routing tried to keep an open 
mind. He was in difficulty because he had withheld the ships which should have 
departed for Batavia and Buschman, still on board, decided to send them on 25 or 26 
September. Moreover, he remained under pressure from Karim Khan and Bushire, 
and faced the stagnation of trade and the insolence of Mir Muhanna, whose envoys 
had rejected the customary small farewell presents and had merely collected the goods 
belonging to Bandar Riq merchants which had been sent to Khark when they had fled 
from Bandar Riq. Letters arriving on 17 September from Karim Khan and Bushire 
demanded a clear response from the Dutch to the request to join forces against 
Muhanna or risk an embargo on the importation of Dutch goods in Bushire, the prin-
cipal mart in the Gulf, and a ban on Persians buying their goods. If they would not 
co-operate the Dutch would be regarded as friends of the enemies of the lord and 
master of all Persia. 99 
Routing was in a difficult dilemma: both choices were dangerous but he chose the 
way that seemed less so according to all reason, and joined the stronger party in the 
hope of restoring the moribund commerce.1oo It would have been better if a proposal 
by The Hague in 1762 for the total evacuation and closure of the Khark establishment 
had been implemented in time to avoid the tragic events now unfolding.lOl When the 
letter from Bushire a.TTived the Dutch Accountant, Winkclaer, wrote to Buschmar1, the 
outgoing Resident, on behalf of his successor, Routing, asking his advice about plan-
ning with the Shaikh of Bushire to destroy the focus of trouble, M"rr Muhanna, once 
and for all. Buschman replied that it was a matter for careful thought; the ships could 
easily be damaged in such an operation; there were several disadvantages in co-
operating with Bushire; and that, although a landing was a good idea in principle, the 
Dutch had insufficient soldiers to bring it to a successful conclusion. Routing, 
however, was of the opinion that a landing was absolutely necessary to put an end to 
Muhanna. On the following day, 19 September, therefore, he sent his Assistant, 
Christian Boucher, to negotiate with the Shaikh of Bushire on a plan for proceeding. 
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Boucher returned on 21 September and the attack was delayed until 7 October when 
the Bushire squadron would arrive. The squadron consisted of three gallivats and 
some other vessels, and was to be escorted by the two Dutch ships (Kronenburg and 
Walcheren, both giants of 160ft overall) and three gallivats.l02 
The force left Khark on 9 October commanded by the Captain of the Walcheren, Hans 
Cornelissen, except for the Bushire gallivats which were commanded by the Shaikh 
himself. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon they anchored under Kharku. They found that 
the island was fortified with artillery positions, ramparts of sand within wooden box-
work, some artillery behind sand-filled basketry and with a group of gallivats drawn 
up on the beach. The Dutch began by firing with all their weaponry on the gallivats 
and the island itself: with the vessels at their disposal that was all they could 
accomplish.I03 Within a few days all of Mir Muhanna's vessels were holed, and one 
gallivat was set on fire. On 12 October a force was landed consisting of 500 soldiers 
from Bushire, 8 or 9 Dutch gunners with three artillery pieces, and some European 
military. This force captured two outposts on Kharku but was then attacked from the 
rear and on the flank by Muhanna's cavalry. The Bushire soldiers fled after having 
lost 150 men; the Dutch force became disordered during a fighting retreat when their 
commanding officer was killed on the beach near the Kronenburg's launch. After that 
the two big ships, which had not suffered any significant damage, retired to Khark. 
The Bushire ships also withdrew tc recuperate but could not remain on the Khark 
anchorage because of the increasing southerly wind: the Bushire Shaikh was also 
demanding payment from the Dutch for his ships and men.l04 In his report Cornelis-
sen records that he received no orders from Routing other than by word of mouth to 
be alert: he wanted to keep his ships at Khark until help arrived from Karim Khan.1os. 
The Dutch waited for help to come from Karim Khan, as promised, but when it failed 
to arrive decided to let the Walcheren depart two days later. M"rr Muhanna had kept 
quiet up to that point and the Dutch had been able to recruit some local soldiers to 
compensate for their losses. The southerly wind obliged the two big ships to seek 
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shelter at Bandar Riq and, on their return Buschman (still on board one of them) and 
Cornelissen heard that their two gallivats had been captured by Muhanna on 11 
December 1765. The Mir's strength had recovered to the point of now having four 
gallivats and five batils, 106 and concern was rising because his small privateering ships 
were already sailing almost daily around Khark so that no vessel could land there 
except at great risk. In an attempt to stop these activities the two big ships were 
cruising out to sea and their land communications were broken off. In a long letter 
Buschman tried to persuade Houting to evacuate the establishment altogether, because 
it could not be maintained, and to carry away everything of value which could be 
transported - such as money, spices and papers - on one of the ships. Houting could 
not decide what to do but it was impossible, in any event, to carry the valuables off 
because M"rr Muhanna's batils blockaded Khark and the big ships could not approach 
because of the changeable winds. 
It was then decided to put forward proposals for peace and the return of the gallivats; 
the Assistant Resident, Christian Boucher, and the Interpreter were sent to Kharku to 
hear what Muhanna would demand in the light of the contract concluded with his 
father, Mir N~ir, which was a part cause of the war and of Muhanna's turbulent 
behaviour, although he had renounced it four years previously on the conclusion of 
peace. Since then he had repeatedly told the Dutch that he was ready to make peace 
if they paid hLrn 1,000 Tomans or Rs 20,000 a year. The Dutch could not accept 
such an exhorbitant claim but Muhanna was unwilling to listen to any other 
proposal.1o1 
Muhanna ferried his soldiers in batils with their munitions to the north bay of Khark 
from 17 to 20 December. The guns of the big ships frred on them to the extent that 
they could see them and continued to do so on 22-23 December with both artillery 
and small arms. 108 Muhanna gained a firm footing in the Armenian houses outside 
the town (see the Atlas, Map no. 19) and, a few days later, attacked and took the 
outer batteries: they had brought the assault ladders with them for this purpose. 
158 
There was great consternation among both Europeans and natives and Routing was 
forced to raise the white flag the next day (30 December) to start negotiations, 
because Muhanna now outflanked him with artillery from the bastions as well as small 
arms from the houses. Communications between the fortress and the big ships were 
almost broken by Muhanna's gallivats and batils, so that the Dutch could not save any 
cash or merchandise other than what was already on the Walcheren. 109 At one 
o'clock in the afternoon a small boat brought a letter from the Resident, Houting, to 
the Walcheren, in which he informed Buschman that Muhanna and his people had 
overpowered the outer fortress during the night; with the other Europeans Routing 
was now in the inner fortress. The boat also brought 36 fugitives, among them the 
native chief of Khark who said that it was now impossible to escape from Khark, and 
that Mir Muhanna would undoubtedly attack the big ships as well- he had 50-60 ships 
ready, great and small. In the evening they saw a ship flying the Kharku flag 
approaching and the fugitives claimed that Mir Muhanna was on board. No shots 
from the fortress guard were heard that evening and, for the Dutch, this did not bode 
well.JIO 
On New Year's Day 1766 the Dutch on board the two big ships saw continuous 
movement of people in and out of the fortress, whose barrier was wide open, and no 
guards were visible. They ran up flags and each fired a shot, but there was no 
response. At 9 o'clock Cornelissen, the Captain of the Walcheren went on board the 
Kronenburg to discuss what to do and all agreed that, with Mir Muhanna's ship right 
under the fortress and near the beach, the people on Khark could not give them any 
information. They fired two more shots but saw no movement, nor anything to indi-
cate that the Dutch were still in the fortress. Finally, a ships' council was held and 
the decision taken to depart, so as not to put the ships in danger. While making the 
ships ready they fired another shot but saw no Europeans and the situation remained 
as before. They therefore raised anchor at 3 o'clock and sailed away to Bandar 
Abbas, Ill where they arrived on 11 January and endeavoured to sell their cargoes 
there. A certain Meijer, the first mate of a Dutch ship, arrived while they were there 
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and told them that the fortress had fallen on 1 January in the early evening and that 
he, with Houting and the few surviving Europeans, had been held prisoner for three 
days. Mir Muhanna had visited them in prison and then given them all their freedom, 
sending them with two vessels to Kangun.ll2 On the way to Kangun, Houting forced 
the nakhoda of his boat to go instead to Bushire, while the other boat continued to 
Kangun. Houting stayed with his people at Bushire for 6 months, in full confidence 
and daily expectation that ~adiq Khan would retake Khark and deliver it, together 
with all their other properties, into their hands again. But after 6 months of his 
expectations· failing to materialise, Houting left Bushire on 21 June aboard a Dutch 
ship for Surat113 (A full account of the fall of Khark can be seen in Houting's report, 
written by him in Surat, which is at Appendix 17). In the early part of this period, 
the letter brought by Meijer from Houting asked the ships to return to pick him and 
the others up, but this was impossible because the season had changed and the NW 
winds ruled out such a voyage.114 
Shaikh 'Abdallah of the Banii Ma'in tribe met Buschman in Bandar Abbas and handed 
him a letter to the Governor General in Batavia, inviting the Dutch to settle in 
Hormuz.11S This was not the first time that Shaikh 'Abdallah had invited the Dutch to 
Hormuz: he had given a similar letter to a Dutch Captain on 8 January 1765116 (see 
Appendices 18 and 19). The Resident, Routing, who had left Rs 800,000 in the 
fortress together with mercha.'ldise, provisions and ammunition to an astonishing 
value, travelled with 60 others from Bushire to Bandar Abbas, and from there to 
India. A number of the merchants arrived in Basrah and they, too, had been robbed 
of everything.117 
On hearing of the fall of Khark, Karim Khan sent 3-4,000 soldiers under his brother's 
command to the neighbourhood of Bandar Riq, where they killed numbers of Mir 
Muhanna's men, enslaved many families and captured quantities of cattle. The 
Shaikh of Bushire, Sa' diin, recruited 500 soldiers and sent for his brother, the ruler of 
Bahrain, who arrived with 800 men, a ship and four gallivats: with the naval elements 
160 
from Bushire these made a sufficient force to make a landing on Khark. Shaikh 
Sa'diin said that Karim Khan would come with a large army to destroy M"rr Muhanna 
and give the island back to the Dutch. 118 The Dutch, however, never thought in 
tenns of re-opening their establishment on Khark island, or any other place in the 
Gulf, in spite of many invitations to do so.ll9 
4.9 Conclusions on the cessation of trading at Bandar Riq and Khark 
island 
BandarRiq There were several factors which, directly or indirectly, 
affected trading at Bandar Riq. One was the high rate of expenditure incurred. This 
included payment to Mir Muhanna for customs dues, contrary to the agreement; the 
heavy cost of constructing the Company house at Bandar Riq; and the losses sustained 
by Wood when he was forced from Bandar Riq. 
Extra costs arose in respect of the English trade, for which the provision of support 
was a crucial consideration. The Dutch would have absorbed all of the trade of 
Bandar Riq unless the English East India Company built a defensible house therel20, 
and the authorities at Bombay postponed a decision on resettling a factory at Bandar 
Riq until they could send suitable vessels into the Gulf to facilitate and support such 
an undertaking.l21 Wood suggested establishing a secure house or small fort at 
Bandar Riq, but was not authorised to do so.122 He also suggested an adequate force 
in the Gulf, such as the Swallow, with 200 able men and a couple of properly manned 
gallivats, to patrol in front of Bandar Riq so that the Arabs could see that the English 
had the power to retaliate and to carry out their policies in the face of any opposi-
tion.l23 
Wood disregarded his orders from the Governor of Bombay to 
follow the instructions hereafter mentioned and all such others as 
you shall from time to time receive from us, or the agent and coun-
cil at Gombroon who have our directions to give you the best advice 
and assistance whenever necessary .124 
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Wood, instead, followed the instructions of Shaw, the Agent at Basrah, who did not 
want to have another trading centre taking part of the trade going to Basrah and so 
reducing the percentage for himself. From the beginning of the Bandar Riq opera-
tion, therefore, he was advising Wood to close the factory there and move to Bushire. 
The most important of the factors, however, was probably the 'commotions' - the 
main cause of the English settlement's withdrawal from Bandar Riq. After leaving 
Bandar Riq, Wood wrote to Douglas about it 'which I still believe to be by far the 
most proper part of the Gulf to settle in, but even there (while the Kingdom of Persia 
continues in this state of confusion and anarchy) I can't pretend to give your Honble 
Co any great hopes of advantage' .12s As a result of the commotions there was a near 
cessation of trading caused by the merchants fearing to go there because of the unsafe 
routes by land; it became impossible to unload big ships there, and bad debts and 
withheld payments became commonplace. 
Khark island The Dutch did not find it economically worthwhile to maintain 
themselves on the island because its revenues were almost nothing. The Dutch Com-
pany operated in such a way that it could be defrauded: the three successive Residents 
left there with fortunes stolen, without much doubt, from the Company. Whenever a 
cargo of spices arrived from Batavia the Resident in Khark, who was also the leading 
merchant, would buy the whole cargo on his own account, and then charge the Com-
pany for the expenses of its sale. He would next sell the cargo in small parcels at 
30%, and sometimes 50%, profit. The value of the cargo would be about Rs 70,000 
and such a shipment would arrive twice a year. The Resident was able, in this way, 
to make himself very rich. 
The garrison, also, was badly managed: the soldiers were very good but were com-
manded by inept officers, as can be judged from the last engagement with ~rr 
Muhanna.l26 ~rr Muhanna's expulsion of the garrison of the Dutch fortress and its 
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officers from Khark, and his seizure of booty on that occasion, amounting to several 
million Guilders, weakened the Dutch position irreparably .121 
The main cause of the closure of the Dutch establishment on Khark island, however, 
was that the Dutch forces were caught up in the 'commotion' and their Residents 
became involved in local politics. With the departure of the Dutch, the English were 
now left without any significant foreign rival in the Persian Gulf. 
Having brought consideration of Bandar Abbas, Bandar Riq and Khark to much the 
same period we should now return to Bandar Abbas, where trade had declined in 1761 
to such an extent that an immediate order was given to Alexander Douglas to move 
the English factory to Bushire on a trial basis. 
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5.0 Introduction 
CHAPTERS 
BUSIDRE IN TURMOIL 
(1762-1769) 
Bandar Abbas suffered a setback on Ja'far Khan's return as Governor in 1761-2, 
when he again set about oppressing both the local people and the English. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, the English Agent had been instructed by the Presidency to con-
sider places where their factory might be relocated, other than Hormuz. He reported 
in December 1761 to the Presidency that the only place where trade was being carried 
on between Bandar Abbas and Basrah was Bushire.I An agreement to allow the 
English to begin trading there was reached in 1762, and trading began in 1763. The 
aim of this chapter is to trace the fortunes of the English there, and to compare these 
with the English experience in Bandar Abbas and Bandar Riq. 
5.1 Geographical background 
Bushire lay on a peninsula connected to the mainland by 21h miles of marshy land 
which was very difficult to cross during the rainy season. It was surrounded by a 
wall mounting some good cannon. To the north of the town, just under two miles 
away, Deira creek was an anchorage where ships drawing up to 20 ft could anchor, 
while larger ships could anchor 41A miles away2 (see Figure 5.1 and the Atlas, Map 
nos. 20, 25, 43, 48). After his visit to the Gulf in 1764, Niebuhr recorded that, 
although Bushire was the port for Shiraz, it was in fact an Arab colony: the town's 
most important families were those of the three Arab tribes - Za'ab, AI Bii Mahair 
and Matmsh.J Kniphausen's report of 1756 records that to the east of Bushire there 
was a long coastal area called Dashtista.n, inhabited by Persian peasantry who had no 
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contact with the outside world. His report also mentions some villages on the coast: 
Niebuhr's map, of about the same period, gives some additional names4 (see the 
Atlas, Map no. 17). To the west lay Bandar Riq, and to the north mountain ranges. 
William Monteith carried out a survey of the trading route from Bushire to Shiraz in 
1820, when he calculated the total distance as 165 miles. To illustrate that shipping 
was only one of the transportation problems facing the merchants of even that late 
date, the main features of the route are given here. During its frrst six miles the route 
followed a dry river bed (which, of course, would flow after rains). There followed 
_ 12 miles of cultivated land before the mountains were reached, when the track became 
stony for 13 miles and the springs offered clear water. Rising steeply, partly in a 
river bed, the track continued very rough and rocky until achieving a pass 11h miles 
in length, where the going was very steep and difficult. Then came a cultivated but 
stony valley for about five miles, and the cultivation continued alongside a difficult 
ascent to a pass 21h miles long, where only one mule at a time could pass. Nine 
miles beyond this, the track followed a cultivated valley with mountains rising 2,000 
feet on either side for five miles, before coming to another pass (the bed of a 
'torrent') where it was stony and narrow for three miles. The valley called Cazaroon 
came next - well provided with vegetation, but the track was still stony for nine miles 
through the valley. At the foot of the next mountain range a causeway over a finger 
of a salt lake was crossed before the track traversed 27 miles of a range of low hills, 
reaching a large river, and following a valley for 22 miles. A further range of hills 
stretching 20 miles came next and another bed, dry at the time, of a 'torrent' was 
crossed on a bridge. From there Shiraz lay only six miles further on, surrounded by 
its suburbss (see the Atlas, Map no. 38, and Figure 4.1). 
5.2 The English Settlement at Bushire 
In April 1761, Alexander Douglas, the East India Company Agent at Gombroon 
(Bandar Abbas), was directed by his superiors to visit Bush ire to give his opinion on a 
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suitable place for a settlement, and recorded that the only port between Gombroon 
and Basrah where any trade was being carried on was Bushire. Caravans (qa.filas) 
took 12 days between Bushire and Shiraz, and 20 to Isfahan: Bushire was full of 
inland merchants who seemed to be at complete liberty to buy, sell or export their 
goods as they thought best, without the slightest impediment. Genuine trading 
seemed to be going on. 6 The Dutch Company had settled at Bushire at the invitation 
of the Persian central government in 1737, arriving there with the Bouche, a 
Company-owned trankey. Many ships from all over the Gulf were coming to Bushire 
to load goods and the local merchants concluded a contract governing the sale of mer-
chandise with the Dutch7 (see Appendix 20 for sales figures). The Dutch settlement 
at Bushire was later closed (the records do not reveal the date) but in 1747 the Dutch 
re-established their settlement. It, too, was closed down at an unknown date. s The 
English, for their part, had planned to set up an establishment in Bushire as early as 
1727.9 
Given the disturbances in the eastern provinces of Persia around Gombroon, the 
English were continually on the search for an alternative location and had surveyed 
most of the islands in the Gulf, but found them unsuitable for the establishment of a 
factory .. Douglas recalled the report on Bushire by Wood (see Chapter 4.4) in 1755 
and now, in December 1761, was able to report to the Presidency that Bushire was 
full of merchants plying their goods to Isfahan and Shiraz, and that Shaikh Sa"diin, 
the Shaikh of Bushire, was keen for the English to settle there. He was reported to be 
of excellent character and unlikely to be influenced by the Dutch, as well as being a 
sworn enemy of Mir Muhanna..to Orders were sent from the Presidency on 29 March 
1762 that the Bushire market be given a one-year trial before any commitment was 
made, and that either Douglas or Dymoke Lyster (Assistant Agent in Basrah) should 
undertake the trial. II 
In mid-1762, Douglas went to Bushire where he met the Shaikh, who made promises 
that the Company's goods would be free from all government duties and that nobody 
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at all would have anything to pay .12 The President and the Council at Bombay 
charged William Andrew Price, Counsellor to the Company, with establishing a 
Residency at Bushire, in order, especially, to introduce the sale of woollen goods into 
Persia.I3 Price arrived there from Bombay on 6 April 1763 on board the Tartar, only 
to learn that the Shaikh and his brother had both moved against Mir Muhanna of 
Bandar Riq. The next day the Shaikh's son, with some of the principal people of the 
place, went on board and invited Price to come ashore, saying that his father was very 
keen for the East India Company to have a factory at Bushire and that he, the son, 
was invested with full authority to settle the terms with Price. Accompanying the 
Tartar were two trankeys full of the Company's goods from Gombroon and, on the 
evening of the 8th, a number of Persian merchants came to visit Price on board the 
Tartar: some came from Isfahan and Shiraz, the rest from Bushire. 
On the following day the Shaikh's son entered into negotiations with Price to settle all 
the points of the agreement, and the negotiations lasted several days.I4 He admitted 
to Price that he could not agree to certain articles of the agreement, particularly the 
one granting the Company exclusive trading rights in woollen goods, without the 
Shaikh's consent. On 11 April, therefore, the Company's Linguist, Stephen Hermit, 
set out for Shaikh Sa'diin's camp before Bandar Riq with a suitable letter (see Appen-
dix 21) and a copy of the articles proposed. Five days later he returned and told Price 
that, alt.'lough Shaildi Sa'dun had stated objections to some of the anicies, especially 
the 2nd and 6th, he at length signed the agreement. He wrote a letter of confirmation 
to Price with a rider to only the 2nd article, providing that, as some of the Bushire 
merchants had gone to Jedda and other ports and might well bring back broadcloth, it 
was not to enter into effect for four months from the date of the agreement. Is 
The detailed agreement (see Appendix 22) made between the Company and Shaikh 
Sa'diin, the Shaikh of Bushire, allowed the English to establish a settlement there. 
The Shaikh was to be paid Rs (rupees) 1,000 annually for providing ~arehousing and 
living accommodation in buildings belonging to his brother Shaikh N3.$ir, and the 
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Residency, in line with the Company's normal practice in support of its settlements, 
was to levy a customs duty of 3% on all goods imported or exported by those trading 
under the Company's protection, whether transacted directly through the Resident or 
not. The Shaikh was to levy his own duties on the Persian merchants trading with the 
English. 16 
On 29 March 1763 Price was empowered by the President and Council in Bombay to 
appoint Benjamin Jervis as Resident at Bushire and advised him of his instructions: 
knowing that a large caravan was expected shortly from Shiraz, Price landed 385 
bales of broadcloth, 176 bales of perpets and four chests of tabbies and satins, thought 
to be the appropriate materials suitable for the Persian market, and recommended 
Jervis to dispose of these at the price such materials usually fetched at Gombroon. 
Jervis was to invite the merchants from up-country, in order to discourage the Dutch 
at Khark and any others from bringing woollens into the Gulf and so lowering the 
prices. As the money realised would be paid in different currencies, of both gold and 
silver, a shroff would be necessary to prevent losses and Jervis was therefore author-
ised to appoint one. To encourage the shrofr s commitment and honesty he was to 
receive a shroffage (money-dealer's commission) of 1h%. 
Jervis was to levy the agreed 3% duty on all goods imported or exported by those 
trading under the East india Company's protection, and hoid the amount collected to 
its credit. In order to prevent any fraud or trickery in that respect he was to be 
guided by the lOth article of the agreement made with Shaikh Sa'diin, whereby an 
account was to be rendered to the Resident if any Bushire merchants bought goods 
from an English-protected person, other than from the factory. For that purpose, one 
of the Resident's staff would attend at the weighing and delivery of all goods sold in 
that way. Furthermore, because article 12 of the agreement did not permit any of the 
Shaikh's subjects to purchase goods from English vessels in the roads, and the collec-
tion of the Company's customs dues depended upon a proper attention to these two 
articles, Jervis was to take care that they were duly enforced at all times. The Presi-
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dent and Council in Bombay permitted Jervis a retainer of 1 % on all English trade 
and he was to levy it accordingly, keeping half of it for himself with the other being 
posted to the credit of the Agent in Basrah, 17 where the factory had already been 
established in June 1640 (see Chapter 6). 
In order to protect the Company's goods and to lend some prestige to its affairs, Price 
landed an artillery officer, five artillerymen and six soldiers. He also ordered Jervis 
to employ Stephen Hermit, lately the Linguist at Gombroon, in the same capacity at 
Bushire: the Shaikh had asked Price for an account to be rendered to him of all the 
goods bought or sold by the English so that he could levy his own duties, as 
appropriate, from the Persian merchants. Price directed the Linguist at Carmania 
(modern Kinnan) to send the wool there to Bushire in readiness. 1s 
Price now set out to renew the grant of the Company's former privileges in the King-
dom of Persia: he had already received a request from the Persians for the Company 
to keep a cruiser in the Gulf to defend Bushire against Mir Muhanna's ambitions, for 
which they would pay Rs 20,000 annually. 19 Price had to send the Linguist to Shiraz 
with a present to ~adiq Khan, in return for one sent from him, and thought that it 
might offer a suitable opportunity for obtaining the reinstatement of the Company's 
former privileges. The Linguist was therefore instructed to make a request for restitu-
tion: he set oti for Shiraz and returned a month later with the grants obtained from 
~adiq Khan. One copy, in Persian, was sent to Jervis by the Linguist and another to 
~adiq's brother, Karim Khan, for him to confirm and seal before sending it to Bushire 
(see Appendix 23 for Karim Khan's faranuin). The Linguist told Jervis that ~adiq 
Khan was anxious that the Company should have a guard ship stationed at Bushire, 
for the expenses of which he agreed to pay Rs 22,000 annually; the payment to be 
made from assignment of the customs or other revenues of Bushire port. 2o 
From September 1763 there was at least one caravan from Shiraz to Bushire every 
month, buying large quantities of broadcloth, perpets and copper, but Bushire's 
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prosperity took off from January 1764 when caravans began arriving not only from 
Shiraz, but also from other parts of Persia. 21 The results of the trial were apparently 
successful and the new Residency of Bushire was constituted subordinate to the 
Agency at Basrah. 22 The decision to establish a settlement at Bushire was taken 
unilaterally by Bombay, and lacked the approval of the Court of Directors in London. 
Although the Court had been informed about the sale of woollens at Bushire, with 
which they were content, they expressed alarm over the settlement in their Commands 
of 2 June 1764: 
We cannot help being alarmed at a Settlement at Bushire on that shore 
in these precarious Times, and especially in the Place now mentioned, 
where we apprehend there is much more Risque than even at Gom-
broon where the Company has suffered so much.23 
The Court expressed readiness to supply the markets of Shiraz and Isfahan with wool-
lens but instructed that no expense be incurred in the erection of any buildings. The 
Resident would have to be satisfied with renting the necessary accommodation until a 
state of tranquillity existed in the region. 24 
5.3 Engfish neutrality during the 'Commotion' 
Karim Khan was trying to assemble forces to send against M"rr Muhanna, who had, to 
a large extent, put an end to the Bushire trade from the end of March 1764, since 
when no caravan had ventured there. There was scarcely any money in the town and 
Jervis had sold goods on the Company's account to the value of only Rs 6,818 in the 
succeeding four-month period. In June 1764 $adiq Khan sent the Company a 
proposal asking for assistance against Mir Muhanna, 25 and Karim Khan declared that 
he himself would move against the Mir in November or December. He requested the 
President and Council in Bombay to help him with a vessel or two to prevent Mir 
Muhanna escaping by sea in his gaUivats, and offered to assign the Company an 
annual sum of Rs 40,000 for two cruisers or 20,000 for one, to be stationed in the 
Gulf for the protection of trade. He also offered to make the town and government of 
Bandar Riq over to the Company. 26 The Governor and Council in Bombay rejected 
Karim Khan's proposal and wrote to Jervis on 4 December 1764: 
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We cannot at present accept Carim Cauns Proposal for stationing a 
Vessel or two constantly in the Gulph for the Protection of the Trade 
but if at any time you think it essential for our Hon 'ble Masters 
Interest to assist him with one occasionally we permit thereof pro-
vided the same does not interfere with transporting goods to Bussora 
or other more material Services of the Companys. 27 
The English at Bushire acted in a neutral manner until July 1764 when Captain Her-
bert Sutherland traded with Bandar Riq: Karim Khan was disgusted by this and 
deemed it an actual breach of friendship. The Agent at Basrah, Peter Elwin Wrench, 
wrote to Jervis saying that the English response should be to the effect that although 
the Khan regarded it as a breach of friendship to trade with Mir Muhanna, the English 
knew of no articles in treaties subsisting between them and the Khan or Shaikh Sa'diin 
which forbade the English from having such trade.28 Peter Wrench, in his cor-
respondence with Jervis, directed that a posture of neutrality be maintained in the dis-
pute between Karim Khan and M"rr Muhanna, arguing: 
. . . if we openly declare against Meermanah and the Caun should 
retire with his Army without Reducing him but should even force 
him to fly to some of the Islands for shelter, we should fmd a 
troublesome Neighbour to us hereafter, with whom the Companys 
Property might be liable to Run no small risk when at Bushire. We 
therefore think it would be good Policy till the orders arrive from 
Bombay in Consequence of the Cauns Proposals with Regard to 
Bunderick that you endeavour to act as Neutral a part as possible in 
their Disputes. 29 
Jervis issued an order forbidding Sutherland from going to Bandar Riq, 30 but the 
English were in a very difficult situation between Karim Khan's demands. and Mir 
Muhanna's hostility. They had already suffered loss at the Mir's hands. In October 
1764 he sent a party of men to plunder the adjacent villages to Bushire and, among 
other booty, they took four of the Company's water buffalo and cut off the 
waterman's ears. Wrench wrote to Mir Muhanna to restore the cattle and he 
immediately returned two. 31 M"rr Muhanna had been a great obstacle to the Bushire 
trade and at the beginning of 1765 the English also suffered losses in their customs 
duties by goods being bought and sold on board ships in Bushire harbour. Caravans 
were detained for many days by Mir Muhanna's forces lying in wait for them on the 
road between Bushire and Shiraz: in April 1765, his people carried off a small 
caravan bound from Bushire to Shiraz valued at about Rs 40,000. The interruption in 
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the Bushire trade caused by Muhanna made specie very scarce and prevented many 
inland merchants from going to Bushire. There were complaints from the merchants 
of the poor state of the markets inland, and of the great shortage of money. The car-
riage of goods and merchandise from Bushire to Shiraz, because of the dangers on the 
road, was raised toRs 40.44 per Tabrizi 11Ulund, having previously been Rs 24.20.32 
As far as Karim Khan was concerned, the situation was both more important and 
more complicated. The Linguist returned to Bushire from Karim Khan's camp on 13 
November 1764 but, instead of obtaining the due confirmation of ~adiq Khan's grant, 
as he had advised Jervis by letter a few months before, he brought with him a set of 
extraordinary grants quite contrary to the instructions Jervis had given him. 
Jervis had directed the Linguist to see if he could obtain a grant covering the island of 
Bushaib, so that the Company could have the option of moving there if they found 
that their trade at Bushire was inadequate. As Jervis saw it, not only would there be 
no additional expense to have such an article included (whether it was later accepted 
or not) but it would be the best way of pressuring the Shaikh of Bushire to carry out 
his agreement with the English, for fear that the Company might remove their settle-
ment to Bushaib and thereby lose him the great advantage he enjoyed from their 
having a factory at Bushire. The Linguist, however, without any regard to that article 
and several others in Jervis' instructions to him had not obtained a single order relat-
ing to Bushire. On the contrary, he had all the grants written as if the Company was 
firmly decided to make a settlement on the island of Bushaib (see the Atlas, Map no. 
45): wherever Bushire was mentioned in the grants formerly obtained from ~adiq 
Khan he had inserted Bushaib. When Jervis demanded to know why the Linguist had 
acted contrary to his orders, the Linguist pleaded that he had misunderstood them. 
Now that he saw his error he told Jervis that he would engage himself to get the mis-
take put right by having the grants properly drawn up without any additional expense, 
and that he would repay all the costs of his journey. 33 
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Karim Khan, for his part, sent a letter to Jervis in March 1765 saying that the matter 
should be rectified and that the Company would fmd him ready to grant whatever they 
might require. He added that he hoped the English would assist him with a vessel or 
two against Mir Muhanna to prevent his escape by sea; he also mentioned that he was 
marching for Bandar Riq.34 Part of the Khan's forces besieged Bandar Riq, while 
Shaikh Sa'diin's fleet from Bushire, together with an English vessel, was supposed to 
blockade the port of Bandar Riq. Following the Khan's orders to him, Shaikh Sa'diin 
applied to Jervis for the help of the Company's ship Tartar. the ship was made ready 
immediately but Shaikh Sa'diin delayed so much that it was early on 4 June before 
they sailed. News then arrived that Mir Muhanna had left Bandar Riq on 2 June and 
had retreated with his gallivats and about 400 men to the island of Kharku. 3S 
In October 1765, Karim Khan proposed that the Company should remove its factory 
to Bandar Riq in the hope of persuading the English to assist him. Jervis wrote to 
Wrench at Basrah36 who replied with instructions to answer Karim Khan 'We shall 
advise our superiors of the offers he has made & when their answer arrives shall 
acquaint you with their resolutions, till when you are not to solicit him on that sub-
ject' .37 Karim Khan was so angry that the English would not help him more effec-
tively against ~rr Muhanna that he decided not to receive the Linguist or admit 
Edward Hercules, the Agent at Shiraz, to an audience. 38 
The Dutch at Khark had declared against Mir Muhanna (see Chapter 4.8) and had 
made an offer to Shaikh Sa' diin to join their forces with his fleet in order to destroy 
the ~rr. The Shaikh asked Jervis to let the Tartar join with him and the Dutch in 
blockading Mir Muhanna at Kharku so, on 5 October 1765, the Shaikh's fleet and the 
Tartar sailed for Kharku. With the Tartar joining the Shaikh's fleet and the Yacht 
arriving at Bushire, the Shaikh asked Jervis insistently for the loan of the Yacht to go 
and join the augmented fleet lying at Kharku. Wrench, however, wrote to Jervis that 
he had broken his orders, and told him to return the Yacht to Basrah loaded with bar-
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ley for the Company's horses; he further ordered him to recall the Tartar from 
Kharku and send it to Bombay with surplus cash amounting toRs 54,000.39 
Mir Muhanna made himself master of the town and Dutch fort at Khark on 1 January 
1766 and became quiescent. Zaki Khan, the brother of Karim Khan, went to 
Ganawah with 2,000 men and was joined by a considerable body from different 
shaikhs to attempt the destruction of Mir Muhanna. Zaki wrote to Jervis asking for 
the Tartar to be sent in support of his attack on Khark island and Jervis again detained 
the Tartar, which was going to Bombay carrying Rs 30,000, the balance of cash in 
Bushire. 40 Wrench learnt of this and wrote to Jervis: 
We Observe you have thought it best to detain the Tartar for the 
Purposes mentioned therein it is needless for us to say anything 
more on that Subject, having already given you our sentiments about 
it, than that it must now be referred to the Governour & Council to 
judge of this transaction. 41 
In February 1766, and after nearly twelve months had passed, the Linguist had made 
the Khan a present of more than Rs 5,000 and had brought with him the package of 
grants relating to Bushaib instead of Bush ire. 42 A few days before the Linguist's 
departure from Shiraz, Karim Khan sent him a message asking for Jervis to be told 
that if the Company would give him effective help against M"rr Muhanna, he would 
very readily grant them whatever privileges they wanted. 43 Jervis maintained his 
vilification of Muhanna; a practice he continued in a series of letters to Wrench, 
despite the fact that Muhanna had always professed friendship for the English and had 
committed no serious breach of the friendship throughout the time they had been 
settled in Bushire. This fact was clearly pointed out to Jervis by Wrench in a letter 
from Basrah of 7 July 1766: 
We cannot but acquaint you, it is the Presidencys orders to us, not 
to come to any rupture with Meer Mahanna, unless he should have 
given sufficient Cause, which hitherto he has not, nay on the con-
trary, we have some convincing proofs of his inclinations and desire 
of being upon a good footing with us which ought to be cultivated 
and which we must recommend to you. 44 
Jervis, in frequently urging that the Company should assist Karim Khan in the 
destruction of M"rr Muhanna, had argued that they really had no choice, situated as 
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they were on the Persian mainland, if they were to maintain· their settlement, trading 
privileges and personal safety. As mentioned before, this would appear to be a valid, 
logical argument and the power structure in the Company, i.e. the Court, the Presi-
dency and the Agency, had placed Jervis in an invidious position by insisting on 
neutrality in the conflict between Karim Khan and Mir Muhanna. 45 The Court of 
Directors sent their Commands dated 17 May 1766 on this subject, received in Basrah 
only on 13 October 1766: 
We also direct that our Resident at Bushire do not correspond with 
Carem Caun or any other Man that may be at the Head of Affairs in 
that Country, on any matters that may regard obtaining new settle-
ments or Phirmaunds [faramlins] for the Company, without leave 
frrst obtained from you our Agent and Counci1.46 
In the meantime, Jervis had left for Bombay in July 1766 and was succeeded as Resi-
dent at Bushire by William Bowyear, until then the Factor. He immediately wrote to 
Wrench asking for the use of a cruiser for his defence if M"rr Muhanna should attack 
Bushire. Wrench replied in a letter dated 10 August 1766: 
We cannot but apprehend your fears of Meennanna in case he 
should attack Bushire to be unnecessary from the several instances 
he has shewn to preserve or rather Cultivate our friendship, 
morespecially as Mr Jervis who was the only one who offended 
him, is removed, and an amicable correspondence entered into with 
him by the Agent, and which we imagine might easily be done by 
the Resident, nay, we are apprehensive your having a Cruizer might 
be attended with sev'ral inconveniences unforeseen by you for in the 
case of the Caun or any of his principal officers coming down they 
would certainly require her of you for their assistance, and a refusal 
would lay you under their displeasure, and a Compliance would be 
breaking thro' the possitive orders of the Presidency, which you 
have been acquainted are, that we are not to commence hostilities 
against him unless his Conduct should oblige us, so that you must 
very seriouslr consider the affair of detaining one of the Cruizers on 
their return. 4 
Very shortly after succeeding Jervis as Resident in Bushire, Bowyear began to face 
difficulties. In the frrst place, the return of Zaki Khan with his body of troops back to 
Shiraz from the Bushire area on 20 June 1766 left the surrounding country open to 
M"rr Muhanna, and the bandits between Bushire and Shiraz who were levying duties 
on English cloth. 48 Also in June, Shaikh N~ir arrived in Bushire. He was the older 
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brother of Shaikh Sa' diin and had been Governor of Bush ire till Karim Khan carried 
him captive up-country about ten years before; he remained a prisoner throughout that 
time in spite of repeated requests for his freedom. Now released, he acted again as 
Shaikh of Bushire and began to stir up trouble. The Company's factory was the prop-
erty of Shaikh N~ir, to whom the Company paid rent of Rs 1,000 annually, nearly 
the full value of the whole house. Being of a fractious nature, however, the Shaikh 
demanded that Bowyear pay Rs 1 , 000 more or otherwise leave the factory. 49 
The Ka'b, too, became a problem. They were an Arab tribe living on the eastern 
bank of the Shan al-' Arab whom Karim Khan had tried to bring under his control in 
1756 and 1757, without lasting results.50 In July 1765 the Ka'b had captured three 
English ships, the Sally, the Yacht, and the Fort William: the English sent an expedi-
tion into the Gulf to reduce the Ka'b to odedience and to exact revenge for the 
insult. 51 By the beginning of March 1766 Karim Khan had heard of an English fleet 
approaching the Gulf (see next paragraph) with orders from the Presidency to chastise 
the Ka'b for seizing the English ships, and expressed himself very ready to give the 
Company his help; he would, if necessary, himself march down to the coast with 
20,000 men for that purpose, but the Resident had no instructions to deal with him on 
the subject. 52 
The English fleet arrived at Bushire on 10 March 1766 and began to attack the Ka'b. 
Karim Khan, heavily bribed by the Ka'b, intervened by claiming that the Ka'b were 
his subjects and that he would not tolerate English and Turkish actions against them. 53 
Wrench wrote to Bowyear on 20 October 1766 reporting that the Khan had placed the 
Ka'b under his protection and had ordered the Turks and their 'auxiliaries' (meaning 
the English) to quit his dominions.54 Bowyear informed the Presidency and Wrench 
that Karim Khan, his largest single buyer, had not made the usual purchases to clothe 
his army and the merchants, knowing of the Khan's displeasure with the English and 
fearing the consequences for themselves, were not trading with him. 55 The English 
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attacks ended in a painful defeat with heavy casualties and the loss of their field artil-
lery.s6 
Wrench had established a rapport with Mir Muhanna, sending him a letter in January 
1766 about the friendship between them, to which the Mir replied on 21 February: 
In good time I received your letter with much satisfaction and com-
prehended the whole of its contents. In regard to what you are 
pleased to write of our friendship it subsisted in the time of my 
Father, and entirely with the English nation. I have therefore 
always solicited the English to traffic freely and peacefully in my 
lands, inviting them in friendly terms that this might be effected 
Captain Sutherland has evinced all the civilities in my power to 
show him, and that out of regard to friendship, not for love of gain, 
but the Balios (Mr Jervis) of Bushire has returned me opposite treat-
ment, that is, evil for good, enmity for friendship. 57 
Wrench continued these communications until 11 February 1767 when the Presidency 
put an end to them by issuing orders for him to return to the Presidency and appoint-
ing Henry Moore as Agent at Basrah, to.be in charge of the Company's affairs in the 
Gulf. ss Moore visited Bushire on 23 March 1767 on his way to Basrah, and wrote a 
letter to Kaiim Khan hoping that the disputes might be brought to a speedy conclu-
sions9 (see Appendix 24). Bowyear, as Resident at Bushire, was controlled by the 
Agency at Basrah and wrote there for advice when he heard, in February, that Karim 
Khan was going to transport six or seven thousand men to Khark and, since the 
English had a force in the Gulf, he might compel them to help him in the expedition: 
As we are obliged to pay a due obedience to all your orders and act 
only conformable thereto, what answers in cases of such earnest 
necessity Gentlemen can we give if applied to for our assistance. 
Reason or Excuses of any kind or all that imagination can suggest 
will not we believe avail us in so defenceless a situation and at their 
mercy as we are here. For in case they are resolved we must sub-
mit, or by a refusal run the hazard of our persons and the loss of 
near £60,000 what of the Companys and other Merchants. 60 
As regards the answer Bowyear should give the Khan if he asked for assistance, the 
Agency replied on 1 March that Bowyear should advise the Agency before giving a 
full answer.61 The Agency sent further directions on 17 March 1767: 
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Notwithstanding our Directions to you under the 1st instant, You are 
hereby directed not to interfere or carry on any negotiations with the 
Caun or his ministers, either in regard to the particular affairs of the 
Chaub [K.a'b] or Meer Mahanna or indeed in regard to any other 
without our further directions, but in case of application from them, 
you are in general to refer their application to the Agency and must 
desire them also to write hither that we may be the better enabled to 
carry into execution the intentions of the Honble the President and 
Council. 62 
After succeeding Jervis as Resident at Bushire, Bowyear began reporting to both 
Wrench and the Presidency that Kaiim Khan was 'disgusted' with the English as a 
result of various irregularities in the previous management of the settlement. Wrench, 
clearly no friend of Jervis (as evidenced by the tone of the correspondence between 
them when Jervis resided at Bushire), asked Bowyear to pursue the reasons for Karlm 
Khan • s displeasure. Bowyear therefore put forward various allegations, albeit in a 
somewhat guarded way, probably conscious of the fact that Jervis was at that time a 
member of the Council in Bombay and would be privy to all his correspondence. 
Jervis naturally reacted with denials, explanations, and counter-accusations against 
Bowyear of fabrication or misjudgement. Possibly because of Jervis' rank and long 
experience of the Gulf, Bowyear was ordered by Dymoke Lyster, second-in-command 
at Basrah, in March 1767 to let the matter drop on the instruction of the Presidency. 
Bowyear, however, conscious that his standing in the Company was being tarnished 
and that trade was suffering the after-effects of the misdemeanours committed by 
Jervis for which he, Bowyear, would eventually be held responsible, persisted in his 
allegations. 
Bowyear's tenacity was rewarded when, on 25 April 1767, Henry Moore demanded 
that he furnish proof of his allegations against Jervis. 63 The allegations made by 
Bowyear may be summarised as follows:64 
i) That Jervis had appointed an agent of his own, Edward Hercules, at 
Karim Khan's court in Shiraz and had, without the permission of either the 
Agency at Basrah or the Presidency, styled Hercules as the Company's 
Ambassador rather than as his own agent, as he had informed the Company. 
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ii) That the title of Ambassador had been used by Hercules on Jervis' instruc-
tions to add more substance to their status and enable them to operate their 
own private business more advantageously. 
iii) That Jervis had utilised the names of bogus merchants in the Company's 
records to conceal his own purchases from the Company and the trade that 
resulted. 
iv) That Jervis had extracted the items of cloth from the bales which were 
most acceptable in the Persian market and diverted them to his private busi-
ness, thus detracting from the Company's sales. 
v) That Jervis had also undertaken private dealings with Shaikh Sa'diin and, 
following a disagreement with the Shaikh about his share of the proceeds, had 
attempted, through the Court at Shiraz, to have the government of Bushire 
changed. 
vi) . That Jervis had either not informed Kanm Khan that he was subordinate 
to the Agent at Basrah or, at the very least, had allowed him to think that 
Jervis was authorised by Bombay to make all decisions relating to Bushire. He 
had used this distortion of the facts to offer Kanm Khan the use of the Com-
pany's fleet, when one was available in the Gulf, to destroy Mir Muhanna and 
the Ka'b for a sum of Rs 50,000. Bowyear suspected that Jervis had collected 
some part of this money by deploying the Tartar against M"rr Muhanna when 
the latter fled from Bandar Riq to Kharku. 
On 25 April 1767 Moore raised several queries about the allegations, which Bowyear 
answered, and the allegations were submitted to the Presidency but they, in the end, 
let the matter drop because of Jervis' position as a member of the Board of the Presi-
dency. 
The Presidency, the Agent at Basrah and the Ambassador at Shiraz all acted with 
impartiality in this critical period, but Bowyear acted as he liked. Henry Moore had 
written a letter to Kaiim Khan on his arrival at Bushire (see page 183) and ordered 
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Bowyear to send it to the Court of Shiraz. Out of his dislike for George Skipp, the 
Ambassador at Shiraz, Bowyear sent the letter on 25 March 1767 to Ra'Is Al}.mad 
Shah, a powerful adviser to Karim Khan, asking him in a separate .letter to open a 
correspondence between them, instead of handing it to Ambassador Skipp, who was 
recommended by his superiors and furnished with the proper faramlins. 65 On the 
same day, Bowyear replied to a letter of 17 March from Moore warning him not to 
have any connections with the Persian Government: 
Your orders shall be strictly complied with respecting the Caun and 
his ministers, no one here has any inland Connections or any con-
cerns whatever at Court or the least occasion to correspond with any 
person, nor was ever any letter wrote from hence. 66 
Moore ordered Skipp on 14 April to go to the Court at Shiraz and open a cor-
respondence with the Khan, ordering also Bowyear to assist him: · 
Mr Geo. Skipp in consequence of being the person recommended by 
our Superiors, for to proceed to the Court of Schiras, now takes pas-
sage on the Defiance, to whom you are to make known, the state of 
the Honble Companys Factory under your management, jointly con-
sidering on such methods as may appear most eligible to remove the 
several obstacles and impediments you lie under with respect to 
commerce or other ways; you are also to afford him all the 
Assistance in your power. 67 
Skipp, for his part, also wrote a letter on 31 May 1767 to Bowyear telling him not to 
have relations or any communication with Mir Muhanna: 
This is purposely to inform you that it is absolutely necessary for the 
Honble Companys Interest as far as relates to the Success of the 
Negotiations intrusted to my care at this Court that for the present at 
least, We hold no intercourse or have any Communication with 
Meer Mahanna, I therefore request you will possitively direct all 
commanders of Ships bound up the Gulph by no means to touch at 
Carrack as they shall answer for the same. 6B 
To aid the success of Skipp's negotiations, on 6 June Bowyear ordered that the 
English should avoid having any relations with Mir Muhanna at that time. 69 Moore 
did not leave the matter up to Bowyear, however, given his reckless behaviour, and 
wrote to him on 18 June: 
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As to the Carrack affair, we mean the preventing ships from putting 
in there, we think it an affair of little or no consequence: the wheel 
of politicks may take such a turn, as to oblige us to make a 
temporary friend of the Meer instead of a foe. 70 
5.4 The decline of trade at Bushire 
By mid-1767 the English were in confusion, torn between the ill disposition of Karim 
Khan and the threat of Mir ~uhanna. Trade had been declining since May 1766, 
when the month's sales had fallen short of English expectations, and they had 
sustained an annual loss of Rs 2,000 on the Persian Government account. In Decem-
ber 1766, English sales were trifling, and no Shiraz merchants had been at Bushire, 
out of apprehension for trading with the English in view of the Khan's displeasure 
with them. Jervis' private engagements with the Khan remaining unfulfilled by the 
Company and the withholding of ships had incensed the Khan considerably. 71 In 
January 1767 the price of goods dropped, and wool stopped coming from Kirman 
because of the trouble there which had disposed of most of the sheep. The place was 
being besieged at that time by the Khan and plundered by his troops, with nobody 
able to come or go. 72 Bowyear commented to Wrench at Basrah, 'It is a little diffi-
cult to re-establish a branch of business of this nature, Considering the present state of 
this Country, and that the parties who provide this article are so far distant from 
Bushire. ' 73 
In April 1767 nine different bandits were operating between Bushire and Shiraz and 
each levied duties on the English cloth and other staples which were being carried by 
the merchants; this was itself an impediment to the English trade. 74 The raw silk 
which used to· be brought down from GTian (a northern district of Persia) and sent on 
to India had almost stopped - a great part of the trade now being carried to Russia and 
the rest exported through Turkey75 (see Appendix 25). A new and significant impedi-
ment to trade at Bushire now arose. Orders came from Karim Khan's Court that all 
the merchants should leave Bushire with their families within 20 days at most. As a 
result of these orders every merchant who had an agent in Bushire recalled him, and 
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many merchants who lived there left Bushire completely: the few who remained were 
preparing to leave as soon as possible. Even some cloth merchants who were on the 
road to Bushire were obliged to tum back. The Khan also prohibited any merchant 
carrying specie to Bushire on any pretext whatever and, should they do any trade, 
they should exchange Persian products for all foreign goods. By the end of June 1767 
the merchants had all left Bushire in response to Karim Khan's orders. 76 
Another policy decision from Karim Khan followed this blow to English trade. His 
second order not only prohibited specie from being sent to Bushire but firmly directed 
that no merchandise whatever should be imported from Bushire into the inland areas 
of the Persian dominions, that no Persian products be sent to Bushire, and that the 
merchants should have no contact with the place. Karim Khan told Skipp quite 
plainly that, since his orders were not respected at Bushire, he was obliged to take 
some measures to show his displeasure there. His actions touching on trade with 
Bushire may not have been altogether directed at the English because he had taken 
strongly against Shaikh Sa'diin, who had never paid him a courtesy visit during his 
two years' residence in Bush ire, nor accounted to him for the customs duties of 
Bushire and Bahrain, which he expected the Shaikh to do. The only quick and effec-
tive way of removing the difficulties under which English trade laboured at that 
moment would be for the Shaikh to pay him, on those accounts, an annual sum on 
which they could agree. 77 
Since before Nadir Shah's time Bushire had been governed by Shaikh Sa'diin's fam-
ily, headed by Shaikh N3$ir with whom the English had formerly discussed the estab-
lishment of a settlement at Bushire in mid-1755, before eventually settling at Bandar 
Riq. Shaikh N3$ir and the tribes of Dashtistan had allied themselves to Karim Khan 
in the Persian power-struggle, but had been forced to change their allegiance when 
Shiraz had come under siege from the forces of :ijusain Khan Qajiir, the pretender in 
Tabriz, in May 1756. As the balance of power again shifted in his favour, Karim 
Khan launched a reprisal attack on the Dashtistan province in late 1756 and early 
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1757. It was probably at this time that Shaikh N~ir was compelled to live at Shiraz 
as a hostage (see pages 181-2). Shaikh N~ir being still in captivity in 1767, his 
younger brothers, Shaikhs Sa'diin and 'lsa, were governing Bushire and Bahrain 
respectively. In February 1767 it was being reported that the traditional tribute paya-
ble to the Shahs of Persia by both Bushire and Bahrain had not been rendered for the 
20 years elapsed since the death of Nadir Shah; in consequence, Karim Khan's dis-
pleasure was manifest. 78 
Shaikh Sa'diin sent his son to Karim Khan with an offer of Rs 20,000, but the son 
came back from Shiraz without resolving any single point at issue with the Khan, 
notwithstanding the offer being raised to Rs 26,000.79 Shaikh Sa'diin himself 
returned to Bushire on 17 January 1768 and informed Morley (see page 201 for his 
succession to Bowyear) that, though the Khan had shown him particular regard during 
his stay in Shiraz, his persuasion had no effect in inducing the Khan to allow any 
trade to be carried on at Bushire with the inland areas of his dominions. The Khan 
had frequently said to him '... as the English Interest was chiefly concerned therein, 
his final resolutions, as to that affair, depended entirely on the answer he should 
receive to some proposals he had made them. '80 
5.5 Karim Khan's 'disgust' with the English 
Bowyear's allegation that Jervis had been the cause of Karim Khan's 'disgust' with 
the English was true. In April 1767 Bowyear received from $adiq Khan the letter 
which had been sent to $adiq by Hercules, then Jervis' agent at the Persian Court, 
proving that Jervis had offered to destroy Mir Muhanna for Karim Khan in return for 
Rs 50,000.81 Karim Khan wanted to renew the ancient friendship subsisting between 
the English and the Persians in the time of the Kings (Shah 'Abbas I and King James 
I), and sent proposals in March 1767 to Moore in Basrah, who forwarded them to the 
President and Governor of Council in Bombay. These provided that a nominee on the 
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English part and another on behalf of Shaikh Sulaiman of the Ka'b should go to him 
and he would settle any substantial demands. 
The President and Governor of Council in Bombay replied to Kanm·Khan's proposals 
on 15 March 1767, asking him to take steps to obtain satisfaction for the English from 
the Ka'b. He asked also for the most advantageous terms for the Company which the 
Khan could determine, among which the following seemed to him the most essen-
tial:B2 
i) Confirmation of Sadiq Khan's grant permitting a settlement at Bushire 
with the building of a fort or factory there and the mounting of some cannon 
on it. 
ii) An annual sum of Rs 20 to 25,000 to be paid to the Company from the 
Bushire customs to defray the costs of keeping a cruiser always in the Gulf. 
iii) A grant of any of the islands in the Gulf should the Company wish to 
settle on one. 
iv) Ample restitution for all their losses to be made to the English out of any 
booty which might be taken from the Ka'b: the latter's vessels to be destroyed 
or surrendered to the English, or, at least, full guarantees to be given that they 
would never again be employed against the English. 
v) Half of all booty or plunder of whatever kind taken from ~rr Muhanna to 
be given to the English. 
vi) In the event of the English undertaking an expedition against ~rr 
Muhanna jointly with Karim Khan, and proving successful at Khark, the Khan 
might be permitted to retain its possession. 
On receipt of the President's Commands (formal letter) Skipp had the proposals trans-
lated into Persian but did not deliver them to Karim Khan. Thinking that the delay 
was on the Khan's side, Moore waited for three months and then wrote to Bowyear at 
Bushire on 1 July 1767. He asked Bowyear, in case a rupture with Karim Khan 
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became inevitable and the English were thereby forced to withdraw their factory from 
Bushire, to find out as secretly as possible: 
a) Whether an alliance with Mir Muhanna of Khark was practicable and 
whether the English could maintain a factory on that island to greater 
advantage than in Bushire. 
b) Whether, in that case, M"rr Muhanna would join whole-heartedly with the 
English in the destruction of the Ka'b.B3 
Bowyear replied to Moore's letter on 13 July 1767 and put before him some objec-
tions which he believed to be insurmountable for the English: 
Firstly, it would incense Karim Khan beyond belief; it would put an end, in effect, to 
English trade in the Khan's territories, and merchants would still not be permitted to 
go to Bushire while he lived or any of his family held power, for they too would 
resent it. Secondly, Mir Muhanna was so notorious for his bad character that no-one 
would willingly choose to live under his government. This was a man who had mur-
dered his father, burnt his mother to death, exposed his wife and new-born infant to 
the sun until they died, thrown his sister into the sea and cut down 65 of his relations 
in one night. He was also greatly addicted to alcohol and no better than a madman in 
his cups.B4 Thirdly, the Mir could not supply more than 500 men and there was a 
possibility of Karim Khan rallying to the Ka'b if he found that Muhanna was a party 
to the attack. Nonetheless, Bowyear thought that an alliance with ivru Muhanna 
would be possible and that the English could gain his assistance against the Ka'b.ss 
Moore ordered Bowyear to send the Company's ships the Tyger, the Schooner and the 
Launch to him in order to put his plan against Karim Khan into operation: 
It is with the greatest concern that we find the Caun will not comply 
with the proposals that we have made to him, should Mr Skipp 
therefore be returned to Bushire of which according to his own 
advices we make not the least doubt, you have already our orders 
for your future proceedings: the Honble Companys as well as pri-
vate property being embarked we would have the seizure of every 
persian Ship and Vessel to be the frrst object. You are then to for-
ward by the next secure messenger the accompanying letter to Carim 
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Caun, a translate of which we now inclose you, and on the return of 
the Cauns answer we direct that you open it, and see the purport, if 
he is willing to come to terms with us, you will consequently send 
us the most immediate intelligence; but if not, and that he still con-
tinues his protection of the Chaub we would then have the Grab and 
Salamander [a bomb-ketch: see page 198] ordered as close to the 
Town as possible and there represent to the Shaik the immediate 
destruction of the Town, unless he is willing to save it by the paying 
you a very large ransom Six lacks of Rupees we think ought to be 
demanded. Get however as much as you can and then give Captain 
Elphinstone orders to proceed immediately to the Island of Car-
rack.86 
Moore further ordered Bowyear, on his arrival at Khark, to intimate to M"rr Muhanna 
the reason for his presence, i.e. to seek th~ M"rr's permission to have a factory on the 
island of Khark, and to promise him the friendship and protection of the English if he 
would join them with his gallivats in the destruction of the Khan and the Ka'b. 
Moore also recommended to Bowyear that, if the Shaikh of Bushire and his brother 
had any influence at the Persian Court, they should write to Shiraz and try to bring 
the Khan to the terms the English wanted. Otherwise, when Skipp arrived they 
should begin to ship off all the English property and then seize all the gallivats and 
other ships belonging to Karim Khan, the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Shaikh of 
Bushire. That done, they should return to Basrah. 87 Skipp had already indirectly 
informed Karim Khan of the plan to destroy Bushire as well as the other towns on the 
Persian coast, if he rejected the English proposals. 88 The Khan offered the sum of 
12,500 Tomans for severai of the losses bui ihis was rejecied by the Engiish, who 
demanded the full amount of the losses sustained and the surrender of the Ka'b gal-
livats.89 
In July 1767, Skipp delivered his further proposals in writing to Karim Khan, who 
told him that they were of a kind he could not possibly comply with, and the next day 
he replied 'These demands are rather like the orders of a master to his servant, they 
have no power to send me orders' .90 On the rejection of the compensation he replied: 
. . . if the English would come to me and beg of me to take the sum 
of 12500 Tomands to settle your disputes I would not do it I have 
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taken much trouble to bring your affairs as I thought to this happy 
conclusion, and now you are not satisfied therewith. I will now 
give leave to the Chaub to make war on you, and to do everything 
in his power to take your vessels - the reason of my expressing 
myself with so much anger is that you would not stay to know how I 
had proceeded in your business but send these demands before you 
were acquainted this sum of 12500 Tomands is the firm cost of your 
Goods, ought you not therefore to be contented, and make your 
account that for one voyage you got no profit, it now plainly 
appears to me the English do not want to settle this affair, but do as 
you please and act in what manner you can by the Chaub91 (see 
Appendix 26). 
Moore now sent a letter to M"rr Muhanna concerning the English making a settlement 
at Khark,92 and proposed an alliance with him for the destruction of the Ka'b. 
Muhanna approved of the English alliance and promised everything which they had 
requested. 93 Bowyear, on the contrary, wrote '... the Khan is too powerful for the 
Mirto give him the least anxiety' .94 
With remarkable arrogance, Moore issued an ultimatum to Karim Khan on 11 August 
1767. It was to the effect that unless the Khan ceased his support of the Shaikh of the 
Ka'b, compelled him to hand his gallivats over to the English and provided compensa-
tion for the losses they had sustained, they, the English, would destroy all Persian 
ships and coastal towns9S (see Appendix 27). 
Before leaving Shiraz on 30 August 1767, Skipp waited on Karim Khan to take his 
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long-standing between the English and Persians would be completely shattered by his 
doing so. After a long discussion with Karim Khan, Skipp wrote to Moore: 
. . . in regard to the Chaub he would oblige him to pay the sum of 
250000 Rupees and will give a Pheramaund to pay the full value if 
ever we sustained any further losses by him his Galivats or other-
wise that the remainder he looked on as so much given to him, as on 
his account we quitted it, and that he would return it ten for one 
provided he was once convinced we had an equal inclination to be 
on terms with him of amity and friendship that he wanted also grant 
us for the benefit of the Honorable Companys commerce in his 
dominions a confirmation of our antient phirmaund, including full 
and free liberty of importing and exporting all our goods and mer-
chandize, and carrying them to any part of the Kingdom free of all 
Customs, and impositions also full and free liberty to build a fort of 
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any strength the Company may chuize, and mount as many cannon 
and of any size they may think proper at Bushire, Bunderick, Con-
goon and Bander Abassi at all or either of these places or any other 
place on the Coast, he also offeres a grant of any one of the Islands 
in the Gulph such as you may chuze, and likewise full permission to 
establish factories at Schirash, Ispahaun and Carmenia, where he 
observes the Honorable Companys houses are ready to be delivered 
them, and in return for this he desires our assistance by sea against 
his enemies by which he does not doubt but in 3 or 4 months we 
may be gained more than ten times the amount of what we shall on 
his account, remit to the Chaub. 96 
Skipp asked Moore to accept Karim Khan's proposal whereby the Bushire trade would 
again be on the English account, and the Khan would not agree to Skipp • s departure 
until a reply had been received to it. 91 Moore replied to Karim Khan directly on 29 
August 1767, refusing the offer of Rs 250,000, and trying to impress him with the 
strength Moore had behind him in the Gulf at that moment: 
Your Majesty must be very sensible from the force I now have with 
me in the Gulph, that it is in my power to do you the greatest of 
services by reducing the disobedient to obedience, by fixing your 
Majesty and your Royal son securely in your Government, and 
making you as happy as you are now great, but your Majesty in 
defiance to my endeavours in defiance to your own interests, will 
not let me be your friend you will not let me contribute to the 
revival of commerce in your Dominions but are forcing me to quit 
your Kingdom by withdrawing the English factory from Bushire, by 
forming destructive alliances against your Majesty, the end of which 
God only knows. If your Majesty will oblige me by forcing the 
Chaub to come into the terms I have humbly requested of you there 
is nothing that your Majesty can in reason ask that I will not in glad-
ness grant . . . As the Whole Gulph of Persia belongs to your Majesty 
there ought not to be an armed ship or vessel in it but what belongs 
either to your Majesty or the English you want to reduce the whole 
Guiph to your obedience, at the same time that you are ieaving one 
of the principal sea powers in it, in full power to molest and injure 
us, let me advise you to begin at Bussora and not end until you get 
down to Muscat you will never have such another opportunity, I 
entreat your Majesty therefore immediately to embrace it, and 
prevent the Slaughter and bloodshed that must otherwise be the 
inevitable consequence. 98 
Finally, Moore tabled his demands, saying that the Khan had only to direct the Ka'b 
to surrender his gallivats to the English and send them Rs 500,000, and the English 
would make peace with him whenever the Khan decided99 (see Appendix 28). 
This letter from the Agent at Basrah was handed to Karim Khan on 30 September; the 
next morning he summoned all the leading men of his Court and the Agent's letter 
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was read to him again before all of them. He immediately sent for Coja Hu~ain, the 
Ka'b representative at Court, and gave him a letter to the Ka'b. The Khan ordered 
him to return to his master and tell him that, as he had seized the property of the 
English, they had both reason and justice on their side in trying to recover it. If, 
therefore, the English made war against them they should not expect any help from 
him: Coja Hu~ain took his leave and returned to the Ka'b. Two days later Karim 
Khan responded that he would forthwith give an undertaking to pay the Rs. 500,000 
out of his own treasury. The money would be paid into the hands of Skipp, as soon 
as the English informed him that their squadron was ready to move against M"rr 
Muhanna of Khark. The Khan had withdrawn his protection from the Ka'b and gave 
the English complete liberty to attack them, albeit without Turkish assistance, any-
where and any time they saw fit, for the prime purpose of the Ka'b surrendering their 
gallivats.IOO 
5.6 The expedition against Hormuz 
Moore wrote to Karim Khan on 3 October 1767 that he had ordered some of his ships 
and forces to go and attack the island of Hormuz, because he understood that Shaikh 
'Abdallah of Hormuz had insolently refused to pay allegiance to the Khan who, there-
fore, wanted to destroy the island. Moore accordingly had sent his ships against 
Hormuz and would, at the same time, exact reparations from Shaikh 'Abdallah for 
some losses he had caused the English. He had ordered Shaikh 'Abdallah to be taken 
prisoner, and his gallivats to be seized and held at the Khan's disposal.IOI The Khan 
replied that he was displeased that the English should think of an expedition against 
Hormuz before they had agreed to the proposals he had made to them about the Ka'b 
and Mir Muhanna. He said he would send troops to protect Shaikh 'Abdallah, whom 
he considered his subject, if the English made any attempt to defeat him.I02 
The aim of the expedition to Hormuz was to try to recover the pearls and treasure 
taken from the ship Islamabad in February 1765 by mutinous Arab lascars on the 
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ship, who murdered the Captain, Herbert Sutherland. 103 ·The history of the Islamabad 
affair was that, having gone down the Gulf from Bushire at the beginning of February 
1765, .she encountered a very violent S.E. wind near the island of Qishm in which the 
ship lost two anchors and was close to foundering. Captain Sutherland bore away 
before the wind up the Gulf again, as far as Mughu on the Persian coast. Being short 
of water and provisions, the Captain sent his long-boat with men ashore on 6 Febru-
ary to obtain both, and they returned the next day with supplies, although they had 
some difficulty in reaching the ship. The wind was blowing very hard and a rope was 
thrown to the boat by some of the lascars, and several men from the long-boat 
climbed aboard. As the Captain's own servant was boarding, however, some of the 
Arab lascars (hired by Captain Sutherland at Basrah) wounded him in several places 
with a lance and he fell back into the water before being pulled back into the long-
boat. Soon after this, the same Arabs shot the 3rd Officer through the head, killing 
him instantly, and the men still in the long-boat cast off, bearing away to save their 
lives. During the period the long-boat was alongside, its occupants could not see 
Captain Sutherland or any officers on the quarter-deck. 
The long-boat came ashore at a little town about a league to the south of Mughu, 
where the Shaikh seized and stripped the boat. Meanwhile, the Arab lascars had mur-
dered Captain Sutherland and the other officers, and plundered the ship of a con-
siderable a..rnount of money. When they la.'lded with it on t.lte island of Qays (see t...'le 
Atlas, Map no. 44) the Shaikh of the island seized them, took the treasure, and con-
signed them in a small boat to the mainland. This account was confirmed by several 
people who arrived in Bushire from Kangun and other parts, who swore that they had 
heard the story from the very Arabs who had mutinied and now excused themselves 
by claiming to have been very cruelly treated by Captain Sutherland and the officers. 
After those Arabs had left the ship the remaining people on board hired two pilots in 
Qays and sailed with her for Muscat.l04 
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It then appeared that N3$ir Khan, the Governor of Ur, had sent a large force against 
the island of Qays under the command of Shaikh' Abdallah al-Ma'ini of Hormuz who 
took the Islamabad's pearls and treasure from the Shaikh of Qays. Captain William 
Justice, the Captain of the Berkshire, wrote from Muscat to Wrench on 19 September 
1766 saying that he had, as promised, enquired at Gombroon about the Isla11Ulbad's 
treasure, and had stayed three or four days on Hormuz with Shaikh 'Abdallah without 
giving him the slightest hint that the English suspected him of having any part of the 
treasure. los The President and Council in Bombay had previously, on 5 January 
1766, informed the Agent at Basrah that if the restitution of all or the greater part of 
the treasure and effects taken from the Islamabad might be achieved by the right 
measures, then he was permitted to use his forces for that purpose as soon as the 
campaign against the Ka'b finished.l06 
Moore therefore wrote to Lyster and Bowyear on 23 October 1767 that for the honour 
and in the interests of his employers' affairs in the Persian Gulf it had been suggested 
to him to send an expedition to Hormuz and Qays, in order to demand satisfaction 
from the Shaikhs of the two islands for the injury done and the insults shown to 
English trade in the Gulf. He accordingly appointed the two of them as joint 
managers in negotiations with the two Shaikhs and gave them the necessary instruc-
tions for their guidance: 
i) The treasure stolen from the Isla11Ulbad, or its value, was at that time in 
the possession of Shaikh 'Abdallah of Hormuz and from him they should 
demand the largest repayment of the whole loss, estimated at Rs 3-400,000. 
Beyond that, Moore wanted them to demand Rs 100,000 on account of the 
trouble and expense taken by the Company in sending a force against the 
island, and Rs 40,000 on account of its capture. 
ii) Apart from the above demands, Moore directed them to require Shaikh 
'Abdallah's cession of the large ship then laying at Honnuz and the fighting 
gallivats, as well as his complete renunciation of the island of Hormuz in 
favour of the English. 
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iii) Moore did not by any means want them to resort to hostile action unless 
the Shaikh refused to negotiate and rejected the terms. 
iv) If the Shaikh refused to negotiate with them they should immediately 
notify the Commanders of the Marine and Military Departments, and leave the 
execution of the hostilities to them. 
v) If they were lucky enough to capture Shaikh 'Abdallah in person they 
were to treat him with the greatest consideration. If Karim Khan had sent 
forces the Shaikh should be handed over to the Persian Commander; otherwise 
he should be taken to Bushire. 
vi) The forces earmarked by Moore for the expedition were the Defiance, the 
bomb-ketch Salamander and the gallivat Wolf. A detachment of artillery, 86 
military and 112 sepoys were embarked on these ships: the Marine Department 
commanded by Commodore Fountain-Price and the Military by Captain Lyt-
ton Leslie. 
vii) Once finished at Hormuz, they should give Commodore Fountain-Price 
orders to continue on to the island of Qays, since a large part of the 
Islamabad's treasure remained in the possession of the Shaikh of Qays. They 
should make enquiries and demand as much compensation as they thought him 
capable of paying. If the Shaikh had any gallivats he should give them up, 
and also the Shaikhdom of the island to whomsoever Karim Khan might 
appoint in charge. If he refused, hostile action should be taken as at Hormuz~ 
and the Shaikh consigned to Bushire. 
Moore also instructed Lyster and Bowyear to demand satisfaction from the Shaikh of 
Charak for taking the Bushire armed boat on her return from Muscat in May 1767. 
There was cargo valued at Rs 10,000 on the boat when the Shaikh seized her, and he 
must not only make full restitution for it, but also pay heavily for his insult to the 
English flag, and his cruelty to their people. His gallivats were all to be seized, his 
island made over to Karim Khan and he himself to be taken prisoner, if they could, 
and be sent to Bushire.I07 
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This affair of the English armed boat from Bushire began when it was sent by order 
of the then Agent to Muscat in April 1767, to water the Success and the Tartar en 
route. On her return journey she was forced by heavy weather to run into Charak. 
The boat was cast ashore and stranded there, so Bowyear sent down an express boat 
with a letter to the Shaikh and one also from Shaikh Sa'diin, asking him to take care 
of what was on board the boat and to return her. On 3 May 1767 the nakhoda of the 
boat arrived at Bushire from Charak and told Bowyear that he was forced by N. W. 
winds to run into Charak, where he anchored. The next morning, when he attempted 
to weigh anchor, four boats put off from the shore full of armed men who boarded the 
Company's boat with scimitars drawn, captured the crew and ran the boat close 
inshore. There they landed everything from the boat, stripped the nakhoda and las-
cars of everything they had and treated them very cruelly. When the nakhoda was 
brought before the Shaikh and told him that the boat belonged to the Company, the 
Shaikh ordered him to be struck and used very abusive language to him, saying that 
the English were not equal to his shoes and that he would take their boats whenever 
they came his way .tos 
Bowyear wrote to Moore on the same day, the 3rd of May, asking him to punish the 
Shaikhs of Honnuz, Qays and Charak: Moore's reply on 27 May 1767 read in part: 
The insolence of the Shaik of Charrack merits corrections; we will 
not neglect him, he may depend on it, at present the calling on him 
is unseasonable. We are very sorry for the accident that has hap-
pened to your armed boat on her return from Muscat; give us a good 
reason for her going there at all, the one you mention is a very friv-
olous one, very puerile, indeed 'to water the Tartar and Success 
between Bushire and Muscat'! we hope you'l find a better, when 
you address the Governor and Counci1109 
Bowyear sent the express boat to the Shaikh of Charak again in June 1767, with a let-
ter instructing him to return the armed boat belonging to the Company which he had 
seized. The Shaikh finnly refused to give the boat up and after reading the letter 
returned it to the tindal saying 'That he should keep the boat or anything else he could 
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take from the English.' The express boat itself had a very narrow escape from being 
captured, but just managed to get under way as three armed boats were sent to board 
it, and pursued it for some distance.IIO 
As for the expedition itself, it sailed on 25 October 1767 from Basrah to Bushire and 
on to Hormuz on 7 November. A letter from Moore for the Khan was received by 
the Resident in Bushire on the same day, translated and given the date of 19 Novem-
ber - after the departure of the expedition. III This letter (see Appendix 29) to Karim 
Khan informed him of the expedition's departure: 'I intended sending our ships 
against Shaikh Abdulla of Ormuse our ships are since gone on that expedition, I con-
clude your Majesty will be rejoiced thereat' ,112 
The reply came from Kalanthar Serlcies (see also Chapter 4.8), an Armenian at 
Shiraz who was very much in the confidence of Karim Khan, who wrote to Moore 
explaining the Khan's reaction to Moore's letter: 
In this letter you wrote you had ordered your ships against Ormuse, 
and to seize Shaik Abdulla the Shaik of that island in order to 
deliver him to the Caun, that as Shaik Abdulla was his subject; the 
English had no business with him, for that he was then serving him 
the Caun: owing to the influence these people had with the Caun, he 
became somewhat angry, and displeased on this he immediately sent 
for me, and asked me what it was the English had wrote to me. I 
told him I had not received any letter from them, the Vackeel 
[Katim Khan] on this observed how came the English not to write to 
you now, as you are always applied to upon their business? I told 
him that by this Pattamar they really had not written me- the Vack-
eel upon this asked 'what business have the English just now with 
Shaik Abdulla?' I must tell you that your engaging on this expedi-
tion has prevented the Caun from writing to you; four or five days 
afterwards in his private apartments, he began a conversation upon 
the English affairs, everything that was necessary I observed to him, 
and told him particularly, that the taking of Shaik Abdulla was one 
of the articles of his agreement with the English; this he allowed: 
but at the same time said that the Chaub's business was first to be 
finished, then Meer Mahanna and then Ormuse: he proceeded, why 
have they left them and gone to Shaik: Abdulla? my reply was, that 
this was the most proper season for it, as the ships were now idle, 
and laying in Bussora river would not answer; on that account they 
were willing to employ their ships first against Shaik Abdulla by the 
time that business was finished news would arrive from Bombay, 
they would set about the other: this some what struck him, and he 
remained for some time silent.ll3 
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From the time of Commodore Fountain-Price setting sail from Bushire, Moore 
received no news about him or any part of his squadron until he was surprised by the 
arrival of the bomb-ketch Salamander, commanded by Lieutenant Gage, at Basrah on 
15 December with the news that the Defiance had blown up on 15 November between 
the island of Qishm and the mainland (see the extract from Lieut. Gage's Journal 
regarding the blowing up of the Defiance in Appendix 30). Only 35 men were saved 
from the 300 and upwards on board. Those who perished included Commodore 
Fountain-Price, Dymoke Lyster and William Bowyear; from the Military, Captain 
Lytton Leslie, Lieutenant Milenburgh and Lieutenant William Robbins; from the 
Defiance, Lieutenants Richard Watkins, James Dowling, James Watkin and Surgeon 
Michael Cummings; and the Bushire Linguist Hermit. This sad disaster had com-
pletely frustrated the Hormuz expedition and the English were not only obliged to set 
that enterprise aside but feared that the accident would greatly influence their future 
operations. 114 As Bowyear was among the dead, Moore appointed James Morley as 
the new Resident in Bushire on 9 January 1768.115 
5. 7 The expedition against Khark Island 
On 15 January 1768, the Eagle; the Success; the bomb ketch Fancy; and the gallivat 
Wolf were despatched with men, provisions and stores from Bombay bound for Bas-
rah. The Revenge and the storeship Essex were also sent from Bombay for Bushire on 
24 January. 116 The whole fleet, under the command of Captain Charles Elphinstone 
(Commander-in-Chief of the United East India Company and Marine Forces in the 
Persian Gulf), arrived at Bushire on 19 March 1768 and started cruising between 
there and Basrah in order to convoy all English merchant vessels passing Mir 
Muhanna's port and to foil any attempt by him to seize them.117 In the fear that Mir 
Muhanna might exploit the absence of the English cruisers from Bushire by trying to 
threaten the port and so damage the Company's interests, the Fancy, the Wolf and the 
schooners Tyger and Dolphin were sent to remain in Bushire for its security.IIB Mer-
chant vessels from Bushire were to be taken under convoy by the Wolf, Tyger and 
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Dolphin, and seen safely to 12 leagues beyond Khark, after which the escorts would 
return to Bushire.ll9 
Although the main objective of the English was to reduce Khark and capture Mir 
Muhanna, this action was to be taken jointly with Karim Khan with whom, however, 
they were still in negotiation. They therefore had to suspend any attack on the island 
until they knew the result of the negotiations.12o At the end of March 1768 the 
English in Bushire were accordingly surprised by the unexpected return of Shaikh 'Isa 
of Bahrain, sent there by Karim Khan in a great hurry to get some vessels ready to 
assist a mounted party marching to attack Ganawah. Mir Muhanna's people based 
there had recently inflicted severe depredation on the neighbouring villages. Shaikh 
'lsa left Bushire on 3 April for Ganawah with a fleet consisting of two ships (i.e. 
large ships compared with the gallivats) and three gallivats, and forced the M"rr's sup-
porters to abandon the place before demolishing its fortifications. 121 At the same 
time, the Turks were seizing eleven trankeys and other boats belonging to Mir 
Muhanna which he had sent up with goods to Basrah and intended bringing back with 
provisions to Khark. The day before the Turks were allowed by the English to seize 
these vessels, the Bombay, the Tyger and the Wolf were despatched to Basrah on the 
pretext of looking out for English shipping but in reality to capture five of the Mir's 
gallivats which, the English had been informed, were lying at the mouth of the river. 
The English intended to keep these vessels until Muhanna gave proper satisfaction for 
some insults he had lately shown to the English pass and colours (the customary 
phrase of the time referring to the ship's papers and flag). 
The M"rr by then had received information about the forces gathering in the area, the 
seizure of his trankeys by the Turks, and the coup which the English planned against 
him: it was assumed that he would certainly try to revenge himself by capturing any 
English vessels which were not strong enough to fight him off.122 To prevent damage 
arising from the Mir' s retaliation, orders were given to the Captains of all vessels to 
be very much on their guard and to await further orders from Skipp in Shiraz.123 
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The Agent, Moore, and the Council at Basrah were informed by Skipp on 27 April 
1768 that he had agreed with Karim Khan that the English squadron with its forces 
embarked should make an immediate attempt on the island of Khark: all of the 
advantage which the English hoped to gain from the alliance with the Khan depended 
upon this. Moore therefore directed Captain Elphinstone to undertake the action with 
the forces under his command. The &mbay and the Essex from Basrah came to join 
him, having embarked all the military elements, the sepoys who had been left at Bas-
rah, and all the factory sepoys.t24 Captain John McKenly, Commander of the Fancy, 
and Lieutenants John Hall, John Birket and Richard Field, in command respectively 
of the Tyger, Dolphin and Wolf at Bushire received Moore's instructions to join the 
fleet.t2S 
The English did not expect any assistance from the Khan's ships or soldiers. Skipp 
wrote to Moore that the Khan was possessed by an extreme distrust of the English and 
he could not be convinced of their sincerity in his cause by any means other than an 
attack on Khark. The Shaikhs of Bush~e and Bahrain were putting every obstacle 
they could in the way of the English, and they would delay both the embarkation of 
any troops that the Khan might order as well as the sailing of the Persian fleet for 
weeks, if not months. Yet, on the other hand, Mir Muhanna's forces numbered only 
1 ~500 men.t26 Moore wrote to Captai11 Elphinstone on 27 April 1768 that 'To 
remedy therefore these disappointments we are compelled to order you to endeavour 
to make yourselves [masters] of the Island of Khark'. He added the following 
instructions: 
In case there are any of the Meers people that are desireous of quit-
ting Carrack, the Caun desires that they would repair to Bushire, 
and assures them of a favourable reception from him. The Caun is 
most anxious for the delivery up of the Meers Person: but this 
should he fall into your hands we would have by no means done; 
untill we can insure his safety, and get the Caun to grant the several 
points we are in want of from him. . . . Should Meer Mahanna be 
desireous of coming to terms without having recourse to hostilities, 
and acknowledge himself a subject of the Cauns with the renuncia-
tion of his Island Gallivats and treasure, and trust to the Cauns 
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clemency for his security, we would have you treat with him accor-
dingly, and immediately advise the Factors at Bushire thereof.l27 
The commanders of Katim Khan's forces around Ganawah and Bandar Riq reported 
to him on 7 and 8 May 1768 that English vessels were then attacking Khark. He was 
waiting only for confmnation of this before sending orders to his troops and the 
Bushire ships to help in reducing the island. 128 Sadiq Khan, the Persian military com-
mander, now granted a number of 'bonuses' (unspecified) in favour of the English,l29 
but the attack on Khark still did not start because the ships which had left Bushire 
were unable to join the fleet owing to the extremely strong North-westerlies. 130 
Karim Khan promised to help the English in the reduction of Khark as soon as he 
received firm information that the English fleet had actually begun the attack.l3I 
The English Commander-in-Chief represented to Morley, the Resident in Bushire, 
that he would need 20 small trankeys for landing his troops on Khark, and Morley 
immediately began trying to procure them. However, the Shaikhs then governing 
Bushire heard of the plan and strictly forbade any of their people offering their boats 
or themselves in the English service. As it clearly appeared to the English, the 
Shaikhs were hoping that denying the assistance would make it impossible to make 
any move against the Arrr: they feared that otherwise the English would be able to 
ingratiate themselves with the Khan so ~uch that his bad opinion of them, which the 
Shaikhs had been fosterh1g for some time, would be erased. In accounting for such 
an unfriendly way of behaving towards them, the English could only suppose that the 
Shaikhs were averse to any English connection with Katim Khan for fear that English 
naval forces might be employed against them, in conjunction with his troops, if they 
incurred his displeasure later on. If that happened, it would inevitably mean their 
downfall because it would deprive them of their only way of escaping the Khan's 
anger, i.e. by retreating to sea with their ships and gallivats: on the whole, it seemed 
likely that they were influenced in this sense. 
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These obstacles did not entirely prevent the English from procuring some boats for 
their fleet. Morley bought five and sent them off in the charge of Lieutenant Field, 
Captain of the Wolf, but the bad luck experienced by the Wolf after sailing from 
Bushire on her return to the fleet seemed to put an end to English hopes. 132 The 
Agent at Basrah received a detailed report from Lieut. Field who returned to Bushire 
on 14 May 1768: 
That in the afternoon of the 13th (the day after he left Bushire) it 
began to blow very fresh from the N. W., which obliged him to 
Anchor about 6 Leagues to the Northward of this place. That the 
Gale increased in the Evening and occasioning a very heavy Sea 
which frequently made a passage over his Vessel, he weighed again 
to run into shoal water. That soon after getting under sail one of the 
Trankeys in Tow broke adrift, with a Lascar in her, on which he 
sent his Boat with Mr Higgins and four other Europeans to save that 
person, but a squall coming on before her return she was obliged to 
put for the shore. That two of our Trankeys belonging to us which 
were at Anchor astern of him when the Gale began weighed in the 
Night and he imagines were run ashore by their people to save their 
lives, as they had no more than one days provisions on board. That 
the people in his own Boat were entirely unprovided with Provisions 
or water and supposing they have all run ashore somewhere between 
Bushire and Hallela, he hopes that some intelligence may be had of 
them. That he had brought two of the Trankeys with him with great 
difficulty and there were 1 Syrang, 9 Lascars and 8 Seepoys in the 
Two Trankeys lost, and 5 Europeans and 1 Lascar in his own 
Boat.I33 
On receiving this news Morley straightaway sent people overland to look along the 
shore as far as Halela for the men and boats lost from the Wolf, and also sent a 
trankey to do the same as far as Kangun, if she did not meet them nearer Bushire. 
The overland party came back with news that one of the trankeys with nine men on 
board were safe in Halela Bay and they were brought back to Bushire.l34 The boat 
sent by Morley towards Kangun looking for the trankey and the ship's boat came back 
to Bushire on 21 May with the latter. Four of the Europeans in her at the time were 
drowned when she capsized, and the trankey was lost.l3S Morley then sent four boats 
for the expedition, one of them being the trankey which separated from the Wolf in 
the gale. 136 
Meanwhile, Morley wrote to Skipp on 9 May about his need for boats and telling him 
of the Shaikhs' behaviour. Skipp immediately wrote to Karim Khan about Morley's 
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needs. He represented to the Khan. that such a reasonable request, and one for his 
own particular benefit on a mission which he had so earnestly asked the English to 
undertake, should not meet with any difficulties. But it had met with many, and the 
behaviour of Karim Khan, who had not put a stop to them, was dilatory and 
inexplicable. When the Khan read Skipp's request for boats and the complaint about 
the Shaikhs' behaviour, he condemned them and sent for them to explain the reasons 
for their actions. The Shaikhs replied that they were ready to help with boats, but 
that their boats could not survive at sea where the ships were going: they would prob-
ably be lost in the high winds with the loss of all hands, if they were not first killed 
by Mir Muhanna by venturing near Khark. To this rather sensible submission Karim 
Khan replied that he did not want his poor people to run so great a risk, and equally 
sensibly ordered M"rrza, the son of Zaki Khan, to arrange for 15 boats to be supplied, 
but without crews. 
Skipp now called on Karim Khan himself and, with Shaikhs present, protested in the 
strongest terms about the behaviour of the Shaikhs at Bushire. He asked the Khan to 
give the Shaikhs orders to supply the boats requested. At the same time he urged him 
to require the Shaikhs to go with their ships, gallivats and all the forces they could 
collect to join the English squadron and act jointly with the English forces at Khark. 
He told the Khan that, in order to ensure success, he should send 3,000 of his own 
troops to act together with the Engiish on the isiand. Tne Khan instantly insisted that 
he would send his brother with 10,000 men, and observed that he would rather have a 
thousand of his own men killed in the attack than ten of the English. But this was all 
a charade of obvious lies and contradictions: one minute denying what he had prom-
ised a minute earlier and finally refusing to send a single man. At one point he 
claimed that if the Agent at Basrah had written to him saying what was necessary he 
would have sent the required number. When Skipp showed him the futility of that 
excuse he said the hot weather had set in and would kill all his soldiers: he therefore 
excused himself from sending any. 
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Karim Khan several times told Skipp that if the Agent at Basrah was not happy with 
the terms which had been agreed there, the English were very welcome to abrogate 
them, even though they had been settled. He spoke in this way so earnestly and fre-
quently that Skipp believed he was looking for a pretext for declaring them void. At 
last, however, afaramfJn was drawn up and signed, ordering 12 boats to be duly sup-
plied and also directing Shaikh 'I sa to go with the three Bush ire gallivats to join the 
English fleet off Khark.l37 A courier was despatched to Bushire by Karim Khan on 
20 May 1768 with orders to the Shaikhs of Bushire to supply the English with 12 
boats for service in the expedition. 138 Skipp pressed Karim Khan hard to have a body 
of troops ready at Bushire or Bandar Riq to join the English forces, but the Khan's 
troops refused to serve off the mainland.l39 
In front of Khark a Council of War was convened on 19 May on board the Revenge, 
composed of the various Captains and the most senior Lieutenants in each Corps. It 
was decided to attack Khark next day in the morning, to damage the defences and 
make a breach in the north curtain of the fort. On the 20th the signal was made at 1 
p.m. to prepare for action at 2.30 p.m. The fleet came within point-blank range of 
the fort but the wind shifted suddenly from N.W. to S.W. by W. This forced the 
fleet to anchor at a much greater distance than they intended, having hoped to run in 
close. Nevertheless, the ships continued to cannonade and bombard the fort for 
nearly three hours- but with little success. The Bombay cut its cable and ran at 4.30, 
being on fire in the starboard quarter. At the same time, the wind freshened and 
seemed likely to stand against them. As it was not possible to warp the ships nearer, 
the signal for engaging was lowered and the ships ran out a little way. The Revenge 
and the Bombay had suffered a good deal in their masts and rigging, and had a num-
ber of shots in their hulls. Mir Muhanna's forces had directed their frre very well, 
and had stood to their guns much better than expected. The Revenge had three of her 
men's legs shot off and the Bombay had ten men wounded, one fatally, while the 
schooner Dolphin had one man killed. 
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Another Council of War, composed as before, was called in the evening (20th) to 
prepare for renewing the attack in the morning if the weather permitted.l40 The next 
morning, the English force accordingly returned to sea but had received a letter from 
Skipp in the meantime, asking for them to write a letter, in the name of the Com-
manders on the expedition, to Katim Khan. The occasion for the letter was that the 
Khan had often asked that they should brief him on the situation at Khark and whether 
it was necessary for a body of his troops to be ordered to act in conjunction with the 
English for the reduction of the island. Until this much was confirmed to him there 
was no possibility of persuading him to give the English such help.l41 
The letter to Karim Khan (see Appendix 31) was written that day, the 21st, and con-
cluded: 
Confiding in this your royal promise, we are now resolved to 
suspend all further hostile proceedings against the Enemy in regard 
to his Town, till the Junction of those Troops with our Forces 
(unless the orders of our Superior the Agent at Bussora should direct 
otherwise) hoping the number will amount to at least 3,000 men and 
that they will be in readiness to proceed to Action before the heats, 
from which they might find some inconvenience, are much further 
advanced. 142 
As there were a number of sick and wounded in the fleet, arrangements were made to 
send them to Bushire, where a hospital was prepared for their reception.I43 Three of 
Mir Muhanna's gallivats did not return to Bushire that day, although they had been 
chasing six of the boats which had sailed from Bushire to join the fleet and which 
were now returning to Bushire.l44 
After a long meeting, lasting some hours, with Karim Khan on 23 May 1768 Skipp 
had finally made enough progress to confirm him in his resolve to send a body of 
men. He promised Skipp he would do so, and when Skipp repeatedly asked him if he 
was fully committed and whether Skipp could depend upon it, he declared that Skipp 
could be quite sure of it; he would not break his word and he proposed sending about 
7,000 men commanded by Zaki Khan. 
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While Skipp was with him, Karim Khan sent for Zaki Khan and ordered him to be 
ready to take the command of these forces and depart in six days. At the same time, 
Karim gave directions for the necessary orders to be sent to Bushire for the ships, gal-
livats and boats to be ready to transport the troops. When the Khan announced his 
intention of sending 7,000 men, Skipp told him that it was more than was necessary: 
half of that number was quite sufficient to ensure success, but the Khan remarked that 
he was determined on that number to be certain that no shame should befall his army. 
But when it was time to send these orders to Bushire on 24 May, Karim Khan's inten-
tions changed completely and he would not now send a single man, claiming that the 
heat would be the death of all his people. However, on the return of the man he had 
sent to Bushire with the order for the boats he would then decide how to proceed. 
This was merely a pretence to keep the English in play while ~rr Muhanna, in the 
meantime, might send to make peace with him.l4S 
After this farce Skipp wrote on the same day, the 24th, to Elphinstone: 
I am led to think that let what will be the case and notwithstanding 
the solemn assurances he has all along given, he will not send a 
single man to the reduction of Carrack. Therefore should we make 
the attempt alone and not be ordained with success we shall then I 
hope have an opportunity of taking our own Satisfaction. I 
acquainted you of the above in order that you make what use you 
may think necessa.ry thereof.l46 
Being given this scope for action, Elphinstone tried on 29 May to bum three of M"rr 
Muhanna's gallivats but his ships grounded, and with the gallivats being hauled too 
far up the beach for any chance of success, they were obliged to return. At the same 
time, M"rr Muhanna had laid a plan against the English in which he was to be very 
fortunate. The Eagle, the Wolf and a storeship being in need of water, they were 
ordered to Kharku on 27 May for that purpose: the English were afraid that if they 
sent the storeship to Bushire she would be unable to rejoin the fleet for a long period. 
The Commander-in-Chief gave orders to his officers that they were not to land if they 
saw any people on the island. They therefore examined the island closely before 
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sending their casks ashore but, out of fear of a surprise attack, Elphinstone also 
ordered one officer and 50 sepoys ashore to cover the watering party, with orders to 
embark every night at sunset. This order was duly complied with. On the 28th Cap-
tains Nelson and Bigg went on shore and walked all over the island without seeing the 
least sign of people, but it seems that during the night Mir Muhanna sent 40 or 50 
men in small boats who hid themselves in trenches dug in the sand. The next morn-
ing they waited for the watering party and sepoy guards to land and, about an hour 
and a half later, the Mir's men rushed from their hiding places and threw the sepoy 
guard into confusion. Most of the guard threw their arms down and ran into the 
water: the few who stood to their arms were all cut to pieces to the number of twelve 
dead and six wounded. Of the four Europeans sent to fill the casks two were cut 
down and two taken prisoner (but see casualty report in Table 5.1 below). 
As soon as the Commander-in-Chief saw the fighting he embarked all the troops from 
the Revenge and the Bombay into boats to send to the shore party's assistance, while 
the Eagle and the Wolfkept up a constant fire upon the ~rr's men. At this the latter 
boarded the small boats which had landed them during the night. Elphinstone sig-
nalled the Bombay and the Fancy to try and cut them off before they reached Khark, 
but the little or no wind prevented them from doing so. 
Seeing that it was not necessary for the troops to iand, and with everyone except those 
cut down now re-embarked, the Commander-in-Chief ordered everyone back to their 
respective ships. The English now knew that they had a bold and daring enemy to 
deal with: one who would exploit all manner of opportunities; whose troops were 
excellently disciplined; one who, since the first arrival of the English at Khark, had 
made great improvements in his fortifications to the surprise of those qualified to 
judge; and one whose people were far from being disaffected - quite the contrary. 
Elphinstone was obliged now to despatch the Fancy, Wolf and the storeship to Bushire 
for water, firewood and to land the wounded sepoys. The storeship was ordered to 
remain at Bushire until further orders, while the Fancy and the Wolf would return to 
210 
the fleet as soon as they had completed watering and loaded firewood. As the Wolf 
had lost most of her men in the last action Morley was asked to hire some Arab 
seamen to help work her. The eight boats without crews previously sent from Bushire 
were returned by these vessels.l47 
European seamen 
Sepoys 
Artillery lascars 
Sea lascars 
Topasses 
Totals 
Table 5.1: The watering party on Kharku: 
casualty Jistl48 
Killed 
4 
I7 
I 
1 
I 
24 
Wounded Missing 
I 
5 
5 1 
On Mir Muhanna's side more than one hundred died in Khark fort during the attack 
made by the English on 20 May I768.149 
5.8 The expulsion of Mir Muhanni from Khark Island 
When Karim Khan finally declared to Skipp that he could not send any men to assist 
in the Khark expedition (see page 209) he conceded that he was ashamed to admit this 
and was greatly obliged to the English for the help they were ready to give him. If 
the English could stay until August he would be grateful; he could then send a large 
body of men and would grant the English any favours they required. In the meantime 
he asked them not to attempt anything against Mir Muhanna without a good chance of 
success because that would only weaken the English force to no good purpose. ISO 
The English, however, were fed up with the Khan's manoeuvrings and took three 
decisions: 
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i) As the Khan's troops were not yet embarked and he saw no likelihood of 
them doing so, Moore ordered the Commanders on 26 June 1768 to return to 
Bushire with the Revenge and Essex. On their arrival Morley would load them 
with the woollens, thereby reducing the value of the Company's property at 
risk from Rs 80,000 toRs 40,000. On 10 August Moore further ordered the 
amount at risk to be reduced toRs 5,000 and added that if Morley thought that 
the English personnel and the remaining effects were in any danger, whether 
from Karim Khan, the Shaikhs of Bushire or from any other direction, he 
should embark them all forthwith on the Revenge and sail straight to Basrah.ISI 
ii) Moore similarly ordered Skipp on 26 June 1768 to quit Shiraz, unless 
Karim Khan marched his troops in 15 days with orders to embark them for 
Khark. Skipp was directed to propose various articles to Karim Khan for his 
acceptance, on condition that the English squadron ·stayed three more 
months, 152 whereby the Khan's troops would have to be marching by 27 July 
1768, or close to it, and ready to embark in accordance with Skipp's require-
ments for the capture of Khark.IS3 
iii) If the Persian troops were not ready to proceed on the expedition by 31 
August the whole expedition would return to Bombay. 
In line with Skipp's agreement with Karim Khan, Moore wrote to the Khan on 15 
July to confirm the arrangements and added: 
In obedience to your Majesty's commands and in expectation that 
your Troops will be in readiness for the service of Carrack accord-
ing to the time you have promised, and which is no more than two 
and thirty days from this date I have directed the Commanders of 
our ships and Soldiers to wait your orders at Bushire and again to 
commence their operations against the Island of Carrack whenever 
your Majestys troops and Ships are ready to insure the reduction 
thereof. 154 
To reactivate the operation against Khark island Moore sent instructions on 27 July 
1768 to Charles Elphinstone and Lawrence Nelson, the Commanders of the expedi-
tion, to move to Bushire to brief themselves from the English Factors there as to the 
movements of Karim Khan's troops: Iss 
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a) If the Khan's troops had arrived at Bushire or Bandar Riq and had 
embarked on the Persian fleet by 31 August, the Commanders would go with 
them to join the other division of the squadron off Khark and would jointly do 
their utmost to capture the island and arrest Mir Muhanna. 
b) If the Khan's troops were not embarked by 31 August, the Bombay, the 
gallivat Wolf and the storeship Essex would return with the expeditionary force 
to Bombay. The squadron composed of the Revenge, Eagle, the bomb-ketch 
Fancy, and the schooners Tyger and Dolphin would remain in the Gulf: the 
Eagle, Fancy and Dolphin to continue cruising off Khark, and the Revenge and 
Tyger to be placed under the orders of the Factors at Bushire. 
Karim Khan ordered the Bushire fleet in readiness on 15 August 1768 for the 
transport of his troops and Shaikh 'Isa, appointed Commander-in-Chief of his Marine 
forces by the Khan, was preparing the Bushire vessels for the task.IS6 In June an 
emissary from Shaikh Khalifah of Grain (modem Kuwait) had arrived in Bushire to 
propose amalgamating his vessels with those of Bushire against Khark, and Shaikh 
'lsa had sent one gallivat and two dinghis to reinforce the Kuwaiti fleet. Now Shaikh 
Khalifah arrived at Bushire with his fleet, asking Shaikh 'Isa for reinforcements to 
enable him to go in pursuit of Mir Muhanna's gallivats.IS7 
Karim Khan's animosity towards Mir Muhanna and desire to destroy him was 
believed to be more for his family than himself. His government was too well estab-
lished and he himself too powerful for the Mir to give him even one moment's 
anxiety. He had completed the conquest of Persia and, after great efforts, pacified all 
the inland provinces. He had conferred the most important positions, civil and mili-
tary, on the chief people of his own tribe, in whom the kingdom's revenues at that 
time were centred, in the hope that they would support his son after his death. Mir 
Muhanna was by birth the chief Shaikh of the coast and most of the province was for-
merly under his family's control; he had never sworn obedience to Karim Khan and 
was the only leader still undefeated. The inhabitants of Dashtistan were a 
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troublesome, rebellious people who were much more attached to their tribes and 
Shaikhs since the death of Nadir Shah than to the present government of Karim Khan. 
After some violence committed by them about a year previously Karim Khan had 
ordered the whole province to be wiped out but, after his ministers remonstrated with 
him, suspended the order: only 75 men of Ganawah lost their heads as a result. 
Karim Khan realised that after his death Mir Muhanna would be the first to rebel 
against his son and would be joined by the whole province once he landed at Bandar 
Riq: a rebellion breaking out so near to the capital would run like wildfire through the 
people before a leader became established and gained the power to subdue them. 
Some of them might be induced to join ~rr Muhanna and it would be impossible in 
that event for his son to keep a standing army in such a poorly-provided area, just to 
prevent the ~rr· s forays. Whenever threatened by a superior force ~rr Muhanna had 
a secure refuge in Khark for himself and his followers which he could always depend 
upon. He might cause the Khan's son a good deal of trouble which could prove his 
downfall: if his son kept an army on the coast the tribes of the interior would rise and 
could not be kept in subjection. ISS 
~u Muhanna, as it happened, was now ill and weakened by the loss of many of his 
people - 100 killed in the English attack of 20 May 1768 against Khark fort and others 
having deserted - and harassed by the English fleet cruising off K.l}ark.159 He sent a 
boat at the beginning of July 1768 with a message to the Shaikh of Bushire, offering 
his assistance in the event of Karim Khan having designs on Bushire. The Shaikh, in 
reply, sent one of his servants over to Khark - something which had never happened 
from the time ~rr Muhanna took Khark and which ran the risk of the Khan's anger if 
it became known to him. In Bushire it was regarded as a remarkable step and it was 
supposed that the Mir had sent some extraordinary news for the two of them to be 
plotting together. Whatever the case, and in apparent desperation, ~rr Muhanna 
decided to try his luck against the grab Bombay by sending six gallivats and many 
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boats armed with his best people in the hope of meeting up with the grab alone, either 
at Bushire or elsewhere. 
The English expedition started firing on the Mir's gallivats on 15 August 1768 and 
had some success in harassing the ~rr but, on the same day, the Speedwell, an 
English boat carrying a packet from Shiraz, en route from Bushire to Basrah, 
unluckily fell in with one of the Mir's armed gallivats off Khark. The gallivat chased 
the Speedwell and drove it ashore near Bandar Riq, where the packet was hidden 
before the attackers carried off the cargo of cloth (see also Chapter 6.1). The packet 
contained a letter from Skipp to Moore, mainly to advise him that Karim Khan was 
still assuring him that the troops he had promised would set out from Shiraz by 21 
August at the latest, and that he had sent orders to the Ka'b and several Shaikhs on 
the Persian coast to have their gallivats and boats ready at Bushire for transporting the 
troops to Khark. He added that Karim Khan himself was getting ready to go with 
them. Five of Mir Muhanna's gallivats escaped from Khark by night on 15 August 
and quickly overpowered a twin-masted ship attacked off Halela on the 17th. The 
Bombay and the two schooners came in sight of the gallivats and continued the chase 
until the evening of the 18th: the very light wind during that period enabled the gal-
livats with the help of their oars to outrun the English vessels and they escaped with 
their prize to an island near Grain on the Arab shore, where they awaited further 
orders from oorr Muhanna.1ro 
At the beginning of August 1768, Karim Khan wrote to Moore, the Agent at Basrah, 
saying that he had reviewed all the preparations for the departure of the troops going 
to Ganawah by 31 August 1768 and had appointed his brother, Mul}ammad Zaki 
Khan, as their commander. He asked for three or four vessels to be kept in readiness 
to assist him in the expedition against the Mir.l61 (see Appendix 32) In Shiraz, Karim 
Khan told his brother, Zakl Khan, that his troops were to proceed to Ganawah and 
embark on the English vessels, and the Bushire and Bahrain fleets. 162 Moore agreed 
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to help with the remaining English vessels going with the Persian fleet against Mir 
Muhanna on condition: 
a) that Karim Khan should immediately order the Ka'b to send 15,000 
Tomans to Moore at Basrah as compensation for losses, as the Khan had 
ordered; 
and b) that he should send someone of substance from his Court to Basrah 
to negotiate with Moore on the subject of English trade in the Khan's 
territories. 
Moore promised that when these two points had been settled to the satisfaction of the 
English, they would then, but not before, negotiate with him about helping his move 
against Mir Muhanna163 (see Appendix 33). 
The deadline of 31 August passed and by 2 September 1768 the Persian troops prom-
ised by Karim Khan to help the English in the capture of Khark had still not arrived at 
any of the sea ports in the neighbourhood of Bushire. The grab Bombay therefore set 
course for India, together with the storeship Essex and the gallivat Wolf. The English 
woollens at Bushire, to the value of Rs 76,784, were shipped on the Revenge, leaving 
only about Rs 5,000 worth to remain, and proceeded to Basrah. Permission was 
again given to the Resident to embark himself, the staff and remaining effects on the 
cruisers and go with them to Basrah if need be.l64 
In September 1768 Morley ordered Captain Thomas Farmer, then Commander-in-
Chief of the Company's Marine force in the Gulf, to despatch the snow Eagle, the 
bomb-ketch Fancy and the schooner Dolphin to cruise between Bushire and Khark 
island, and the Revenge and Tyger to cruise on to Basrah. Their aim was to prevent 
M"rr Muhanna having any communication with the Persian mainland, where his people 
had frequently carried off provisions from Halela on his five gallivats; as also to pro-
tect any of the English trading vessels coming from the south or elsewhere and to take 
or destroy all gallivats belonging to M"rr Muhanna which might come within reach.l65 
From September 1768 to January 1769 the English vessels cruised the Persian coast 
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from Bushire to Basrah. Mir Muhanna's gallivats were doing the same, sometimes 
reaching and attacking Qishm island, where there was no protection for English trad-
ing vessels: but no confrontation took place between the Mir and the English. He had 
nine gallivats, several of which carried six 9-pounders and 2 swivel-guns: they had 
between 70 and 80 men in each. Apart from these vessels he had several armed 
trankeys. By December 1768 the English vessels were in a poor condition and were 
unaccustomed to the weather at that time of year, so were kept most of the time in 
port during January. The costs of the English vessels in December 1768 were Rs 
2,510 but in January 1769 amounted to only Rs 374.7. 166 
The Persian military commander, Zak'i Khan, encamped at Ganawah in November 
with an army of about 3,000 men. He remained there during the winter but Karim 
Khan seemed to have no intention at that time to order his troops to attack Khark. On 
6 November, Shaikh 'lsa, the Shaikh of Bahrain and brother of Shaikh Sa'diin of 
Bushire, sailed from Bushire to Ganawah in order to receive the Khan's troops on 
board.l67 
As for M"rr Muhanna, on 26 January 1769 he imprisoned eight of his gallivat nak-
hodas on some unknown charge, and the heads of the most important Arab tribes on 
the island went to him to request their release. Muhanna agreed, subject to them 
paying him money, and set them free as soon as the money was paid. The principal 
nakhoda then rallied the leading people of the island to his side and they rose up 
against Mir Muhanna, killing about 60 of his guards and supporters as he sat 
unsuspectingly in a silversmith's shop. He himself was wounded by scimitars and 
escaped with great difficulty, accompanied by ten men, to a small boat and made his 
way to the Basrah river. Another boat from Basrah accompanied his own and, on 
arriving at the mouth of the river, Mir Muhanna took the nakhoda from the Basrah 
boat, who knew the river, into his, and they continued up Khor Abdullah (see the 
Atlas, Map no. 62). His intention was to put himself under the protection of Shaikh 
Thamir, the son of the brother of Shaikh 'Abdallah of the Muntafiq, with whom there 
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had been a long-standing friendship. Next day, when Mir Muhanna was expecting to 
reach Zubair, the Turkish Miitesellim (Governor) of Basrah was told of the M"rr's 
arrival on 3 February 1769 and sent 40 horsemen to find him. They left Zubair very 
early on 4 February to search along the banks of Khor Abdullah and soon found the 
Mir with his ten slaves coming towards them on camels and horses. The 
Miitesellim's men were worried that Muhanna would be alarmed if he saw Turks so 
deep into the desert and might escape to his boat. They therefore shed their Turkish 
capes and some of them circled around to intercept any move to his boat, and sur-
rounded him before arousing his suspicions. 
When the search party came up to Muhanna he expressed surprise at finding Turks so 
far into the desert, but they told him that it was quite usual for the Miitesellim to send 
them out there in order to keep the roads clear of robbers. As the M"rr and his men 
appeared to be strangers they must allow themselves to be taken to Basrah to explain 
themselves to the Governor. The Mir told them that he intended only to pay a visit to 
Shaikh Thamir, after which he would continue to Baghdad before returning to Basrah. 
When he found that ·they would not allow this he followed them quietly towards Bas-
rah. After some time Muhanna stopped, dismounted from his horse and said he could 
go no further without having his shoulder wound dressed: he therefore asked permis-
sion to return to Zubair, which they had passed not long before, after which he prom-
ised to accompany them to Basrah. A scuffle might have ensued except that 20 more 
Turkish horsemen arrived and forced him to continue on the road to Basrah. The 
Zubair people belonged to the Muntafiq and had shown a disposition to protect the 
Mir, but he was rapidly taken to Government House in Basrah, where he was very 
well treated by the Miitesellim but remained there as a Turkish prisoner. 168 
5.9 The withdrawal of the English settlement from Bushire 
In May 1768, Morley wrote to the Agent in Basrah telling him that Shaikh N~ir, the 
brother of the Shaikh of Bushire, had made frequent demands over the previous few 
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months, insisting that the Company should pay him an additional Rs 1,000 a year for 
the rent of the factory. In this he assumed that the English, having no other place to 
go, would have to agree to these exorbitant terms. 169 Then, in March 1768, he had 
resumed the dispute he had begun with Bowyear about the rent for the factory and 
ordered his attorney to give Morley notice that the English could no longer occupy it 
without paying him Rs 2,000 a year. Morley refused to accept such a great 
increase.11o Shaikh Sa'diin, too, in July 1768 insisted on being paid Rs 1,000 a year 
for serving as the factory's broker .m 
Morley found himself put into a very difficult situation in January 1769 by Shaikh 
Man$iir, the eldest son of Shaikh Ni$ir. He received a letter informing him that 
Man$iir' s father had directed him to enter into a new agreement for the factory rent, 
for which he was demanding Rs 1,500 a year, and in claiming the arrears also insisted 
on receiving Rs 1 ,000 rent for every lunar year of 354 days from the time the English 
first took possession. This would make a difference of about 70 days to which he was 
certainly not entitled, as it was the general custom among the Persians, as well as the 
Europeans, to allow 365 days to the year in all bargains struck for that term. The 
Shaikhs themselves took advantage of that interpretation in their agreements with the 
Kings of Persia governing their annual tribute. 
Despite being treated in such a cavalier manner, Morley did not enter into any argu-
ment with Shaikh Man$iir, contenting himself with replying that his decision would be 
made known by Shaikh :ijajji, the son of Shaikh Sa'diin, who was Governor of 
Bushire at that time. He intended seeing Shaikh :ijajji the next day to see to what 
extent he would countenance these demands, and act accordingly. In the interim, 
however, he heard that some of Shaikh Ni$ir's men, armed with large clubs, had 
been at the Hospital, which belonged to him, ordering the sick to move out 
immediately. It was only with great difficulty that they could be persuaded not to use 
violence, even though it was then late in the evening and there were no other places 
of shelter to be found: knowing that the patients were leaving a house belonging to 
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Shaikh N~ir, the local people would fear upsetting him by making any others avail-
able. There were no other caravanserais into which they could move. 
Shaikh :ijajji went to Morley who stressed the injustice and discourtesy of these events 
and said that unless the Shaikh could guarantee him no further harassment he would 
no longer regard Bushire as a safe place for the Company's employees and effects, 
and would therefore immediately withdraw. This statement seemed to alarm the 
Shaikh a good deal and he expressed deep concern at the problems encountered by the 
English, which he attributed to Shaikh Man!1iir's obstinacy. He assured Morley that it 
was far from Shaikh N~ir' s intention to give any offence to the English and that he 
could depend on having no cause for future complaints. Having also promised that 
Morley would receive a written agreement signed by Shaikh Man!1iir on behalf of 
Shaikh N~ir that the factory rent would continue to be Rs 1 , 000 for a year of 365 
days, Shaikh :ija.iji asked for a favour for which he would be greatly obliged. As 
regards the difference of 70 days in what the Company had paid in the past, he sug-
gested a compromise to resolve the dispute by which Morley should pay Rs 1,000 in 
full settlement of all demands for the factory rent. Morley agreed to these tenns.l72 
The next day, some of the Hospital people were trying to get in a local boat in order 
to go aboard the cruisers, when Morley heard that the Shaikh had placed a guard near 
the factory so as not allow them to put off, nor to take away any of the Compa..ny's 
effects. Morley consequently sent to see Shaikh :ija.iji again. On his call the latter 
said it gave him the greatest concern to have just received orders from Zaki Khan 
which obliged him to detain Morley: unless the Persians were obeyed to the letter his 
father and two uncles at Shiraz might inevitably fall victim to the Khan's anger. 
Shaikh :ija.iji told Morley that he was waiting for Zaki Khan's messenger to return 
soon from Shiraz, and he was certain he would receive orders not to molest the 
English. 173 
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Morley now decided to withdraw the settlement from Bushire and wrote to the Presi-
dent and Governor in Council at Bombay: 
In this situation I am now preparing for my departure and flatter 
myself your Honours will approve of the measures I have taken 
having acted entirely from a regard to the interest of my Honble 
Employers, with which, I must likewise beg to observe, the con-
tinuance of this settlement would in my opinion be no way con-
sistent, while our affairs in the Gulf are in an unprosperous state, 
considering the treatment we have lately received from Sheik Nas-
sir_174 
Early on the morning of 6 February 176~, without giving the Shaikh any previous 
warning of such an intention, the Resident, James Morley, together with John Both-
man, the Factor at Bushire, embarked with all the Company's effects on the Revenge 
and left for Basrah. On the 8th, the snow Eagle, the bomb-ketch Fancy, and the 
schooners Dolphin and Tyger took the same course.11s 
5.10 Conclusion 
The withdrawal of the English from Bushire was probably inevitable, arising as it did 
from four fundamental factors. 
a) The commotions Although the English at Bushire acted in a neutral manner, 
their trade was forced into decline in any case by an environment of conflict and 
instability beyond their control. The English were boxed into a very difficult situation 
between Karim Khan's demands and M"rr Muhanna's hostility. They had suffered pal-
pable losses at M"rr Muhanna's hands, and yet Karim Khan was so angry that the 
English would not (as he believed) help him against the Mir that he determined not to 
receive the English Linguist, nor to admit their Ambassador at Shiraz to an audience. 
b) Corruption The poor quality of the staff (Jervis and the Linguist) gave rise to 
corrupt and costly management. Without any authorisation from Bombay, Jervis 
offered Karim Khan the use of the Company's fleet to destroy M"rr Muhanna and the 
Ka'b, against a payment of Rs 50,000. This caused a distortion of the facts in Karim 
Khan's mind and fuelled his 'disgust' with the English for many years. The Linguist, 
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Stephen Hermit, in his attempt to secure renewed grants from Karim Khan, failed to 
obtain a single grant relating to Bushire. On the contrary, he had all the grants so 
written that the Company appeared to be firmly committed to settling at Bushaib: 
wherever Bushire had been mentioned in the grants formerly received from Sadiq 
Khan, Hermit had inserted Bushaib. By his carelessness, Hermit embroiled the Com-
pany and the Persian Government in many difficulties. 
c) The poor financial returns From 1766 onwards the Company had sustained an 
annual loss of Rs 2,000 on the Persian Gulf account: English sales were trivial and no 
Shiraz merchant had been near Bushire. It is instructive to set out a rudimentary 
financial balance sheet for the 18 months from July 1767 to December 1768 (see 
Table 5.2). Staff costs and the cost of security, including the cruiser and soldiers, 
exceeded the revenue from sales. In all the circumstances it is remarkable that sales 
reached almost Rs 150,000. 
d) Unsuccessful military operations There were, in addition, heavy expenditure 
and losses caused by the three unsuccessful military operations: 
i) The expedition against the Ka'b (1766). 
In July 1765 the English lost three ships, the Sally, the Yacht and the Fon 
William, captured by the Ka'b. On 10 March 1766 an English expedition 
arrived at Bushire to punish the Ka'b, but the attack ended in a painful 
defeat, with casualties and iosses estimated at Rs 500,000. 
ii) The expedition against Hormuz (1767). 
The aim of the expedition to Hormuz was to recover the pearls and 
treasure taken from the Islamabad in February 1765 by the Arab lascars in 
its crew. Shaikh 'Abdallah of Hormuz was accused of being involved in 
taking the treasure, which was estimated at Rs 3-400,000. The expedition 
was sent to Hormuz on 25 October 1767 but, on 15 November of the 
same year, its flagship, the Defiance, blew up. Only 35 men from the 
300 or more on board were saved. 
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Table 5.2: Balance sheet for Bushire 
trading, July 1767-December 1768 
Expenditure Rupees 
George Skipp's expenses at Bushire, August 1767 
Advance to Skipp, October 1767 
1,000 
5,400 
3,244 Payments for freight vessels (native boats) 
Skipp's expenses at Shiraz, September 1768 
Rentals for two years (July 1767 & July 1768) 
Arrears of the rentals, 1763-1767 
Cruiser costs - 4 months at 2,510 
Linguist's salary July 1767-December 1768 
Linguist's bonus (600 a year) 
Bushire factory; staff salaries, 
13,500 
2,000 
1,000 
10,040 
900 
1,200 
July 1767-December 1768; Bushire guards (6 soldiers, 
5 artillery men, one officer) for same period; Stables 
for same period 116,000 
Cost of the Grab (service boat) July 1767-
December 1768 
Total expenditure 
Money borrowed from the Basrah Agency 
July 1767-December 1768 
August 1767 
November 1767 
July 1767 
Total borrowing 
Money repaid to Basrah Agency 
July 1767-December 1768 
January 1768 (Bill of Exchange) 
January 1768 (specie) 
May 1768 (Bill of Exchartge) 
September (specie) 
December 1768 (specie) 
Total repayments 
Sales balance July 1767-December 1768 
Expenditure brought forward 
Money repaid to Basrah 
Total expenditure 
Less: Money borrowed from Basrah 
Net sales 
Losses on sales [as shown in the records] 
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Rs 159,684176 
10,000 
2,000 
20,000 
Rs 32,000 
2,400 
3,000 
700 
15,000 
1,164 
Rs 22,264 
159,684 
22,264 
181,948 
-32,000 
149,948 
3,585177 
iii) The expedition against Mir Muhanna (1768). 
The main objective of the English in this expedition was to reduce the island of 
Khark and capture Mir Muhanna. The action was to be taken jointly with 
Ka.Iim Khan but they remained, to the end, in negotiation rather than co-
operation with him. When the English sent a party ashore on Khargu for water, 
Mir Muhanni attacked them, killing 24, wounding 5 and leaving one missing. 
These four factors well illustrate the problems of trading in the Gulf; .when they 
operate together, as happened at Bushire, the outcome is a foregone conclusion. 
Lorimer levelled the charge of unilaterally withdrawing the Residency from Bushire 
against Morley: 
. . . Mr. J. Morley, the Resident at Biishehr, who seems to have had 
an inkling of their intentions before they were carried out, and who 
foresaw a rupture with Ka.Iim Khan as the probable consequence that 
early in February he took steps, on his own responsibility, for with-
drawing the Residency from Biishehr.l78 
But this is incorrect, since Moore had written to Morley on 11 October 1768 giving 
him permission to leave Bushire: 
We again repeat our permission to you to embark yourselves and 
effects on board such cruizers as may be on the Bushire station and 
repair therewith to Bussora, in case you see any cause for apprehen-
sion from the Caun or his Troops.l79 
The 'cause for apprehension' from the Khan was shown in Morley's letter of 14 Feb-
ruary 1769 to the President and Governor at Bombay, when he reported the visit of 
the Shaikh of Bushire's son: 
On his second visit, he said it gave him the greatest uneasiness to 
have received the late orders from Zackey Caun, which laid him 
under an absolute necessity of detaining me, for that unless they 
were punctually obeyed his Father and two uncles at Shiraz must 
inevitably fall a sacrifice to the Caun's resentment. ISO · 
Morley clearly knew that he was warranted in withdrawing from Bushire, as he 
showed in his letter to the President and Governor in Bombay quoted on page 221. 
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Moreover, he received support for his action from Moore, in Basrah, who recorded 
his opinion that Morley 'acted prudently' in withdrawing; Moore did not bother to 
reply to Shaikh ij:aiji's letter complaining of Morley's departure181 (see Appendix 34). 
Moreover, it has been shown above that, quite apart from the fear of the Khan, there 
were several other factors which indirectly motivated the withdrawal of the English 
settlement from Bushire. Whatever the case, profitable trade was impossible and the 
end result was that the perilous situation in Bushire induced the Resident, Morley, to 
leave there in February 1769, when he embarked all of the Company's effects on the 
Revenge and left for Basrah. In Chapter 6 the trade potential of Bushire becomes 
clear as turmoil gives way to peace. 
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6.0 Introduction 
CHAPTER6 
BUSHIRE FROM TURMOIL TO PEACE 
(1769-1820) 
This chapter sees a transition from turmoil to peace in Bushire; from withdrawal from 
a field of repeated disasters, through confrontation of the enemy, to his decline, to the 
birth of another dynasty and, finally, peace. Most of the stages in this transition were 
realised through the actions of Henry Moore, who arrived in Basrah in February 1769 
to take over control of all English affairs in the Gulf from the Basrah factory. The 
factory had been established in June 1640, after the first visit of an English vessel 
there on 31 May 1640. 1 In his Travels in Mesopotamia, Buckingham mentions the 
Basrah factory, which he visited in 18162, and says 'it has continued to exist almost 
without interruption ever since' .3 In reality, during the period of this study the fac-
tory was removed to Grain (Kuwait) for nearly three years, 1793-5 (see page 270 and 
Figure 5.1). 
6.1 Tbe Englisb and Khark Island 
On 14 February 1769, the Agent at Basrah, Henry Moore, held a Consultation with 
John Beaumont, George Green and a Mr Lewis to discuss making good the English 
losses and expenses at Khark. They unanimously agreed: 
a) that the Revenge, Eagle and Fancy should be made ready to go to Khark as 
quickly as possible, and that the former Resident in Bushire, James Morley, should 
embark on the Revenge to fmd out on what terms the Kharkis wanted the friendship of 
the English. 
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b) that if the Kharkis chose to negotiate and make peace with the English, then 
Morley was empowered to make certain demands. If these were met he could prom-
ise English friendship and a guarantee of freedom from any harassment by the 
English. The English demands were: 
i) All the galli-vats belonging to Mir Muhanna, and their equipment, to be 
surrendered. 
ii) Ten lacs of Rupees to be paid on acount of English losses and as com-
pensation to the Company for its expenses. 
iii) The demolition of the fortifications and the hand-over of their ordnance to 
the East India Company. 
The demands were to be made whether the Persians or the Kharkis were in power at 
Khark: if the ·first and second demands were complied with, the third could be 
waived. Those at the Consultation thought that there would be between 20 and 30 
lacs of Rupees (Rs) worth of effects and money on Khark (but see Table 6.1 below). 
If the Kharkis refused to negotiate it was decided that Morley should order the Com-
mander of the squadron to do his best to seize all the Khark vessels, and to prevent, if 
possible, any effects being carried off - whether in the Khan's ships or otherwise. 
Morley was then to return with the Eagle and Fancy to Basrah, leaving the Revenge to 
cruise between the island and the mainland, until the other ships returned. Ii the Per-
sians were in control of the island and were willing to accept the terms promised by 
Karim Khan to Skipp during his first Embassy to Shiraz in August 1767, (viz. to sur-
render five lacs of Rupees, all of M""rr Muhanna's gallivats, all the warlike stores on 
the island and half of all effects there), Morley was authorised to accept. He was not, 
however, to allow any items to be taken from the island until the terms were fully 
complied with. 
If the Kharkis refused to demolish the fortifications, but offered to hand the island 
over to the English on condition that the latter would protect them against the Per-
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sians, Morley was to inform the Agent at Basrah of this and await his further orders. 
By then the Agent would very probably have received his own instructions from his 
superiors and could act accordingly. 4 
A report of 17 February 1769 claimed that 1 ,500 Persians had landed on the island of 
Khark that day, but M"rr Muhanna sent a servant from his prison to the Agent on 21 
February to say that he had received news from Khark three days before to the effect 
that no Persian soldiers had arrived on Khark, although the place was in utter confu-
sion. The servant added that Persians under Zaki Khan were said to be coming to 
Khark but that the islanders were determined not to surrender it. 5 By 22 February 
Morley had been given the instructions agreed in the Consultations, together with a 
letter to the interim Shaikh of Khark, foreshadowing the demands listed on page 234 
(see Appendix 35). On the next morning, the 23rd, Morley sailed on board the 
Revenge, accompanied by a country (i.e. local) boat. 6 
Mir Muhanna sent his servant to Moore, on 21 and again on 24 February 1769, to ask 
for help with some clothes, and the Agent agreed. But on 26 February M"rr Muhanna 
again sent to Moore asking to be taken under his protection, because the Mir's situa-
tion under the Turks was dire. Moore told the servant that this was a request he could 
not comply with in any circumstances and asked not to be apProached ever again on 
•"'e s .. J...~e--• 7 Ul UUJ ... L. 
The expedition reached Khark island on 27 February 1769 and Morley despatched the 
country boat to the shore with the letter from the Agent to the interim Shaikh (who 
turned out to be M"rr I;Iusain Sultan), and another from himself asking the Shaikh to 
send him someone who was authorised to negotiate with him about the conditions for 
entering into an agreement of mutual friendship (see Appendix 36). The Shaikh ans-
wered that he sincerely wanted to be in friendship with the English and that the town 
and island were entirely at their disposal (see Appendix 37). At the same time an 
Armenian came on board and told Morley that the Shaikh was asking him to go 
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ashore. Morley declined, thinking it unwise to put himself in the Shaikh's power 
until his negotiations were showing signs of success. The Armenian was therefore 
sent ashore with the Linguist, with orders to try to get the Shaikh to come aboard, or 
at least some other notable from the island who might negotiate. Next day, the 
Linguist returned with Mulla 'Abbas, who used to be employed by M"rr Muhanna in 
the management of his mercantile business at Basrah before the recent rupture 
between him and the Turks. He gave Morley to understand that the Shaikh was ready 
to clear out the small fort and make it over to the English, provided they entered into 
an alliance, both defensive and offensive, with him against the enemies of both 
parties. The Shaikh, he said, was convinced that this was the only way of making 
himself independent of Karim Khan. 
In reply to that offer, Morley asked Mulla 'Abbas to inform the Shaikh of the instruc-
tions he had about the expenses incurred by the East India Company in fighting 
against Mir Muhanna, and the losses suffered by the English through his depreda-
tions. Morley told Mulla 'Abbas that the English would expect the payment of a sum 
of money equivalent to both these elements and that the gallivats must be handed over 
to the English, complete with their equipment. Mulla 'Abbas replied that, as to the 
money, he had no authority to make any proposals, and Mir ijusain had never spoken 
to him on the subject. As regards the gallivats, however, Morley could assume that 
the Sh.,.;lrh ... ,.. .. 1,1 "'e" .... agrAA .. lthough h .. •wronld .... ad;l., pnt .~... .. .,.. ; .... ,.. Pngl;sh s ...... 
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ice if occasion arose, so long as the English settled on the island. 
As Morley saw it, after considering M"rr ijusain' s offer to surrender the small fort 
without making any other proposals, the Shaikh was still deceiving himself in the 
belief that the English would be satified with simply settling on the island, leaving the 
Shaikh in sure possession of all, or most, of his wealth and full use of his gallivats. 
Morley therefore thought it time to tell the Shaikh the terms which the Agent in Bas-
rah had ordered him to try to obtain. He wrote accordingly, but the Shaikh was so 
angry that he returned a defiant reply, declaring that the island, and everything in it, 
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was the possession of Karim Khan, and that he would give nothing up without the 
Khan's orders (see Appendix 38). Morley could see that it was pointless to try any 
more to bring the Shaikh to any terms of agreement which matched his instructions, 
so he sailed on 8 March 1769 to Basrah with the Eagle and Fancy, leaving the 
Revenge to cruise between Khark and the mainland. As for the actual situation on 
Khark, Morley had discovered only that the few Persians sent there from the mainland 
had now all returned, and that Karim Khan had assured Mir IJusain of his protection. s 
As the new Mir of Khark would not agree to the English terms Moore had no alterna-
tive to having English ships patrol between Khark, Bushire and Ganawah, trying to 
prevent goods being carried off from Khark. He believed that Khark was the only 
possible source for making good the Company's expenses in any shape or form. At 
this critical juncture, Moore hoped that a sizeable force might arrive from the Presi-
dency and take Khark, with Mir Muhanna unable to react and internal dissensions 
prevalent on the island.9 As it was, at midnight on 24 March 1769, ~rr Muhanna 
and an attendant were strangled at Basrah by order of the Pasha of Baghdad: his head 
was sent to Baghdad and, from there, to Karim Khan. Karim Khan returned the 
favour by releasing a Turkish boat which he was holding at that time. Moore was 
disturbed by this crime and wrote to the Governor of Bombay on 2 April 1769 ' ... 
they have been guilty of this act of barbarity. How great soever might have been the 
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prisoner ought surely to have entitled him to their humanity and protection, if not that 
they ought to have given him up to the Caun, and not have stained their hands with 
his blood. •to 
While the English continued cruising between Khark, Bushire and Ganawah to pre-
empt the carriage of goods from Khark, a boat brought news to Basrah on 23 March 
that Karim Khan had confirmed Mir IJusain in the Shaikhdom of the islands, and had 
appointed him 'Admiral of the Gulf'. The report also said that Karim Khan had sent 
20 people, including writers, to take stock of the effects on Khark and to bring him 
237 
those which belonged to Mir Muhanna.ll And by the end of March 1769 the Ka'b's 
gallivats were on their way to Ganawah to help Katim Khan in Khark. 12 
The Eagle and Fancy returned from Khark on 4 April 1769 after failing to stop effects 
being removed from the island; at that time the islanders and the Persians were fully 
engaged in this. There were Bushire gallivats at Bandar Riq and the Ka'b fleet, con-
sisting of ten gallivats, came to anchor at Khark. Lieutenant Mackenley of the Eagle 
was forced to leave the Khark station with the Fancy for want of provisions; he had 
no cattle on board and only one cask of salt meat13 (see Appendix 39). The English 
had been cruising off Khark, Bushire and Ganawah for almost four months without 
knowing what was going on in the island, until the arrival at Basrah on 4 June 1769 · 
of an Armenian from Khark, who had been an inhabitant there for upwards of seven 
years. He reported that after Mir Muhanna's expulsion from Khark, Mir ij:usain 
wrote to Karim Khan to tell him of it and acknowledging himself to be the Khan's 
subject. He offered the Khan the possession of the island and all of the effects on it. 
Kaiim Khan expressed his satisfaction and made ~rr ij:usain a Khan, directing him to 
send all his fighting men, other than 200 musketeers, with their families over to 
Bandar Riq. An Armenian and two Bengalis belonging to Khark were appointed to 
accompany the goods, and to make a division of the property of Mir Muhanna and the 
Dutch into three equal shares. One share was given to ~rr ij:usain and the Khark 
soldiers, one third to Zak.i Khan and his troops~ and the fm::~l third went to Karim 
Khan himself and was therefore sent to Shiraz. The bales from Bengal, which had 
been taken from the English vessel Speedwell in August 1768 (see Chapter 5.8 and 
Appendix 14), were ordered not to be touched but to be sent to Shiraz; of the 160 
bales taken from the ship no more than 90 to 100 remained when Mir Muhanna was 
expelled. 14 
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Table 6.1: Property found on Kharkis 
The effects belonging to ~rr Muhanna and the Dutch on the island were about: 
120 chests of cloves and nutmegs valued at Rs 40,000 
4,000 canisters* of sugar valued at Rs 300,000 
15,000 Tomans in ready money valued at Rs 300,000 
Total RS 640,000 
*basket chest 
As far as pearls were concerned, the Armenian said that there had been a considerable 
amount but that he could not pretend to know their value: at the time of Mir 
Muhanna's departure the military on the island had been very mutinous and Mir . 
ijusain, to quieten them, had distributed 4, 000 Tomans worth among them. He told 
Karim Khan of this and the Khan deducted that amount from M"rr ij:usain' s one-third 
share. 
The guns on the fortifications, and the fortifications themselves, were just as they 
were in Mir Muhanna' s time. But the Speedwell's guns, and all others which were 
not too weighty, had been taken to Bandar Riq; the ammunition was also equally 
divided between Bandar Riq and Khark. The eight gallivats belonging to Mir 
Muhanna, and two new ones built from the Speedwell's timbers - together with 
Bushire's ships and gallivats - had been put under the orders of M"rr ij:usain, now 
appointed Admiral of the Gulf and Governor of Khark, with 200 military to back 
him. When the Armenian left Khark, Mir ijusain was at Bandar Riq, preparing to go 
to Shiraz. Tnere were a few Armenians and Battialls on Khark, as well as the 
Dutchmen who were in the M"rr's service.I6 
Moore asked his Captains to cruise between Basrah and Cape Bardistan in order to 
convoy any vessels to Basrah as necessary.I7 He instructed the Captains: 'We would 
not have you act offensively against the Galivats and armed boats of the Caun [Khan], 
Chaub [Ka 'b] or other powers. Defend however to the utmost, keep your vessel in a 
constant posture of defence, and beware of Surprize. •Is 
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6.2 The Persian attitude towards the English 
6.2.1 Negotilltions on resettling at Bushire 
The Agent at Basrah received a letter on 8 November· 1769 from Shaikh Ni$ir of 
Bushire, in Shiraz at the time, asking the English to resettle in Bushire and complain-
ing that the departure of the English had stopped the trade there completely. 
Simultaneously, a letter came from Shaikh Ni$ir' s Attorney in Bushire saying that 
European cloth was in great demand therel9 (see Appendices 40 and 41). Another let-
ter from Shaikh N"~ir was received by the Agent on 26 November, and yet another 
from the Shaikh's Attorney repeating his claim that European cloth was much sought 
after. In his second letter Shaikh Ni$ir said 'Give me your orders and I will do it 
immediately, or if you choose to send any goods to Bushire, the town is yours.' He 
mentioned also that the French had sent their Linguist to negotiate with Karim Khan2o 
(see Appendices 42 and 43). 
Moore replied to these letters on 29 November 1769 saying 'As to again resettling at 
Bushire, it is what I never think of, nor of having any further connections with Persia, 
unless I am ordered to do so'21 (see Appendices 44 and 45). He wrote also to the 
Presidency about resettling at Bushire; he received a reply dated 4 May 1770 saying 
that if Karim Khan wanted the English to be re-established at Bushire and wrote to the 
Agent to that effect (or empowered Shaikh Ni$ir or some other suitable person to do 
so), a representative would immediately be sent to negotiate. 22 At the beginning of 
May 1770, Morley, the previous Resident at Bushire, passed by there on his way 
from Bombay to Basrah on the Dolphin and was invited ashore by Shaikh 'lsa, the 
Governor, for discussions. When Shaikh Ni$ir heard about it he wrote to 'lsa recom-
mending that a letter on the subject be sent by the British, from either Bombay or 
Basrah, to Karim Khan, rather than ask him to do so23 (see Appendix 46). 
Moore received further letters on 28 June from Shaikh Ni$ir at Shiraz, Agha Kiiciik 
(the Shaikh's messenger from Shiraz) and Shaikh 'lsa, all asking the English to 
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resettle at Bushire. Referring to Ka.Iim Khan, Shaikh N~ir wrote ' ... you must write 
a Petition to him, and send it by a spirited and capable person, who can talk in a 
proper manner to so great a man as the Vackeel of Persia'24 (see Appendices 47, 48 
and 49). By the same boat which brought the letters from Bushire, Moore sent ans-
wers to Shaikh N~ir, Shaikh 'lsa and Agha Kiiciik, agreeing to send the Arzee to 
Ka.Iim Khan but adding that he was for the time being to defer action until receiving 
further orders from his superiors at the Presidency25 (see Appendices 50, 51 and 52). 
In the interim, a month later, another letter was received from Shaikh 'lsa of Bushire 
repeating the request to resettle in Bushire26 (see Appendix 53). 
In August 1770 the Agent in Basrah received orders directly from the Company in 
London to defer the resettlement negotiations recommended by the Presidency in 
Bombay: 
We have here to observe that the measure recommended by the 
Presidency, we mean the Re-Establishment of Bushire, or the form-
ing some other settlement on the Coast of Persia surprizes us more, 
as we must consider the Orders we gave for withdrawing from 
Bushire as implying a prohibition of any attempt to re-settle in the 
Persian Dominions . . . By our Directions on this subject you will 
perceive that the intended Embassy to Carem Caun is, as far as it 
relates to the Establishment of a residency at Bushire, become 
altogether unnecessary. 27 
The Company added that for its trade in the Gulf to be carried from Basrah alone 
would be the most convenient and profitable. 28 After receiving these instructions, 
Moore heard from ijusain K.!'!.2..'l (the newly-elevated Mir ~usain who had ousted Mir 
Muhanna from Khark), by now the Governor of Khark and Bandar Riq, who was 
offering his friendship, assistance to English ships, and a factory at Bandar Riq. 
Moore answered politely, thanking him for the offers and informing him that the 
English could not at the moment think about settling at Bandar Riq or anywhere 
else.29 
6.2.2 Piracy committed by the Persians 
After Mir ij:usain of Khark had been appointed Admiral of the Gulf by Ka.Iim Khan in 
March 1769 and had taken over all the gallivats belonging to Mir Muhanna, he began 
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preparing both the Khark and the Bushire gallivats for a large expedition in August of 
that year. The English thought that he was targetting them, but his intention was to 
take the boats south in order to intercept the coffee fleet from Muscat (see the Atlas, 
Map nos. 18, 46).30 The basis of the dispute between the Persians and Muscat was 
the demands made on the Imam of Muscat by Karim Khan, involving a Persian ship 
which had for long been in Muscati possession, and the arrears of annual tribute 
which Muscat had formerly paid to Nadir Shah during his reign. The Muscatis 
argued that the ship was a lawful purchase made by them from Shaikh 'Abdallah, the 
Shaikh of Hormuz, for which they had exchanged several gallivats and paid the 
balance in cash. They had spent a great deal in repairing the ship, which had long 
been their property and they would not give it up. As for the annual tributes, Nadir 
Shah was too powerful a tyrant to contend with so the tribute was paid, not as of 
right, in the belief that it would be impolitic not to do so. However, the powers of 
Nadir Shah and Karim Khan were widely different. One they dreaded, the other they 
rather despised: one was the conqueror of all Persia, the other was only the Waldl of 
two or three of its provinces. If, therefore, Karim Khan persisted in his demands and 
used that kind of argument with them, they would answer him with cannon and 
shot.31 In his book Karim Khan Zand, Perry observes that the ship, the Rahmani, 
was sold by Shaikh 'Abdallah Ma 'ini of Hormuz without the Khan's consent. 32 
At the beginning of October 1769, two large Muscati ships from Muscat, laden with 
coffee and other goods bound for Basrah, were captured by the Persian gallivats. The 
crews were put into a small boat and sent to Grain (Kuwait) by the Persian Com-
mander.33 To revenge this and similar captures of Muscat ships bound for Basrah, the 
Imam of Muscat fitted out a large fleet under his son's command, and planned an 
attack on Bahrain. 34 The fleet indeed appeared off Bush ire and made a show of 
force. 3S 
Whatever Karim Khan's plans might be, and however detrimental they were to the 
tranquillity of the Gulf, the English took no notice provided he did not impede their 
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trade. Orders from the Presidency were positively against beginning any hostilities 
with Kaiim Khan: Moore reported that English cruisers would not convoy or give 
protection to ships of any country in dispute with him unless they had English papers 
and colours. The English galley Betsey, a Bengal vessel, ran into the Persian gallivats 
by chance as she returned from Basrah and as they were chasing a large Muscat ship 
bound for Grain. The Commander of the Persian gallivats, ij:usain Khan, took ten 
bales of coffee from the Muscat ship but the Betsey engaged the Persians, severely 
damaging two of their gallivats and killing many from their crews. 36 Between August 
1770 and August 1771 there is no information available from any source, thanks to 
the loss of the Basrah Diaries for that period, other than some reports in the latter part 
about Karim Khan fighting opposing forces in the northern provinces . These do not 
concern us here but, in any event, the result was a quiet situation in the Gulf which 
saw the English ships of that time sufficient for all their duties (the Britannia incident, 
in the next paragraph, took place in this period but was recorded thereafter).37 
The Khark fleet consisted of ten gallivats, besides other boats. One of the gallivats 
mounted ten guns, another one eight guns, and the remainder carried six guns each, 
mostly six-pounders. They were very well built and, although manned by 60 to 80 
men, drew no more than five feet. This fleet sailed down the Gulf and off Kangun, 
on 22 June 1771, they captured the Britannia, an English snow from Bombay laden 
with sugar~ iron, spices and other goods belonging to William Shaw; a country ketch 
under English co~ours, carrying cotton amongst other goods; and a batil from Muscat. 
After seizing these prizes, ijusain Khan's men tried to take them up to Khark, but a 
strong north-west wind prevented them. Instead, they took the vessels initially over 
to Bahrain.38 When the gallivat crews heard that English cruisers had been sent to 
look for the vessels they sold half of the goods at B;ilirain and other places on their 
way to Khark. The vessels were being taken there in the charge of two gallivats but, 
as they approached the island, they saw the grab Bombay, the Fox and the Success in 
the distance and became so alarmed that they went instead to Bandar Riq. 39 In his 
Gazetteer, Lorimer ~signs this incident, erroneously, to the summer of 1770.40 
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When news of Britannia's capture reached Basrah on 9 July 1771, Moore 
immediately sent the Resolution, the Expedition and the Dolphin to .Khark and Bandar 
Riq, or any other place where they might get news of the vessels' whereabouts. He 
wrote a letter to ij:usain Khan asking for the release of the Britannia's crew together 
with the correspondence aboard her (see Appendix 54). If the Khan refused, Com-
modore Ince, the squadron commander, was instructed not only to try to recover the 
vessels but also to take or destroy the Persian gallivats. 41 The squadron sailed from 
Basrah on 12 July 1771 to Khark. Finding no vessels there, Commodore Ince sailed 
for Bandar Riq and sent the Linguist ashore on the 14th with the Agent's letter to 
ij:usain Khan. He detached the Expedition and Dolphin to Bushire to gather informa-
tion. 
When the Linguist landed at Bandar Riq he found that ij:usain Khan was on Khark and 
he was therefore taken first to the Khan's agent, and then to three of Karim Khan's 
men who were there to assess the value of the prize ships. These three pressed the 
Linguist to give them Moore's letter, but he refused to deliver it to anyone but ij:usain 
Khan. The latter arrived the next day from Khark and took the letter. In the presence 
of the Persians he began by talking of attacking the English cruisers, but in private 
with the Linguist he spoke differently, throwing the whole blame for the incident on 
Ka.Ti.rn K..h.~'l. He asked the Linguist to assure the Agent in Basra..'l t'lat, speaking for 
himself, he wanted to be friends with the English and would enter into alliance with 
them. If they would leave him alone he undertook to give Khark up to them and to 
remain there under their control. 42 
In his reply to the Agent, ij:usain Khan claimed that the Britannia was not taken by 
any order from him or Karim Khan, but that Shaikh N~ir of Bushire was the sole 
instigator. He also alleged that the Britannia had attacked the gallivats first and they 
had reacted in self-defence. He undertook, however, to return the English passengers 
and crew as soon as they arrived back in Bandar Riq43 (see Appendix 55). His treat-
244 
ment of the English crew was harsh in the extreme: they were given hardly any 
shelter from the sun (the temperature there in July and August reaches 50° Centigrade) 
nor the barest necessities of life. Captain Shaw and his First Officer, Nicholson, 
were ordered to Shiraz by Karim Khan in order to give him an account of the Britan-
nia's cargo, and they left Bandar Riq on 1 August. Captain Shaw died the next day, 
Nicholson continued to Shiraz, and part of the crew was sent to Bushire, arriving 
there on 16 August. The Second Officer, Rowe, and the remainder were returned to 
English hands by ij:usain Khan, but all of the papers on board were destroyed by the 
Arabs in order to prevent Karim Khan knowing what the cargo had been. 44 
Karim Khan's letter in reply to the Agent at Basrah about the Britannia affair was 
received on 7 September 1771. The Khan outlined his displeasure with the English, 
citing the English failure to help him against Khark when he had sent his army to the 
coast to be transported by the English ships to the island, as agreed with Skipp when 
he was in Shiraz. He seemed also to be irritated by the English not resettling in his 
territories. At the same time Moore received a letter from Shaikh N~ir of Bushire, 
advising the Agent to send Karim Khan an account of the cargo on board the vessels4s 
(see Appendices 56 and 57). This, in spite of the fact that the First Officer, Nichol-
son, had given a description of the cargo at Karim Khan's request while he was in 
Shiraz46 (see Appendix 58). A further request was made of Karim Khan to return Mr 
Nicholson and two others of the Britannia's crew at Shiraz, asking for them to be 
allowed to go to Basrah since their continued detention could not be of any advantage 
to him. Another letter was also sent to Shaikh N~ir asking him to help secure the 
release of the English at Shiraz47 (see Appendices 59 and 60). The Agent fmally 
received a letter on 22 October 1771 from Karim Khan, and another from Shaikh 
N~ir, confirming the release of Mr Nicholson and the other two from the Britannia, 
and they arrived from Shiraz by way of Bushire on the 24th48 (see Appendices 61 and 
62). 
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An account of Mr Shaw's cargo on the Britannia, amounting to Rs 42,187.3, was 
sent to Karim Khan on 17 January 1772 with a letter from the Agent49 (see Appendix 
63). The courier who took these to Shiraz came back on 18 March saying that Karim 
Khan would not give him a written reply to the Agent's letter, but that his deputy, 
Mu}J.ammad Ja'far, told the courier to say - Yes, if the English wanted restitution of 
their goods they might apply to the deceased ijusain Khan. ijusain had recently been 
murdered by M"rr 'Ali in revenge for the expulsion of M"rr Muhanna, a relation of Mir 
'Ali's, from Khark50 (see Appendix 64). 
Mir 'Ali was sent as a prisoner to Shiraz in March 1772 but was received with 
honour. Karim Khan gave him presents and positive orders to use the Bandar Riq 
gallivats, inactive since ijusain Khan's death, to take all the English vessels they 
encountered. At the end of March the Bandar Riq gallivats under M"rr 'Ali took about 
20 boats, mostly from Basrah, but then released them with all their contents because 
his orders from Karim Khan related to English and Muscati vessels. In the next 
month, April, three Bandar Riq gallivats were fitted out to take the English cutter Sky 
on her return from Basrah. They lay at the mouth of the River Euphrates for several 
days, but returned to Bandar Riq on hearing that the Sky was accompanied by the 
Expedition. 51 
The protection of the Sky resulted from the recommendations the Agent had received 
in March 1772 from the Presidency to employ the cruisers on the Basrah station for 
the protection of English trade, and to convoy any English merchant vessels lying in 
Muscat and bound for Basrah. The cruisers were the Expedition, commanded by 
Captain Robert Freeman Gage, Tyger, Lieutenant James Scott, and the snow Drake, 
John Mackenley. The Agent ordered them to take or destroy any gallivats or armed 
boats belonging to Bandar Riq which they came across. The convoys between Bas-
rah and Muscat prevented any of the English trade falling into Bandar Riq hands, 
while the Imam of Muscat allotted four of his ships to the convoying of the Muscat 
coffee fleet. 52 
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Moore in Basrah received another letter from Shaikh Ni$ir of Bushire on 17 May 
1772 to say that other Europeans had asked him for a factory at Bushire, but that he 
delayed giving permission because he hoped that the English would again settle there. 
He assured the Agent that he would give the English the same privileges as they 
enjoyed before, and the Agent, thanking him, said that he could not accept the offer 
without his superiors' permissions3 (see Appendix 65). On 16 October 1772, Shaikhs 
Sa'diin and 'lsa of Bushire sent Agha Kiiciik on board the Revenge, at anchor off 
Bushire with Moore aboard, to salute the Agent and invite him on shore. Moore 
politely declined, saying that his cruise was for health, not business. The Shaikhs 
appeared to be in high hopes of the English resettling. S4 
But another act of Persian piracy followed these contacts. On 26 April 1773, the brig 
Tyger was preceding the Drake down the Shatt al-Arab by about 3 or 4 miles, Bom-
bay bound, when it was boarded by four Bandar Riq gallivats and, in spite of Drake's 
best efforts to overtake them, was towed off by them and another gallivat which had 
joined them. They had let the Tyger pass them with no sign of hostile intent and 
Lieutenant Scott therefore imagined that they were Muscat vessels. He was not 
shown his mistake until the gallivats' men poured onto his decks in numbers. Finding 
that his lascars had all jumped overboard, and having only 11 Europeans to face the 
mob attacking him, he also jumped oveiboard cu.1d was picked up by the Drake, 
together with two other Europeans and two lascars. John Beaumont and George 
Green, both members of the Council of the Basrah Agency, who were on their way to 
Bombay were taken along with the ship and remaining passengers and crew (see 
Appendix 66). The Tyger was taken to Bandar Riq where Beaumont and Green were 
landed and, at first, treated kindly by the Governor, Shaikh 'Ali. However, as soon 
as he received instructions from Karlm Khan, on whose orders the ship was captured, 
he began treating them harshly. ss 
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6.2.3 Persian extortions 
Beaumont and Green were taken to Shiraz on Karim Khan's orders and the Governor 
and Council at Bombay wrote to him on 27 October 1773 asking for their release and 
the return of both ships (Britannia and Tyger), with whatever goods had been on 
board56 (see Appendix 67). The letter was carried by Moore, in Bombay at the time, 
who was instructed to stop at Bushire on his way up the Gulf and to make whatever 
approach to Karim Khan seemed most likely to persuade the Khan to release the 
hostages and the ships, with their cargoes. If Kaiim Khan refused to release 
Beaumont and Green without the English agreeing to establish themselves somewhere 
on the Persian coast, Moore was to tell him that the English were anxious to be on 
good terms with him and to meet his wishes, but that their superiors' orders were 
expressly against doing so. They had no power to comply without previous sanc-
tion.S7 
The Agent, Moore, sailed on 28 October on board the Revenge, bound for Basrah, 
and arrived at Bushire on 18 December 1773, following ·a short stay at Muscat and 
Gombroon. Shaikh N~ir of Bushire sent a man to invite the Agent ashore and to 
offer his services: the Agent sent a letter with his compliments and the Governor's let-
ter to Kaiim Khan by the hand of Mr Abraham, a member of the Basrah Council. 
Abraham delivered the letters to Shaikh N~ir, who was hopeful that the Governor of 
Bombay would re-establish the English factory at Bushire. When, however, Abraham 
pressed Shaikh N~ir to know whether Beaumont and Green were on their way to Bas-
rah, as Kaiim Khan had promised them, he became evasive before fmally admitting 
that they would not be released until a present was given. 58 The Agent did not 
understand the hint made by Shaikh N~ir talking of a present before the men could 
be released, and left Bushire on 23 December 1773. 
Shaikh N~ir now wrote to Karim Khan claiming that a Persian subject, a merchant 
on board the Revenge, had quarrelled with the English and, after a reconciliation, 
dined with them- only to die soon after. The Shaikh hinted that the causes were not 
248 
natural and that the body was thrown overboard;. the English refusing to deliver his 
effects up to Shaikh Ni$ir.s9 A friend of Moore's, Coja Agasy, heard of the story 
Shaikh Ni$ir was trying to put into Karim Khan's head and four times visited the 
Khan to speak his mind in front of the grandees of Shiraz, who also were very much 
the Agent's friends, unlike Karim Khan himself. When Shaikh Ni$ir visited Shiraz in 
March 1774, Agasy called on him and asked how he came to fabricate such a story to 
Karim Khan about Moore, and whether that was not a poor return for Moore putting 
into Bushire and trading there, to Shaikh Ni$ir's profit. Shaikh Ni$ir replied 'I sent 
off 20 sheep to Mr. Moore as a present, the present Mr. Moore returned me was only 
6 pieces of Chintz. Was that a present proper to send to me! I confess however I 
was wrong in writing what I did to the Vackeel [Karim Khan] about the death of the 
Persian, but now I will do what I can to get Mr. Beaumont and Green their liberty. '60 
Meanwhile, Moore wrote on 16 January to Karim Khan from Basrah asking him to 
release Beaumont and Green, and offered all kinds of cloth to be provided to him6I 
(see Appendix 68). On the other hand, the Agent also recommended all Commanders 
of English ships to be constantly on their guard against gallivats or armed boats 
belonging to any power in the Gulf, but not to take the offensive against them unless 
they first made a hostile move. At the same time, he ordered that if they came across 
the brig Tyger, then in possession of the Bandar Riq gallivats, they should do every-
thing possible to recover her. He ~lso directed that t.~Iey should net supply t.'le Per-
sians with lead, iron or any other warlike stores; nor should they take on freight for 
anywhere in Persia. 62 
Since the end of 1773 Karim Khan had been preoccupied by the shameful perform-
ance of the troops he had sent to Muscat under his brother, Zaki Khan. It seems that 
3-4,000 of them had been lured into an ambush by Shaikh 'Abdallah of Hormuz who 
allowed them to occupy Qishm island, and then informed the Muscat people who sur-
rounded the island. The Persian gallivats fled, after one from Bushire and one from 
Bandar Riq had been captured. The Shaikhs of those places- and Ma'~iim Khan of 
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Ganawah - were pardoned by Zaki Khan and returned to him at Bandar Abbas with 
their fleets. Soon afterwards, however, Shaikh 'lsa and Ma'~iim Khan deserted again 
with their fleets and they were arrested, along with Mir 'Ali (of Khark), put in irons 
and bastinadoed twice a day. At one moment it seemed that M"rr 'Ali might be 
strangled, after his money had all been taken from him, because Zaki Khan had inter-
cepted a letter from him to the Muscatis, offering to defect to them with his gallivats. 
Thirty other Persian leaders were indeed strangled at that time. 63 
Zaki Khan invited Shaikh 'AbdalHih of Hormuz to join him in Bandar Abbas in March 
1774, having previously sworn to the safety of the Shaikh. Shaikh 'Abdallah 
accepted the invitation and they agreed on a peace plan, one of whose provisions was 
that Zaki Khan should marry Shaikh 'Abdallah's daughter. Under persuasion from 
the Shaikh and bolstered by confidence in the new treaty, Zaki Khan went to Hormuz 
with 40 of his men, and was forthwith imprisoned. The Shaikh told Zaki Khan that 
he would stay in prison until Karim Khan released the Shaikh's son from detention in 
Shiraz.64 
Beaumont and Green wrote to Moore from Shiraz in January 1774 saying that the 
head of the Armenian community in Persia, Serkies, had told them of Karim Khan 
wanting to ask the English to help him against Shaikh 'Abdallah of Hormuz. Moore 
t.'lerefore wrote to the Presidency seeking the Governor's instructions on the basis that 
he could offer the assistance on condition that Karim Khan first released the two 
prisoners and gave compensation for the Britannia and Tyger. No reply from the 
Governor is recorded. 65 
A copy of the Agent's letter was handed to Karim Khan by Beaumont and Green, still 
detained in Shiraz. After reading it, Karim Khan dismissed it as 'fictitious' and 
ordered them to write to Moore asking him to loan or sell the vessels to him, in which 
case English losses would be made good. In their letter to Moore relating this, 
Beaumont and Green wrote 'We set forth the absurdity of our writing such non-
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sense' .66 They added that they had told Karim Khan that the Agent would not reply 
to such a peremptory and insulting a letter, nor even receive the messenger. As a 
result, the original letter was torn up and a more friendly one drawn up, to be 
delivered to Basrah by Ibrahim Agha. 67 
Ibrahim Agha and a second courier, Mut,ammad Agha, arrived in Basrah on 10 Feb-
ruary 1774 from Shiraz with two letters, to -the Agent and to the Miitesellim 
(Governor of Basrah), from Karim Khan. To the Governor of Basrah, Karim Khan 
wrote that he was very powerful by land and his forces were innumerable, but he had 
no ships. This prevented him taking Muscat, as he was determined to do, so if the 
English would either lease or sell him the ships they currently had at Basrah he would 
pay ready cash: for this he appointed the Miitesellim his Attorney. Then he would 
release Beaumont and Green, together with the Tyger and the value of her contents. 68 
The Miitesellim spoke to the Agent as Karim Khan had requested and Moore replied, 
in front of the two couriers. He said: 
i) He was very anxious to be on good terms with Karim Khan and to trade in 
his kingdom, as before. 
ii) The Governor of Bombay had expressed the same wish in the strongest 
terms to him when he was in Bombay, and he was sure the Governor would do 
everything .iil his power to oblige Karim Khan. 
iii) He would inform the Governor of Karim Khan's request but he, as Agent, 
could neither sell nor loan a single ship without orders from the Governor. 
iv) If Karim Khan first released the two Englishmen and the English vessels, 
the Agent might then convince the Governor of the Khan's friendly intentions 
and expect him in return to do his best to help the Khan. 
v) The Imam of Muscat had requested English assistance against Karim Khan 
but had not taken the same steps to obtain it that Karim Khan had: the Imam 
had Mr Abraham in his power at Muscat but did not once think of detaining 
him. 
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vi) Katim Khan had shown scant friendliness towards the English by taking 
their vessels and people when they had done nothing to offend him. 69 
The couriers had little to say in reply. They repeated the strong desire that Katim 
Khan had for the friendship of the English and his willingness to give them Khark, 
Bushire, Bandar Riq or anywhere else in his realm they might want. The Agent 
remarked that if Katim Khan was well-disposed enough to give the English so much 
belonging to him, why wouldn't he give them back their own property? The couriers 
repeated that he would restore it and release the prisoners if the English gave him the 
help he wanted. 70 Katim khan's letter to Moore seemed to be as vague and 
indeterminate as ever; his general behaviour reminded Moore of the negotiations 
about the expedition to Khark in 1768. His reply of 12 February 1774 to the Khan 
was along the same lines as his response in front of the Miitesellim and couriers71 (see 
Appendices 69 and 70). He wrote a private letter at the same time to Serkies, asking 
him to help in releasing Beaumont and Green, and promising 'a present payable either 
to you or your order of 5000 Rupees as soon as ever you get their liberty to return to 
Basrah - this will much recommend you to the English nation'. 72 
The Armenian merchant and Persian grandee, Coja Agasy, wrote to Moore from 
Shiraz in February 177 4 saying that Katim Khan would not allow Beaumont and 
Green iO leave. He was a11gry with the English because of their refusal of the English 
ships, and he proposed to go to Basrah in order to take them.73 The Khan's courier 
returned from Shiraz to Basrah on 3 March 177 4 with a letter for Moore. Katim 
Khan qu'oted the Governor of Bombay as saying that if he had any commands in his 
relations with the English he should write to the Agent, but now Moore was refusing 
him74 (see Appendix 71). Given Karim Khan's interpretation of the Governor's letter 
Moore told his Council on 3 March that he suspected the letter had not been properly 
translated into Persian in Bombay. He therefore decided to translate it afresh and 
send a copy to the Khan but commented 'though we do this, we are at the same time 
sensible a person of the Caun' s ignorant and capricious disposition may doubt the 
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translation being an injurious one'. 75 The new translation was duly made and sent to 
the Khan76 (see Appendix 72). 
A ware that there were many people involved in the affair and being blamed for fab-
ricating the story about Moore killing the Persian merchant (see pages 248-9), Shaikh 
N~ir returned to Bushire in February 1774. He affected concern for Beaumont and 
Green by claiming that the other Europeans and lascars left in the Tyger at Bandar Riq 
had run away and were at that time in Bushire, where he had ordered them provisions 
and given instructions for them to be returned to Basrah as soon as possible. 77 But 
this was untrue: they had been forced back again to Bandar Riq and were in great 
need of a little money to buy essentials. 78 Beaumont and Green wrote on 2 March 
177 4 to Moore '.. . but we cannot altogether credit the Shaiks assertion that they will 
be suffered to depart, he having proved himself to us as well versed in deception as 
any Persian whatever. •79 
Moore received a further report on 18 April about the Khan's enmity towards the 
English and Shaikh N~ir's machinations. He immediately sent orders to maintain the 
curbs on communications between English ships and all places in Karim Khan's ter-
ritory: he noted that trade carried on in those places increased his revenues, benefited 
his subjects and simultaneously put English ships at risk by lying in ports where 
friendship could not be relied upon. so 
Shaikh N~ir was able to secure the release of Beaumont and Green into his hands on 
25 April 177 4 and they set out on the 28th towards Bushire. Moore received letters 
from both the Shaikh and Karim Khan from Shiraz on 19 May 177 4. Karim Khan's 
letter said that he had granted the release of the prisoners to Shaikh N~ir who, in his 
letter, requested Moore to make an amicable settlement of the differences between the 
Persians and MuscatBI (see Appendix 73). It seemed to Moore that Beauinont and 
Green had merely changed one place of confinement for another, since no mention 
was made in either letter of their release from Bushire. 
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The settlement proposed by Shaikh N~ir on Karim Khan's behalf was communicated 
via Beaumont and Green and called for the English: 
i) to depute someone to go to Muscat to negotiate between Karim Khan and 
the Imam of Muscat. 
ii) to send vessels to Hormuz to safeguard Shaikh N~ir' s expedition against 
Shaikh 'Abdallah of Hormuz, which was being undertaken to secure the 
release of Karim Khan's brother, Zaki Khan. 
iii) to re-establish a factory at Bushire, at which time Karim Khan would 
grant the English every privilege in his power.s2 
Moore's reaction, summarised in a letter dated 22 May 1774 to Shaikh N~ir, was 
that: 
i) he had never promised Karim Khan to negotiate peace between him and 
the Imam of Muscat; he simply advised the Khan to make it up with the Imam 
and offered a passage on an English cruiser to any person the Khan might wish 
to send for that purpose. With the differences settled between Karim Khan 
and the English, the latter could have sent someone with the Khan's Ambas-
sador to show a greater respect and to mediate between the main parties. But 
Karim Khan had refused this, thinking that it was not consistent with his dig-
nity. T'nerefore, for the Engiish on their own account to send someone to 
Muscat with Shaikh N~ir's man, and with no appearance of Karim Khan 
being aware of the matter would achieve nothing other than making the 
English look ridiculous. 
ii) although Karim Khan and Shaikh N~ir said that they wanted the English 
vessels simply to safeguard the expedition to Hormuz, and not in the slightest 
to help it against Shaikh 'Abdallah, nevertheless, the Muscatis and Shaikh 
'Abdallah would not know what the English intentions were. They would 
appear to them to be hostile, and the Agent's superiors had positively forbid-
den all hostile measures. 
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iii) as regards settlement, the Governor and Council in their letters had told 
the Agent that they could not settle in any part of Persia without previously 
receiving the Company's permissionB3 (see Appendix 74). 
Moore also wrote to Karim Khan that he was obliged to him for giving permission for 
Beaumont and Green to travel to BushireB4 (see Appendix 75). 
6.2.4 The release of the Europeans from Persia 
The situation began to change in favour of the English. In mid-1774, Shaikh N~ir 
received orders from Karim Khan to make peace with the Imam of Muscat at any 
cost. In that context Shaikh 'Abdallah's son had been released by Karim Khan, and 
the Shaikh had given the Khan's brother, Zaki Khan, his freedom, although Zaki 
remained in disgrace with Karim Khan. Shaikh N~ir was to go to Khor Fakkan, on 
the east coast of the Musandam peninsula, to be joined by Shaikh Rashid al-Qasimi of 
Jultar, Shaikh 'Abdallah of Hormuz and the Imam of Muscat's authorised representa-
tive: there, everything was to be settled. as Shaikh N~ir's journey was aborted when 
he had news that the Imam would not listen to such disgraceful terms as Shaikh N~ir 
had to propose. Muscat wanted to be on an amicable footing with the Persians but 
would not buy their friendship by an annual tribute. Moreover, Shaikh Ni$ir was 
given to understand, the Imam's fleet was going up the Gulf with trade as usual, and 
Karim Khan and the other powers in the Gulf could behave towards them as they saw 
fit in their own interests. 86 
Shaikh N~ir returned to Bushire from his expedition to the south on 17 August 177 4 
and started preparing his gallivats to attack the Ka'b. They had captured a boat 
belonging to one of the Bushire shaikhs and sent its complement to their capital: the 
boat was said to contain treasure belonging to the Bushire merchants valued at 3,000 
Tomans. The capture had been made in revenge for the Shaikh of Bushire hanging 
three Ka'b Arabs for robbery and other crimes.B7 Shaikh N~ir was still collecting his 
gallivats together on 15 October 1774 in order to follow the Ka'b fleet to Bahrain, 
where 14 Ka'b gallivats were said to be lying.88 Karim Khan was also making 
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preparations in October for the Persian army to march against Kurdistan in Novem-
ber. 89 In these circumstances, ideas of attacking Muscat or the English mediating 
evaporated: all that was left of Karim Khan's and Shaikh N3$ir's points for the release 
of the Europeans, including Beaumont and Green, was the re-settlement of the 
Residency at Bushire. 
Shaikh N3$ir released three Europeans from the brig Tyger at the end of June 1774. 
These were named as Samuel Brown, George Adder and Compeachy and they arrived 
in Basrah on 24 July 1774. The Agent received letters from Beaumont and Green 
quoting Shaikh N3$ir as still very keen for the English to re-settle at Bushire. 90 He 
also received a letter from his superiors on 26 July ordering him not to enter into any 
agreement with Karim Khan until Beaumont and Green were released, and to transmit 
any proposals which Karim Khan might thereafter put forward. 91 Moore once again 
advised English ships against touching at Bushire, or any other Persian port or island, 
except of necessity. He also repeated his orders not to engage the gallivats of any 
power in the Gulf, unless they were approached by them. However, if they fell in 
with the brig Tyger in Persian hands, and had a chance to retake her, they should do 
their utmost to do so. 92 
George Green arrived at Basrah on 19 September 177 4 from Bushire and brought two 
letters from Beaumont a.'ld Shaik.~ N~ir. In his letter Beaumont wrote t.';.at Shaikh 
N3$ir had finally decided to allow Green to go to Basrah to propose the terms of an 
accommodation to the Agent, namely that someone should be sent to Bushire as 
temporary Resident, and that English vessels should trade to Bushire as before. In 
return for this, Shaikh N3$ir promised to give back the Tyger with her stores. He also 
engaged himself to be answerable for any piracies that might be committed against the 
English by Bandar Riq or Ganawah gallivats and to put a total stop to their plunder, 
as well as releasing Beaumont. 93 Shaikh N3$ir' s letter also remarked that Beaumont 
and Green had told him that it would be much better for one of them to go to Basrah 
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and explain everything to the Agent: he had therefore given Green his liberty for that 
purpose94 (see Appendix 76). 
The Agent wrote to Shaikh N~ir on 23 September 1774 explaining that it was not in 
his power to re-settle in Bushire, but that if Beaumont arrived at Basrah he would then 
write to the Governor of Bombay about Shaikh N~ir's friendship for the English9S 
(see Appendix 77). A week later Moore concluded that Shaikh N~ir would not run 
the risk of sending Beaumont to Basrah in any of his own gallivats or boats, and that 
the Shaikh's reply to Moore's letter of the 23rd might have been lost in a boat taken 
by the Ka'b near Basrah. He decided, therefore, to send the ketch Success to Bushire: 
Lieutenant Thistleton, Commander of the Success, was to deliver the Agent's letter 
and Moore hoped that the benefit to Shaikh N~ir from communication being re-
opened between English ships and Bushire would induce him to release Beaumont 
forthwith96 (see Appendix 78). 
The Success sailed on 3 October 1774 and arrived at Bushire on the 6th, when 
Lieutenant Thistleton delivered the Agent's letters to Shaikh N~ir and Beaumont. On 
15 October 1774 the Success arrived back in Basrah with replies from both of them.97 
Beaumont was disappointed by the results of the latest exchange and wrote to Moore: 
It is with Greatest concern that I see all the Generous endeavours in 
your power prove unsuccessful to procure my liberty which I have 
no hopes of uatil my Honorable Superiours at Bombay with their 
usual goodness are pleased to take some effectual measure for my 
delivrance from almost an eighteen months captivity with the Melan-
choly circumstances attending it. Which I beg the favour you will 
be pleased to represent to them.98 
In fact, Moore thought that Shaikh N~ir's letter was complete nonsense and that there 
would be no use in writing again99 (see Appendix 79). A secret letter from Agha 
KiiCiik to Moore even suggested what Moore considered a dishonourable ploy, which 
he refused to adopt. Kiiciik advised: 
If you want the release of Mr. Beaumont this is the only method for 
procuring it. There can be no harm in trying. Mr. Morley when he 
went away left such a man in his room [i.e. place], and a few days 
afterwards the man went away likewise. If the Shaikh does not 
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behave properly to the man that you may send, he may leave 
Bushire at any time. This is my opinion if you think otherwise and 
will not follow my advise Mr. Beaumont will not get his liberty. 100 
In a private letter of 28 December 1774, received by Moore in Basrah on 6 January 
1775, Beaumont reported that it was firmly believed in Bushire and Bandar Riq that 
Karim Khan had ordered Shaikh N~ir to release him. When questioned by 
Beaumont, Shaikh 'Ali, the provisional Governor of Bushire, confirmed the report. 
But Shaikh. N~ir was then absent in Bahrain and Shaikh Sa'diin had no authority to 
deal with the Beaumont affair. tot 
In March 1775 Karim Khan's brother, ~adiq Khan, was on the march as Commander 
of the Persian forces going to attack Basrah, when English ships engaged gallivats of 
his ally the Ka'b on 15 March, destroying two of them and disabling the others, 
which ~adiq was able to recover. Moore sent a letter to ~adiq Khan on 29 March 
1775 offering to send someone to re-establish the English factory at Bushire if Sadiq 
surrendered the Ka'b gallivats to him, put the Bandar Riq and Ganawah gallivats in 
the charge of Shaikh N~ir, returned the Tyger, and released Beaumont. That, he 
said, would settle the peace of the Gulf at once. Moore wrote to Shaikh N~ir telling 
him of the communication between him and ~adiq Khan, and English ships underlined 
the message by attacking Shaikh N~ir's gallivats. Shaikh N~ir immediately replied 
that he would continue to be a friend of the English and would do everything in his 
power for them.I02 
At the beginning of April 1775, four English ships - the Drake, Captain Robert 
Freeman Gage; the schooner Betsy, Lieutenant George Kuirson, from Bombay; the 
latty Boy, Captain Thomas Smith, from Surat; and the Trident, Captain Tresdale, 
from Bengal, arrived at Bushire. On board the Trident was Robert Garden, sent from 
the Presidency with powers to make peace with Shaikh N~ir and re-establish a fac-
tory in Bushire. Garden sent a message to Karim Khan about his mission and, in a 
few days, received a favourable reply, in which Karim Khan ordered the release of 
Beaumont. 103 
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6.3 The re-establishment of the Bushire settlement 
In the face of the Persian invasion the Basrah Agent, Moore, left there on 11 April 
1775 on board the Eagle, accompanied by the Tigris, Euphrates and the Success for 
an action against the Ka'b gallivats. They reached Khark with the Agent debating 
whether they had sufficient force to return to Basrah; if not, they had no option but to 
carry on to India. They anchored in the inner roads at Bushire on 24 April and found 
the four English vessels riding at anchor there.I04 On the next day, the 25th, Moore 
received a note from Garden telling him that he had amicably settled all the dif-
ferences with the Persians, and that Beaumont was on board the Trident. He had 
ordered Captain Gage to fire a salute in honour of Karim Khan'sfaramiin, and asked 
Moore to do likewise. Garden and Beaumont went ashore and were saluted by the 
Trident and Drake in succession: the whole fleet and other vessels then saluted the 
English flag which was raised over the English factory .1os 
Moore asked Garden for an account of his negotiations and Garden replied: 
In answer to your favour of this date, I am to inform you that in 
consequence of Mr Beaumont having been delivered up to me and 
the assurances of Carem Caun that the Tyger shall be returned to me 
with all her stores, immediately on her coming back from Bussorah 
[where she was part of the besieging Persian fleet], I have agreed to 
a re-establishment at Bushire, in the same conditions as 
heretofore.l06 
Garden received twofaramllns on 13 May 1775, one for the release of Beaumont and 
one for the return of the English vessel Tyger, with all her stores to himl07 (see 
Appendices 80 and 81). 
The President and Council of Bombay decreed the-appointment of John Beaumont as 
the Company's Resident at Bush ire, and Moore appointed George Green to assist in 
the running of the factory there. At the beginning of May 1775 Karim Khan 
expressed his sutprise that the English had not as yet unloaded any goods and 
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wondered if they were trying to deceive him by simply raising a flag in Bushire. The 
English therefore told him of the woollens at that time on board the Drake and Bet-
sey108 (see Appendix 82). By 16 May 1775 the two ships were almost unloaded of 
goods valued at Rs 34,522.109 Karim Khan replied on 20 May to Moore's letter 
advising the Khan that he had arrived at Bushire from Basrah, and referred to his ear-
lier reply to Garden: 
I have in reply thereto told him, wherever the English are pleased to 
settle in my dominions whether at Bushire or other places I shall 
give them protection and all the encouragement in my power which 
I desire you to believe, having immediately on Mr. Garden's arrival 
directed Shaik Sadoon to give the English the best of treatment and I 
have now ordered him to render you every good service, that the 
English may be convinced I set a proper value upon their friendship 
but if you have any service beyond his power you need but signify it 
to me and think while you write me that it should be immediately 
complied with.l 10 
Garden wrote to the Governor of Bombay on 23 April 1775 that Katim Khan, in his 
letter to the Governor and to the President, ascribed the blame for the rift between the 
English and the Persians entirely to Henry Moore.lll 
6.4 Karim Khan's last efforts 
Neither Lorimer in his Gazetteer, nor John Perry in his Karim Khan Zand, mentioned 
the reasons for Karim Khan's attacks on Kurdistan in the north, and Basrah in the 
south of Turkish Iraq. They have been followed by later historians.ll2 The reasons 
appear to have been as follows. 
At the beginning of 1774, the Pasha of Baghdad removed Mul}.ammad Basha from the 
government of Kurdistan, one of the Pasha's provinces: Mul}.ammad complained to 
Karim Khan, who had some influence in the province and who, in November 177 4, 
ordered one of his Generals, 'Ali Murad Khan, to march with 10,000 men to 
Mul}.ammad Basha's assistance. On being joined by Mul}.ammad's own men his total 
forces amounted to 12,000. The Pasha of Baghdad had sent only about 3,000 men to 
support 'Abdallah Basha, the replacement of Mul}.ammad. The two armies clashed 
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near a place called Cameamal, between Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk. After a few hours 
the Persians were beaten and fled; the Turks pursued them vigorously until the rem-
nant Persian army was back inside Persian territory, and in the process captured 'Ali 
Murad Khan with 10 or 12 of his senior officers and many of lower rank. When the 
battle was over they also seized a courier bringing a letter from Karim Khan to 'Ali 
Murad Khan in which he ordered 'Ali not to enter Ottoman territory, but to return 
immediately with his army to Shiraz, where he had other tasks for him.ll3 
None of the historians mentioned before has noted, in this context, the beginnings of 
the revolution which led to the establishment of the Qajar dynasty and, by ending the 
power struggle, opened up the Gulf for free trading. In November 177 4, ijusain 
Khan, son of Fatl}. 'Ali Khan of the Qajar tribe, revolted: the Qajars inhabited 
Astarabad and the province of Mazandaran bordering the Caspian Sea. About 17 
years before they had captured Isfahan from Karim Khan, but were later defeated by 
Karim Khan's army and their leader killed. Astarabad and Mazandaran fell to Karim 
Khan, who took two sons of ijusain Khan with him as prisoners to Shiraz; a younger 
son fled to the mountains bordering Mazandaran where he was well received by one 
of the tribal leaders, whose daughter he married. With the help of his father-in-law, 
he invaded Mazandaran, defeated Karim Khan's Governor, and took the province 
over. An army sent against him by Karim Khan was similarly defeated.114 Karim 
Khan then assembled an army at Astarabad, and another of 6,000 men was to leave 
Shiraz and would be joined by about 14,000 more collected en route. The grandson 
of Nadir Shah wrote to ijusain Khan's son from GTian, on the Caspian, which he had 
recently seized, recommending him to make a stand against Karim Khan's troops and 
promising to join him as soon as he had firmly settled himself into his new posses-
sion.115 
Also in November 1774, Karim Khan ordered another army of 10,000 men to be in 
readiness to march against Basrah. At the beginning of February 1755, his brother 
Sadiq Khan set off there by land. He crossed the Ottoman Turkish border at 
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Huwaizah, about 60 miles north of Basrah, and captured it. Sadiq Khan wrote a very 
arrogant letter to the English Agent in Basrah, without the opening compliments 
which were normal in those parts, telling him that he had 30,000 troops and expected 
10,000 more to join him from Shaikh N3.$ir, Ma'!liim Khan of Bandar Riq, and 
sundry other places on the coast of Persia. They would be augmented by forces from 
the Ka'b, who would come by sea, and the whole would then attack Basrahl16 (see 
Appendix 83). He also described his reason for attacking Basrah ' ... the only cause 
of my being ordered out with the army from Shiraz is to take Bussorah for the good 
of the place and the people of it.' 117 He ordered the Agent to come and meet him, 
but Moore replied that he had already left Basrah.l18 Lorimer holds that the spur for 
the invasion was the defeat administered to the Persians by the Turks in the north: this 
is erroneous since the two armies had been prepared at the same time.l19 
On his departure for Bombay, Moore left the Company's affairs at Basrah in the 
hands of Garden and Abraham. In August 1775 Garden sent a letter to Karim Khan 
asking him to instruct Sadiq Khan to safeguard the security of English property at 
Basrah if the town was captured. Karim Khan therefore wrote a faraman to his 
brother to take care of the English factory, the house and Engli~h property therel2° 
(see Appendix 84). 
The siege of Basra.~} lasted 13 mont.l}s, as noted by Perry i..11 Karim Khan Zand, a.11d 
very briefly by Lorimer.l21 Abraham Parsons, who was in Basrah when it was under 
siege, records in his Travels that the garrison there consisted of fewer than 1 ,500 men 
and a small naval force in the river.l22 
Sadiq Khan finally occupied Basrah on 21 April 1776, without executions or oppres-
sion according to Perry, who relied on Persian sources in his research. 123 James Cap-
per reports otherwise. He was an English traveller in Basrah at that time and records 
that when the Persians took Basrah they appointed 'Ali Mul}.ammad as its Governor, 
262 
leaving a garrison of 15,500 with him. The Governor, Capper alleges, raped the 
daughter of an Arab physician and: 
Notwithstanding such unheard of barbarity, the major part of the 
inhabitants of Zebeer and Coebda were so infatuated as to continue 
to live within twelve miles of him; imprudently relying on the faith 
of one who had thus publicly violated all laws, both divine and 
human. A few, and but very few of the most prudent of them had 
left either of these places, when one night in a fit of drunkenness, 
and instigated by avarice, Aly Mahomed marched from Bassora with 
a body of troops and burnt Zebeer; at the same time putting to death 
all those who attempted to escape from the flames: from thence he 
marched to Coebda, where he acted in the same manner, and then 
returned to Bassora; exulting as much in having treacherously mas-
sacred, in cold blood, a number of defenceless people, as if he had 
obtained a glorious victory over a powerful army .124 
The English Resident in Basrah, Abraham, wrote about the same atrocity to the Resi-
dent in Bushire on 3 July 1778 saying 'The 30th of June at night the Persians under 
Ally Mahomed Caun proceeded to Zebere and on some pretence or other killed or 
made slaves of all the Arabs that they found there - the latter they are now selling 
publickly to whoever will purchase them' .12s Meanwhile, the Miitesellim of Basrah, 
Sulaiman Agha, had been captured on the occupation of Basrah and sent a prisoner to 
Shiraz.126 
Kanm Khan died on 2 March 1779; Perry wrongly gives the date as 1777 or 1778.127 
His son, Abii'l-Fat.Q Khan succeeded him and Shiraz stayed quiet under the close 
guard of his brother, Zaki Khan. Several couriers were sent to Basrah to recall $adiq 
Khan to Shiraz.l23 Acting on the messages irom Shiraz, ~adiq Khan devolved control 
of Basrah to Shaikh Darwish of the Muntafiq tribe, until such time as he could 
arrange for the previous Miitesellim, Sulaiman Agha, to be sent back from his Shiraz 
imprisonment and to take over. $adiq left Basrah on 24 March 1779 en route to 
Shiraz, and on the 26th all the gallivats from Bushire, Ganawah and Bandar Riq 
returned to their respective ports. Sulaiman Agha left Shiraz in the opposite direction 
on 4 ApriJ.129 
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6.5 Trade at Bushire from the time of its re-establishment up to the 
death of Karim Khin: 1775-1779 
Trade in 1775 amounted to no more than Rs 80,000, while in 1776 the Company was 
selling at a loss. Lorimer curiously attributes this to the merchants' custom of retiring 
from Bushire to Shiraz to escape the heat from June to August.130 Table 6.2 shows a 
marginal price gain on most items for that year but leaves other very significant costs 
out of account (such as shipping and other overheads): 
i 
Fine Medleys 
Coarse do. 
Superfine cloth 
Fine do. 
Coarse do. 
Worsters 
Drabs 
Ditto 
Perpets 
Pieces 
Rupees 
12 
36 
42 
102 
78 
66 
6 
22 
1,070 
Table 6.2: Bushire trade in 1776131 
(original form of record retained) 
Cost in Sold for 
(Rupees) 
5.0.00 per Guz. 5.2.10 
3.2.18 do. 4.3.00 
5.3.17 do. 6.2.10 
3.2.18 do. 4.2.10 
3.0.05 do. 2.2.10 
3.0.01 do. 3.1.05 
6.0.15 do. 8.0.00 
6.0.15* do. 7.0.05 
20.0.12 each 21.0.00 
* (the presents deducted) 
A report in November 1776 showed that annual sales at Bushire never exceeded Rs 
88,000 at the best of times.132 See Appendix 85, however, for an optimistic estimate 
that Rs i88,240 worth of broadcloth and perpets could be sold annually in the Bushire 
market.133 The actual imports of broadcloth to Bushire in 1777, compared with Bas-
rah, are shown in Table 6.3. Nevertheless, the Resident at Bushire reported in 1778 
that trade had become 'unmarketable' 134 (Lorimer mistakenly records that in the same 
year there was a strong demand at Bushire for perpets, coarse medleys and coarse 
cloth13S), and in 1779 was in need of money, writing to the Presidency, 'I have 
nothing of the honourable Company's under my charge but Dead Stock' .136 The 
Resident was able to ship pearls and specie valued at Rs 31 , 115 to Bombay on the 
ketch Success on 2 May 1779137 (see Appendix 86), and a similar consignment worth 
Rs 34,486 on the snow Eagle on 15 July 1780138 (see Appendix 87). 
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Table 6.3: Imports of broadcloth to Basrah and Bushire, 1777139 
(original form of record retained) 
Bussora Bush ire 
Scarlet 16 58 
Aurora 12 44 
Blue 10 55 
French Green 6 39 
Emerald do. 6 50 
Grass do. 12 
Purple 7 20 
Wine 1 6 
Cherry 1 8 
Yell ow and Red 5 
Popinjay 3 11 
Cinnamon, Dove & Black 5 
Bales 67 Bales 308 
6.6 The decline of the Zand dynasty, 1779-1794 
The Persian dependency of Bahrain was lost on 23 July 1783 to the Arab tribe of 
'Utiib, from Zubarah on the west coast of the Qatar peninsula. Most historians fol-
lowed the mistake of Francis Warden, in his 'Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe 
of Arabs', where he attributes Shaikh N~ir's earlier attacks on Zubarah to the jeal-
ousy of Shaikh N~ir (Shaikh of both Bushire and Bahrain), caused by Zubarah's 
prosperity, and claims that repeated attempts were made to reduce Zubarah between 
1777 and 1801.140 This is incorrect: the true story of the 'Utiib conquest of Bahrain 
begins with a visit in 1782 by some of the Zubarah people to the island in order to 
buy wood. A quarrel arose between them and the Bahraini people, in which an 
'Utiibi Shaikh's slave was killed.l41 The 'Utiib retaliated on 9 September 1782 by 
descending on Bahrain and engaging in a short battle in which several lives were lost 
on both sides. They plundered and destroyed the town before returning to Zubarah 
after three days, taking with them one of the Bushire gallivats which Shaikh N~ir had 
sent over to collect the annual tribute from the island. This news reached Bushire on 
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13 September, and on 1 October Shaikh N~ir was accordingly ordered by the (now 
released) Persian warlord in Shiraz, 'Ali Murad Khan, to prepare an expedition 
against Zuba.rah, in which he would be supported by the Shaikhs of Bandar Riq, 
Ganawah and Dashtistan.I42 
It took Shaikh Ni$ir until 12 December 1782 to put together a sufficient force, which 
sailed for Bahrain as a fleet of four large gallivats, 13 or 14 dhows, and nearly as 
many other boats, bearing altogether 2,000 men. A further three gallivats were to 
follow a few days later. Extensive powers had been given to Shaikh Rashid al-Qasimi 
of Juliar to settle matters between the two parties143 but he joined Shaikh Ni$ir at 
Bahrain, having failed in his mediation. The Persian forces landed at Zuba.rah on 17 
May 1783 and launched an immediate attack. After a stiff fight, in which many were 
killed on both sides, the Persians threw down their arms and fled to their boats. 
Shaikh Mul).ammad, nephew of Shaikh Ni$ir, and Shaikh Rashid bin Sa' dun's nephew 
were both killed in the action. The 'Utiibi fleet from Grain (Kuwait) of six gallivats 
and a number of armed boats arrived the same day and plundered the town of Bahrain 
before setting frre to it. 
The 'Utiib also took a boat belonging to Shaikh Rashid al-Qasimi and put the crew of 
18 to the sword: the Shaikh had, in fact, taken an active part against the 'Utiib. The 
Persian forces returned home and began again to collect a sufficient strength to attack 
Zubarah once more.I44 But Shaikh Rashid bin Sa'diin, nephew of Shaikh Ni$ir, 
arrived back in Bushire on 5 August 1783 to report that he had been forced to 
abandon the fort of Bahrain to the 'Utiib on 23 July. The remains of the Persian gar-
rison left for Bushire with him.I4S 
With the last Shah of the Zand dynasty, Lutf 'Ali Khan, failing to re-establish its 
ascendancy over Persia, Bandar Abbas was leased in 1794 to a foreign power, the 
Imam of Muscat, for the frrst time.I46 Although Bandar Abbas was leased to the 
Imam at that time, there are no records of the original agreement, except the report in 
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a letter from Dr Jukes, Political Agent at Qishm, to the Presidency on 24 August 
1821: 
I regret extremely that neither at Maskat, nor at Kishm have I been 
able to obtain a sight of one of the old Persian Farmauns by which 
His Highness the Imam farms Bunder Abbasee from the sovereign 
of Persia, in order to ascertain what places are particularly specified 
as constituting its dependencies. I think it unlikely that such an 
important document as the grant, or Farmaun of the King of Persia, 
by which His Highness the Imam farms so large a portion of ter-
ritory and for which he pays 4,000 tumans annually should not be in 
existence; it is possible it might have been mislaid at the time I was 
at Maskat, or it might have been intentionally withheld, but I was 
expressly informed by Saiyid Abdul Kahir, His Highness's con-
fidential Secretary that neither Kishm, Ormuz, nor La.rak, are 
specified on the receipts annually granted by the Persian 
Government, for the stipulated sum paid to them; and in reply to a 
series of questions which I wrote out to be answered at Maskat, and 
which I know were carried by Saiyid Abdul Kahir to His Highness 
the Imam himself, it was expressly declared that the islands of 
Kishm, Ormuz and La.rak belonged exclusively to the Imam.I47 
In her work Oman & Muscat, Patricia Risso distorts this arrangement to the port 
being on lease 'from a hostile power' and the customs being let out to a wealthy mer-
chant named ij:ajji KhalTI. 14B In his Myth of Arab piracy in the Gulf, al-Qasimi wrote 
that in 1794 the Imam of Muscat leased the port from the Persians and collected an 
annual revenue of 8,600 to 10,000 Maria Theresa Dollars (riyals).l49 
6. 7 Trade between the death of Karim Khan (1779) and the downfall of the 
Zand dynasty (1795) 
Persia was given over to disorders and civil wars. Four Shahs were killed or blinded, 
four Khans were killed or blinded, and many provinces became separated from Per-
sia. Along the whole coast from Hormuz to Bandar Riq and Khark, fighting broke 
out among the various Shaikhs. 1so The period comprising the decline of the Zand 
dynasty (1779-95) saw a comparable decline in Persian trade. The Bushire Resident 
wrote to Bombay on 7 June 1783: 
On balancing the Honorable Companys Books of this Settlement 
ending the 30th April last it appears that their Net Loss for the Year 
amounts to Rupees 6517.3 and the amount of Charges general to 
Rupees 9647.3.15 or a decrease of Rupees 1034.2.19 on the former 
and Rupees 928.1. 03 on the latter when compared with the preceed-
ing Year. Permit me to observe also to Your Honor &ca. that no 
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Customs was collected during the last year, that no Treasure and 
Pearl freight offered, and that owing to the communication between 
this place and Bussora having been stopped for some time past.151 
George Melcham was sent to Persia on 1 February 1785 to try to identify the causes 
of this decline in Persian trade. 152 The difficult trading conditions of the time are, in 
fact, clearly indicated in thefaramiin issued by Ja'far Khan on 18 January 1788 (see 
Appendix 88). Table 6.4 gives a statement of goods exported from Bombay to 
Bushire in this period. 
Table 6.4: Summary of goods exported from Bombay to Bushire, 1787-1792153 
Year Date Quantity Value Ship 
inRs 
1787 26May 16 bales of broadcloth 13,556 Panther 
1788 4May 150 bales of perpets 53,863 Drake 
ro,ooo IIIIJIInds of iron 55,0001 
1789 22 Feb 55,000 maunds of steel 60,500 Intrepid 
38,000 maunds of tin 49,400 
1789 July 60 bales of broadcloth 36,063 Intrepid 
1790 26 April 50 bales of broadcloth Morning 
and 20 bales of tin 36,621 Star 
1792 25 March Consignment of tin 6,949 Drake 
1792 12 Dec Perpets (imported from 
Europe) and 245 bales of 
bullion cloth 58,8741 
15 bales of scarlet .... . 
5,383! 
unuce 
perpets 
N.B. Drake's last load was consigned to Basrah but landed at Bushire 
The revolution at Shiraz, which lasted from July 1791 to June 1792, imposed a total 
stoppage on trade with Bushire for the last part of this period. Only 67 pieces of 
broadcloth were disposed of at that time whilst all of the Company's tin had not been 
cleared by the end of the period, after nearly 2,500 maunds had been bought.154 The 
balance of cash in the Bushire treasury on 30 June 1792 was only Rs 1 ,842.155 
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Exports from Bushire to Bombay during the same period (1779-1794) were limited to 
wool from Kirman156: the Resident in Bushire bought about 560 maunds of this wool 
in January 1792. Table 6.5 summarises these exports for part of the period. 
Table 6.5: Kirmin wool exported from Bushire to Bombay, 1790-1795157 
Year Date Quantity Value 
inRs 
1790 4 Feb 122 maunds 732. 
25 July 1, 000 maunds 6,000. 
1792 30 July 537 maunds 3,222. 
1793 25 June 683/4 maunds 415.50 
1795 March 200 maunds 1,200. 
1795 1 Nov 401 maunds 1,879. 
The fmancial position of the Bushire settlement was that debt had reached Rs 7,045 
by November 1788, and had increased to Rs 10,149 by April 1789158: losses from 1 
May 1788 to 30 April 1789 amounted to Rs 12,779 - an increase of Rs 2, 112 over the 
figure one year earlier.1S9 
Bombay was also exporting to the Basrah factory during this same period and Table 
6.6 shows something of both the quantities and values involved. 
Table 6.6: Summary of goods exported from Bomba~ to Basrah, 1787-1792160 
Year Date Quantity Value Ship 
inRs 
1787 27 Jan 20 bales of broadcloth 17,609 Scorpion 
(snow) 
1787 27 April 19 bales of broadcloth 16,353 Panther 
1789 4 July 60 bales of broadcloth 36,063 Intrepid 
1790 26 April 50 bales of broadcloth 21,385 Morning 
Star 
1791 17 Feb Consignment of woollens 27,217 Intrepid 
1792 25 March ~Consignment of broad-
cloth and perpets 26,122! Drake 
Tin in bars 6,943 
Generally speaking, the sale of woollens at Bushire from 1780 to 1790 produced a 
total net loss of £1,232 12s 6d (about Rs 12,000)·, or 5 1A per cent on the 'first cost'. 
269 
At Basrah during the same period the total net loss was £11,305 lOs (about Rs 
11 0,000), or about 2P/4 per cent on the first cost (see Appendices 89 and 90).161 The 
consignment of woollens imported in February 1791 to Basrah (Table 6.6 above) 
remained in the warehouse and was not expected to be sold for some years. The 
reason for this was that the Gulf market, which in former years had taken a large 
proportion of the Company's woollens, was now to a large extent being supplied 
overland by French manufactures.162 Samuel Manesty wrote from Basrah in August 
1792 to the Board in Bombay '... we beg leave respectfully to request that your 
Hon 'ble Board will take the necessary measures to prevent the further consignments 
of that assortment of cloth ['medleys'] to Bussora' .163 He reported that in the 
previous month, July, the French ship Le Grain had brought a quantity of canvas, 
cordage and iron to the Gulf market, along with a few bales of broadcloth.164 In these 
circumstances Manesty was nevertheless able to sell a quantity of woollens in Septem-
ber for 1,544 Tomans16S (see Appendix 91). 
Before the end of 1792 the factory at Basrah was closed, and a consignment of 245 
bales of bullion cloth, and 15 bales of scarlet perpets were landed from the Drake at 
Bushire instead (see Table 6.4). The Basrah factory had been brought to a critical 
situation as a result of the dispute caused by the Turkish Pasha of Baghdad's various 
acts of interference, as well as the obstructive nature of Samuel Manesty, the Resident 
at Basrah. The factory was therefore moved to Grain (modem Kuwait) for three 
years, 1793-5,166 and had as its main function the reception and forwarding to Aleppo 
of packets from Bombay, for onward transmission to Constantinople.167 Some goods 
were also landed at Grain and carried overland to Basrah by caravans.168 
6.8 The establishment of the Qijir dynasty, 1795-1799 
The Qajar dynasty (named after Qajar Khan, the leader of the Turcoman tribe), took 
some years to establish its power, and thus to restore Persia to a position of respect 
through its control of all the Persian provinces.169 The founder of the Qajar dynasty 
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in Persia, Agha Mu}Jammad Khan, ruled from 1795 to 1797. During that period 
losses arose on sales at both Bush ire and Basrah .110 
6.8.1 Bushire's trade 
At the beginning of 1797 the Shaikh of Bushire took control of the Company's busi-
ness by ordering the Resident not to deal directly with the local merchants. He 
instructed the Resident to deliver goods to a named person or persons, then collected 
the full purchase price, deducted 10% profit for himself, and paid the remainder to 
the Resident. The confusion arising from the death of Agha Mu}Jammad Khan in 
mid-1797 put an effective stop to all trading. The successor to Agha Mu}Jammad 
Khan was Fat}J 'Ali Shah, who now began to impose his control on Persia. In the 
case of Bushire, he sent ij:usain Qul"i Khan, Governor of Shiraz and Beglerbegi (Com-
mander) of Forces, with 12,000 men, in mid-1798, to punish Shaikh N~ir for his 
independent behaviour in the past. N~ir and his men evacuated Bushire temporarily, 
and ij:usain Quli Khan took possession. The Resident, Nicholas Hankey Smith, 
reported to Bombay that he had given presents amounting toRs 60,000 and had suc-
ceeded in renewing the validity of the faramlins governing the Bushire factory.l71 
The Grand Vizier or Chief Minister, ij:ajji Ibrahim, was given Rs 10,000 for him-
self.172 In a letter dated 6 October 1798 to the Governor in Bombay, Smith elegantly 
characterised the events as a revolution: 173 
I have aiready informed your Hon~bie Board of the revoiution which 
took place here on the 20th ultimo, and am sorry to add that it 
appears to be the determination of the present dynasty to reduce the 
Shaikh's power and subject Bushire as in the reign of Nadir Shaw 
to the military government of an officer nominated by the Governor 
of Sherauz or immediately under his injunctions. In consequence of 
this avulsion of authority, Shaikh Nassir is already degraded to the 
allegorical vocation of Collector and Custom Master, under the 
vigilant eye of jealous and voracious circumspection, the curb of 
affectitious power, and the perplexity of fraudulent artifice and 
intrigue. 
6.8.2 Basrah 's trade 
The factory at Basrah was re-established in October 1795 and the dispute with the 
Pasha was finally brought to a successful conclusion.174 In December 1796, the 
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Board of Trade in Bombay accused Samuel Manesty (the Resident at Basrah) by 
implication of being less zealous than the previous Resident in his desire and efforts to 
promote the Company's woollen sales at Basrah. Manesty replied in July 1797 that, 
after the re-establishment of the Basrah factory, he had asked the Bombay 
Government to send him quickly a large consignment of woollens for sale on the 
Company's account: he could not, then, be reasonably suspected of subsequent 
indifference in the matter. The losses which had arisen on the sales of broadcloth for 
the period precisely from his take-over of the Residency from John Griffith had 
'unavoidably' grown out of the general losses on the sales of woollens in the Gulf.l7S 
At the beginning of 1797, the Board noticed an increase in the quantities of copper 
being exported from Basrah to Persia, and thus competing with the Company's copper 
imported through Bushire. The results of their enquiries into the copper being pro-
duced in the Turkish dominions (marketed through Basrah in copper cake) and its 
comparison ·with European copper in plates, imported through the Company, are sum-
marised in Tables 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9. 
Year 
1791 
1792 
1793 
1794 
1795 
1796 
Year 
1791 
1792 
1793 
1794 
1795 
1796 
Table 6.7: Costin& of European co2per, 1791-1796176 
Prime cost 15% advance Total 
per cwt for charges Rupees 
37.1.94 6.2.48 44.0.42 
41.1.53 6.0.44 47.1.97 
51.1.65 7.2.84 59.0.49 
50.1.09 7.2.15 57.3.24 
50.1.09 7.2.15 57.3.24 
47.0.67 7.0.28 54.0.95 
Table 6.8: European C02JX! imported and sold, 1791-1796177 
Quantity Quantity Median price for general 
imported sold sales of cwts in Rs 
(cwt) 
7,210 7,210 46.2.45 
1,798 1,798 57.2.04 
888 none 
2,358 1,346 of the uncleared 1792 
56.3.16 
none 3,150 of the 1793/4 imports 
61.3.44 
730 730 62.1.00 
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Table 6.9: Pricing of Basrah copper, 1791-1796178 
1791 
Cake of 30 lbs cost 80 Mahmudis: 10 Mahmudis = Rs 1 
Equivalent of one hundredweight (112 lbs) in Rupees = 29.3.46 
Freight 
Commission @ 2'h% 
Insurance @ 5% 
Customs: reckoned @ 
15%- advance@ 2%% 
Hamallage [porterage] 
1796 
1.2.00 
3.20 
1.2.40 
3.68 
1.00 
5.0.28 
34.3.74 
Cake of 30 1bs cost 130 Mahmudis: 10 Mahmudis = Rs 1 
Equivalent of one hundredweight (112lbs) in Rupees = 48.2.12 
Freight 
Commission @ 21h% 
Insurance @ 5% 
Customs: reckoned @ 
15%- advance@ 21h% 
Hamallage 
2.1.60 
1.0.84 
2.1.68 
1.1.56 
1.00 
7.2.68 
56.0.80 
Until 1796 the actual quantities of copper exports from Basrah were unknown, but in 
that year they amounted to 7,000 maunds at 30 lbs each, or 1,875 hundredweight 
(cwt). They sold at an average of Rs 63 per cwt, which was three quarters of a Rupee 
greater than the Company's highest copper prices in Basrah.I79 
6.8.3 Persian Gulf trade 
During the decline of the Zand dynasty and the establishment of the Qajar dynasty 
trade in the Persian Gulf fell to its lowest level. The general statement of exports and 
imports between India (Surat) and the Persian Gulf by the Company is summarised in 
Table 6.1 0, for the period between 1 May 1794 and 30 April 1799. Large quantities 
of goods were also carried between India and the Persian Gulf by the native mer-
chants. Table 6.11 shows the quantities and values imported and exported between 1 
May 1794 and 30 April 1799. 
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Year 
1794/95 
1795/96 
1796/97 
1797/98 
1798/99 
Table 6.10: East India Company trade between Surat 
and the Persian Gulf, 1794-1799 (in Rupees)lBO 
Imports 
to Surat 
48,570.0.45 
175,036.2.25 
77,598.2.25 
80,997.2.50 
28,328.3. 70 
Exports to the 
Persian Gulf 
36,263.2.40 
120,008.0.60 
165,470.1.00 
56,260.2.60 
49,834.1.80 
From various 
ports: 
re-exported 
to the Gulf 
29,370.3.20 
33,829.0.38 
44,089.3.00 
20,276.2.80 
19,390.2.80 
In 1798/99 exports from Surat to Bombay for re-export to the Persian Gulf amounted 
toRs 48,528.1.95. 
Year 
Table 6.11: Native merchant trade between Surat 
and the Persian Gulf, 1794-1799 (in Rupees)lBl 
Imports to 
Surat 
Exports to 
the Persian Gulf 
1794/95 
1795/96 
1796/97 
1797/98 
1798/99 
69,801.3.60 
118,605.2.05 
129,513.3.57 
125,896.1.13 
114,129.1.94 
432,768.1.40 
401,532.1.00 
460,682.1. 70 
344,621.0.60 
416,586.3.20 
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show that in the year 1794/95 the value of goods carried by 
native merchants from India to the Persian Gulf was over six times the value carried 
by the Company. This situation led to protests being raised against the Company's 
Chief in Surat, Daniel Seton, who withdrew the privileges he had allowed to the mer-
chants. Immediately, the native merchants reacted with a letter in May 1796 to the 
Governor of Bombay, translated as: 182 
Four months ago some of our Merchants sent your Excellency a Petition 
in which there was no complaint against any individual, the present 
Chief Daniel Seton Esqr. has shown us the highest degree of support and 
protection and we are exceedingly happy and content under him. There-
fore we hope that we shall be favoured with his assistance, and advice 
for the Management and advantage of our Trade with Mocha Juddah and 
Bussorah for the ensuing season. We here [sic] troubled you that from 
your excessive goodness you will be pleased to communicate this our 
desire in a friendly way to the Chief. 
The Governor, however, gave orders for the reform of the Surat establishment, reduc-
ing it to a form better related to its objectives. He suggested that the post of Chief be 
274 
reduced to that of a Resident, although with all the powers and functions of the last 
Chief, and that there should be an adequate number of Assistants. 183 Following the 
reform, the disparity in favour of the native merchants between 1795/96 and 1798/99 
reduced at first to under three times, and never rose again to previous levels. 
6.9 The increase in the value of English trade with Bushire, 1800-1820 
In the last few years of the century the East India Company had thus noticed a decline 
in trade with Bushire. The Bombay Government sent a letter on 14 July 1798 to the 
Resident at Bushire, asking for his observations about trade there. He replied: 184 
The propriety of abdicating or protractising this establishment depends, I 
should imagine, on the prospects the Hon'ble Company have or may 
have of commercial or political views in the country, consequently the 
expediency of the one must be determined by your Hon'ble Boards 
expectations as superior discernments of the feasibility of the other. 
The Company therefore decided to send a number of missions to Persia to boost its 
trade and political influence in that country. As a result, this period in Gulf history 
was characterised by close relations between the English and the Persians: Iss missions 
from Bombay visited Tehran (the new capital) and the Gulf ports, while English 
imports and exports both increased.I86 
6.9.1 The missions 
a) The East India Company's missions 
1. Mehdi Ali Khan's mission 1799 
Mehdi Ali Khan (Mahdi 'Ali Khan) was a Persian from Khuiisan, domiciled in 
India, who was appointed by Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay, to be 
Resident at Bushire. His predecessor as Resident there, Nicholas Smith, handed 
over charge of the English factory to Mehdi Ali Khan, as well as the Com-
pany's cash amounting to Rs 6,338 and its dead stock. But Smith returned to 
the Presidency without handing the British flag over to Mehdi Ali Khan; refus-
ing, as he said, to deliver the flag to a non-English Resident. This was the first 
- and the last - time such a thing occurred, and Smith was ordered to send the 
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flag back to Mehdi Ali Khan with the Panther. Mehdi Ali Khan was then 
installed on 30 October 1798.187 He was received by the Shih in the next year, 
and succeeded in persuading him to continue his hostilities against Afghanistan, 
which was then threatening India.1ss 
2. Malcolm's missions to Persia 1800, 1808, 1810 
Captain John Malcolm was appointed by Lord Mornington on 10 August 1799 
as Envoy to the Court of Persia: on his first mission, Malcolm signed an agree-
ment at the beginning of 1801 with the Persians, by which he secured commer-
cial concessions. His second mission failed to reach Tehran and was aborted 
because the Persian Government was busy with a French mission under General 
Gardane; Malcolm returned to Bombay. His third mission was to bolster the 
effect of the preliminary treaty with the Persians earlier arranged by Sir Harford 
Jones. 189 
3. The mission of Sir Harford Jones 1808-1809 
The activities of Sir Harford Jones, deputed by the British Government and not 
under the Governor General's control, caused friction; his relations with India 
became so strained that his function was suspended. Nonetheless, the good 
work he had done remained of value for many years. 190 His preliminary treaty 
was made definitive in 1814. 
b) The Persian missions 
1. IJijji Khafil's mission 1801-1802 
Khalil's function was to dispose of the points connected with trade which still 
remained unsettled. In the event, he was struck by a stray bullet while in Bom-
bay and fell dead,l91 
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2. Mu)}ammad Nabi Khan's mission 1805-1807 
With this mission the Shah hoped to obtain protection from the British against 
the Russians. The Bombay Government, however, referred all questions of 
British policy to His Majesty's Government at home, and the envoy returned to 
Persia empty-handed.l92 
6.9.2 Measures tending to boost trade 
i) The safety of the seas and the protection of the East India Company's ships now 
became important considerations, and the Bombay Marine was strengthened at the 
beginning of 1800.193 
ii) In the past the terms and conditions of trade might well have been analogous as 
between British merchants and those trading under British protection, e. g. the Indian 
native merchants (see pages 274-5). In recent years, however, the Bombay 
Government had become aware of a vast increase in British shipping owned and 
freighted by natives of India and Persia. Even on vessels which were the property of 
Europeans, their own importations were a very small proportion of the whole. After 
the Governor of Bombay's intervention that proportion would increase, to the benefit 
of the British merchants.t94 
iii) The Shah's inclination to cultivate the friendship of the English.t9s 
6.10 The trade of Bushire at peace, 1800-1820 
The trade of Bushire during this period consisted principally of:-
6.10.1 Bushire's imports/rom India 
Cotton, cotton yam, cardamoms, cloves, cinnamon, chinaware, cassia buds, China 
camphire, ginger, indigo, iron, lead, musk, nutmegs, peppers, red lead, sugar candy, 
steel, shawls, silk goods, turmeric, tin and woollens.t96 
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6.10.2 Bushire's exports to India 
Persian and Turkish coins, Venetian sequins (coins), German crowns, and gold and 
silver in bars. One fifth of imports were balanced by exports of Persian commodities, 
consisting of drugs of various kinds, carpets, rose-water, attar of roses and Shiraz 
wine.l97 
6.10.3 The trade of the Bushire factory 
After disposing of 5,000 pieces of perpet and other goods to the value of Rs 200,000, 
in November 1800,198 the Resident at Bushire placed the order shown in Table 6.12 
with Bombay. 
Table 6.12: Cloth ordered by Bushire, 1800199 
Perpets 
Broadcloth 
Worsters 
(fine smooth yarn) 
Fine cloth 
Superfine cloth 
3, 000 pieces 
162 pieces 
126 pieces 
174 pieces 
258 pieces 
In March 1801, the Resident estimated (badly, as it turned out) the indent of goods 
required for the succeeding years of 1801 to 1804; see Table 6.13. 
Table 6.13: Estimate of goods required in Bushire, 1801-1804200 
Year Cloth type Bales Pieces 
1801 Coa...--se & medleys 20 120 
1802 " " " 
I Coarse & medleys " 240 Superfine " 240 1803\ Fine " 120 Coarse Aurora " 190 
Worsters " 210 
I Coarse & medleys " 240 Superfine " 240 
1804{ Fine " 120 
i Coarse Aurora " 190 Worsters " 210 
The statement of accounts at Bushire during the following three years is set out in 
Tables 6.14 and 6.15. 
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Table 6.14: Bushire factory accounts- Debits20l 
(m Rupees) 
Year 
1800 (Nov & Dec) 
1801 
1802 
1803 (1-15 Jan) 
Total Rupees 
Amount of 
disbursements 
3,095 
11,633 
10,942 
Losses and drafts 
Losses: 12,425 
Cash forwarded to 
Manesty (Basrah): 20,307 
Expenses on death 
5,416 
43,511 
of Persian Ambassador: 13,846 
Mission expenses: 12,692 
59,270 
Table 6.15: Bushire factory accounts - Credits202 
(m Rupees) 
Year 
1800 (Nov & Dec) 
1801 
1802 
1803 (1-15 Jan) 
Total Rupees 
Profit Cash 
Account closed: 13,080 
Woollens sale: 3, 606 
6,352 Woollens received 
from Presidency: 565,474 
290 326 pieces of broadcloth 
& 100 cwt of lead from 
the Presidency: 12,099 
166 bales of broadcloth: 2,682 
6,M2 5%,~1 
Tables 6.14 and 6.15 make the situation of the Bush ire factory quite clear. The good-
will engendered by the missions, and the practical effect of the measures on page 277, 
saw the factory moving into profitability. 
For the year 1804 the Resident re-ordered perpets, not exceeding 5,000 pieces, and 
1 ,500 cwts of metals, divided between tin - 300 cwt; lead - 700 cwt; iron - 300 cwt; 
and steel - 200 cwt.203 Tin went to both Basrah and Bushire from the year 1805/6 
onwards to a value of upwards of Rs 50,000 to 60,000 a year, until 1810/11 when it 
rose toRs 81,663.204 As for other commodities, in May 1801 the Resident managed 
to sell all the goods sent there in 1798, at a prime cost of Rs 99,600, making a net 
profit of Rs 13,400.20S But the 'Europe' cloth was not saleable in the market, and 
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several bales sent in 1800 were sent back to the Presidency as there was no prospect 
of selling them.206 
By the last quarter of 1801 the factory at Bushire was perfectly secure but its sales -
the marketing of the East India Company's woollens, especially its perpets- depended 
largely on their being taken up for Afghanistan. At that time Afghanistan had been 
reduced to a state of distress and no-one, therefore, ventured to buy such large 
quantities of the Company's woollens.2o1 The woollens mainly in use there had of 
late been brought from Russia, by the safe and easy route through Herat. There they 
sold cheaply and were distributed to various parts of Afghanistan and Punjab.20s In 
August 1803, the Resident wrote to the Secretary to Government in the Revenue 
Department at Bombay about current imports being so low, seldom more than a few 
hundred Rupees. 209 On the basis of this latest information from Bushire, the Bombay 
Government recommended that no more goods should be sent to the Persian and 
Afghan markets. 21o 
The sale of goods in the Bushire market in 1811 was satisfactory, except for the sale 
of woollens: large quantities had been bought up by private individuals, who sold at 
prices much lower than the Company's prime cost, and a large amount therefore 
remained unsold.211 In August 1812, the Resident at Bushire drew up two statements 
of the current prices of goods which were saleable in the Bushire market, and goods 
which could be bought there (see Tables 6.16 and 6.17). 
Table 6.16: Prices of goods on the market at Bushire, 1812212 
(ongmat form of record and N.B. retamed) 
To be purchased in the Bushere Market 
Almonds p. Tubreez Maund 
Dried Roses 
Persian Silk as p. Muster 
Carminia [Kirman] Wool asp. Muster 
Persian Copper 
Saffron 
Raisins 
5.2 
6 
302.2 
84 
36 
206 
6 
N.B. A Tabreez Maund consists of 7% Pounds English & One Bombay Rupee of 8 1.4 
Mahmoodees - As further opportunities of information offer the above Statement will 
be extended. 
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Table 6.17: Prices of goods saleable at Bushire, 1812213 
( ongmat form of record retained) 
Saleable in the Bushere Market 
Cheewullee [locality in India] Turmeric p. Tabreez Maund 
Bengal Soft Sugar 1st Sort 
Do. Do. Do. 2nd Do. 
China Soft Sugar in Chest 
Cannister [i.e. basket chest] Sugar of Batavia 
Batavia Sugar in Bags 
Sugar Candy 1st Sort 
Do. Do. 2nd Do. 
Moorah Pepper 
Bag Pepper 
Camphor 
Sal Ammoniac 
Tin 
Cloves of the Isle of France [Mauritius] 
Cardamums 1st Sort 
Cloves of Batavia 
Tutenague 
Ginger 
Nutmegs 
Ivory of their Sort [three qualities were recognised] 
Kuth [kalh] & Hurtoo [hurtaul] 
Blue Vitriol 
Lead 
Cotton 1st Sort 
Bengal Indigo 1st Sort 
Chinnamon [sic] 
Cassia in Sticks from Surat 1st Sort 
Bengal Rice 1st Sort per Bag of 22 Tubrees Maund 
Raw Bengal Rice Do. 
Pegu [southern Myanmar] Sealingwax 
VermUlion Europe 1st Sort 
Chintzes Europe asp. Pattion [pattern] p. Guz-e-Shah [shaw] 
or 100 Guz-e-Shah = 107 yds English 
Teak Planks p. 20 Planks 
Mocha Coffee p. Coffee bag of 521h Mds 55 or 
60 Spanish Dollars [rials] p. bag 
6.10.4 East India Company trade with the Gulf, 1800-1820 
6 
16.2 
14 
16.2 
16.2 
13.2 
24.2 
23 
9 
8.1 
91 
30.1 
31.2 
115.2 
118 
121 
27.2 
9 
220.2 
50 
9 
33 
10 
16.2 
192.2 
36 
.14 
60 
[sic] 66 
22 
1100 
45 
1800 
The drop in the sale of woollens reduced the value of exports from Bombay to the 
Persian Gulf in the year 1810/11 from Rs 1,771,470 toRs 1,021,953.214 But, during 
this period in general, peace in Persia helped to increase the volume of the Com-
pany's trade. Imports to Bombay increased more than two-fold and exports from 
Bombay rose about three-fold (see Appendices 92 and 93). 
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Table 6.18 contains a summary statement of the East India Company's woollen and 
other main staples exported from Bombay to the Persian Gulf from 1 May 1801 to 30 
April1811. 
Table 6.18: Value of EIC exports to the Persian Gulf, 1801-1811215 
(in Rupees and by principal articles only) 
Year Broad Long Lead Iron Copper Steel Tin Coch-
Cloth Ells ineal 
180112 3,424 18,239 19,458 990 19,059 11,050 2,619 
1802/3 6,300 9,232 39,043 62 7,459 2,321 2,796 
1803/4 15,303 10,697 79,753 1,425 9,052 422 6,827 
1804/5 10,525 1,200 33,555 26,449 1,750 3,600 3,405 24,255 
1805/6 300 13,212 49,807 650 5,455 30,150 5,663 
180617 31,103 4,340 75,023 2,358 6,766 87,013 16,505 
1807/8 20,585 16,800 25,876 11,194 2,443 5,091 90,679 40,340 
1808/9 16,360 2,650 39,998 29,127 500 510 16,335 
1809/10 41,808 57,035 8,526 12,745 300 8,434 46,675 9,440 
1810/11 4,660 15,930 11,155 20,430 525 139,129 3,000 
6.11 Conclusion 
Karim Khan blamed his • disgust' with the English on Moore, as he indicated to both 
the Governor of Bombay and to Garden. The Presidency nevertheless insisted on 
leaving the handling of the relationship with Karim Khan in Moore's hands, with the 
result that: 
a) An expedition was sent against Khark in February 1769, to 
negotiate whilst besieging the island; 
b) Orders were given to English cruisers to attack any ship which 
came too close; 
and c) English cruisers gave convoy to the Imam of Muscat's fleet. 
These events in turn led to the Persian piracies in which English ships were captured 
and English citizens imprisoned. Notwithstanding Karim Khan's nature and the dis-
graceful treatment that the English had received from him, Moore proceeded on a 
thoroughgoing negotiation with him to achieve the re-settlement at Bushire. He 
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summed Karim Khan up as 'the most unsteady and perverse of characters' .216 Karim 
Khan never changed his demands, while the_ English had to give up all of theirs. The 
Persians wanted the English to come back and resettle at Bushire after they found that 
their war with the Ottoman Turks had isolated them from the north, and up to their 
southern borders. The only country they could trade with was India - and India was 
in the hands of the English. 
The growth of trade in Bushire passed through many stages, from the failure of trad-
between 1775 and 1799, up to the success of 1800-1820. 
Stage 1. The period from the re-establishment at Bushire to the death of Karim 
Khan, 1775-1779: the occupation of Basrah by the Persians and the death of Karim 
Khan caused the Company to sell at a loss at the beginning of the period, and to be 
left with dead stock at the end. 
Stage 2. Between the death of Karim Khan (1779) and the downfall of the Zand 
dynasty (1795): the revolution at Shiraz imposed a total stoppage on trade with 
Bushire. 
Stage 3. The establishment of the Qajar dynasty, 1795-1799: the confusion arising 
from the death of Agha Mul)ammad, the revolution of Shaikh N~ir of Bushire, and 
the punishment he received from the Commander of the Persian forces for his actions, 
all combined to put an effective end to all trading. 
Stage 4. The remaining period of comparative peace (1800-1820), marked by the 
increasing value of English trade through Bushire, when imports to Bombay more 
than doubled and exports almost trebled (see Appendices 92 and 93). 
Appendix 92 shows a decline in the value of exports from Bombay for the year 
1810/11 of about Rs 750,000: in the year 1811/12 they rose by Rs 927,000. When 
he visited Bushire in 1811, James Morier recorded in his book A Second Journey 
through Persia etc that the port was frequented annually by no more than eight ships 
under English colours and about six from Muscat, making an average annual total of 
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about 4,500 tons of shipping.217 There were, however, special circumstances affect-
ing trade at that moment. The decline was caused by: 
a) Operations by French privateers from their bases in the islands of Bourbon and 
Mauritius, at the time of the Anglo-French war, which sank over 15,000 tons of the 
Company's shipping in the Indian Ocean, with the loss, in 1809-10 alone, of cargoes 
to the value of more than £1 million sterling. 
b) The financial strain which the Company in Bombay experienced between 1807-
1812, forcing it to seek assistance: in those years the Company in England had to 
raise £6 million in bonds.21s 
When political conditions were stable and relationships normal, the Persian trade of 
the East India Company could thrive. The variety of goods imported and exported is 
impressive, and the potential profits were attractive. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
7.0 Introduction 
The overall concern of this thesis has been to make a contribution towards the 
understanding of events leading up to the withdrawal of European trade settlements 
from Persian ports during the second half of the 18th century. The particular aim has 
been to examine the effects of Persian power struggles, and other local conflicts on 
trade in the Persian Gulf and on the affairs of the European East India Companies. 
Some writers have blamed the lack of reliable research materials for the lacunae in 
their studies. The present study has been undertaken on the basis of an almost total 
reliance on authentic primary sources from the records of the European Companies, 
which are preserved in many archives and libraries. In the writings of earlier authors 
no connection is made between the events they describe preceding the withdrawals, 
and the withdrawals themselves. It was therefore logical and timely to ask what the 
reasons actually were for the withdrawal of European trading establishments from 
Persian por&.S. 
To answer this question it will be useful to summarise what this thesis has uncovered 
in the way of main contributory factors to the failure of Bandar Abbas, Bandar Riq, 
Khark, and Bushire. Some remarks will also be made about the nature of the Persian 
Gulf trade itself, and the Companies' roles in promoting their share of the trade in the 
prevailing circumstances. Finally, more general conclusions are added, together with 
a brief note on possible further research into this topic. 
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7.1 The English withdrawal from Bandar Abbas, 1763 
It was inconceivable that the violent and bloody reign of Nadir Shah, who usurped the 
Persian throne in 1736, would prove remotely conducive to successful external or 
local trade in Persia. He admittedly directed that a loss sustained by Jonas Hanway 
(when rebels seized his woollen goods in Astaiibad in 1744) should be made good to 
him: 1 but such parts of the English Company's records at Bandar Abbas which touch 
on Persian affairs are replete with instances of his oppressive actions against the fac-
tories at Isfahan and Bandar Abbas, and of the insults and provocations he offered to 
the Company servants there. 2 
From the assassination of Nadir Shah in 1747 to the establishment in office of Karim 
Khan, Persia was plunged into the most acute turmoil and distress it had ever experi-
enced. Although Karim Khan was able to consolidate power in his hands in 1763, 
assuming the title of Wakil (Regent), Persia remained in the grip of disturbances until 
his death. English trade in Persia had declined so much that~ taking also into account 
the extortions they continually suffered from the Persian Governor in Bandar Abbas, 
Mulla 'Ali Shah, neither good sense nor self-interest could justify the English Com-
pany supporting so expensive an establishment. The Company therefore considered 
over a period of a dozen years the many places to which the factory might be with-
drawn, before action was taken. In seeking aitematives, poiiticai stability was a 
prime consideration. 
The possibility of withdrawal to Bahrain was examined in 1750, but the initiative by 
the Agent was stopped by the Presidency, after hearing that Bahrain was a most 
'inhospitable' place. In 1751 the Agent' was given authority by the Presidency in 
Bombay to leave Bandar Abbas at the first sign of fresh trouble, and to take posses-
sion of Bahrain or any other island in the Gulf, such as Qishm or Hormuz. The 
Agent threatened Mulla 'Ali Shah that if he did not act as expected of him, in keeping 
things quiet and the sea routes open, the factory would be closed. The threat seemed 
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to impress Mulla 'Ali Shah, and he promised to do his best to follow the advice. 
After visiting the islands of Qishm and Henjam, the Agent reported to the Presidency 
in 1752 that the Company factory should move to one of them. A few months later, 
however, he wrote again, saying that the factory was quite safe in Bandar Abbas for 
the time being. He saw many arguments against withdrawal, whilst the notional 
benefits from doing so could be double-edged, perhaps leading to a rupture with the 
Persians. However, in October 1760 the Agent received instructions from the Presi-
dency to take possession of the island of Hormuz. He visited it, and reported back 
that it was by no means a suitable place to move to. After receiving this report, in 
1761 the President and Governor in Bombay wrote back to the Agent at Bandar 
Abbas, giving him carte blanche to withdraw to wherever he thought best. 
In February 1762, the Presidency ordered the Agent in Bandar Abbas or the Assistant 
Agent in Basrah to give the Bushire market a trial before any commitment was made 
to moving there. The Presidency recommended removing the factory from Bandar 
Abbas to Basrah for security reasons on 16 January 1763, and on 4 March 1763 the 
Agent attacked the Persian fort in Bandar Abbas after receiving threats from the port's 
Deputy Governor. On 7 March the English discovered that Persian reinforcements of 
about 250 horsemen had arrived, and the Agent therefore ordered the three English 
ships waiting in the port to embark everyone and load whatever they could before 
sailing for Basrah. The Agent himself returned to Bombay on 10 March 1763 aboard 
the Prince of Wales. One can scarcely doubt that the withdrawal of the English fac-
tory from Bandar Abbas was caused by the situation of chaos and anarchy then 
prevailing, which affected all forms of trade. 
7.2 The withdrawal of the English settlement from Bandar Riq, 1756 
The little port of Bandar Riq, situated almost opposite the island of Khark, benefitted 
from certain natural advantages, and in normal times would have thrived as a trading 
centre. Although the ports of Bushire and Bandar Riq are much the same distance 
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from the island of K.hark they differ significantly in their accessibility from Shiraz, 
the market for which the greater part of Dutch imports was destined. A caravan 
(qafilah) departing from Bushire for Shiraz generally completed its journey in 12 to 
14 days: those coming from Bandar Riq required no more than 7 or 8 days on the 
road. This difference in travel time obviously translated into a difference in the costs 
of the journey, so that the Dutch always preferred to land their goods consigned to 
Shiraz at Bandar Riq rather than Bushire, whether on the Dutch Company's account 
or on the account of private merchants. Moreover, most of the Bandar Riq merchants 
who lived at Bushire made frequent commercial trips to K.hark, where they bought 
large quantities of spices and sugars. These were then despatched from K.hark to 
Shiraz. 
The port at Bandar Riq, depending as it did on the trading settlements on Khark for its 
commercial importance, lapsed into its former obscurity when the Dutch withdrew 
from the island in 1766,3 but while the link existed the English operated a trading 
establishment at the port which lasted for two years (1755-1756). It was a period of 
dangers and high expenditure, accentuated by rivalry with the Dutch in that area. The 
English factory was closed as a direct result of the struggle for power between Mir 
Muhanna and his brothers on one hand, and the Persian authorities on the other. But 
other factors hastened the decision to withdraw. One was the high rate of expenditure 
already referred to: the other was the disregard of the Agent, Wood, for his orders 
from the Governor of Bombay. The Governor had instructed Wood to take his direc-
tions from Bombay or the Agent at Bandar Abbas. Instead, he followed the instruc-
tions of the Basrah Agent, Shaw, who had no wish to see another trading centre 
taking part of the trade going to Basrah and thereby diminishing his own percentage. 
7.3 The withdrawal of the Dutch settlement from Khark island, 1766 
The violence offered by the Turkish Governor of Basrah to Frederik von Kniphausen, 
chief of the Dutch factory ~ere, prompted the establishment of a Dutch fort and a 
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factory on Khark island in 1754. Kniphausen soon added lodgings for the Dutch 
Company's servants, warehouses for their goods, and barracks for the troops stationed 
there for the island's defence. Dutch imports to Khark consisted mainly of sugar and 
spices from Batavia, and other south Asian products. The return trade included 
pearls, mules, wines from Shiraz, and drugs produced in different parts of Persia. 
There were several factors which worked towards ending the Dutch settlement on 
Khark island. First, the Dutch operated in such a way that they could be defrauded, 
and the Dutch garrison on Khark was badly managed. Second, the Dutch Resident 
became involved in local politics, and the lack of awareness of local power struggles 
of the new Dutch Resident allowed the Dutch forces to be caught up in the local 
'commotion' .4 Above all, Dutch involvement in the struggle between Mir Muhanna 
and the Persians led to the Dutch factory on Khark island being captured by Mir 
Muhanna, with the result that the Dutch were forced to withdraw from the Gulf, 
never to return. 
7.4 The withdrawal of the English settlement from Bushire, 1769 
The Government of Bombay ordered a member of their Board, William Andrew 
Price, who was on his way to Basrah, to visit Bushire in April 1763 along with the 
Agent at Basrah. His remit was to negotiate with Shaikh Sa'diin of Bushire for the 
establishment of an English factory in the port. He found no difficulty in carrying out 
his instructions and left Benjamin Jervis as Resident in charge of the Company's 
affairs. The new Residency was constituted subordinate to the Agent in Basrah, and 
subject to the the Presidency and Council in Bombay. Jervis occasionally made large 
sales of woollens and velvets on the Company's account, whilst trade carried on by 
private merchants living there increased daily. Bushire soon became an important 
port following the opening of the English Residency. 
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Nevertheless, Persia had been reduced to desperate straits by the long period of civil 
war and by expensive military campaigns, .so that Karim Khan's necessary expendi-
tures far exceeded the revenues he could collect. The economic climate and Karim 
Khan's hostility prompted English thoughts of withdrawing from Bushire. After 
nearly eight years of trying to maintain their neutrality, the English were unable to 
avoid becoming embroiled in conflict and instability. As with the withdrawal from 
Bandar Riq, there were also other factors at work. The corruption or incompetence of 
Jervis and the factory's Linguist fuelled Karim Khan's hostility towards the English 
for many years, for what he saw as false promises to use the Company's fleet to 
reduce Mir Muhanna and the Bani Ka'b. Even so, unsuccessful military operations 
against both the Mir and the Ka'b cost many lives and hundreds of thousands of 
Rupees. The prevailing instability caused poor financial returns which did not even 
cover staff costs and security provisions: the Company was suffering an annual loss 
on the Persian Gulf account. 
Following six years of disputes with Karim Khan, the English re-established their 
Bushire factory in 1775. Unfortunately, at the outset of this period the commerce of 
Persia was already moving almost imperceptibly into decline. In the period of 45 
years from 1775 to 1820 trade followed the political journey from turmoil to peace, as 
the conflict for supremacy between the Persian dynasties came to an end. In its first 
half, this period witnessed the decline and downfall of the Zand dynasty from 1775 to 
1795. This was followed by the establishment of the Qajar dynasty, which took five 
years to become stabilised. During that time there was an almost total stoppage of 
trade with Bushire. 
To boost its trade and gain political influence in the country, the East India Company 
decided to send a number of missions to Persia. These were led by Mehdi Ali Khan 
in 1799, John Malcolm in 1800, 1808 and 1810, and Harford Jones in 1808-1809. 
During the same period the Persian Government sent missions in the reverse direc-
tion: l;lajji KhalTI's mission in 1801-1802, and Mul)ammad Nabi Khan's mission in 
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1805-1807. At much the same time, extra protection for merchant ships was provided 
by the Bombay Marine, and the competition of native merchants with the Company's 
trade was curbed. Thereafter, English imports and exports started increasing. From 
1801 to 1821 , importations from the Persian Gulf to Bombay more than doubled in 
value and exports from Bombay to the Gulf almost trebled. That growth in the value 
of trade did not stop there, but continued increasing as long as there was stability in 
Persia. Study of the subsequent period - from 1821 to 1858 - when Persia enjoyed 
stability, shows that the value of trade from Bombay to the Persian Gulf nearly dou-
bled, from Rs 3,359,000 to Rs 6,431,000 (see Appendix 94). It continued to rise, 
until the final closure of the British Residency at Bushire in 1947, after a political dis-
pute between the British Government and Iran. The prosperity of Bushire during the 
period of relative political stability and peace after 1800 demonstrates what might 
have been, had other trading centres in the Gulf similarly enjoyed the essential pre-
conditions for trade in earlier years. 
7 .S General conclusions 
At the beginning of the 17th century the situation in the Gulf was generally peaceful. 
The dominant powers were the Ottoman Empire, Persia and the Portuguese, apart 
from some small independent states within the Gulf itself. The Ottoman Empire 
became unable to maintain its position in the Gulf except for Basrah, which was par-
tially able to act as a gateway between the East and the West. Persia was essentially 
an inland power bent on extending its influence to the Persian coast of the Gulf. The 
Portuguese, as a maritime power, had a free hand in Gulf waters and a monopoly in 
its trade. 
By the second decade of the 17th century the English had succeeded in obtaining a 
foothold in the area in order to share in the Gulf trade: this was Jask, actually outside 
the Gulf where no trade had been carried on. Nonetheless, the Portuguese began har-
rying the English ships and the English had to defend their trade by force. In this 
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way, the interests of the English fell into line with those of the Persians. With 
English help the Persians could expel the Portuguese from Hormuz in 1622, and re-
expel them with the combined Dutch and English fleets when they briefly re-occupied 
Hormuz in 1625. Neither the English nor the Dutch, however, could replace the 
Portuguese military power deployed in the Gulf: the impact of this was that many of 
the small Gulf states became, or made bids to become, independent. 
A century later, in the first half of the 18th century, the impact of events was equally 
significant. The downfall of the Safavi dynasty in 1722 and the Afghan invasions of 
1723 plunged Persia into a power vacuum, until the rise of Nadir Shah in 1736, fol-
lowed by his extraordinary campaigns in Turkey, Afghanistan, Tartary, Oman and 
India. Until his death in 1747 Persia was a power with real authority, but the vacuum 
before his rise saw coastal Shaikhs starting to establish their own trade centres (see, 
for example, pages 65-6). 
The second half of the century witnessed the the phenomenon of falling European 
trade and the withdrawal of trade settlements from the Gulf, as a result of power 
struggles and consequent instability. In this period the power struggles had an 
enormous impact on the whole of the Persian coast from Jask to the Shan al-' Arab: all 
of the coastal states rebelled against the central government and acted independently. 
The northern districts of Persia were also in conflict with Shiraz during the whole 
period. 
It is important to stress that the political instability had a direct impact on the East 
India Company's trade: it was not just an irritation. During the earlier power strug-
gles rivalry between the Europeans was able to flourish. The Portuguese were a spent 
force at that time, but Anglo-Dutch competition began when the Dutch changed their 
trading methods from selling in Isfahan to selling at the port of Bandar Abbas, where 
the whole market had been in English hands. The rivalry increased from 1653, dur-
ing the Anglo-Dutch wars, and persisted until 1753-1754 when the English became 
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involved in problems with Kniphausen on Khark island (see pages 8-11 and 57-8). 
Anglo-French rivalry also erupted occasionally. Although the French arrived late in 
Persia (1665), their challenge to the English started from 1698, when the English 
claimed that French ships coming to the Gulf were privateers. War between the two 
nations saw the number of French warships and privateers in the Gulf increase from 
May 1757, and in October 1759 the French went so far as to destroy the English fac-
tory at Bandar Abbas, and loot its contents (see pages 51-2 and 76-7 for example). 
Rivalry of another kind also prospered during the power struggle. The perennially 
opposed Turks and Persians both claimed the important Ka'b tribe as their subjects, 
and this had its impact on the East India Company. Although the Ka'b attacked and 
inflicted losses on the Company's trade the English were unable to obtain redress 
because Karim Khan placed the Ka'b under his protection, warning both the English 
and the Turks to leave them alone (for the complications caused the English in this 
way, see pages 145 and 182). Apart from the Ka'b, bandits exploited the absence of 
an effective central government by controlling the land routes for caravans and levy-
ing duties on English goods, as pages 181 and 187 show. 
In fact, the most important and obvious impact of political disorder on trade was the 
interruption of trading routes, whether on land or sea. When instability was rife 
armed ships would be needed (and seldom available) to protect merchant ships. The 
latter, therefore, were sometimes forced to bypass the Persian ports without discharg-
ing: this was particularly damaging in that there was a general shortage of ships, 
described in pages 61-2, in any case. Many examples have been given of unprotected 
trading vessels being attacked (see pages 144, 236, 242 and 247 for some of these), 
while attacks on caravans, such as those cited on pages 80, 146, 150 and 177, forced 
the Company to buy and sell on board ship sometimes. 
During periods of war or lower-level conflict, markets were not held and people 
preferred not to spend money, even if they had not suffered financially from the dis-
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order. As a result, goods were sometimes returned to India and orders had to be 
given to stop importations. Examples of this happening are given on pages 68, 91-2, 
103 and 154. At other times, ships might be lost, burnt or seized; supply depots 
might be looted or destroyed, as pages 77, 138, 199 and 201 show; and goods might 
be lost to extortion (see pages 88, 141 , 177 and 190). 
Other less dramatic but important aspects of instability which were injurious to trade 
derived from the absence of continuous and effective government. Treaties and 
agreements at various levels were difficult to achieve, and the agreements were often 
broken, with no redress (see pages 79 and 98). In the prevailing anarchy the lead-
ership was unpredictable and the power hierarchy was uncertain, with governors and 
the like being appointed and driven out too often. Examples are given on pages 106, 
128, 173 and 235. 
In an environment such as has been outlined above trade becomes physically 
impossible, extremely hazardous and risky at times, and above all expensive to main-
tain. Witness the attack on the Ka'b in March 1766, which ended in such a painful 
defeat with casualties and losses estimated at Rs 500,000 (over and above the original 
loss). Against that sort of background the customary toll of disease among the Euro-
peans (see pages 88 and 148) and the normally high costs of operating warships were 
more than usually onerous (see pages 91 and 222 for examples of these costs). Such 
an environment also accentuates the frailties of human nature. Some Company offi-
cials were corrupt, others were greedy or incompetent, or simply exceeded their terms 
of reference. The Dutch suffered from maladministration on Khark island, where 
Kniphausen diverted trade to his own account and van der Hulst was a poor manager. 
At Bushire, Jervis was of poor quality and allowed a corrupt and costly management 
to prevail. He was charged with maladministration, egoism, disobedience, and ill-
treatment of others; his inadequacies feature on pages 8, 175-6, 180-5 and 221. 
Although the behaviour of the European Companies' officials was not a major factor 
in the failure of their trading settlements, it certainly hastened the fate of some of 
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them. The underlying structure of the Companies and their officials' terms of 
reference may have been to blame. In the case of the Dutch, major decisions were 
taken far away in Batavia and the local Agent had a free hand. The English had the 
opposite problem of orders coming from Bombay, Madras and Calcutta at one level, 
whilst a typical Resident might also be subject locally to an Agent elsewhere in the 
Gulf, or to the Ambassadors in the capitals (in Persia and Baghdad). This structure, 
likewise, encouraged officials to press ahead with personal initiatives. 
7.6 Proposals for further research 
Two classes of material have been little used or not at all in this research. One is the 
peripheral accounts which focus on social and similar aspects of Persia during the 
study period. Persia was a much visited country by Europeans, and there is a large 
stock of travellers' tales which could be systematically studied in parallel with the 
English and Dutch official records. To the extent that they throw light on the subject 
of this thesis they have, of course, been examined. The other is the Persian source 
material which has always been difficult to access, particularly in recent years: parts 
have been translated by Europeans who had insufficient knowledge of the language 
and were working without the benefit of modern research. The time may be coming 
when researchers will be able to work in the Persian archives and establish whether 
they constitute a valuable resource: given the confusion of lh.e period studied in this 
thesis it may be unlikely. Further research on the Qajars however, mainly after this 
period, will certainly profit from the Persian sources. 
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APPENDIX 1 
(India Office Library, G/29/1, Factory Records: Persia and the Persian Gulf. 
Early Documents relating to Persia 1620-97, pp. 632-5) 
Letter from King James I to Shah 'Abbas 
about English trading in Persia 1621 
Letter from King James I to Shah Abbas King of Persia relative to establishing a 
Trade in the Persian Dominions. 19th March 1620/1 
James by the Grace of Almighty God, Creator of Heaven and Earth, King of Great 
Brittain, France and Ireland, Defender of the Christian Faith 
To the High and Mighty Monarch, the Great Lord Abbas Emperor of Persia, Media 
and Armenia &c. High and Mighty Prince, not long since we directed our princely 
Letters unto you which were delivered by our Agent Thomas Barker to your Royal 
Hands, since which time we are advertised that you have not only lovingly received 
them, but have with all princely regard afforded many princely favors to ours residing 
within your Dominions and Territories, for which as we cannot omit to render unto 
you condign thanks, so we have thought meet to further the Advancement and estab-
lishing of this Trade, which upon mature deliberation we foresee (being once settled) 
will prove of great importance for the behalf of the Subjects of both our Kingdoms 
and Dominions, yet because no design can be prosecuted much less brought to perfec-
tion without many interruptions which do from time to time occur to the prejudice and 
impeachment thereof. 
We have therefore once again addressed our Royal Letters to you, wherein we recom-
mend to your princely consideration not only the furtherance of the Trade in general 
by accommodation thereof with such privileges and immunity as may most conduce to 
the advancement of so important a Business, but also certain particularities incident 
thereto, amongst which one is that the place from whence our Merchants fetch the 
Silk is so far remote from the Port at Jasques where their Ships come and the carriage 
of the Silk so far by Land, subject to so many difficulties and dangers, that unless you 
shall be pleased to appoint some convenient mart Town near the Port whither our 
Subjects may resort to. buy their silks and speedily put them aboard their Ships, it will 
not only much indamage and discourage our Merchants in the prosecution of their 
Trade but to expose their Ships which ride off at Sea expecting their lading, to the 
attempts of the Portugalls who being ill willers of their Trade seeke, by indirect 
meanes, to drive our Subjects from all trade in those parts. And other is that our 
Merchants may have that freedom of Commerce and traffick with your Subjects as is 
usual among the Subjects of Princes in amity one with another and whereof at present 
they are restrained. And that the native Commodities of our Kingdoms and such 
other Merchandizes as our People shall import into your Territories and are useful for 
your Subjects may be accepted in part of satisfaction for such Silk of your Dominions 
as our Merchants shall contract for. For the better accommodation of which circum-
stances, and out of our affection to the prosperity of the trade, we have been pleased 
to interpose our mediation unto you on the behalf of our Subjects and more particu-
larly to signify that we have appointed and authorised our Trusty Subject and Servant 
[space left in original] to be our Agent to negotiate with your Royal Person for 
obtaining such privileges as may be advantageous for your benefit and establishing of 
that trade and for the removing of all such impedements and redressing of such 
inconveniences as our Subjects have incountered and may interrupt the prosperous 
proceeding thereof. Expecting that you will give full credit to our Agent and grant 
him access to your Royal Person upon all occasions wherein he shall have cause to 
address himself unto &ca 
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APPENDIX 2 
(Algemeen Rijks Archief (ARA), Kolonial Archief (KA), Vol. 10753, p.53) 
Two ships: 
Dutch cargoes received in Batavia 
from Persia in 1703 [summary] 
i) Cargo valued at 210,991 pounds sterling (buying price). All cash (gold and 
mostly Persian silver coinage) except: 
£4,759 
1,837 
11 
gold cloth 
woollen cloth 
melon seeds 
ii) Cargo valued at 23,411 pounds sterling, of which 11,698 in gold, and including 
6 camels. The remainder being: small quantities of carpets, velvets, leather, 
almonds, kismis prunes, rose-water, Shiraz wine, seeds and drugs. 
APPENDIX3 
(Algemeen Rijks Archief (ARA), Kolonial Archief (KA), Vol. 11838, pp.462-3) 
Dutch East India Company 
imports into Persia 1714 
[summary] 
Value of goods sent to Persia by the Dutch East India Company in the year 1714, 
amounting to 515,564 guilders in all: 
20,009 pounds 
40,139 " 
24,000 " 
25,169 " 
1,000,000 
20,433 
6,061 
5,000 
250,056 
800,222 
60,000 
39,040 pieces 
tin 
cloves 
cinnamon 
nutmeg 
black pepper 
benzoin 
Japanese camphor 
elephants' teeth 
candy sugar 
granulated sugar 
mppan wood 
sundry kinds of 
Indian cottons 
6,503 
12,543 
7,200 
1,573 
132,000 
10,723 
5,387 
8,757 
34,831 
57,791 
1,735 
221,000 
The weights here are in Amsterdam pounds of 494 metric grams 
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guilders 
" 
APPENDIX 4 
(Algemeen Rijks Archief (ARA), Kolonial Archief (KA), Vol. 10760, p.207) 
Dutch East India Company 
imports from Persia into Batavia 1715 
[summary] 
Two ships from Persia delivered merchandise to Batavia in 1715; one of them, the 
Kockenge, arrived 21 March carrying a total value of 217, 178.17 guilders, almost all 
in cash or bullion - the remainder being: 
Pounds 
Sterling 
100 boxes Shiraz claret 2,008 
1 box tarragon vinegar 22 
620 pounds red raisins 113 
800 pounds kismis 135 
250 pounds pistachios 17 4 
200 pounds almonds 163 
792 pounds drugs 1,694 
30,000 pounds, or 10 loads red earth 95 
7 50 pieces Kirman pottery 256 
APPENDIXS 
(Algemeen Rijks Archief (ARA), Kolonial Archief (KA), Vol. 10769, p.51) 
Dutch East India Company 
imports from Persia into Batavia 1735 
. [summary] 
Two ships were received from Persia, the cargo of one was valued at 250,960 
guilders, and the second at 61,735.5 guilders. All was in cash or bullion exceot as 
under: & 
1st ship 
44,063 pounds Kirman wool 
100 boxes rose-water 
81 loads red earth 
tools 
Pounds 
Sterling 
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78,050 
5,256.14 
2,926 
2,009 
APPENDIX 6 
(Public Record Office, Admirals' In-Letters, ADMl/161) 
14 October 1759 
ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION WITH THE FRENCH AT GOMBROON. 
Articles of Capitulation for the English East India Company's Factory of Gombroon 
between Alexander Douglas Esq., Chief of the said Settlement and Council; and 
Monsieur Des Essars, Captain of His most Christian Majesty's Ship Conde and Com-
mander in Chief of the present Expedition and Monsieur Charuyan, Captain Com-
mandant of the Land Forces. 
Article 1st 
So soon as the present Capitulation is signed a Detachment of French Troops are to 
take Possession of the Factory, the Keys are to be delivered to the Commanding 
Officer and no Person is to come in or go out, without his permission, as he will take 
care to prevent Disorders and Thefts. 
Article 2nd 
All Effects of what kind soever contained in the Factory are to belong to the Bes-
iegors, and are to be delivered to the French Commissary, with all Books and Papers 
in Possession of the Besieged: the Besiegers are to be shown the Warehouses, that 
they may place the necessary Centinels over them; the Artillery, Arms, Ammunition, 
Provisions, Money, Merchandise and Stores; in general everything contained within 
the Factory, are comprehended in this Article. 
Article 3rd 
The Chief, the Garrison, Factors, Writers and all Europeans, in the service of the 
English East India Company, in general all the subjects of His Britannick Majesty in 
the Factory are to be Prisoners of War, under the following Clauses only. 
Article 4th 
Whereas Monsieur D'Estaing, Brigadier of foot a..'ld formerly a Prisoner of His 
Britannick Majesty now on Board the ship Conde in his way to Europe by way of 
Bussorah, being desirous of rendering more Secure the Intelligence received of an 
Exchange having been made in his behalf between Governor Pigot Esq., of Madras, 
and Monsieur Lally Lieutenant General; it is now agreed between the Besiegors and 
Besieged that Alexander Douglas Esq., Chief of the English East India Company's 
Factory at Gombroon, with William Nash, Ensign Johnson, Dymoke Lyster, 
Lieutenant George Bembow, Lieutenant Richard Evans, and Richard Mainwaring are 
Lawfully exchanged for Monsieur D'Estaing, and they are at full Liberty to go where, 
and to what places they Please, in Consequence of which, Monsieur D'Estaing is 
under no other Clause than what's specified in the sixth Article. 
Article 5th 
Tho' the present Exchange of Prisoners is an unnecessary Precaution in behalf of 
Monsieur D'Estaing, yet all Persons mentioned in the preceding Article, are 
absolutely Free; but should Monsieur D'Estaing have been already Exchanged, as he 
undoubtedly is, in that Case, the seven Persons already mentioned who now enjoy 
their Liberty; a like Number and of equal Station of His most Christian Majesty's 
Subjects are to be released whenever a Cartel is made. 
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Article 6th 
Monsieur D'Estaing, in order to fulfill with the greatest Exactitude, the Promise he 
made Governor Pigot, that he would not take Arms against the English, on the 
Cormandel Coast only, for the space of Eighteen Months, reckoning from the first of 
May, One Thousand Seven Hundred fifty Nine, desires it may be inserted in the Pre-
sent Capitulation, that notwithstanding he is now exchanged, yet he will keep the 
Promise made Governor Pigot of not taking Arms against the English, on the Coast of 
Cormandel only, for the Space of Eighteen Months; but he is at free Liberty in all 
other Places to take Arms. 
Article 7th 
If it is possible to agree about the repurchasing of Gombroon Factory, it will be 
looked on as part of the Present Capitulation, the Besiegers reserving to themselves, 
the Liberty nevertheless, to do therewith as they think fit, should no agreement be 
concluded with the Besieged. 
Article 8th 
In Consideration of the Exchange of Monsieur D'Estaing and at his particular request 
to Monsieur Des Essars, Alexander Douglas Esq., Chief of the English East India 
Company's Settlement of Gombroon, and all others mentioned in the fourth Article 
have Liberty, and may carry away all their Effects, of what kind or sort soever 
excepting Ammunition, Provisions, Marine, Military or Warlike Stores, or any thing 
tending thereto, or to the Art of War. 
Gombroon the fourteenth day of October 
at six o'Clock in the Morning, and in 
the Year of our Lord, One Thousand seven 
Hundred fifty Nine. 
DES ESSARS 
CHARUYAU 
A true Copy 
Dymoke Lyster 
ALEXANDER DOUGLAS 
WILUAMNASH 
RICHARD. JOHNSON 
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APPENDIX 7 
(K.lerk de Reus, G.C., Geschichtlicher Ueberblick der administrativen, rechtlichen 
undfinanziellen Entwicklung der Niederllindisch-Ostindischen Compagnie, Batavia-
's-Gravenhage, 1894, Appendix IX) 
Years 
1700-10 
1710-20 
1720-30 
1730-40 
1740-50 
1750-57 
The decline of Dutch trade in 
the Persian Gulf in the 18th century 
[ suq~marised] 
Average Profit 
(guilders) 
581,027 
475,344 
219,868 
102,565 
46,592 
47,956 
APPENDIX 8 
(ARA, VOC, Vol. 2937 [Gombroon Diary], nos. 10,11) 
Dutch trade in Bandar Abbas 
1757 [summarised extract] 
One consignment was sold in Bandar Abbas in 1757, comprising: 
5,277 pounds 
4,675 II 
15,914 II 
28,524 II 
189,171 II 
105,094 II 
2,800 II 
5,000 pieces 
3,500 II 
cloves 
nutmeg 
tin 
pepper 
granulated sugar 
candy sugar 
coffee (Java) 
Indian cotton cloth 
Dutch woollen cloth 
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2, 150 gu~ders 
953 
? 
21,000 
17,702 
14,450 
365 
15,094 
12,175 
Medicines Hospital Stores 
Sanitary Ware 
Table Expences 
Garrison Charges 
Charges Extraordinary 
Charges on Merchandize 
Stable Charges 
Servants Wages 
Accounts Presents 
Account Salaries 
Asseen Garden 
House Repairs 
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Charges General From 1st. August 1755 to the 
31 5tJuly1756 Do 1757 
1500.6 3617. 
1470.6~ 1292.4 
107530. 126838.3 
103420.7 115290.2 
84348.7 99228.1 
36292.8 21722.4 
17447. 27880.6 
20420. 19560. 
32994. 38659. 
5308. 25000. 
26306.6 6563.8 
437039. 485651.8 
Bombay Castle 19th Febry 1761 
Errors Excepted. 
Per. Benjamin Pervis Account. 
Do 1758 
1692.8 
806.7 
151241.3 
128288.4 
100469.4 
24933.3 
44032.5 
19750.6 
49523. 
25888.8 
6287.5 
552914.5 
APPENDIX 9 
(lOR, G/29/13, Report dated 2 April 1761) 
from l21h Feb 1760 
to 31 5t July 1760 
5722.1 
945.3 
61810.2 
168595.8 
44186.7 
13226. 
17742. 
21232.8 
2360. 
6571.5 
337444.4 
To Mr. Francis Wood 
Sir 
APPENDIX 10 
(lOR, G/29/8, Report dated 23 December 1754) 
Governor of Bombay to Francis Wood 
ordering a settlement at Bandar Riq 
1st. The Honble the Court of Directors in their Command of the 5th April last, 
having left it to our Discretion to settle a Servant at Bunderick in the Gulph of Persia, 
and we having carefully attended to such matter as has been delivered to us on this 
Subject, deem it of advantage to them to fix a factory there, and have pitched upon 
you to carry this our design into execution, you are therefore to take your passage, on 
the Indian Queen, Captain John Demare (who has been ordered to receive and 
entertain you in a becoming manner) and follow the instructions hereafter mentioned 
and all such others as you shall from time to time receive from us, or the agent and 
council at Gombroon who have our directions to give you their best advice and 
assistance whenever necessary. 
2ndly. Your utmost abilities and attention must on all Occasion be exerted to pro-
mote the Consumption of the British Woolen Manufacture at Banderick which is the 
chief reason of your being employed there. In order therefore be careful to make 
yourself acquainted with the sortments, that are most proper for that market and frame 
your indents to Gombroon accordingly. 
3rdly. Large sales tho at a moderate Profit, will always meet with Honble Com-
panys approbation, you are therefore to take all proper methods to hinder the Mer-
chants from dealing in French or other Foreign Woolen Manufacture, and likewise to 
discourage the Alleppo adventurers from dealing in these Commodities as much as 
possible. 
4thly. No Consideration whatever will be deemed sufficient to warrant your 
lending goods or money to the Government upon the Honble Companys account, and 
all your Bargains with the Merchants must be for ready money only, receiving the 
amount of the Goods before they are delivered. Hereby all bad debts and disputes 
will be effectu~y prevented. 
5thly. Embrace all opportunities of advising the Agent and Council at Gom-
broon, with the State of affairs under your Direction, transmitting an account of your 
Sales, remains in Warehouse and Ballance of Cash, by every Conveyance, you must 
avoid keeping any quantity of money by you, but embrace every good opportunity 
that Offers for conveying it to Gombroon. 
6thly. As it will be for the Honble Companys Credit and Honour, and a means 
of alleviating their expenses, to Collect Customs at Bunderick, you must insist on this 
Priviledge from the Shaik or Govemour, and we hereby empower you to levy a Duty 
upon all imports and Exports by people trading under the Honble Companys pro-
tection, in the same manner as at Gombroon of which a particular account must be 
annually sent thither agreable to the practice of the Resident at Bussora. 
7thly. Upon your arrival at Bunderick the Purpose of your Coming must be 
notified to the Shaik or Govemour, in the Plainest and openest manner, that no dis-
pute is may or is hereafter thro a misunderstanding, and all controversy whether with 
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the Government or Dutch, who have now a great influence in the Gulph must be care-
fully avoided and as we do not at present think it necessary or adviseable that the 
Honble Company should have any Dead Stock at this place you are to hire one of the 
most commodious houses in the town, unto which may be added such conveniences of 
Repairs as in Moderation may appear requisite, so that the Honble Companys goods 
and Servants may have a safe and proper lodging. 
We wish you Success in this undertaking and are 
Bombay Castle 
1st October 17 54 
A True Copy 
William Andrew Price 
Secretary 
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Your Loving Friends 
Richard Bourchier 
Hugh Symmons 
William Sedgwicke 
Thomas Byfeld 
Brabazon Ellis 
William Hornby 
William Andrew Price 
John Spencer 
APPENDIX 11 
(ARA, VOC 2909, Khark, p.55) 
Khark: abstract of shipping activity 
from Dutch archives - 1755-6 
List of shipping at Khark for the accounting year 1755-1756 (Sept-Aug) 
British ship St George from Bengal to Gombroon and Basrah: 
rice, sugar, Bengali cotton and gum lac 
French ship Le Moore from Bengal to Basrah: 
300 parcels of Bengali cotton cloth (mostly for Armenian merchants) 
50 of the same on its own account 
600 bags of sugar 
60 tons of rice 
Wrecked near Cape Bardistan in 1756, a British ship from Bombay en route to Bandar 
Riq: 
750 boxes of chinaware 
80 bales of Surat cotton cloth (all taken away by local inhabitants) 
50 bales of indigo 
British ship Ganges passed by Khark to Basrah, having sold rice in Muscat: 
600 bags of sugar 
12,000 pounds of gum lac 
25,000 pounds of iron 
6, 000 pounds of tin 
350 bales of cotton cloth for Armenian merchants, and 40-50 on its 
own account 
British ship Elizabeth from Bengal sold part of its cargo in Muscat and Gombroon: 
6,000 pounds of pepper 
5,000 pounds of cardamom 
40 bales of Bengali cotton cloth (370 bales sold in Gombroon) 
10,000 pounds of tin from England (cast in ingots of the same shape 
used for Malay tin 
French ship Tegenepatnam from Bengal, having sold rice in Muscat: 
400 bales of Bengali cotton cloth 
700 bales of sugar 
30,000 pounds of iron 
British ship Success to Bushire: 
rice, pepper, cardamom, china. It could not sell its cargo in Bushire 
and went on to Gombroon 
Two ships from Surat to Basrah, owned by the Muslim merchant Shalabi, with cargo 
for Muslim and Armenian merchants: 
1 , 000 bales of Surat cotton cloth 
130 packs of indigo 
British ship Experiment from Malabar to Bandar Riq 
rice 
10,000 pound of pepper 
5,000 pounds of cardamom 
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4 boxes of cloves 
2 boxes of nutmeg and mace 
It was unable to sell its rice in Riq; took on wheat there and sailed on to Basrah 
French ship Saint Catherine from Mahe, sold rice in Muscat and 30,000 pounds of 
iron in Bushire; then carried to Basrah: 
50,000 pounds of pepper 
10,000 pounds of cardamom 
6,000 pounds of ginger 
5,000 pounds of curcuma 
1 , 000 pounds of false cinnamon 
50 pounds of benzoin 
18 boxes of chinaware 
1,000 ropes 
2 bales of French fine woollen cloth 
British ship Warren (belonging to the British Governor of Bombay) from Bombay to 
Bandar Riq: 
100 boxes of china ware 
250 bales of cotton cloth 
Went to Bandar Riq and was unable to sell there, but out of friendship towards the 
Governor was allowed to sell its cargo in Khark. 
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Khark: abstract of shipping activity 
from Dutch archives - 1756-7 
APPENDIX 12 
(ARA, VOC 2937, p.29) 
List of shipping at Khark for the accounting year 1756-1757 (Sept-Aug) 
British ships Dragon and Swallow sent empty for the repair of the settlement in 
Bandar Riq 
The Captain of the wrecked British ship Phoenix arrived at Khark 
British ship Dragon from Bombay to Basrah: 
150 bales of Surat cotton cloth 
24,000 pounds of iron 
30,000 pounds of pewter 
13,000 pounds of lead 
20,000 pounds of pepper 
400 packs of indigo 
150 bales of Surat, and 100 bales of coastal cotton cloth on account of 
the Armenian merchants 
Moorish [sc. Arab] ship Leifde from Surat, owned by the brother of Salih Shalabi: 
400 pieces of Surat cotton cloth sent to Basrah 
300 packs of indigo 
British ship Success from Bengal to Basrah: 
2,000-3,000 bags of rice sold in Muscat 
500 bales of Guinea [made for the West African trade] cotton cloth sold 
in Khark 
61 bales of sundry other cotton cloth 
200 pounds of cardamom 
Native ship Armandien from Surat in the service of the British Company, bound for 
Basrah: 
')()() n;~,.~s nf C::n~t l'nttnn ,.lnth 
-vv .t',....,__ ...,.., ....., ......... vv" .. '-'&.& ..,.a.vw.a. 
80 packs of indigo 
A Surat grab passed by carrying coffee from Mocha 
British sloop Phoenix carrying news of the fall of Chandernagore but no cargo 
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Khark: abstract of shipping activity 
from Dutch archives- 1757-8 
APPENDIX 13 
(ARA, VOC 2968, p.29) 
List of shipping at Khark for the accounting year 1757-1758 (Sept-Aug) 
Three British ships sent to Muscat carried only rice and did not enter the Gulf (the 
British brought a good deal of woollen cloth and Indian manufactures to Bandar 
Abbas, which was then carried on native ships to Basrah) 
British ship Triumvirate came to Bandar Kung and Ta.hiri: 
Malabar cinnamon, Bengali ginger, gum lac, curcuma and rhubarb 
French frigate Bristol from Mahe to Basrah: 
200 pounds of pepper 
150 packs of sugar 
Took on wheat at Khark which had been brought there by native ships from Ganaveh 
and Bandar Riq 
British ship Hibernia from Bengal: 
rice, iron, gum lac and lead 
400 large bales, each of 200 pieces of Bengali mulmul, mostly for 
Moorish merchants 
British ship Dragon belonging to the Governor of Bombay: 
200 bales of Surat cotton cloth 
800 bales of kapok 
indigo, rice, gum lac 
chinaware, Chinese rhubarb 
also packets for native merchants 
Ship belonging to Shalabi from Surat to Basrah: 
rice, indigo and cotton cloth 
Dutch private ship owned by the Company's broker in Surat: 
indigo, rice and Surat cotton cloth 
StJohn the Baptist, private ship of the Armenian Tarkhan, in Surat, flying the Dutch 
flag: 
iron, lead, sugar, Malabar cinnamon, pepper, chinaware and rhubarb 
British grab Katti from Malacca and Malabar: 
sugar (sold in Muscat) 
rice, curcuma, ginger and chinaware 
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APPENDIX 14 
(ARA, VOC 2996, pp.20-2) 
Khark: abstract of shipping activity 
from Dutch archives - 1758-9 
List of shipping at Khark for the accounting year 1758-1759 (Sept-Aug) 
Dutch private ship Phoenix from Bengal: 
400 bales of cotton cloth 
5_,000 pounds of gum lac 
nee 
British private galley Neptune from Bombay to Basrah: 
rice and copperware 
British Company ship Swallow: 
European manufactures to Basrah 
British grab Monmouth from Bengal: 
gum lac, Malabar cinnamon, kapok and cardamom 
6 bales of Bengal cotton cloth 
sold rice in Muscat 
British private ship Tess from Bombay: 
curcu11Ul, ginger, pepper, cardamom and rice 
British private ship Dragon to Basrah carrying goods belonging to its Captain 
Ship Sulaiman belonging to Shalabi of Basrah 
British ketch Ketti passed on way to Basrah: 
400 bales of British woollen cloth 
British galley Rose: 
sold kapok and rice in Bandar Riq 
British ship Welcome from Bengal: 
200 bales of cotton cloth for the natives in Basrah 
sold rice in Muscat 
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APPENDIX 15 
(ARA, VOC 3027, pp.20-1) 
Khark: abstract of shipping activity 
from Dutch archives- 1760 
List of shipping at Khark for the period March-August 1760 
British grab Speedwell from Bengal to Basrah: 
85 bales of Bengali cotton cloth 
iron, pepper, ginger, cardamom, curcuma and lead 
British private ship William from Bengal to Basrah: 
200 bales of Bengali cotton cloth; tin and iron 
British private ship Defence from Bengal to Basrah: 
300 bales of Bengali cotton cloth 
iron, pepper, tin, cardamom, curcuma, gum lac and sugar 
British private ship Admiral Pocock passed by from Bombay to Basrah, carrying: 
300 bales of Surat cotton cloth 
800 bales of European woollen cloth 
150 churls of indigo 
British private ship Dudley from Bengal to Basrah: 
300 bales of Bengali cotton cloth (of which 200 for Armenian merchants) 
200 gunnies of sugar 
gum lac, lead and rice 
British Company ship Swallow from Bombay carrying only letters 
Danish private galley Success from Bengal to Basrah: 
450 bales of Bengali cotton cloth (mostly for Armenian merchants) 
200 boxes of cardamom 
60 boxes of chinaware 
100 packs of gum lac 
iron, lead and tin 
British private ship Dragon from Bengal to Basrah: 
250 bales of Bengali cotton cloth 
150 churls of indigo 
~ 00 packs of pepper 
tron 
Small ship belonging to the Muslim merchant Shalabi from Surat to Basrah: 
60 bales of Surat cotton cloth 
wood, pepper, cinnamon and indigo 
British ship Prince Edward from Bengal to Basrah: 
120 bales of Bengali cotton cloth 
rice and false cinnamon 
Danish sloop Eleanora Adriana from Bengal to Basrah 
120 bales of Bengali cotton cloth and iron 
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Ship belonging to Ali Raja of Malabar, from Malabar to Basrah: 
300 packs of pepper 
20 packs of false cinnamon 
cardamom and wood 
British galley Rose 
60 packs of kapok 
10 bales of Surat cotton cloth 
500 packs of pepper 
iron, tin, lead, cardamom and chinaware 
British grab carrying only letters from Bombay to Basrah 
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APPENDIX 16 
(ARA, VOC 3064, [Khark Part 1], pp.50-4) 
Khark: abstract of shipping activity 
from Dutch archives - 1760-1 
List of shipping at Khark for the accounting year 1760-1761 (Sept-Aug) 
British private ship Prince Edward from Basrah to Bengal cash and a little merchandise 
Danish ship Eleanora Adriana from Basrah to Bengal carrying cash 
Moorish [Arab] ship belonging to Shalabi from Basrah to Surat with cash and a little merchandise 
Moorish private ship of Ali Raja from Basrah to Cananore with cash and a little merchandise 
British private ship Dragon from Basrah to Bombay with cash and a little merchandise 
Moorish ship Sulaiman belonging to Shalabi from Basrah to Surat with cash and a little merchandise 
British private ship Monmouth from Bengal and Madras to Basrah: 
40 bales of cotton cloth 
tin, lead and dry ginger 
Moorish ship Santa Catharina of Hajji Yusuf from Basrah with dates and wheat to Muscat and Diwel 
British ship Monmouth from Basrah to Bombay and Bengal with cash 
British Company ship Swallow carrying new Residents to Basrah 
British private ship Admiral Pocock from Bengal to Bombay: 
200 bales of Bengali cotton cloth 
150 bales of Surat cotton cloth 
300 churls of indigo 
British private ships Fort William and Dudley: 
500 bales of Bengali cotton cloth (mostly for Armenian merchants) 
Moorish ship belonging to Shalabi from Malabar to Basrah: 
500 packs of pepper 
30 packs of false cinnamon 
cardamom 
Danish ship Adriana Eleanora (sic) from Bengal to Basrah: 
180 bales of Bengali cotton cloth (mostly for Armenian merchants) 
dry ginger 
Moorish ship Sulaiman belonging to Shalabi from Surat to Basrah 
200 packs of Bengali cotton cloth 
400 churls of indigo 
The same ship returning to Malabar with cash 
British private ship Admiral Pocock from Basrah to Bombay with cash and a little merchandise 
Danish ship Adriana Eleanora from Basrah to Bengal with cash and a little merchandise 
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APPENDIX 17 
(ARA, VOC 3159, pp.711-18) 
Account by the Dutch Resident, Routing, of the fall of Khark in January 1766 
(written from Surat) 
On December 12th a ship approached from Basra. We sent out 2 gallivats as an 
escort, but after they left we saw that were approached by 4 gallivats of the enemy 
and 4-5 privateer batils. Our gallivats could not retire to port because the wind had 
turned. They drifted towards the enemy. We could not support them with our artil-
lery. So 40 European sailors and 48 native sailors became prisoners. 
The 21st of December Mir Muhanna sent his troops to Kharg and they were in control 
of the island on the next day. He used the houses that were built immediately outside 
the fortress to put his artillery in under cover from our guns. We could not flush 
them out of there because we had only 80 European and 120 Moorish soldiers, the lat-
ter being a mixed lot that we had been obliged to recruit as an emergency. They were 
not as reliable as the outcome proved. I tried to persuade the captains to put their 
ships between the two islands and chase the enemy from his bridgehead on Kharg or 
to sail to Khargu to make a diversion, but they refused, telling me that this was 
impossible because of the unsteadiness of the weather, although the weather was good 
at the time. At that moment I notified the Shaikh of Bushihr of the difficulties we 
were in, as I had already done at the occasion of the capturing of the gallivats, but he 
was so much afraid that he did not dare to send his force without the escort of one of 
our ships, and in the circumstances I could not allow the ship to leave. 
The 30th of December the enemy attacked with a force of 600-700 men at midnight at 
a gate where native soldiers stood on guard with 2 European gunners. They climbed 
the walls [of the outer fortress] with ladders and cut down all those who opposed them 
(then there were not so many because the native soldiers were cowards and may have 
had contact with enemy, otherwise the enemy would not so easily have overpowered 
them). The battery position held out until 7 in the morning with great courage, but 
then the gunners were obliged because of the great crowd of attackers inside and out-
side to return into the [inner] fortress. The enemy, having captured the batteries, 
established himself there immediately and also in the nearby bazaar and in the houses 
near the inner fortress where they hindered us with fire of small arms while they were 
under cover from the frre of the fortress, even safe from our heavy artillery. All 
native soidiers deserted after the fail of the batteries. This discouraged the Europeans 
who had not slept for 11-12 days and who were very tired. Because I could expect no 
help at all I decided to surrender in order to try to safeguard some of the Company's 
merchandise and I sent somebody to Khargu to negotiate. 
Hardly had the [negotiator's] boat left the island than we saw a big batil that carried a 
pennant approaching. In it was Mir Muhanna himself who had already been informed 
. of his victory and came instantly to Kharg. His proposal to us consisted of three 
items: first that we leave everything behind us but depart in freedom, the second that 
we would pay him 300,000 rupees once and 20,000 rupees each year and then we 
could stay to continue our trade, but he would remain master of the outer fortifica-
tions. The third was that I would come outside and negotiate a peace treaty with him. 
Misled by these false words and hoping that by risking my person to the enemy I 
might safeguard many lives and the possessions of my masters I left January 1st and I 
was received by him in a friendly manner, but after I had sat for some time, he asked 
me what the ships that he could see leaving from there were planning to do, whether 
they would leave me now and depart. This question did not surprise me because his 
remark was not unfounded, but I could not know whether it was really their intention 
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to leave without my knowledge and without that they knew how the situation was on 
land. I had had no occasion for some days to send them a vessel because the enemy 
was continually cruising. He, seeing the ships departing, declared that now we 
should do business, and that he would deliberate with his counsellors and that he 
would send me his answer. He let me go then, and under way it was announced by 
one of his superior officers to me and to two clerks whom I had taken with me that 
we were prisoners and that I had no other choice but to write a letter to the fort to the 
deputy chief and to the commander to leave the fortress with the garrison and to 
evacuate the fortress. Forced by violence and in the conviction that the ships had now 
entirely left us I wrote to the deputy what had happened, these were unable to disobey 
my command because the soldiers had started a mutiny already in the afternoon, 
refusing brazenly to fight any more and to be killed all. Threats or good words could 
not help because they had seen the departure of the ships. At that occasion I could 
only obtain that the Europeans were allowed to keep their swords, but I could not 
obtain that they could keep the firearms. In this way, partly through superiority of 
arms, partly by treason and deceit has Mir Muhanna captured the establishment of the 
Company on Kharg. He has sent us away on January 4th (after we had been in arrest 
in the meantime), I thought I could go where I wanted, but when we were already in 
the vessel, it was shouted to the nakhuda that he should carry us to Kangoon, a 
miserable place inhabited by people to whose robbery instinct we were exposed once 
again. I presumed that the ships would be in Bushihr to wait for any sure news how it 
was finished with the affairs of the Company, so I forced the Nakhuda to bring us to 
that place, where we arrived in the morning of the 5th with half of our people, the 
others had sailed to Kangun, because we had no chance to inform them of our inten-
tion. They arrived there after much deprivation and left to Muscat. 
To our distress we found at our arrival that the two ships had not even called there, 
and we sent immediately messengers overland and by sea to Bandar Abbas, to do all 
possible to make the ships return, because we could not undertake the travel with 40 
men in open boats in this season. On February 4th our messenger returned with the 
communication that the ships could not decide to return, but that they would wait for 
us to arrive either by sea or by land until February 15th. Being uncertain to find the 
ships there I did not dare to undertake this travel to a place where we could not expect 
any assistance and where we had nothing while here we were received friendly by the 
English Resident because we had here still some money of the Company standing out 
to an amount of 8,000 rupees which I could recover from time to time with the 
assistance of the Shaikh. 
I immediately sent a letter to Karim Khan to notify him of the failure of the war we 
had started on his instigation and for his interests against Mir Muhanna and I could 
not avoid to show him the damage caused by the fact that he had not assisted us. This 
had as a result that 400 horsemen were sent to the coast who now encircle the lands 
belonging to Mir Muhanna in expectation of a big army. Karim Khan sent this news 
to me through the former ruler of Ganaveh, Kayyid Hather, sent expressly to assure 
us, adding that he would not permit us to leave the Kingdom of Persia, until he had 
fully revenged the shame done to the Company. This kept me from undertaking the 
dangerous voyage to Bandar Abbas even more, but I stayed here to wait for some 
time the outcome. 
The Resident Buschman has written me that he would leave some merchandise in 
Bandar Abbas and Muscat in case we would have no money to live from, and I did 
not dare to trust Buffkens or the broker Narratoen and I will send the deputy Winckler 
and the assistant Brandt to send them to me. 
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APPENDIX 18 
(ARA, VOC 3156, Khark, pp.54-5) 
Letter of Shaikh 'Abdallah bin Mul}ammad 
to an unknown Dutch Captain 
I expected in vain your visit to Hormuz so that I would be able to be of service to 
you, and because Bandar Abbas, Hormuz and the other islands are now ruled by one 
and the same person, all are now equally submissive to the Dutch East India Com-
pany, so your servant has written a letter to the Governor General in which he asked 
. . . to send a reliable person with orders to build a Dutch factory on Hormuz and to 
start trade there ... 
APPENDIX 19 
(ARA, VOC 3156, Kharg, pp.48-51) 
Letter of Shaikh 'Abdallah bin Muhammad of Hormuz to the Dutch 
Governor General and High Council of India 
January 1766 
Your humble servant the Arab Abdulla Muhammad notifies most reverently that I do 
not know why the Dutch factory in Bandar Abbas has been empty for over 7 years ... 
but now Hormuz, Adjaron and the island of Draas otherwise called the Long Island 
[modem Qishm] pronounce their submission to the Company so you are free to build 
a factory there and place a reliable person in it to continue the Company's trade. You 
do not have to fear anything because the judges of the 'A jam, otherwise said the 
'negorij' [an error: 'ajam = Persians, whereas negorij = natives] of Iran, have no 
authority there at all and that the merchants are free to come here . . . I also request 
you to sell me a sloep [sloop] or patschalling [small, versatile sailing vessel]. 
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APPENDIX 20 
(ARA, VOC 2448, pp.1602-4) 
Sale of Dutch merchandise at Bushire - 1737 
Figures for Dutch exports to Bushire in 1737; prices in guilders. 
Item Weight Buying Price Clear Profit 
(lbs) 
Cloves 490.5 160 2,246 
Nutmeg 297.5 23 828 
Powder sugar 9,595 756 1,636 
Candy sugar 5,313 845 744 
Pepper 1,637 234 633 
Cardamom 120 19 40 
Iron 5,971 572 581 
Textiles Piece 
Small bedspreads 20 214 140 
Boutidas so 386 244 
Muramath 42 358 189 
Abba 20 177 125 
Long lungi 20 34 28 
APPENDIX21 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 193, pp.26-30) 
Letter from William Andrew Price to Shaikh Sa'diin (at Bandar Rig) 
seeking agreement on settlement at Bushire 
To Shaik Saddoon 
After compliments 
I was duly favoured with your letter, wherein you invite me to settle in Bushire and 
desire me to land my goods, for this purpose I have had several meetings with your 
son, and shown him a set of articles but as he now acquaints me, that he is not suffi-
ciently authorised to adjust the terms without your consent, I despatch Stephen Hermit 
our Linguist, with those articles for your approbation, as nothing is contained therein 
but what will lend to the benefit of your port and increase of your revenues. I do not 
doubt of your concurrence, the English are merchants, and their views nothing but 
trade, the good character you bear induces us to settle in your country and as you 
have for many years been in friendship with our nation we hope this will be a means 
of cementing it more strongly. 
I desire you will give me a speedy answer by the Linguist, to whom I refer you, for 
all further particulars. May God the giver of all victory make you successful over 
your enemies. 
Bushire 
1Oth April 1763 
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APPENDIX 22 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 193, pp.26-30) 
Articles of Agreement between Shaikh Sa'diin of Bushire 
and English East India Company 
Articles of Agreement made and concluded this 12th day of April 1763 between the Right Honourable 
William Andrew Price Esq., Agent for Affairs of the British Nation in the Gulf of Persia, in behalf of 
the Honourable United English East India Company on the one part, and Shaik Saddoon of Bushire on 
the other part. 
1st- no customs or duties to be collected on goods imported or exported by the English and in like 
manner only 3% to be taken from the merchants who buy from or sell to the English. 
2nd - the importation and sale of woollen goods to be solely in the hands of the English, and if any per-
son whatever attempts to bring woollen goods clandestinely it shall be lawful for the English to seize 
them, this article to take place in four months from the date hereof. 
3rd - no European nation whatever is to be permitted to settle at Bushire so long as the English con-
tinue a Factory here. 
4th - the Brokers, linguists, servants and others of the English, are to be entirely under the protection 
and Government of the English, nor is the Shaik or his people in any shape to molest them, or to inter-
fere in their affairs. 
5th - in case of any of the inhabitants, become truly indebted to the English and refuse payment, the 
Shaik shall oblige them to give the English satisfaction. 
6th - the English to have such a spot of ground, as they may pitch upon for erecting a Factory, and 
proper conveniences for carrying on their commerce to be built at the Shaik's expense, they are to hoist 
the colours upon it, and have twenty-one guns for saluting. 
7th - a proper spot of ground to be allotted the English for a garden and another for a burial ground. 
8th - the English and those under their protection not to be impeded in their religion. 
9ih - soldit::n;, sailors, servants, siaves and others belonging to the English who may desert, are not to 
be protected, or entertained by the Shaik or his people, but bona fide secured and returned. 
lOth- in case any English ship, sell to or buy from the country merchants apart from the Factory, a due 
account thereof is to be rendered to the English Chief for the time being, for which purpose, one of his 
people is to attend at the weight and delivery of all goods so sold, which is to be done at the public 
Custom House. 
11th - if through any accident an English vessel should be drove on shore, in the country belonging to 
the Shaik, they shall not in any respect be plundered, but on the contrary, the Shaik shall afford the 
English all the assistance in his power for saving them and their effects the English paying them for 
their trouble. 
12th- the Shaik shall not permit his subjects to purchase any goods from the English vessels in the 
Road, but only on shore. 
Seal of Shaik Saddoon 
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APPENDIX23 
(Aitchison, C.U., A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India 
and neighbouring countries, vol.13, Calcutta: Government of India 1933, pp.42-4) 
Karim Khan's faramiin establishing the Bushire factory 
[original italics] 
2 July 1763 
The Great God having, of his infinite mercy, given victory unto Karem Khan, and 
made him Chief Governor of all the kingdoms of Persia, and established under him 
the peace and tranquillity of the said kingdoms, by means of his victorious sword, he 
is desirous that the said kingdoms should flourish and re-obtain their ancient grandeur 
by the increase of trade and commerce, as well as by a due execution of justice. 
Having been informed that the Right Worshipful William Andrew Price, Esq., 
Governor-General for the English nation in the Gulf of Persia, is arrived with power 
to settle a factory at Bushire, and has left Mr. Benjamin Jervis, Resident, who, by 
directions from the said Governor-General, has sent unto me Mr. Thomas Durnford 
and Stephen Hermit, linguist, to obtain a grant of their ancient privileges in these 
kingdoms, I do, of my free will and great friendship for the English nation, grant 
unto the said Governor-General, in behalf of his king and Company, the following 
privileges, which shall be inviolably observed and held sacred in good faith:-
That the English Company may have as much ground, and in any part of Bushire, 
they choose to build a factory on, or at any other port in the Gulf. They may have as 
many cannon mounted on it as they choose, but not to be larger than six pounds bore; 
and they may build factory houses in any part of the kingdom they choose. 
No customs shall be charged the English on any goods imported or exported by them 
at Bushire, or at any other port in the Gulf of Persia, on condition that at no time they 
import or export other persons' goods in their names. They may also send their 
goods customs free all over the kingdom of Persia; and on what goods they sell at 
Bushire, or elsewhere, the Shaik, or Governor, shall only charge the merchants an 
export duty of three per cent. 
No other European nation, or other persons, shall import any woollen goods to any 
port on the Persian shore in the Gulf, but the English Company only; and should any 
one attempt to do it clandestinely, their goods shall be seized and confiscated. 
Should any of the Persian merchants, or others, become truly indebted to the English, 
the Shaik, or Governor of the place, shall oblige them to pay it; but should he fail in 
his duty herein the English Chief may do his own justice and act as he pleases with 
the debtors to recover what owed him [sic] or them. 
In all the kingdom of Persia the English may sell their goods to and buy from 
whomever they judge proper; nor shall the Governor, or Shaik, of any ports or 
places, prevent their importing or exporting any goods whatever. 
When any English ship or ships arrive at any ports in the Gulf of Persia, no mer-
chants shall purchase from them clandestinely, but with the consent and knowledge of 
the English Chief there resident. 
Should any English ship or vessel be drove on shore, unfortunately wrecked, or other-
wise lost in any part of the Gulf of Persia, the Shaiks, or Governors of the adjacent 
places, shall not claim any share of the said wrecks, but shall assist the English, all in 
their power, in saving the whole or any part of the vessel or cargo. 
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The English, and all those under their protection, in any part of the kingdom of Per-
sia, shall have the free exercise of their religion, without molestation from any one. 
Should soldiers, sailors or slaves desert from the English in any part of Persia, they 
shall not be protected or encouraged, but, bonafide, delivered up, but not be 
punished for the frrst or second offence. 
Wherever the English may have a factory in Persia their linguist, brokers, and all 
their servants, shall be exempt from all taxes and impositions whatever, and under 
their command and justice, without any one interfering therein. 
Wherever the English are they shall have a spot of ground allotted them for a burying 
ground; and if they want a spot for a garden, if the Icing's property, it shall be given 
them gratis; if belonging to any private person, they must pay a reasonable price for 
it. 
The house that formerly belonged to the English Company at Schyrash, I now re-
deliver to them, with garden and water thereto belonging. 
Articles desired by the Khan - 1763 
That the English, according to what was formerly customary, shall purchase from the 
Persian merchants such goods as will answer for sending to England or India, pro-
vided they and the Persians shall agree on reasonable prices for the same, and not 
export from Persia the whole amount of their sales in ready money, as this will 
impoverish the kingdom and in the end prejudice trade in general. 
That the English, wherever they are settled, shall not maltreat the Musssulmen. 
What goods are imported by the English into Persia they shall give the preference in 
sale of them to the principal merchants and men of credit. 
The English shall not give protection to any of the Icing's rebellious subjects, nor 
carry them out of the kingdom, but deliver any up that may desert to them, who shall 
not be punished for the first or second offence. 
The English shall at no time, either directly or indirectly, assist the Icing's enemies. 
All our Governors of provinces, sea-ports, and other towns are ordered to pay strict 
obedience to these our orders~ on pain of incurring our displeasure; a.nd of being 
punished for their disobedience or neglect. 
Dated in Schyrash, the 23rd of Seerhoja 1176, or the 2nd of July 1763 
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To 
Carem Caun 
from the Agent 
After Compliments 
Letter from Moore to Karim Khan 
hoping to solve all disputes 
APPENDIX 24 
(lOR, R/15/1/1, p.214) 
The friendship so long subsisting between you and the English Nation makes me very 
happy in the opportunity I now have of paying my Compliments to you from Bushire, 
and of assuring you of their inviolable attachment to your person, and their good 
wishes for the success of your royal house and kingdom. Tomorrow I embark for 
Bussora, where I have the honour of being appointed Agent by the Honble the Presi-
dent and Council of Bombay for the management of the East India Company's affairs 
in the Gulph of Persia, and am in hopes I shall be honoured with your friendship that 
the present disputes may be speedily brought to a Conclusion and your wisdom be 
proclaimed in all parts of the world. I hope for the protection of my Honble 
Employers affairs at this Factory and that you will do me the honour of letting me 
hear from you. May the Almighty receive you into his protection. 
Bush ire 
23rd of March 1767 
Henry Moore 
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APPENDIX25 
(lOR, R/1511/1, p.135) 
Silk trade and exports from northern Persia 
20 February 1765 
[Extract from letter of 20 February 1765 from Benjamin Jervis, Resident at Bushire, 
to the President and Governor of Bombay, Charles Crommelin] 
Account of the Raw Silk of Gilan & Schirvan Schamaky as received from Cojee Sar-
hees who was three years Custom Master for Carim Caun at Ruchd the Capital of 
Gilan. 
The Annual Produce of Raw Silk 
at Gilan about 
at Schirvan Schamaky 
Exclusive of the Above is produced Kedje a 
kind of Silk Cotton 
The Annual Exportation 
To Yezd in Persia & Manufactured there in 
Brocades & 1st Sort 
To Spahaun Carmenia & other parts of Persia 
2 sorts about 
30,000 Md. Shaw 
50,000 Ditto 
80,000 
20,000 Md. Shaw 
10,000 
10,000 
To Turkey (mostly to Smirna) at 2 & 3 sort about 30,000 
To Russia 2 & 3 Ditto 30,000 
80,000 
The Kedge about 5000 Md. is annually exported to Turkey & the Remainder used in 
Persia, it is spun into a Thread after the manner of Cotton & then wove into a Coarse 
Silk Cloth. 
The Prices the Raw Silk sold at during his Residence in Ruchd 
An equal 
proportion of each 
1st sort for Yezd from 300 to 400 Mam per Md Shaw 
2 sort for Sphaun at 200 to 250 Ditto Ditto 
} 2 & 3 sort for Turkey 180 to 230 Ditto Ditto 
} 2 & 3 sort for Russia 180 to 250 Ditto Ditto 
N.B. The Md [maund] Shaw is about 13 lb English Weight & 
Mammoodies 6 are one Rupee 
Kedje from 120 to 180 per Md. Shaw 
The exports to Turkey are partly by Turkey Merchants who come to Gilan to Pur-
chase it & partly by the Merchants of Schirvan. The Russians have a Consull at 
Anzalee, a small Island in the Caspian about 3 Leagues from Ruschd & another at 
Saleean about 25 Leagues from Schirvan Scharnahia for the Protection of their Sub-
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jects who trade for Silk to Gilan & Schirvan. A great part of this Trade to Russia is 
carryed on by Georgian & Armenian Merchants, he observes that very large Customs 
are collected at different Places by the Russians on this Article of Raw Silk only, is a 
considerable branch of the Emperors Revenue. 
The Russians Import into Gilan Woollen Goods, Hides, Cocheneal, Indigo & Furs & 
the Merchants from Turkey mostly Woollens, Cocheneal & Indigo, the woollens are 
partly the Manufacture of England & partly French. 
He is very confident, that the Silk may be brought to Bushire for about half the 
Expences attending its being carried into Turkey & to Petersbourgh in Russia & 
imagines that it will be very easy to contract with the Gilan & other Persia Merchants 
to bring it down at their Risque & thinks that the Customs between here and Ruschd 
are very inconsiderable. He also thinks that the Merchants would take in return con-
siderable Quantity of Coarse Cloths & Perpets besides Indigo & many sorts of India 
Piece Goods, such as Bengali ... Hummums Cossas & Surat Chint Goods, with 
Sugar, Sugar Candy, Pepper & Different sorts of Spices. 
He judges that at the very utmost the Expences bringing down the Raw Silk to this 
Place, including all Charges whatever cannot exceed Rupees 40 per Ass Load of six-
teen Mds Shaw & Adds that so long that the present Government continues there is 
not the least Risque from Ruschd to this Place till it comes near Meer Mahanna & 
should Carim Caun not destroy him, he will be very cautious of meddling with the 
Companys Property as he is sensible it is in their Power at any Time to destroy him 
with a very small Force. 
An Account of the Raw Silk Trade of Gilan as Received from Antonio Pillon sent 
by me to Ruschd, for Musters & to learn the particulars relative to this Branch of 
Commerce. 
He informs me the Produce & Exports are much the same as mentioned by Cojee Sar-
hees, & that by the best Accounts he could learn that the Prices for some years past 
have been much the same as mentioned in the above Account, but as the proper time 
for purchasing this article on the cheapest terms is in June, July & he did not arrive 
there till November, & the Musters he bought being so small a quantity he paid for 
them as follows. 
MdShaw 
1st & 2nd Sorts 1hoz 6 
3rd & 4th Ditto 96 
Md Shaw 2 
Charges at Ruchd Weighing Duty 
Brokerage 
Dungaree Cloth for a bag 
Customs at Spahaun 
Md Md 
at 400 per Md. Shaw 212 
at 300 Ditto 144 
6.10 
2 
1.10 10 
6 
372 
or Rupees 62 
He says there are no other Customs to be paid on the Exportation but the Weighing 
Duty & that the Russians are excused from this. 
331 
The Rout the Silk must be brought to Busbire & the Hire thereon. 
From Ruschd to Cazbin 32 Leagues in 6 Days from thence to Spahaun 80 Leagues in 
15 Days the Hire of an Ass Load Mid. Shaw (16) 
from Gilan to Spahaun is Rupees 16 
From Spahaun to Schirass 72 Leagues in 72 Days the Hire 
for an Ass Load 8 
From Schyrass to Bushire 50 Leagues in ten Days the Hire 
of an Ass Load 7 
Rupees 31 
The price that the Silk would cost at Bushire with hire thereon & at the Prices 
bought as above. 
1st & 2nd Sort 16 Md 
Gilan & Spahaun Charges 
Hire to Bushire 
400 6400 
256 
180 
Rupees 
6836 
1139.1.33 
This is 11.83 Rupees per Md. Shaw of 17 Sear or better & is a little more than 10 
Rupees per Sear. 
2 & 3 Sort 16 Md Shaw at 300 Md 
Gilan & Spahaun Charges 
Hire to Bushire 
4800 
192 
180 
Rupees 
5252 
875.1.33 
This is Rupees 54.2.80 per Md Shaw of 7 per Sear & is something more than 7 3/4 
per Sear. · 
The above is estimated at the Prices he gave for the Musters, but says he was 
informed by the Merchants that in June & July any large quantity may be bought, 1st 
& 2nd at Md 350 & 2 & 3 at 250 & that the Merchants trading in this Article to Rus 
sia & Turkey get it still cheaper by Advancing Money to the Factorers beforehand & 
he says many Merchants told him they would bring it to Bushire if sure sale, for a 
reasonable Profit & . . . . that they would take many Goods in return. 
Goods most in Demand at Gilan & their Current Prices when he was there Viz. 
Cochineal perMd Shaw 600 
Indigo Do 400 
Coarse Cloths per Guz 20 
Worsters Do 30 
Fine Cloths Do 40 
Medleys Coarse Do 60 
Drabs Do 70 
Perpets Do 180 
Tin perMd Shaw 60 
Lead Do 30 
Sugar Do 30 
Sugar Candy Do 50 
Pepper Heavy Do 70 
Cardamomes Do 200 
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Bengal & other India Piece Goods 
Cossas 
MulmuUs 
Bajtaes 
Sannas 
Chappa Handkerchiefs 
Mogadooties not much used 
Musalapatam Painted Chints 
Ditto Printed Ditto 
Suratt Chints 
Gujarrat 
Do Palampores 
Do Suratt 
pc 120 
Do 120 
Do 70 
Do so 
Do 60 
per Corge 3SO 
per pc 180 
Ditto 120 
Do 30 
Do SO 
Do SO 
Do 30 
The Goods in greatest Demand & Consumption are Broad Cloths Perpetts Bengali 
Goods Cochineal, Indigo, Tin, Sugar, Pepper & Cardamoms, of the others, the Con-
sumption is but small. 
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APPENDIX26 
(BA, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 197, pp.20-4) 
Karim Khan's reply (via his Vakil to Skipp) 
to Moore's demands 
These demands are rather like the orders of a master to his servant, they have no 
power to send me orders; they first demand I should send soldiers against the Chaub 
[Ka'b] to destroy him joyntly with the English and the Turks: this is contrary to all 
reason and justice and the custom of our Countries, the Chaub has fled to me for pro-
tection, which I have promised him and secure within I would not molest him, I will 
not send a force to assist you, nor will I on any account let the Turks make war on the 
Chaub in my dominions I have treaties with the Turks by which we have reciprocally 
agreed not to enter each others territories to make war, if the Turks break these 
treaties, it will give me great satisfaction, as I have for some time past desired they 
would do, for I think myself in many respects, ill used by them, and shall be glad of 
this pretence to make war on them, I will go with my troops to Stambole and give 
orders to the Chaub to destroy Bussora and Bagdad. If I wanted to destroy the Chaub 
it is not necessary I should send a force against him. I would send only a manservant 
and he dare not refuse but it is not my intention to hurt him, for I have sworn not to 
do it when he fled to me for protection, neither the English, Turks or any other nation 
have sustained the losses I have done by the Chaub, but on his flying to me and beg-
ging my protection I forgot it all pardoned and promised it to him at the time I wanted 
to destroy the Chaub, I came just to Bassora and neither the English nor Turks would 
assist me, why would they not at that time assist me with their force by sea it was 
then my full intention not to leave a single Chaub alive. The English and Turks at 
that time never considered the great expence I was at but declined assisting me tho I 
asked it, if the English and Turks at that time had shown the least Friendship by a 
small assistance by sea I would now with pleasure convince them I was sensible of it, 
but nonetheless if the English only chuse to make war on the Chaub I will not impede 
or assist either side, they are welcome to do anything in their power to obtain their 
own satisfaction, but if I hear there is one Turk joyned with them I will then send ten 
thousand of my soldiers to assist the Chaub against the Turks (but the English I will 
not molest) I will break the treaties subsisting between us and will make war upon the 
Turks. 
In answer to the 4 articles you demand ... 1st in regard to the payment of your losses 
and expences amounting to 5 lack of rupees, this I cannot order the Chaub to comply 
with, the Chaub says that in Bussora the Chief there was satisfied to take the sum of 
5500 Tomands in full I out of regard to the English and from the friendship I was 
desireous of cultivating with them obliged the Chaub to consent to return the sum of 
12500 Tomands Raige [coined in] Schiras, but more that that I cannot do, this I have 
done for your sakes, but it appears by your last demands that you will not be satisfied 
therewith in such case do what you can to obtain your own satisfaction, but it is 
necessary you should consider that you will not afterwards get one fluce [Arabic: 
fulas, pl. of fils, a tiny coin] from the Chaub, and after this day if the English would 
come to me and beg of me to take the sum of 12500 Tomands to settle your disputes I 
would not do it I have taken much trouble to bring your affairs as I thought to this 
happy conclusion, and now you are not satisfied therewith. I will now give leave to 
the Chaub to make war on you, and to do everything in his power to take your vessels 
- the reason of my expressing myself with so much anger is that you would not stay to 
know how I had proceeded in your business but send these demands before you were 
acquainted this sum of 12500 Tomands is the firm cost of your Goods, ought you not 
therefore to be contented, and make your account that for one voyage you got no 
profit, it now plainly appears to me the English do not want to settle this affair, but 
do as you please and act in what manner you can by the Chaub. 
334 
By what law or justice am I to order the Chaub to deliver his Gallivats to you? you 
want to take all your losses, and then you must have his Gallivats; the laws and reli-
gion of my country will not permit me to do any such thing, such a demand as this 
you ought to make at the time the Chaub is your prisoner, and then he will be obliged 
to comply with this or any such like demands to save his life - but you should con-
sider you are not ... nor in my opinion like to be so, you should therefore be con-
tented with such a peace as I made for you, the nature of a peace is to compromise 
matters on both sides, and so I did as I thought for your Credit. 
In regard to the release of prisoners taken by the Chaub it is reasonable and if you had 
been satisfied with the sum I had fixed and the peace I was desirous of making, I 
should readily have ordered the Chaub to return your prisoners. 
In answer to that part wherein you demand the Chaub should quit the territory of 
Gahan, I look upon it Gabab is the territory of the Turks I think it is not right in you 
to demand this it is the Turkish territories let the Turks come and . . . it. I have 
received many letters from Omar Pacha regarding these affairs, but he has never once 
mentioned it to me, if your intentions by this are to keep the River of Bussora open 
and clear so that your ships and boats may pass without any impediment from the 
Chaub, this the Turks ought to take care of, they are very considerable gainors by 
your trade to Bussora if they have power let them go and take possession of their ter-
ritories, it is theirs and why have they not done it for a long time past, it appears to 
me, the Turks are greater cowards than Women, they sit in their houses with fear and 
leave the burthen of the war on the English. 
What I have before said is on account of the friendship I desired to have with you, it 
appears to me the Turks have deceived you, and I find you do not yet see it, I am of 
opinion all these unreasonable demands which you have sent me was done by the 
advices of the Turks, I cannot think the Turks have any real intentions or desire to 
obtain you satisfaction, from the Chaub it is now two years since the English have 
brought their vessels into the Gulph, and have expended vast sums of money for the 
sake of the Turks, and what advantage or satisfaction have you yet got for the 
expences losses and dishonour you have suffered, have they ever yet procured you an 
offer from the Chaub of peace on such reasonable terms as I have now done, all the 
council the Turks give you, are not for your sake or good but calculated for their own 
interest only have not the English yet found out that the Turks did not desire these 
vessels from them for the sake of obtaining satisfaction from the Chaub, no, quite 
contrary were their intentions, it was only for the protection of the ... , that it might 
not fall into the hands of the Chaub, I am fmnly of this opinion. 
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To 
Carim Caun 
APPENDIX27 
(I OR, R/15/1 /1, p.506) 
Ultimatum to Karim Khan about the Ka'b 
by Moore, Agent at Basrah 
After Compliments 
Bussora 
11 August 1767 
I am very sorry to learn from our Embassador, Mr George Skipp, that your Majesty 
has been displeased at the proposals I directed him to make known unto you, to dis-
please you was not my intention, neither was it in my power to order your Majesty to 
come to those terms that have been proposed to you, if your Majesty disapproves 
them. 
It was at your Majesty's request that a gentleman was sent to Schiras in order to have 
the disputes between the English and the Chaub [Ka'b] adjusted, and as your Majesty 
undertook to be the mediator I had very little reason to doubt but what the peace 
would have been such as the interest of my Honble Employers and honour of my 
Country would not have compelled me to have rejected Your Letters and the words of 
your Embassador Agassy Caun are sufficient to evince how contrary your resolutions 
are to the promises made on your behalf. This person declared both to us and the 
Turks in publick Divan, that he was come to demand of the Chaub in our name full 
restitution for us, and to the Turks the relinquishing their territories: that the Cause of 
his coming first to Bussora, was to obtain the account of our losses from us, in which 
we duly complied by delivering them to him with what slight and contempt he was 
treated by the Chaub, no doubt but he has acquainted you on his return, he assured us 
he would inform you of the facts, and in your name declared that it was sufficient 
only for one of my gentlemen to proceed to Schirass and you would reimburse our 
losses out of your own treasury - once sworn, and that for the last time I again make 
the same proposals to you, nor will I recede from the most trivial Article of them. 
Your Majesty is to consider how we have been used by the Chaub, what we have lost 
by him, a..id whett'ier the sum of Twelve thousand Tomaunds is any way equal to the 
losses we have suffered, and the expenses we have been at since Soliman first 
molested us. You are to consider in protecting him, you are protecting a rebel and a 
robber. You are to consider that by doing it you are drawing on yourself an Enemy, 
whom would you make a friend of have it in their power to do you more service that 
the Chaub possibly can do. 
Your Majesty is not to imagine that our having a settlement at Bushire will induce us 
to come into the terms you have proposed, the impediments our trade has long 
laboured under at that Settlement make it a settlement of very little consequence to us 
on that account I have ordered it to be withdrawn. 
The Squadron that his Excellency the General of Bombay has sent into the Gulph was 
sent to do the English justice for the injuries they had received from the Chaub & 
Shaik Soliman, but this your Majesty prevents by the protection and countenance you 
are giving this Chaub on your Majesty therefore now rests the making of the English 
either your friend or Enemy; I would recommend to your Majesty to consider well 
before you determine if you make these your friends. There is nothing that you can 
in reason ask of me, that I will not in reason do to serve and oblige you, but if you 
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oblige me to use force I will not leave a persian ship, Vessel or boat in the whole 
Gulph. There shall not be a persian town upon the Sea Coast within the reach of our 
Cannon, that shall not be destroyed, Bushire _shall be the first, if you protect Traytors 
and thieves against us on account of any assistance or benefit you may receive from 
them, there are those who are more powerful who sollicit our protection which we 
have just cause to grant, what can you do without Vessels against Carrack and other 
Islands, especially when under our protection (which we have just cause to grant) may 
even encourage your Enemys not to confine themselves to Islands. 
I would not have you imagine that I am now writing on behalf of the Turks: pay the 
English their demands and deliver up to them the Chaubs Gallivats, the Turks will 
then settle with you about Gahan. 
Your Majestys threats regarding the Turks, your going to Starn bole, the ordering the 
Chaub to take Bagdat and Bussora, make a very great appearance upon paper but a 
person of your Majesty's great wisdom I make no doubt would well consider on mat-
ters of that nature before you undertake them. 
To avoid all these disagreable circumstances I once more hold out my hand to your 
Majesty to be received by you as your friend, let me assure you, you will find the 
friendship of the English of much more consequence that your protecting such a 
traitor as the Chaub. The English want to be your friends but you will not let them, 
your Majesty's answer to this letter will determine me, weigh therefore what I have 
now written and consider the distruction you are bringing upon your Country which 
you have in your power now so easily to prevent. 
Your Majesty alledges that Shaik Soliman having fled to you for favour and pro-
tection you have sworn to grant him it and will not molest him, but give me leave to 
represent to you, that application was made to you on behalf of the English by the late 
Agent long before the Chaub fled to you and that we never entered your territories, 
till we had advice from the Calentar [Kalanthar Serkies] that on account the concern 
you was under, with respect to Carmenia, he could not prevail on you to answer our 
letters but that you directed him to acquaint us that as Shaik Soliman was a rebel and 
a robber you had nothing to say to him, and that we and our Allies might act against 
him as we thought proper, for the Truth of which we refer you to the said Calentar. 
May God preserve your Majesty many years, may your wisdom be universal and may 
it be employed in the producing an immediate peace rather than a troublesome and 
destructive war. 
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29 August 1767 
To 
Carim Caun 
APPENDIX28 
(BA, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 197, pp.SS-90) 
Letter from Moore to Karim Khan demanding 
Rs 500,000 and the Ka'b's surrender 
After Compliments 
I have received a letter from Mr Skipp our Embassador, who is now at your Majestys 
renowned Court in which he has signified to me the friendship you profess for the 
English nation and the terms on which your Majesty is desirous of accommodating the 
differences that have so long subsisted between the English and the Chaub [Ka'b] 
shaik Soliman. 
It would afford me the highest satisfaction to come into the measures which your 
Majesty has condescended to point out to me, could I consider them in the light of 
restoring a lasting quiet on this Gulph of answering the end for which at your 
Majestys own request Mr Skipp attended upon you at Schiras, but this end I must 
inform you is not the least answered, the Chaub Shaik Soliman, still continues in pos-
session of all his Galivats. 
The sum of two hundred and fifty thousand (250000) Rupees is by no means an aquit-
ment for the losses the English have Sustained since those troubles have been brought 
upon them and by your Majestys not obliging the Chaub to reside entirely at Doorack 
your Majesty leaves open a door for perpetual contention between him and the Turks, 
in which it is impossible but we must more or less continue to take a part, so long as 
we continue a factory at Bussora. 
I am very sorry to find your Majesty should imagine I am influenced to write to you 
from any motive but the honor and Interest, of the Honorable body, whom it is my 
duty, as well as my happiness to serve, their long friendship and attachment to your 
Majestys royal Ancestors the former Kings of Persia, I hope you will admit me to 
renew the profession of and to assure you at the same time, that it affords me no 
small share of satisfaction, that in my endeavours to serve them I at the sa..-ne time am 
serving your Majesty. 
Your Majesty must be very sensible from the force I now have with me in the Gulph, 
that it is in my power to do you the greatest of services by reducing the disobedient to 
obedience, by fixing your Majesty and your Royal son securely in your Government, 
and making you as happy as you are now great, but your Majesty in defiance to my 
endeavours in defiance to your own interests, will not let me be your friend you will 
not let me contribute to the revival of commerce in your Dominions but are forcing 
me to quit your Kingdom by withdrawing the English factory from Bushire, by form-
ing destructive alliances against your Majesty, the end of which God only knows. 
If your Majesty will oblige me by forcing the Chaub to come into the terms I have 
humbly requested of you there is nothing that your Majesty can in reason ask that I 
will not in gladness grant. Let me recommend to your Majesty but for a moment to 
consider, whether it is for your fame or your advantage, to protect such a robber as 
this Chaub, and make a friend of a man who cannot essentially serve you in prefer-
ence to those who so essentially can. 
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As the Whole Gulph of Persia belongs to your Majesty there ought not to be an anned 
ship or vessel in it but what belongs either to your Majesty or the English you want to 
reduce the whole Gulph to your obedience, at the same time that you are leaving one 
of the most principal sea powers in it, in full power to molest and injure us, let me 
advise you to begin at Bussora and not end until you get down to Muscat you will 
never have such another opportunity, I entreat your Majesty therefore immediately to 
embrace it, and prevent the Slaughter and bloodshed that must otherwis~ be the 
inevitable consequence. 
How easy is it for your Majesty to put an immediate stop to all our troubles, how 
must it add to your name and glory the settling in a few hours, what other powers 
have been for years attempting. 
You have only to direct the Chaub to deliver us up his Galivats and send me 5 Lacks 
of Rupees and we will make a peace with him whenever your Majesty orders it. 
If I may be- permitted to advise your Majesty I would immediately order my renowned 
General and Brother Zakey Caun down to Doorack, and whom I will order Mr Skipp 
to accompany to demand of the Chaub the articles we have sollicited of you, this will 
be the most speedy and effectual method of concluding every thing and as such for 
your Honor and interest as well as my own I mention it to you. 
As to Gahan if your Majesty does not chuse to have the Credit of obliging the Chaub 
to relinquish it, we will leave it to be settled between the Chaub and the Turks. 
I hope your Majesty will . . . consider the matter on which I have written you, and 
reflect on the great services I may be of to you if you oblige the Chaub to come into 
the terms which I propose to you. If you do not oblige him to come into them I have 
ordered Mr Skipp to proceed immediately to Bushire and there with all our merchants 
and effects embark on board our ships that are laying there. I hope you will furnish 
him with the necessary passports. 
I am afraid your Majesty has too great dependence on the Chaubs galivats, take my 
word for it they cannot do you the least service, so long as we have an English 
Cruizer in the Gulph of Persia, besides with us for your friends what can you want 
with them. 
Alliances in this Gulph I must make if your Majesty now for the last time refuse me 
your friendship. 
Once more then consider what I have written you may now comma,."ld my friendship 
and services, reflect with them what services are before you without them what 
destruction is impending. 
May God receive your Majesty into his sacred protection and may you accept me as 
the Friend which it is my inclination to be. 
Henry Moore 
Bussora 
29th August 1767 
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APPENDIX 29 
(BA, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 197, pp.266-7) 
Letter from Moore to Karim Khan 
saying the English expedition had departed to Hormuz 
To 
Carim Caun 
After Compliments 
I have already had the honour to write your Majesty three letters since Mr. Skipp left Schiras, which I 
hope have duly reached your greatness, and by the favour of God and your Majestys favour I daily 
expect your answer thereto. 
In these letters I acquainted your Majesty how happy I was, on hearing the favour you were ready to 
show us; Mr. Skipp has informed me thereof fully by word of mouth, and I hope shortly to receive 
your Majestys answer to be convinced you still intend the same friendship to us. Your Majestys letter 
which I received by that Gentleman, I look on as a great favour, I was happy in receiving that mark of 
your friendship. 
In those letters I advised your Majesty that I intended sending our ships against Shaik Abdulla of 
Ormuse; our ships are since gone on that expedition, I conclude your Majesty will be rejoiced there at; 
I undertook this Expedition on your account to convince your Majesty of the value of our friendship, 
and to show to the world, that in future we shall allways be friends and at peace with those who are 
friends to your Majesty, and enemies to those who dare presume to refuse paying obedience to your 
conquering sword. I don't want to keep possession of Ormuse, in the same manner as the English and 
in Ancient times reduced this island and delivered it into the hands of former King of Persia: so have I 
ordered it to be delivered to your Majesty or any person you may think proper to send to take posses-
sion of it on your account. 
Meer Mabanna has lately sent many boats hither to purchase provisions and dates, I acquainted the 
Mussaleem [Miitesellim; Governor of Basrab] it was not proper your enemies should be supplied here, 
and this Government will to do every thing for your Majestys benefit ordered no provisions should on 
any account go from hence to Carrack, all this I hope will convince your Majesty of the value of our 
friendship, and by the favour of God I hope to give your Majesty in a short time much greater proofs of 
it. 
I beg your Majesty of your greatness will show your protection our Factory at Bushire throughout the 
whole of your Majestys extensive dominions we have at present but one Factory and it will be a dis-
credit to us should we be obliged to withdraw the same by the chastisement you have been pleased to 
inflict on the place. The whole world will conclude your Majestys favour is not towards us I do not 
request of your Majesty to quit the demands you make on Bushire, such is not my intention, I request 
only you will permit trade to flourish there and that the effects of the Honorable Company may not be 
subject to a perpetual risque, our effects there are of great value. 
By the favour of God I shall shortly receive his Excellency the Governor Beglerbeg [Turkish title: 'Bey 
of Beys'] of Bombay his orders, whom I do not in the least doubt will be happy in your friendship, and 
order that the whole of your Majestys commands be compleated to your satisfaction. I then propose 
Mr. Skipp shall again present himself before your Majesty -your Majestys answer I beg to be favoured 
with and then I may be so happy as to hear your favour and friendship is towards us, and that every-
thing necessary may be done for your Majestys service, the moment the orders of the Governor of 
Bombay reaches me. I always pray to God for your Majestys health and prosperity, and that the same 
may be daily increased. 
Bussora Henry Moore 
the 19th November 1767 
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APPENDIX30 
(BA, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 197, pp.297-9) 
Extract from Lieutenant Gage's Journal 
on the blowing up of the Defiance 
Saturday 14th Pleasant land and sea breezes at 4 p.m. observed the Com-
modore haul up with an intention of going between the island of Kishmee and the 
Main d0 [ditto] haul up after her at 8 p.m., anchored in 1h ... to fathom by the 
Defiance at day light the Southermost end of Kishmee SE by E off shore about 4 
leagues. 
Sunday 15th At 1 p.m. weighed in Company with the Defiance, Launch 
and Trankey, steered ENE till 9 p.m., then anchored by the Defiance. At 11 p.m., 
the fleet weighed, wind N byE at 1h past 1 a.m. the Defiance was taken aback, and 
came to an anchor at the same time the Commodore ordered me to stand on as long as 
the flood run. At 1h past 2 a.m. observed some thing inshore of us, took it to be a 
large trankey undersail; fired a shot at her to bring her to, soon after heard a great 
noise on board her; at 3 do fired 3 shots more at her discovered her to be a large ship 
at Anchor, she fired several musquets at us out of her tops; we past her about a 
musquet shot distance, and anchored to the Eastward of her within Gun shot; made 
the signal to the Commodore of seeing a strange ship, and immediately dispatched 
Lieutenant Kerr to the Commoodore to acquaint him that we was at Anchor by a 
strange ship. · 
At this time the Defiance was at anchor distance from us about 4 miles. Lieutenant 
Kerr acquainting the Commodore that we was at anchor by the ship, weighed and 
stood towards us and we at times burnt blue lights to let the Commodore see where 
we was- there being little wind and the tide of ebb against him, he couldn't get near 
us, and a little after day light the Defl3.Ilce anchored, distance from the ship about a 
mile and from us about 1lh miles - found with the ship 3 GaUivats and four armed 
Trankeys. At 7 do Lieutenant Kerr returned acquainting me that the Commodore 
intended attacking the ship, and board her as soon as possible, and to keep our boat 
manned and armed, in case he should make the signal for her- all this time the ship 
and Galli vats making preparations - At 8 a.m. the Launch with the Commodores boats 
was alongside him taking the Military in for boarding the ship. At 3/4 past 8 saw a 
smoke from the Deft.ance took it to be a gun fired from her, but to our great surprize 
she blew up in less than two minutes after - we were then about a mile and a half dis-
tance from her, but could not observe any men living about the wreck, indeed the 
explosion was so great that we could not think it was possible that there was any men 
saved from her- the enemy immediately on seeing this manned their ship and Gal-
livats, with a number of men- that was not seen before which prevented us from get-
.. ting under sail and making towards the wreck, but if we had weighed, we should have 
' dropt on board the ship, it being strong tide of ebb, and no wind at 9 a.m. observed 
the enemys trankeys under way, and thought they were making for our Trankey, that 
has about forty Seapoys in which the trankey weighed and stood back again - but we 
soon saw the enemys trankey alongside the wreck getting what they would out of her. 
At 11 a.m. the enemys trankeys returned from them and went on shore, soon after the 
tide of flood making, and thinking it was impracticable for us to pretend to engage the 
enemy, they have so many vessels, and such a number of men; thought it more pru-
dent for us to make the best of our way to Gombroon road to join the Wolf Gallivat, 
who parted company with us the 12th instant and then to proceed to Kishme to 
endeavour to water, having only one Tank of water on board, and then to make the 
best of our way to Bussora or Bushire according as our water held out. 
Monday the 16th saw some Europeans on shore, sent our boats to see who they 
were, we then being to the Eastward of the Enemy about 1h miles - the boat soon . 
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after returned with 10 seamen, 1 soldier, 10 Lllscares, 8 Seapoys, 2 Topasses, 2 Ser-
vants belonging to Mr. Bowyear, 1 Servant belonging to the Commodore; and a black 
Carpenter, who informed us they were saved by being in the fore part of the ship, and 
says that the ship was blown up by the carelessness of the Gunner, and Steward who 
had a candle down in the after hold drawing Arrack off which took fire. 
The foregoing thirty five men are all that were saved of 3 hundred and more there 
were Eighty six Europeans military on board about as many European seamen, and 
the remainder consisted of Seapoys and lascars: The gentlemen who unfortunately 
perished by this sad event, are 
Commodore Fountain Price 
Dymoke Lyster } 
William Bowyear} 
Capt. Lyton Leslie } 
Lieut. Wm. Robbins} 
Lieut. Melenburgh } 
Richard Watkins! 
James Dewling 
" Watkins 
Michael Cummings 
joined managers on 
the Ormuse expedition 
Military 
Lieutenant 
Surgeon 
Elemine [Stephen] Hermit the Bushire Linguist 
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APPENDIX31 
(lOR, R/15/111, p.338) 
Letter of Commanders of the Khark expedition to Karim Khan 
To 
Carim Caun 
After Compliments 
We the Commanders in Chief of the land and Sea forces belonging to the English 
Nation in the Gulph of Persia, think it incumbent on us to acquaint your Majesty with. 
the present situation of affairs regarding the Island of Carrack. Our forces having 
lately assembled off that place, We received orders from our superiors at Bussora, to 
make an attempt for the reduction thereof, in consequence of your Majestys desire 
signified to him by our Embassador to your renowned Court. To put those orders 
into Execution we were obliged to wait some days for a favourable wind which would 
enable us dispose of our Ships in a proper manner for commencing the attack. This 
opportunity happening yesterday by the wind being at NW, our fleet advanced 
towards the Fort about 2 hours after noon, but shifting unfortunately to the SW before 
they could reach their proper stations, it obliged them to Anchor at a much greater 
distance from the Fort than we intended not being able to go in any further. However 
to testify our zeal for your Majestys Service We determineq to continue our 
endeavour to contribute thereto, notwithstanding this disadvantage hoping that Fortune 
would still render us superior to the Efforts of the Enemy, to the end we might have 
the satisfaction of advising your Majesty of the utter destruction of your rebellious 
subject the Meer, but his last hour being not yet come, We perceived after an Engage-
ment of two hours that our ships were then at too great a distance from the Fort to do 
so much Execution as was necessary to make a breach for the entrance of our troops 
into the town, that the wind increased and night nearly approached- We judged there-
fore it would be most advisable to discontinue the Attack for that day and renew it 
again the next morning if the wind would permit. We accordingly returned again to 
Sea, but having received a Letter in that interval from our Embassador at your Mag-
nificent Court acquainting us your Majesty had been graciously pleased to promise 
him that a body of your Troops should be ordered to Act in Conjunction with us in 
this undertaking the issue of which would be rather doubtful with only the small num-
ber of Troops we are able to land, (tho we could not neglect the opportunity to give 
your Majesty an Instance of the continuance of that friendship on our parts towards 
your Majesty which had always subsisted between your Royal Predecessors, the 
ancient Kings of Persia and our nation, by commencing hostilities against Meer 
Mahanna who has had the presumption to act contrary to your royal will and pleasure 
in defiance of that authority with which the great God has invested your Majesty, for 
the benefit of mankind). Confiding in this your royal promise, we are now resolved 
to suspend all further hostile proceedings against the Enemy in regard to his Town, 
till the Junction of those Troops with our Forces (unless the orders of our Superior the 
Agent at Bussora should direct otherwise) hoping the number will amount to at least 
3000 men and that they will be in readiness to proceed to Action before the heats, 
from which they might find some inconvenience, are much further advanced. 
21st May 1768 · 
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APPENDIX 32 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 199, pp.61-2) 
Letter from Karlm Khan to Moore 
on his preparations against M""rr Muhanna 
August 1768 
The most honble amongst the tribe of Jesus and the most esteemed of the Law of 
Christ, Mr Moore, Balios of Bussora for the most honorable English company we 
desire he will be fully satisfied and assured we have much friendship and favours 
towards him. Before this time we acquainted him of the departure of the brave 
soldiers of our Kingdom on the expedition against Mahanna, the whole that we 
acquainted him therein. We have our troops, we have reviewed, all the preparations 
for their departure on this expedition, and have named for their commander the most 
honble, the ... and most Royal Mahomed Zackey Caun our brother. All the guns and 
ammunitions for war and provisions we have made ready that on the 17th of this 
moon which is rabal sauney [Rabi' al-thani] they will depart, and day by day will 
travel and on the 29th of this same moon will be arrived in ginover [Ganawah] that in 
this place they may embark on the vessels and embarkations of our kingdom with the 
assistance of the vessels of the most honble English company. We have also ordered 
that from every place under our power on the seacoast, that they shall bring as many 
embarkations as possible to genover, that in the end these troops may embark and 
pass over to the Island of carrack and taken the fort and finish the affairs of mahanna, 
beside these, every day we shall view and send to the sea coast, as many soldiers as 
possible, by way of precaution, as we have seen it necessary to advise you of the 
departure of these troops and now we again make renew our promises to you and on 
this account we have wrote this short phirmaund [faramiin] and ... you by ally Beg 
gillopdar to go as choppar and arrive with speed and we request that as soon as the 
phirmaun will be received by you, Honble sir, conformable to all the conditions 
which I now again confirm that you will order your commanders in the manner we 
before requested, to keep ready 3 or 4 vessels, that at the end of this moon, when my 
respectable brother with the troops shall arrive on the sea coast, they may not be 
retarded to finish this expedition as soon as possible, every thing stands agreeable to 
the promises I have made, and after finishing the affair of mahoona, you shall be fully 
convinced of the veracity of my promises, and they shall be fully accomplished agree-
able thereto. This we request you will confide and believe in as from us. 
Rebual Sauney 1182 
A True Translate 
George Skipp 
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APPENDIX 33 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 199, pp. 74-5) 
Letter from Moore to Kanm Khan 
offering help on certain conditions 
I have been honored with Your Majesty's letter by your trusty messenger and fully 
understand the contents of it. 
Your Majesty has therein been pleased to solicit the assistance of the east India com-
pany's remaining ships and vessels, in order jointly with your own fleet to proceed 
against Meer Mahanna of Carrack. It was for this service, the Begler Beg [Governor] 
of Bombay, sent the Squadron into the gulf in the month of November last, he wrote 
you so; I then wrote to you also. The condition of this assistance on our parts, was 
the prior performance of sundry promises on yours; whether you have performed 
those promises or not I submit to Your Majesty's determination. To convince you, 
however, how much we wished to be your friends, this public breach of your faith 
was overlooked by us, and in the month of may last we acceded to the agreement then 
passed between Your Majesty and Mr. Skipp in consequence thereof our ships 
attacked Carrack, but the God of victory was against them, since that time not a per-
sian troop has marched, after an immence expences of men and money you have com-
pelled us to return a great part of our squadron to India without performing a single 
service for which they were sent hither by attaching ourselves to Your Majesty's 
cause, we have met with nothing but perfidy, disgrace and disappointment. These 
several points considered and Your Majesty must not think it extraordinary, that we 
cannot have the confidence in you, that we would wish to have. 
For these reasons we sometime since directed Mr. Skipp to quit Shiraz, he informs us 
Your Majesty would not admit thereof, again we have repeated our orders to him, and 
are to request you would indulge him with the necessary passports for that purpose. 
Should Your Majesty think proper to attack Carrack with your own ships and forces 
we hope Your Majesty will be successful, your treatment to us has been by far too 
injurious to admit of our now assisting you, but on the following conditions. 
That you immediately order the Chaub [Ka'b] to send to us at Bussora the sum of 
1 ' 1"1/"IQ T.omau"d.. 1"SSe" ..... :s s"- ,..,~ .... S1~pp ... ..; ... s v .... u .. '"'r .. ;es+-· has p .. ,.m:se..:~ 
.a...J,VV .& •• ., ••• .&V .,, &.II.& Ulll l.V.i..&. A.l nJ..U.~ .&.V .L i.l'"lGJ L] I .lUU 1 U. 
That you send to Bussora a person of the frrst distinction about your court to treat 
with us on the subject of our Commerce in Your Majesty's Dominions. 
These points concluded to our satisfaction and we will then treat with Your Majesty 
on the subject of assisting you against Meer Mahanna and not before. 
I pray God to give Your Majesty health and wisdom 
and am respectfully 
Your very obedient humble servant 
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APPENDIX34 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 199, p.267) 
Morley's departure from Bushire: 
complaint from Shaikh ij:ajji and Moore's reaction 
Bussora February 1769 
Tuesday 14 Received the following letter from sheik Hodjee the present sheik of 
bushire, his father sheik sadoon being at Schiras. 
Translate of a letter from Shiek Hodjee, Son of Shiek Sadoon, at Bushire, 
to the agent. 
A. C., 
By the favor of god Meer Mahanna has fled and the trade of the poor will 
now be carried on without any hindrance. When your vessels last arrived 
from Bussora, Mr. Morley began to send his effects away from hence, 
informing me that he had received orders from you for the purpose; I 
earnestly requested him to stay and wait your further orders which if he 
again received he might then retire unmolested; but he would not hear me 
and I am sorry to inform you that he has left this place. I earnestly 
request you will not forget us at Bushire, or leave the honble company's 
house here uninhabited. 
In Mr. Jervis's time it was always customary for the English broker to pay 
the sheik of this place 1000 Rsl- per annum on account brokerage, but 
Mr. Morley has refused me the same allowance, unless he received your 
orders to pay it me; of this I some time ago informed you by letter, but 
received no answer; I therefore again request you will allow me the 
arrears which are for two years or 2000 Rs/-, and as I am indebted to 
Coja Y acoob of your place in that sum I request you will account with 
him for it. 
At a Consultation Present 
Henry Moore Esq., Agent 
John Beaumont George Green 
William Lewis 
Read and approved our last consultation. 
Read the several letters received yesterday from Mr. James Morley. 
It is to be wished Mr. Morley had not been driven to the disagreeable necessity of 
relinquishing our factory at Bushire so precipitately; at least until he could have 
received our honble superiors sentiments relative to that settlement; in our opinions 
however he has acted prudently in coming away from thence, as the insolence of the 
bushire sheiks has long been alarming, and the having a factory at bushire can no 
longer be a check upon us. Whatever may be our determinations as to our future con-
duct with the Caun. We hope that this further injurious treatment from the persian 
(with the whole tenor of the residents letter considered) will in some measure 
exculpate us to our honble superiors should we relax a little in our observance of the 
positive orders we lay under, received in january 1769 relative to our conduct towards 
the caun, the necessity of the case we flatter ourselves will plead our pardon. 
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APPENDIX35 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 199, p.278) 
Letter from Moore to the Shaikh of Khark 
on compensation for losses caused by Mir Muhanna 
To, 
The Sheik of Carrack for the time being 
A. C., 
You must be very well acquainted with the great losses which the English have 
sustained from the late Sheik of your island, Meer Mahana, whom you have expelled 
from Carrack, and who is now a prisoner with the Turks for which losses the English 
have never received any consideration; I therefore now send Mr. Morley our late 
Resident at Bushire to give you an account thereof and to make such other demands as 
the honble the E. I. company are from justice and honor entitled to, and on your 
granting those demands, you may be always assured of my friendship and the friend-
ship of the English nation. 
Bussora 22nd Feb. 1769 
APPENDIX36 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 199, p.298) 
Morley's letter to the Shaikh of Khark 
asking for negotiations to begin 
Translate of a letter from Mr. James Morley to the Sheik of Carrack for the time 
being, on board the Revenge off that island the 27th February 1769. 
A. C., 
Accompanying this you receive a letter from the honble English East India company, 
their agent at Bussora, acquainting you with the intention of sending me to you, 
agreeable to which I am now waiting here in expectation of seeing a person of con-
sequence and capacity on board this ship very shortly, fully empowered to treat with 
me in your behalf on the conditions of our entering into a mutual, and lasting friend-
ship with each other, which you must doubtless be convinced must be so essential to 
your interest that the rejecting this offer must in the end inevitably prove your 
destruction. 
Whomsoever you may employ in this negotiation, I assure on the good faith and sin-
cerity for which our nation is so justly famous, will be in no danger of any hurt or 
molestation from us, but shall be entirely at liberty to return again whenever he may 
think proper. 
True Translation 
J. Botham Assistant 
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APPENDIX37 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 199, p.298) 
Shaikh of Khark's letter to Morley 
professing friendship and co-operation 
Translate of a letter to Mr. Morley from Meer Husain Sultan the Sheik of Carrack 
received the 27th Feb 1769, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. 
A. C., 
I have received your letter and fully understand its contents. The offer you have 
made me that a mutual friendship should subsist between us, I am sincerely desireous 
of accepting, wishing that friendship may never diminish, but always continue to 
increase. By the favor of god whosoever reside here on your part, will experience the 
greatest friendship from us, and that this friendship is of the purest nature will also 
appear to every one of the English nation. As you have now proposed that we should 
be on friendship with each other, let it be bound with the strongest ties as before, and 
you will always find me sincerely disposed to act agreeable thereto. The town is 
yours, so is the country, and we will in future be so closely united as to be but one. 
Whatever has happened has happened, and whatever is gone is gone and may god for-
give what has passed. Such orders as you may give me, I am ready to obey. 
True Translation 
J. Botham Assistant 
APPENDIX 38 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 199, p.299) 
Defiant letter from the Shaikh of Khark to Morley 
Translate of a letter from Meer Hussein Sultan Sheik of Carrack to Mr." Morley 
received the 28th Feb 1769 at 5 o'clock in the afternoon. 
After Compliments 
Your welcome letter I have received and heartily rejoice to hear you are well. You 
first demand of us the galivats. Ten lakhs of Rsl- and the demolishing the fortifica-
tions and then declare you are ready to be in friendship with us. These demands you 
should not have made on us but on others who may stand in fear of you, for we are 
no way terrified thereby. I before wrote you a letter, thinking at that time you meant 
us well, but now it plainly appears you have other intentions. Be it known to you we 
have no property, the town and everything on the island belonging to the vackeel 
[Karim Khan] whose favor may god preserve to us, and we also pray he may always 
be fortunate against his enemies. If you are desirous of having what you have 
demanded, bring me an order from the vackeel and it shall be obeyed; otherwise I 
cannot comply. This is my word contrary to which you must not entertain any 
thoughts. 
What you intend you may do. Should you bring me an order from the vakeel to 
receive any money it shall be paid, but without, you nor any other shall . . . anything 
from us but shot balls, and this is my final answer. 
A True Translation J. Botham Assistant 
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APPENDIX39 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 199, pp.332-3) 
Report (extract) of a cruise in the Eagle 
off Khark in March 1769 
Extract from a Report of a Cruize in the Eagle Snow off Carrack 
March 1769 
Saturday 11 Weighed from Bussora with a fresh breeze from the South-
ward. 
Wednesday 15th Passed over the Bar 
Friday 17 Being at anchor in 10 fathom, in the morning it began to blow 
so hard that we could not purchase our anchor, got Topgallant Yards and Masts down 
lowered the lower yards down and made the vessel as snugg as possible. 
At 7 A.M. a hard Gale took us on the larboard Bow, and we drove with a whole 
cable out falling athwart the sea and laying much along we were water logged, the 
live stock all falling forward: were obliged to heave some of them over board to clear 
the cables, the small Bower Cable being over the sheet cable were obliged to let go 
the small Bower, and veered to half a cable, at which time we brought up. 
Saturday 18 Joined the Revenge. 
Sunday 19th Anchored off Carrack in 20 Fathom when brought up the 
Extremes of Carrack ... distance off Carrack 7 or 8 miles, the Extreams of Cargo 
[Kharku]@ ... S toN. Wt. The ... distance 4 or 5 miles, we were obliged to give 
Corgo a good Birth on account of clearing it with an Easterly wind. 
20th. 21st. 22nd. There were many boats passed from Carrack to Corgo from 
that to the Main, but they without reach of our Guns, and close to Corgo could not 
chace them. 
Thursday 23rd. Anchored off R ... 9 fathom, Extreams of the Persian shore @ 
NEWt 'A Wt. S ... Bang being the ... extreem, Carrack@ NEWt. 3/4 ... distance 
of the main 3 leagues. 
Tuesday 28 Finding that we could not block up the passage from Carrack 
to the main, weighed and ran over to Carrack, anchored in 21 fathom, the extreams 
of the Persian shore from . . . distance about 6 leagues the trees on Cargo N. W. dis-
tance 4 miles. In the afternoon boats standing from Carrack towards the main, they 
coming pretty near us weighed and gave chace to them. At 4 P.M. we being within 
random Shot and they rather gaining on us we fired a gun to bring them to. But they 
not minding the frrst fired 76 [sic] more at them; at which time by the carelessness of 
one of the people a powder hom blew up, and two guns went off accidentally and 
wounded 5 men. Mr. Bond midshipman having his arm broke and hand hurt, Wil-
liam Germon Quarter Master having the powder hom in his hand much burnt, Joseph 
Jordon who died soon afterwards, two soldiers slightly burnt. At the same time 10 
sail of galivats hove in sight at 1h past 4. Finding the chase gained on us bore away 
for the galivats, they seeing us standing for them they wore and stood to the 
northward. At sunset was near enough to them to discover they were the Chaubs 
[Ka'b] galivats but night coming on we lost sight of them; at 1h past 9 anchored. At 
midnight Richard Price Soldier in relieving the sentinel accidentally shot himself. 
Wednesday 29th In the morning a fresh gale from the S.E. Quarter could not 
weigh, sent a midshipman up to the mast head, who saw the galivats at anchor off the 
fort of Carrack; saw two of the Bushire galivats inshore at anchor. 
Thursday 30 Weighed and ran over off Carrack at noon the extream ... NW 
& W lh ... the trees on Cargo NW & N Cape Bang N/171W Hallala peak SE & E 
distance of Carrack 4 or 5 miles there we saw 7 of their galivats on the beach at Car-
rack. 
Friday 31 Bad weather and want of cables, our livestock being all done 
and only one cask of salt provisions on board bore away for Bussora. 
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APPENDIX40 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 200, p.142) 
Letter from Shaikh N~ir of Bushire 
asking Moore for English resettlement 
Translate of a letter from Shaikh Nassir at Schiras to the Agent received the 8th 
November 1769. 
After Compliments 
You have wrote me concerning your withdrawing your gentlemen from Bushire - at 
the time I heard of their leaving that place and returning to Bussora I was very sor-
rowful and at the same time was much puzzled to know your reasons for so doing, as 
the whole business of Bushire was stopped by it - it was on this account that I wrote 
you as a friend, desiring to know your reasons for leaving that place - For many years 
we been in friendship with the English and now more than ever, I desire to be friends 
with them, and to forward their interests as much as lies in my power. Concerning 
the Vackeel [Karim Khan] you write me that when he sends a person to you, to pay 
your losses as he promised to do, you may then think of resettling .in Persia- this I 
am afraid he never will do, unless you frst send a Gentleman to him, if you do this, I 
will then prove the friendship I have for you: I give you my word that your business 
shall be finished, and your Gentleman returned contented with his reception. I beg 
you will continue your friendly letters to me. 
Shaikh Nassir 
APPENDIX41 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 200, p.142) 
Letter from Shaikh N~ir's Attorney in Bushire 
on the demand for European cloth 
Translate of a letter from a person belonging to Shaikh Nassir named Alii Narrigh at 
Bushire, received with the foregoing [previous Appendix]. 
After Compliments, 
Europe cloth is now in great demand at Bushire. I now send you a letter which 
Shaikh Nassir forwarded me for you from Schiras. 
Alli Narrigh 
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APPENDIX42 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 200, p.143) 
Letter from Shaikh N~ir of Bushire to Moore 
warning of French hopes to settle in Bushire 
Translate of a letter from Shaikh Nassir at Shiras to the Agent received the 26th 
November. 
After Compliments, 
If you have arrived that I should send a person to speak with and settle affairs, give 
me your orders and I will do it immediately, or if you choose to send any goods to 
Bushire the town is yours, and affords a good price for them - advise me if you send a 
Gentleman to act for you, and I will then prove the friendship I have for you. God 
knows that it is for this motive of friendship that I am so solicitous about your affairs. 
The French Linguist is arrived here. He wants to make a mercantile contract with the 
Vackeel [Karim Khan], but with everyone the English goods are in the greatest 
esteem, and I doubt not but you would speedily sell as great a quantity as you could 
send. I write this to you in order that you may have a gentleman ready at Bushier 
with cloth, to sell to the merchants that would immediately go there for it. No one 
knows that I write you this letter; my first desire is to preserve your friendship, t.lte 
next to follow the Vakeel's will. With the other nation I do not desire to have any 
concern. The French Vakeel a Linguist now here has many and long petitions to 
make to Carim Caun. I therefore advise you of it, that you may if you please send a 
person here in your behalf, if you choose to do so advise me of it some time before, 
that I may prepare the Vakeel for his reception. Consider well what I write, and then 
act as you think proper. I shall impatiently wait your answer to this. 
November 1769 
Shaikh Nassir 
APPENDIX 43 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 200, p.143) 
Letter from Shaikh N~ir's Attorney in Bushire 
confirming the demand for European cloth there 
Translate of a letter from Alii Narrigh a person at Bushire belonging to Shaikh Nassir 
at Schiras received with the foregoing. [previous Appendix] 
I send you a letter from Shaikh Nassir at Schiras, who has desired me to wait on you 
at Bussora. I wait your orders on this head, and will attend you where you desire it -
Europe cloth is in great demand at this place. 
Alli Narrigh 
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APPENDIX 44 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 200, pp.146-7) 
Letter from Moore to Shaikh N~ir at Shiraz 
rejecting the idea of resettlement at Bushire 
To Sheik Nasir at Schiras. 
A. C., 
I have received two letters from you to which I would have replied sooner had not my 
absence from Bussora and business since my return prevented me. 
My reason for withdrawing from Bushire was the ungenerous treatment that the 
English received from Carim Caun, and because continuing there was attended with 
no advantage to my Employers the East India Company. As to again resettling at 
Bushire, it is what I never think of, nor of having any further connections with Persia, 
unless I am ordered to do so or unless the Vakeel [Kaiim Khan] thinks proper to do, 
what I have already mentioned to you. I am glad to hear cloths are in such demand in 
Persia - they are also in demand here. There is no occasion for your sending any per-
son up to treat with me at Bussora, because I can treat with no one but Carem Caun, 
or one of the principal men of his court. I am obliged to you for the intelligence you 
have sent me with respect to the French Linguist and his mercantile Contracts with the 
Vakeel; the Vakeel I doubt not will do what is most conducive to his interests, and 
you, if you are a faithful subject, ought to assist him therein. I am much obliged for 
the good will you profess for me, and will good wishes for as much prosperity as you 
deserve, I am &ca 
Bussora the 29th November 1769 
Henry Moore 
APPENDIX45 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 200, p.147) 
Moore's reely to Shaikh N~ir's Attorney in Bushire 
about resettlement there 
To Alli Narrigh at Bushire 
After Compliments, 
I have received your two letters with those you inclosed me from Shaikh Nassir, and 
fully understood the meaning thereof - be pleased to forward the inclosure to Sheikh 
Nassir, to whom I refer you, as to your coming to Bussora or not- I ani &ca 
Bussora the 29th November 1769 
Henry Moore 
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APPENDIX 46 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 200, pp.295-6) 
Letter from Shaikh N~ir at Shiraz to Shaikh 'lsa at Bushire 
saying that the British alone should write to Kaiim Khan 
Translate of a letter from Shaikh Nassir at Schyras, to Shaikh Ise at Bushire. 
At this time you write me that a vessel from Bombay is arrived with Mr. Morley who 
was formed y Resident at Bushire - that he was one day with you and that you paid 
him the necessary compliments and civilities. I find it was Mr. Morley's desire that 
you should write to me to procure from the Vakeel [Kaiim Khan] a Phirmaund 
[faramiin] for his return to Bush ire. Bush ire from the first was always under the 
orders of the English - from frrst to last we were their friends. By the favor of God 
during the English, or other strangers, their being at Gombroon, Bushire or other 
places in the Kingdom of Persia, I was as their Vakeel [agent], I promoted their inter-
est all in my power, and do their business, when they thought proper to employ me. 
From us, they never received any hindrance or opposition. I believe it is very clear to 
them that Carem Caun gave Bushire to me, and that no one has any thing to do with 
such persons as I permit to reside there; now this is my recommendation; let Mr. 
Morley come and settle at Bushire: if he has any letters from the General of Bombay, 
let him send them to Carem Caun by a capable person; I will forward the business all 
in my power, and get a Phirmaund from the Vakeel [Kaiim Khan] agreeable to his 
desire, and send it. If Mr. Morley has no letters from Bombay, let Mr. Moore write 
one from Bussora to Carem Caun and send a person with it. God willing he shall 
receive the Phirmaund he desires - but if Mr. Moore remains at Bussora and does not 
write, how can anyone else request Carem Caun to send him a letter, inviting him to 
resettle Bushire. In short until Mr. Morley is really settled at Bushire, to speak to the 
Vackeel to procure Phirmaunds, will answer no end. I would have applied for them, 
but I have been considering for a long time for an opportunity to speak to the Vackeel 
about this business and I found this was not a proper time. The English as they have 
wrote, have many favors to ask of Carem Caun; as I said before, let them send a per-
son with a letter to him and their business shall be finished. I will get it done for I 
hope that Carem Caun will be content with everything that they shall with him 
because I want that he shall be friends with them. I have no interest in this affair-
what Carem Caun's intentions is, I am very well acquainted with, but I want to do 
good for the English. This is what I write; inform them of the purport of this letter; 
and then let them do as they please. 
A true translate 
Bussora the 24th May 1770 
William Digges Latouche 
Secretary 
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APPENDIX 47 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 200, p.315) 
Letter from Shaikh N~ir to Moore recommending him 
to petition Karim Khan about resettlement 
Translate of a letter from Sheik Nassir to the Agent, received the 28th June. [1770] 
After great compliments, 
I write you this letter to enquire concerning your health. I have been informed from 
Bushire that Mr. Morley was there a few days, and departed for Bussora. Afterwards 
a ship from Europe arrived there; she stayed a few days and then sailed. The reason 
of her coming and going we are at a loss to fmd out - or what were your thoughts on 
that head. You must know for certain that that port belongs to the English as also its 
inhabitants as formerly- in the time of our father and Grandfather, who were always 
in the English Service. They were sincerely attached to the English Interest, and we 
are much more so. If any of your people want to trade in this country and you 
approve of their settling at Bushier, and want the Caun's Phirmaund [faramiin] for 
that purpose, you must write a Petition to him, and send it by a spirited and capable 
person, who can talk in a proper manner to so great a man as the Vackeel of Persia. 
As I am your friend, I have wrote you this letter and because I want that the English 
should again settle at Bushire. I have sent a man to Bussora on purpose with it, and 
request you will send me an answer by him. 
APPENDIX 48 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 200, p.315) 
June 1770 
Letter from Agha Kiiciik to Moore recommending him 
to petition Karim Khan about resettlement 
Letter from Aga Cukheek at Bushire inciosing the foregoing [previous Appendix] 
After compliments, 
I write you this letter to enquire of your Health. At this time I have received a letter 
from my master Sheik Nassir which will give you pleasure, as it assures of his friend-
ship. He sent me from Schiras to forward to you; it therefore goes now inclosed, 
together with one to you also from Sheik Ise. I have before wrote you t~o or three 
times and it gives me great concern that I have never received an answer 'from you. 
What has passed before this must now be forgotten and you must be friends with the 
people of this Country. As my Master has wrote to you according to his promise, 
you must confide in him, and consider this port as belonging to you. You must settle 
again at this place, and everything will then go well - the Gentlemen that come will 
always be certain of finding me a steady friend. But if you want to settle here on a 
more certain footing, write an Anee to the great Ascander [he is equating Karim 
Khan with Alexander the Great], as my Master has desired you, and send it by a 
capable person; he will be able to fmish anything at Schyras and return to you in a 
few days - I beg you will send your answer to the present letters, as soon as possible. 
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APPENDIX 49 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 200, pp.315-6) 
Letter from Shaikh 'lsa to Moore recommending him 
to petition Karim Khan about resettlement 
June 1770 
Translate of a letter from Sheik Ise 
After Compliments, 
I write you this letter to be informed of your health. The Sheik of Sheiks my brother, 
now writes to you, to desire you to settle a factory again at Bushire. If you settle here 
agreeable to my brothers desire and mind your business, without thinking on what has 
passed, you may depend that everything that he promised you shall be punctually per-
formed. You must know very well that Ascander Shawn [Karim Khan] has given 
everything belonging to this Port to my brother, and as my brother is a great friend of 
yours, he wants to give you proofs of his regard for you, and to do for the English 
everything that they desire - you may also be assured of my friendship. This boat is 
now sent on purpose with my brother's letter, and after you have read it, you will 
send your Gentlemen to settle at Bushire. If you want the Caun's Phirmaund 
lfaramiin], you must send a person with an Anee to him, and my brother will assist 
him in procuring one, that will answer your expectations. But if you do not send a 
petition, how can my brother speak to the Vakeel [Karim Khan] concerning your busi-
ness. If you want anything done at this place, pray employ me. 
APPENDIX SO 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 200, p.318) 
Letter from Moore to Shaikh N~ir of Bushire 
on having to await orders from his superiors 
July 1770 
To Shaikh Nassir, at Schiras 
After Compliments, 
A few days since I was favoured with your letter for which I am now to thank you by 
the return of your servant. The information you received of Mr. Morley's arrival at 
Bushier was very true; he is now here and one of the Bussora Council. Concerning 
the ship which you mention to have arrived, to have stayed only a few days, and then 
to have returned, I am to inform you she was one of the King of England ships, dis-
patched here by the English commodore now in India, with a view for the British 
Government. The friendship which has so long subsisted between your family and 
the English is well known. I am obliged by your offers of service at Schiras, and you 
may depend when the business of the English renders it necessary to send a person 
thither, I shall take the liberty to make use of them. I will also in due time attend to 
your advice concerning the petition to be written to the Khan, and the sending a 
proper person to him; for the present however, for particular reasons we are obliged 
to defer both the one and the other, until we can receive the further orders of our 
Superiors at the Presidency. I am &ca 
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APPENDIX 51 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 200, pp.318-9) 
July 1770 
Letter from Moore to Shaikh 'Isa at Bushire 
on havmg to aw3.lt orders from h1s supenors 
To Shaikh Ice at Bushire 
After Compliments, 
I am obliged to you for your letter, for the enquiries concerning my health, and for 
your offers of service at Bushire. Your Brother's letter from Schiras is also very 
agreeable to me, and I now send him my reply to it. What has passed between the 
Bushire sheiks and the English must now be forgotten. I thank you for your offers of 
friendship, in due time perhaps I may call on you for them, when I hope to find you 
the friend to the English that you say you are. I will also in due time attend to your 
advice concerning the Anee to be written to the Khan, and the sending a proper per-
son to him. But for particular reasons, we are for the present obliged to defer both 
the one and the other, until we can receive the further orders of our Superiors at the 
Presidency, I am Ca. 
APPENDIX 52 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 200, p.319) 
Covering letter of thanks from Moore 
to Agha Kiiciik in Bushire 
July 1770 
To Aga Cutcheek at Bushire 
After Compliments 
I thank you for your letter, also for the letters which you forwarded from Shaikh Nas-
sir and Shaikh Ice; to both the one and the other I now write the needful, which I am 
to request you would deliver. I am in very good friendship with the people of 
Bushire, and shall be glad to do you or them any good offices at Bussora. When our 
ships touch at Bushire you must do them all the good offices you can, as the Khan, 
the Sheiks and English are now such good friends. I obse~e what you say concern-
ing writing an Anee to the great Ascander [accepting the Agha's equating of Karim 
Khan with Alexander the Great] and resettling at Bushire, to all which will be paid all 
due attention. My not writing you often is owing to my not having anything particu-
lar to say to you, I am &ca. 
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APPENDIX 53 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 200, p.336) 
Letter from Shaikh 'lsa of Bushire to Moore 
promising friendship and assistance 
Translate of a letter from Shaikh Ice at Bushire to the Agent received the 26th July 
1770. 
After Compliments, 
I have received your letter and am glad to hear of your health. The letter you 
inclosed for my brother Shaikh Nassir, I dispatched to Schiras the day it was received 
here. This port as I always told you belongs to the English- former disputes are 
entirely forgotten, and we are now sincerely attached to the interest of each other. 
Whenever you may think proper to resettle again at Bushire, you shall find me steady 
to the promises I have made you, of affording the Gentlemen you send down, every 
friendly assistance in my power. If you have any commands at this place by all 
means employ me. 
APPENDIX 54 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 201, p.3) 
Moore's letter to :ijusain Khan of Bandar Riq 
requesting the release of Britannia's crew and papers 
Delivered 15 July 1771 
To Hossein Caun at Bunderick 
After Compliments, 
I have received the letter which you wrote to me by Commander Ince, the subject of 
it will be referred to the General of Bombay, who will act in consequence as will 
appear to him most just and proper. In the meantime I have only to request that you 
will deliver to the Commander of the Expedition sent to Bunderick the men belonging 
to the English Vessel which has been taken by your fleet, together with such packets 
and papers as were on board her. Your doing this will be a proof of the sincerity of 
the friendship which you profess for our nation. 
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APPENDIX 55 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 201, p.15) 
Letter from.}Jusain Khan to Moore blaming 
Shaikh N~ir of Bushire for the Britannia incident 
Early August 1771 
Translate of a letter from Hossein Caun. 
After Compliments, 
I received your letter and understand the contents - you desire me to send the people 
belonging to your vessel. Before your letter arrived I sent the Captain with his people 
and some of mine to Bushire, from thence the Captain and one of his Officers were 
sent to Schyras by orders from Carem Caun. The Captain I hear is since dead, which 
has given me great concern: the Officer continued his journey to Schyras. This affair 
was entirely put under the management of Sheikh Nassir of Bushire - the capture of 
the Vessel and the sending to Schiras the Captain were entirely through his means; 
may the Almighty punish him for so doing! The other Officer ~ith some of the 
people who remained here are now sent to you. The women belonging to the Captain 
and First Officer shall be also sent to you, as soon as the Officer returns from 
Schyras. I hope you will not have a bad opinion of me for detaining them until his 
return. I request you will believe that neither Carem Caun or I, have been the causes 
of the late unfortunate circumstance which has taken place. Shaikh Nassir of Bushire 
has been the sole promoter of it. I cannot write you more particularly on this head, 
but a person of your sense will guess the rest. I request you will not discontinue your 
corresponddence with me, but employ me freely if I can be of any service to you. 
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APPENDIX 56 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 201, pp.33-4) 
Letter to Moore from Karim Khan 
justifying the taking of the Britannia 
Received 7 September 1771 
Translate of a letter from Carem Caun to the Agent 
After Compliments, 
The petition you wrote me concerning two of your Vessels taken by Sarmas Caun 
(Hossein Caun called Sarmas or most valiant) Admiral, I have received and 
understand the contents. You best know why those vessels were taken; formerly the 
Kings of Europe had houses in the kingdom of Persia to carry on their trade and busi-
ness then, when the Persian Gulf was disturbed by Pirates, those Kings assisted the 
Kings of Persia by seizing and sending such Pirates to them: for which service the 
favour of the Kings of Persia was towards the Europeans. In such manner as the 
ancient Kings behaved, in such manner have I always done. Since you settled at Bus-
sora many things have happened contrary to ancient custom; this has divided the 
friendship formerly subsisting between us. · 
When Mr. Skipp came to settle several points with me, one of which was his asking 
my permission to take Carrack, and sending Mahanna to me, for which service the 
English were to have liberty to settle on Carrack or elsewhere in Persia, I granted my 
permission. You then sent a few vessels and a few soldiers against Carrack and they 
did nothing. After this you desired my Army to send with your Army on board three 
large ships and a number of smaller vessels belonging to you against Carrack. I did 
not then know you would not keep your word with me, and I made preparations with 
a great ... and ammunition and sent them with Mr. Skipp, in order to assist you in 
taking the boats and Vessels belonging to Meer Mahanna, and giving them up to me. 
When my troops arrived near Bushire your goods and vessels were all sent to Bussora 
-this I understand was by your orders. My Army waited, depending on your prom-
ise, but they were deceived. By this management of yours, the friendship formerly 
subsisting between us divided. Your management is contrary to ancient capitulations 
between the English and Persians. I am not certain whether the Vessels you mention 
belong to the English to any other Europeans or to Muscat. You must know I have 
not behaved contrary to the ancient friendship subsisting between us. 
I order you as soon as possible to send me a true account of the goods belonging to 
those vessels. 
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APPENDIX 57 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 201, p.24) 
Letter from Shaikh N~ir recommending Moore 
to send details of Britannia's cargo to Karim Khan 
Received on 7 September 1771 
Translate of a letter from Sheikh Nassir to the Agent 
I have always been a friend to the English and spoke well of them to Carem Caun. 
Your first Pattamar arrived here without a letter to me, and I then thought you had 
forgot me. By your second Pattamar you wrote me a letter the contents of which I 
fully understand. As you have wrote to me I must give you my advice, that is, to 
send Carem Caun as soon as possible a particular account of the Goods belonging to 
the Vessels you mention- if you do not you will injure your Nation. 
August 1771 
APPENDIX 58 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 201, p.36) 
Account of the Britannia's cargo given 
to Karim Khan by First Officer Nicholson 
An account of the Snow Britannia's Cargo 
Sugar Candy 
Soft sugar 
Camphor 
Sal Ammoniac 
Coffee 
Cloves 
Cinnamon 
Cardamoms 
Quick Silver 
Chests 255 
Canisters 250 
Tubs 17 
Bales 18 
ditto 117 
Chests 10 
ditto 2 
Bales 1 
Pots 2 
Cassia flower Chests 10 
Musk Box 1 
Piece goods Bales 17 
Moorman's caps Chests 3 
Bags of Black pepper 
Bars of Iron 
Pigs of Lead 
Pigs of tin 
Bales of Indigo 
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September 1771 
To Carem Caun 
After Compliments, 
APPENDIX 59 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 201, p.45) 
Letter from Moore to Karim Khan urging 
the release of Britannia's crew 
I have been honored with your Majesty's letter to me relative to the vessels taken by 
your Admiral Hossein Caun, and shall leave the whole world to judge whether the 
reasons you give in it are sufficient to justify such undeclared hostilities against a 
Nation, which has ever been as I observed in my last letter in friendship with yours, 
and from which your Majesty as well as the former Kings of Persia have received 
such services, performed too with large losses to itself. As your Majesty now has 
declared that the friendship between us is broken, I shall not trouble you any further 
with respect to the Vessels until I receive the further orders of my Honorable Supe-
riors at Bombay. With those orders I expect to receive an account of the Cargo of 
our Vessels which has not as yet been sent me. 
In the meantime I have a request to make to your Majesty which I hope you will not 
refuse me. It is that you will permit the Officer of the Britannia and our two other 
people now at Schiras to return to us.. Your compliance therewith will be a proof of 
your humanity and cannot be of any detriment to you, as they are very poor, and have 
not the wherewithal to pay their ransom, should you expect any from them, having 
lost what little they had by the capture of the Britannia. 
To Sheikh Nassir 
After Compliments, 
APPENDIX 60 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 201 , p.45) 
Letter from Moore to Shaikh N~ir urging 
the release of Britannia's crew 
I have received your letter and should follow your advice in sending Carem Caun an 
account of our Vessels Cargo, but I have never received from India any account of it. 
I enclose you another letter to him, which I request you will deliver. It is only to 
request the release of the Officer and the two men now at Schiras belonging to our 
vessel. It can be of no service to Carem ~aun to detain them, and his discharging 
them will be an act of the greatest humanity, as they are very poor, having lost what 
little they had on board the Britannia. You will much oblige me by procuring their 
liberty. I have wrote to a Merchant at Schiras to advance them a small sum to bear 
their expenses to Bussora. 
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APPENDIX 61 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 201, p.64) 
Karim Khan's agreement to release 
the Britannia crew 
Received 22 October 1771 
Translate of a letter from Carem Caun 
After Compliments, 
I have received your letter relative to your three people, and agreeable to your request 
I have now sent them to you. 
APPENDIX 62 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 201, p.64) 
Shaikh N~ir' s confirmation of the 
release of the Britannia crew 
Received 22 October 1771 
Translate of a letter from Shaikh Nassir 
After Compliments, 
I received your letter and delivered your Petition to the V ackeel, who now sends you 
your three people agreeable to your request. I have provided them with Mules and 
everything necessary for their journey, and have given orders to my people at Bushire 
to provide them with anything they may want and send them to Bussora. You have 
wrote very short concerning the account of your Vessels cargo - you know however 
your own affairs best. 
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17 January 1772 
To Carem Caun 
After Compliments, 
APPENDIX 63 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 201, p.118) 
Letter from Moore to Karim Khan enclosing 
an account of the Britannia's cargo 
I had the honor of writing your Majesty sometime ago, and then informed you that I 
had not at that time received any account of the cargo on board the Britannia when 
she was taken by your fleet under the command of Hossein Caun, having however 
received one a few days since, I now enclose it to your Majesty, agreeable to your 
desire, and the orders of the Governor of Bombay, and I doubt not but on receipt of it 
you will order Hossein Caun to make restitution as well of its amount, as the value of 
the Vessel and all damages that have been suffered by the capture. 
Bussora 
the 17th January 1772 
APPENDIX64 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 201, p.145) 
Letter from Karim Khan's deputy to Moore 
explaining the absence of a written reply 
Translate of a paper from Mahomed Jaffair. Carem Caun's second at SchLras received 
the 18th March f772. · 
After Compliments, 
Your letter to Carem Caun has been received by him, but he has not returned any ans-
wer to it, except what the Patta11Ulr will inform you by word of mouth: I give this 
paper to your messengers lest you should be displeased with him thinking he had not 
delivered your letter. 
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APPENDIX 65 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 201, p.179) 
Letter from Shaikh N~ir to Moore renewing 
his invitation to re-settle at Bushire 
Translate of a letter from Shaikh Nassir received the 17th May 1772. 
After Compliments, 
It is a long time since I had the pleasure of receiving a letter from you, though you 
will know, I have always been a friend to the English. Bushire you will know too is 
yours. It is a long time since you withdrew your factory from thence, but I believe 
you now think of returning to that place. My friendship for your Nation leads me to 
wish that you would do so- other Nations have desired a Settlement there, but I have 
declined, and shall continue to decline granting them permission, because it is my 
desire that you should return and re-establish a Factory there. If you will do so, you 
will find many good effects will ensue. Have your Affairs prospered more since, that 
they did before you withdrew from Bushire? Or did I ever give your Gentlemen any 
cause to leave my place. I request your answer to this letter. 
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APPENDIX 66 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 201, pp.354-7) 
Report of the capture of the Tyger 
On Board the Drake - April 1773 
Received from Lieutenant Scott the following account of the capture of the Tyger 
Brig. 
Report of the Tyger brig 
April 24th- The winds from the S.E. with frequent Squalls, and hard rains, 
unmoored per order Henry Moore Esq. at 1h past 3 do. Received orders to weigh and 
to proceed to Bussora, and there to anchor, and send our Boat with an officer to the 
Factory to bring off Messrs. John Beaumont and George Green with their necessaries 
for Bombay. Accordingly, weighed and anchored off Bussora Creek, at 6 P.M .. sent 
our boat with an officer up at 1h past 10 do he returned with two large Baskets of 
necessaries, came on board Messrs. John Beaumont and George Green; one girl and 
two slave Boys, and two children. Weighed and worked a little below the Creek, 
where we anchored at midnight. 
April 25 - Strong gales from the S. E. with constant rain and cloudy weather at 
8 P.M. weighed and worked down the river at 1h do, anchored in 4 fathom off the 
S.E. end of Chellaby's Island, as did the Drake at 1h past 8 A.M., weighed and 
worked down the river, at noon anchored off the Tombs in 4 fathom as did the Drake 
the vessel being much lumbered endeavored to stow away sundry provisions &ca 
belonging to Messrs. Beaumont and Green. 
26- Strong Gales from the S.E. to S.W. with constant rain, cloudy 
weather, thunder and lightning which obliged us to batten down our hatches, and 
prevented getting our vessel clear, at 1h past 4 P.M. weighed and worked down the 
river. At 6 do passed the Hafar, at 1h past 6 grounded on the Arabian side, struck 
yards and Topmasts up, and made sail down the river, at 6 do past the Drake at 
anchor at 7 do passed deep water point, I saw a large number of boats and Gallivats at 
anchor, between the Island Hommusa and the Persian side of the river, at 9 do saw 
several Gallivats and Dows at anchor off Chubola ooint which we took to be the Mus-
cat fleet, clearing the vessel, and got 4 guns clear,-from 9 to 1h past 10, weighing 
between the above mentioned vessels and saw several more at anchor off Chellaby's 
point, which confirmed us in our opinion, of their being the Muscat Fleet. Seeing 
them have to appearance 250 or 300 men each which we took to be slaves, not having 
intelligence of the Chaubs [Ka'b's] or Bunderick Gallivats being in the River, though 
we anchored ... at times coming down, at 3/4past 10 working down the river, saw 
what we took for a Trankey in shore weigh and stand up the river under an easy sail, 
which we thought was going to join the other boats at anchor - she came close past us, 
and in a few minutes after (when we were in stays) she hauled her wind and stood 
after us as did three more which were now close by us having tripped their anchors 
and dropped towards us, as I now suspected they intended to attack us, I immediately 
made all the dispatch in my power to put the vessel in a posture of defence as we 
were much lumbered with the Stock & furniture of Messrs. Beaumont and Green, 
though we had used our utmost endeavors under the 25th to clear our Decks which we 
found however impossible owing to a quantity of goods received from Captain Mack-
enley in order to enable the Drake to receive on board, the Swallows consigned of 
Surat goods together with the Agents &ca necessaries on my mentioning it to Messrs. 
Beaumont and Green, whose orders I was under, my suspicions of these vessels, Mr. 
Beaumont asked me if I thought the vessel could defend herself against them and of 
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my letting him know I was of opinion she could not being under in command for want 
of wind, and her decks so lumbered that her guns could not play. Mr. Beaumont then 
requested I would not fire a gun which he said might be the means of saving the lives 
of the people which would in all probability be hazarded, should any of the Gallivats 
people be killed or wounded, however had I not received these verbal orders, and 
even had an opportunity of firing, my orders bound me up, in such a manner that I 
could not with any degree of safety to myself make any resistance till first attacked, 
and as the Gallivats sailing near me was not a sufficient proof of their intentions to 
attack us, I did not think myself warranted to fire on their approach. I however put 
about and stood for the Drake on which the Gallivats astern of us came up almost 
instantaneously, and the Tyger refusing the helm for want of wind, she boarded us, 
and thereby rendered our guns useless with about 200 men, the other three Gallivats 
close by us and were rowing, for our head, the lascars immediately jumped overboard 
and as I thought the remainder (consisting of 11 Europeans) stood no chance against 
such odds as poured in on us the Vessel was delivered up without firing again [sic], 
the Crew having fled, some on the Bow sprit others in the Shrouds (drove by the 
enemy) and finding my presence of no manner of service, I jumped into the river and 
got on shore where I had the good fortune to procure a boat, which carried me on 
board the Drake together one European, one Tindal and one Military Topass, who 
had likewise jumped overboard and gained the shore. · 
Drake Snow James Scott 
April the 30th 1773 
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APPENDIX 67 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 201, pp.375-6) 
Governor of Bombay's letter to Karim Khan requesting the return 
of the Britannia and the Tyger, and the release 
of Beaumont and Green 
Copy of the President's letter to Carem Caun, Bombay the 27 October 1773. 
After Compliments, 
Having learnt that a small vessel belonging to the Hon'ble company coming out of 
Bussora river in April last was taken by some Gallivats belonging to Bunderick, on 
board which Vessel was Messrs. Beaumont and Green two gentlemen belonging to 
our Factory at Bussora, also a Grab belonging to William Shaw about two years ago 
was taken by the same Gallivats and carried into Bunderick and so I understand that 
those people are your subjects. In consequence of the friendship that has subsisted for 
many years between the kings of Persia and the Hon'ble English East India Company, 
I make this application to you to have those Vessels with whatever goods and Mer-
chandize was on board them made good to the Hon'ble East India Company and their 
Owners, and likewise request that you will release Messrs. Beaumont and Green that 
were taken 7 or 8 months ago coming out of Bussora river, and the offenders 
punished. I cannot suppose that the people of Bunderick could have your 
Excellency's directions to commit these acts of Piracy, therefore hope your orders 
will be to punish the offenders and orders be given to make good every loss and 
damage we have sustained. 
I hear you have ordered Messrs. Beaumont and Green to be brought up to Schyras, 
this letter I have delivered to Henry Moore Esq. the Company's Agent at Bussora 
who now returns thither and as directed to touch at Bunder Bushire to forward this let-
ter to your Excellency and he will also write you what farther is necessary. May your 
days be many and happy. 
367 
APPENDIX 68 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 202, pp.12-14) 
Moore's letter to Karim Khan offering various cloths 
and asking for the release of Beaumont and Green 
16 January 1774 
To Carim Caun, the King of Persia 
After Compliments, 
I had the honor to forward your Majesty from Bushire a letter from his Excellency the 
governor of Bombay; and now join my wishes to those of his Excellency for the con-
tinuation of your Majesty's health, and the prosperity of your kingdom. I would have 
addressed your Majesty from Bushire, but could not get a proper person there to 
translate my letter. 
The purport of the letter that I forwarded you from his Excellency the Governor 
would be known to you on the perusal of the requests that his Excellency therein 
makes of your Majesty I hope be complied with, in order that the English may again 
trade to your Kingdom, from which benefit may accrue as well to you as them. 
This however never can be the case so long as your Majesty permits the Bunderick 
and Carrack Gallivats to disturb the trade of the Persian Gulf in the manner they for 
some years past have done;· and this too, at a time that the English have as I thought 
been in profound peace with your Majesty and no British subject that I have known of 
since my being at Bussora has ever dared to show your subjects the least insults, or 
given them the least molestation. If any British subjects have behaved in any shape 
improperly towards your Majesty I beg you would be pleased to inform me. 
The taking of a trading vessel from Bombay named the Britannia; and the taking of a 
small vessel in Bussora river belonging to the India Company my Employers, on 
board of which were Messrs. Beaumont and Green two of the Bussora Council - these 
are acts of the Commanders of the Bunderick Gallivats; but they are acts I hope not 
authorised by your Majesty - in that hope, I humbly trust your majesty will very 
severely punish these your offending subjects, and give immediate orders for the 
release of the two gentlemen with their families, and for the restitution of the 
abovementioned vessels, the remainder of the Tyger' s crew, the stores and Cargoes. 
My wishes and the orders of my masters are to be on terms of friendship and com-
merce with your Majesty, these points your majesty may be assured I will endeavor to 
cultivate to the utmost to that end, and as I imagined it would be pleasing to your 
Majesty, I touched at Bushire in my way hither with five ships, and transacted busi-
ness with the Merchants at that place. I am very ready to obey your Commands at 
Bussora at which place I arrived the 5th instant. 
Once more I humbly petition your Majesty to give Messieurs Beaumont and Green 
their liberty, and that your Majesty would be pleased to signify to them such schemes 
of commerce as may be most agreeable to you. 
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Our Warehouses have plenty of all sorts of cloths in them, which I should be very 
happy to dispose of to your Majesty provided your Majesty and I can agree on equi-
table conditions on both sides previous to the delivery of them. 
Bussora 
the 16th 1774 
I have the honor to be with great respect. 
Your Majesty's 
Most obedient and humble servant 
H.M. 
APPENDIX 69 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 202, pp.l 05-6) 
Karim Khan's reply to Moore, offering help 
in return for ships 
Translate of a letter from Carim Caun to the Agent received the lOth February 1774. 
After Compliments, 
The letter that you forwarded me from Bushire from the Governor of Bombay, I have 
received and perfectly understand the contents thereof. I have also received the letter 
you wrote me from Bussora after your arrival there, the purport of which touching 
Commerce, the release of Messrs. Beaumont and Green, the restitution of property 
taken by the Bunderick Gallivats, and prohibition of the said Gallivats acting 
offensively against the English, I also perfectly understand. Agreeable to your 
request I will return the Europeans that are pnsoners in my country, the Vessel, and 
will punish the Bunderick people for their conduct. You say that trade will flourish in 
my country if I stop the depredations of the Bunderick Gallivats, because merchant 
ships will then sail up and down the Persian Gulf in safety; this I will also do because 
you require it - the gentlemen here shall be well treated. 
In former times the English used to keep the Gulf clear of all that were enemies to the 
Kings of Persia, and to show their favour unto them. It now happens that the Con-
queror of Muscat, which place was ever heretofore under the dominion of Persia, has 
thrown off his allegiance to us, and treats such merchants as trade to the Port of Mus-
cat improperly; on this account I have ordered some of my troops to get ready for 
Muscat, as ships however will be necessary for conveying of my troops, which ships I 
know you have under your command as Agent for the English Nation, I therefore 
apply to you in consequence of the friendship that the General of Bombay and you 
have made a tender of to me, to assist me in this particular; any other act of friend-
ship I ask not besides the one in question as I have no occasion for any. I therefore 
beg that for a few days you would lend me your ships to land my troops upon the 
Arab coast, and they will return again to you after this service is performed. If any 
accident to the ships happen on this service I will pay you the full amount of them. I 
am certain you cannot refuse me this favour, as our friendship will be so much 
increased by it. You may depend your gentlemen and the other English Prisoners 
shall be released, and that the Gulf shall be kept quiet by the Bunderick &ca Gallivats 
not molesting it in the manner you desire, that the merchant ships may go securely 
backward and forward. 
On the arrival of my Chubdar Ibrahim Aga with you, this business I hope will be fin-
ished and then your desires shall in all points be accomplished. I trust you will not 
refuse me these my demands. 
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12 February 177 4 
APPENDIX 70 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 202, pp.107-8) 
Moore's reply to Karim Khan 
declining to provide ships 
To Carim Caun, Vackeel of Persia 
After Compliments, 
I have been honored with your Majesty's letter by the hands of your servant Ibrahim 
Beg, the contents of which I have read with very great attention, and perfectly 
understand them. 
Your Majesty I am afraid has a much greater idea of the charge that is vested in me 
than it is deserving of; this circumstance has led your Majesty into the error of its 
being in my power to assist your Majesty with the English ships in order to transport 
your troops to the Arab Coast, for the prosecutuion of your war against the Muscat-
ters; but your Majesty must know that no servant can do a thing of that sort, without 
permission from his master, if he did, loss of honor and life must be the consequence 
of it. This is directly my situation; in which light I hope your Majesty will consider 
it; and not to the want of inclination either to serve or oblige you. The Muscatters 
would have been glad of the English assistance against your Majesty, but it could not 
on any account be granted them. 
By the first opportunity that offers for Bombay, I shall inform my Superiors of the 
request you Majesty has made of me; but I am afraid your request cannot be granted, 
because your Majesty still thinks proper to keep Mr. Beaumont and Green with 
sundry other British subjects, Prisoners in your dominions, prisoners taken in time of 
profound Peace, the release of these my unfortunate friends and Countrymen, with all 
English property will I hope be considered by your Majesty as the previous point, on 
which our future trading to your Country, and assisting your Majesty in other points 
depends. To assist your Majesty before these points are granted us would have a 
compulsory appearance incompatible with honor and fair fame. 
I do therefor most humbly beseech your Majesty to take these points into your con-
sideration, and hope you will give orders for the immediate release of Messieurs 
Beaumont and Green as they have now been near ten months your Prisoners, and their 
services are much wanted in Bussora. 
If your Majesty has any letter to forward to the General of Bombay I beg to be 
favored with it as soon as possible, as a vessel will in about twenty five days sail for 
that Port. · 
Bussora 
the 12th February 177 4 
I have the honor to be 
with the most profound respect, 
Your most obedient humble servant 
H.M. 
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Received 3 March 177 4 
Letter from Carim Caun 
APPENDIX 71 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 202, p.l40) 
Karim Khan's letter to Moore 
complaining of his refusal 
The letter I wrote you by Ibrahim Beg sometime since, you write you have received. 
Your answer to it by Mahomed Ziar Beg I have received and clearly understood 
everything that you have wrote in it. You say you must have the Governor of Bom-
bay his orders before you can give me the ships - the Governor writes me that he is a 
friend of the Persians, and wishes always to be friends with them; this letter you for-
warded from Bushire. The Governor also writes if I have any commands of business 
with the English I must write to Mr. Moore at Bussora, for these reasons I wrote to 
you for your two vessels to transport my troops to the Arab coast, and wrote you 
also, that I would be answerable for whatever accidents might happen to them. By 
your letter it appears you have not the power to let me have the ships; this does not 
agree with what the Governor writes. I am therefore of opinion you do not want to 
be friends with me and my kingdom; the favour I asked of you was a very small one, 
but you refused it. You may therefore suppose, that I shall most readily grant 
whatever favors you in tum may ask of me [sic]. You think you are acting properly 
in not lending your ships- go on therefore and act as seemed best unto you. 
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APPENDIX 72 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 202, pp.144-5) 
Moore's letter enclosing new translation 
of the Governor of Bombay's letter" to Karim Khan 
4 March 1774 
To Carim Caun, Vackeel of Persia 
After Compliments, 
I have this morning been honored with your Majesty's letter from the hands of your 
faithful servant Mohamed Ziar Beg and as he now returns to your sublime presence, I 
tepeat by him my wishes for your Majesty's health, honor and prosperity. 
From the construction that your Majesty has put on the letter that I forwarded you 
from Bushire from my Superior the honorable the President of Bombay, I am afraid 
the said letter has not been properly turned into the Persian language. For that reason 
I now send you another Translate thereof from a copy taken from them by the 
Governor himself, you will not I hope doubt the truth and purport of this letter sent 
with the hope of standing fair in your Majesty's good opinion. 
Give me leave to assure your Majesty, that I am most anxious to be on terms of Com-
merce and friendship with you, and your subjects; to trade to your country as usual 
and to serve and oblige your Majesty. That is so far as I can do so consistent with my 
own honor and the honor and interest of those by whom I am employed. 
Your Majesty must be sensible that the making war with other states solely depends of 
the will of kings and Princes; this is a power with which no subject is entrusted. 
Consequently your Majesty cannot in justice be offended with me as a subject for not 
assisting you with the English ships in your enterprises against the Muscatters. The 
Muscatters and the English have been long in strict friendship - they trade to our 
country, we to theirs; the benefit by this is reciprocal. Such is the situation I wish to 
be on with your Majesty, if your Majesty in wisdom and good Policy would but admit 
of it. 
In friendship to your Majesty, I think it a duty incumbent on me to recommend to 
your consideration the making a peace with the Muscatters. Making war with them, 
must be injurious to your honor and your interest - their situation is their security -
numerous as may be your troops, if you hind them by laacks upon the Arab Coast, 
they are so many subjects lost to the Persian dominions. If your Majesty therefore 
approves of sending a proper person to Muscat to treat with the Imaum touching the 
differences that are between you, he shall be conveyed thither in an English cruizer 
and if your Majesty pleases Messrs. Beaumont and Green shall also accompany him. 
My influence and mediation shall likewise be exerted with the Imaum for your 
Majesty's honor, and for the restitution of all Persian effects that are at present in the 
possession of the Muscatters. 
I beg of your Majesty to take these matters into your consideration and pray God to 
give you an increase of years and wisdom. 
The 4th March 177 4 Henry Moore 
372 
APPENDIX 73 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 202, pp.179-80) 
Shaikh N3.$ir's letter to Moore on the release of 
Beaumont and Green 
Translate of a letter from Shaik Nassir received the 19th May 1774 
After Compliments, 
Before I went last to Bushire, I received a letter from Mr. Abraham relative to the 
English business. I wrote him an answer to it, but so long as I was at Bushire I never 
received a line from you. On account the friendship however that has so long sub-
sisted, between the English and me, how many times I spoke to the Vackeel [Karim 
Khan] about them. I made him understand in what manner the English and the Kings 
of Persia formerly visited one another, that the English had always settlements in Per 
sia, and that the power of the Kings were upon them. If you choose therefore to 
resettle in this kingdom, the Vackeel will show you every indulgence in his power. 
When your letters to the Vackeel arrived particularly the one by Ibrahim Aga, I was 
present and did all in my power to make him pleased with them. It is needless for me 
to tell you what I said on the occasion as you must have heard it from others. I sup-
pose Mr. Beaumont and Mr. Green have wrote you on that head. The Vackeel knows 
I am not the least interested in these affairs- I therefore spoke to him freely, 
requested the release of Mr. Beaumont and Mr. Green, and engaged to settle with you 
relative to those gentlemen. For this reason he granted them their liberty, called them 
before him, treated them like Kiyas, gave them coats of honor, spoke on the most 
gentle manner to them and honorably dismissed them. The 12th of last moon we left 
Schiras, the 22nd we arrived at Kesht. I know that Mr. Beaumont and Mr. Green 
have wrote you all the news. Moolla Mahomet will deliver you this. I send him on 
purpose with it and the V ackeels Phirmaund Varamiin], though it is not customery to 
send the original Phirmaund before the business on which it is wrote is settled, yet on 
aceount our friendship I do not regard the custom. When Moolla Mahmood arrives 
with you, you will understand the meaning of the Phiramaund, and of this letter, and 
what trouble I have taken in this business. I beg you will not detain him above two or 
three days- consider that time of the things that the Vackeel expected from you, for 
the performance of which I bound myself for you, in the presence of the Vackeel and 
your Gentlemen. They will inform you of the particulars and the Phiramaund will 
show you that I have promised to settle them - when you have considered them you 
will then give such an answer as you may think most for your and the Company's 
interest. In your letter to the V ackeel you have promised that you will settle his dif-
ferences with the Muscatters, if he will trust you with the negotiation. Before I left 
Schiras the lmaums uncle Shaik Salim, and Shaik Mahmed brought presents to the 
Vackeel. The Imaum and Shaik Calphan wrote letters to me at the same time, of the 
purport of which Messrs Beaumont and Green will inform you. The Vackeel has not 
engaged you in this business - but if you can settle amicably the differences between 
the Muscatters and the Persians, you will gain great honor. I wish we could see one 
another to settle these affairs - you know I am under orders, and have great business 
on my hands. I cannot therefore go to you at Bussora, but if you should think no 
trouble to come as far as Bushire, we could them settle everything in a very short 
time, without the interferences of a third person. You will consider of these things 
and wrote me an answer by Mulla Mahmood in 2 or 3 days, because agreeable to the 
orders which I have received from the Vackeel I cannot stay at Bushire a longer time -
you will write me fully relative to the Muscat and your affairs. 
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APPENDIX 74 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 202, pp.182-3) 
22 May 1774 
Moore's letter declining to negotiate peace 
between Kaiim Khan and Muscat 
To Shaik Nassir Khan Governor of Bushire. 
After Compliments, 
Your Secretary Moolla Mahomed now returning to Bushire, I have to thank you by 
him for the letter you favoured me with from Kesht, and for the very friendly part 
that you have acted in procuring the enlargement of Messrs, Beaumont and Green 
from Schiras - they write me in a very particular manner of your great influence with 
the Vackeel [Kaiim Khan] and that it is entirely owing to you that they have obtained 
liberty to proceed to Bushire - this your good inclination will I hope be continued 
towards them, and in consequence I flatter myself with shortly seeing them at Bus-
sora. 
Your letter has been fully explained to me, and I am perfect as to the meaning of it. I 
will understand also what Messrs. Beaumont and Green have wrote. The principal 
points I fmd on which you seem sollicitous are, the English resettling again at 
Bushire, the sending a Cruizer to Muscat with an English Gentleman on board in 
order to accommodate matters between the Vackeel and the Imaum [Imam of Muscat] 
and the sending a Cruizer to accompany you and your Galivats in an expedition 
against Ormuse. A compliance with the foregoing points is by no means in my 
power, and for the following reasons. 
1st. Messrs Beaumont and Green are still Prisoners in Persia, though 
removed from Schiras to Bushire. 
2nd. The India Company have forbid the resettling at Bushire or in any 
part of Persia. 
3rd. We have oniy one Cruizer here- the services of which being wanted 
at Bussora, she cannot proceed on any expedition whatever, had I even permission 
from Bombay, to admit of her proceeding; which permission I have not. 
4th. When I wrote the Vackeel that I would send a ship to Muscat it was 
to pay him a compliment by the accommodating of his Embassador with a passage to 
Muscat, ~data time when the Vackeel was at war with the Imaum; but as a peace 
has now taken place between them, and the Vackeel thinks it would hurt his dignity 
the sending a person from his Court on this business, it would be as useless as dis-
honorable in my humble opinion was I to think of sending one. Besides I had then 
two ships here, and I have now only one. 
When Mr. Beaumont and Green arrive at Bussora I shall then transmit a copy of your 
demands to the Governor and Council of Bombay, but until these Gentlemen are 
released, the Governor and Council cannot in honor enter into any commercial agree-
ment whatever with you. By detaining them, you infallibly stop up all communica-
tion on our part with your Port of Bushire. This is a point that deserves your 
maturest consideration and I hope it will have its due weight with you - the Governor 
and Council as well as the English in General want to be on terms of commerce and 
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friendship with you and the Vackeel, but then the conditions thereof must not be 
repugnant to their honor and their interests. 
It is not from want of respect that I do not pay you a visit at Bushire, but it is because 
of Messrs. Beaumont and Green are still prisoners in Persia, and because I cannot 
think of talking any business whatever, until they are first sent up to me; besides it 
would be a reflection I think on my judgement and understanding, the throwing 
myself into a situation from which I have been for so many months past so fruitlessly 
endeavouring to extricate them. 
I congratulate you on the wise choice that the Caun has made in appointing you Com-
mander in Chief of his fleet in the Persian Gulph; in that character I wish you 
honored success, and hope your power will only be exerted against such as disturb the 
peace and commerce of it. 
the 22nd May 1774. H.M. 
APPENDIX 75 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 202, p.l82) 
Moore's thanks to Kaiim Khan for 
releasing Beaumont and Green to Bushire 
22 May 1774 
To Carim Caun, Vackeel of Persia. 
After Compliments, 
I have been honored with the letter you wrote me by Shaik Nassir Caun Governor of 
Bushire, and am much obliged to your Majesty for the permission you have given 
Messrs. Beaumont and Green to proceed to that place. Those Gentlemen have wrote 
me of the honors you shewed them before their departure from Schiras, and when 
they arrive at Bussora, I shall then take the liberty of again paying my respects to 
your Majesty- in which time everything I hope will be properly settled between your 
Majesty and the English, in order that the commerce of both may benefit. Shaik Nas-
sir has wrote me a letter; the purport of which I perfectly understand, and now send 
him a reply to it by his servant Moolla Mahmood. It's a copy I presume Shaik Nassir 
will forward to your Majesty; therefore I trouble you not with its purport, the more 
especially as your Majesty has referred me to Shaik Nassir relative to business. 
the 22nd May 1774. H.M. 
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APPENDIX 76 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 202, pp.254-5) 
Letter from Shaikh N~ir to Moore 
professing friendship and releasing Green 
Translate of a letter from Shaik Nassir of Bushire to the Agent received the 19th Sep-
tember 1774 by Mr. George Green 
After Compliments, 
The long friendship that has subsisted between the English and me, and the desire you 
expressed to me when you was at Bushire for the release of Messieurs Beaumont and 
Green, induced me when I was at Schyras to enter upon this business. I was induced 
to enter upon it from my regard for the English, and from the promises Messieurs 
Beaumont and Green made in case I could bring about their liberty. In consequence, 
I used all my influence with the V ackeel [Karim Khan], and made him many prom-
ises, that I would settle every thing with the English to the Vackeels satisfaction; the 
Vackeel for these reasons gave the gentlemen their liberty, and I brought them with 
honour to Bushire. When we first arrived at Bushire I wrote you a letter and sent it to 
you by one of my own servants named Moolah Mahomed, and I flattered myself that 
I should have received an answer from you by him, that would have been for your 
good as well as mine, but I find by your answer, that you make many more promises, 
the completion of which you say you must defer to a future day, I consider them 
therefore, as not made upon a sure foundation. 
When this letter of yours came to me, I was just setting off upon an expedition to the 
southward and on that account could not immediately reply to it. On my return 
however I found affairs just in the same situation as when I left them. On my seeing 
Mr. Beaumont and Green they told me it would be much better that one of them 
should go to Bussora, and explain everything to you. For these reasons, I have given 
Mr. Green Liberty to proceed to Bussora, in order that you may know from him the 
promises that they made from frrst to last before the Vackeel, as the condition on 
which they were to sustain their liberty. When you hear this from Mr. Green, I sup-
pose everything will then be settled in friendship between us - I call God to witness I 
have no private interest in this rather than the good of the Company and the release of 
your gentlemen. 
You will now act as you think best, but I hope you will not do anything that will 
bring shame on me before the Vackeel. I do repeat to you Sir, I have no interest in 
this business, I have endeavoured to serve the company to the interest of my power, I 
have brought Messieurs Beaumont and Green from Shyrash to Bushire. Mr. Green I 
now send to you, you will therefore, I hope settle matters for the good of both, in 
order to give me honour in the eyes of the V ackeel. 
I beg your answer to this letter, and if you have any comments I am ready to serve 
you. 
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APPENDIX 77 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 202, p.258) 
Letter from Moore to Shaikh N~ir asking 
for Beaumont also to be released 
23 September 1774 
To Shaik Nassir of Bushire 
After Compliments 
Mr. Green arrived here four days ago, and delivered one of your letters. I have read 
it with very great attention, well interested in its purport, and am much pleased at the · 
friendship that you entertain for the English, your giving Mr. Green his liberty, and 
the kind treatment that he and Mr. Beaumont have received since their being at your 
Bunder [port], are striking proofs of your attachment to us, and I most heartily thank 
you for them. 
To send you any person to settle at your Bunder is not in my power, because my 
Employers the India Company, and my Superiours the Governor and Council of Bom-
bay most positively forbid it. It is in my power however to admit of the English 
Ships touching at your Bunder, in order to trade with your subjects, and this I con-
clude will answer every commercial end that you can be desirous of. In about twenty 
days two ships will sail from hence for Bombay and Madrass both of which shall 
touch at Bushire provided Mr. Beaumont and his family are sent up to me, before 
they sail from Bussora. 
I repeat to you my desire of being on terms of friendship and commerce with you, I 
wish it most heartily; but this cannot be so long as Mr. Beaumont continues your 
Prisoner. It is in your interest as well as mine that a friendship should take place 
between us; and this nothing prevents but Mr. Beaumonts detention at Bushire. 
When he arrives at Bussora I will then write to the Governor and Council of your 
friendship for the English; and they I dare promise will do every thing in their power 
to serve vou. that is not inconsistent wit.h their honor, and the honor a11d interests of 
the English nation in general. 
Bussora 
the 23rd September 177 4 H.M. 
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APPENDIX 78 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 202, pp.282-3) 
Letter from Moore to Shaikh N~ir sent in the 
Success repeating his request for Beaumont's release 
3 October 1774 
To Shaikh Nassir 
After Compliments 
I had the honour to write you some days since and then returned you my thanks for 
the favour you have done me in sending Mr. Green to Bussora. The cause of this let-
ter is to bear to you my respects, and to repeat to you my desire of being on terms of 
friendship and commerce with you. 
I am to inform you also, that[ ... ] having been taken in Bussora river by the Chaub 
[Ka'b] Arabs, I think it probable a letter to me from you may have been sent in the 
said Boat; for this reason, and as our river is stopt by the Chaubs Gallivats, which 
must prevent my hearing from you for some time, I now send the Success Cruizer 
down to your Bunder [port], in order to bring me a letter from you and to have your 
determinations regarding Mr. Beaumont and his family. Permit me again to request 
the release of this Gentleman, and as a cruizer, with one Bengal, and one Madrass 
ship will sail for India in a few days, I want to advise the Governor and Council of 
Bombay whatever may be your final resolves regarding Mr. Beaumont. 
Be assured your releasing him will bring you honour and profit, if you send him up to 
me the ships now here shall touch at your Bunder [port] in their way down, and I will 
do every thing, be assured, to serve you. 
A Cruizer from Bombay and a Bengal ship arrived here a few days ago. The Com-
manders tell me that you fired many guns as they passed your Bunder; if as a compli-
ment, I am obliged to you for it, as I am also for the boat of water that I hear you 
sent off for them. 
The Cmizer is ordered to w~it three days for your reply to this letter, a..•d then to 
return to Bussora. I again beg of you to send Mr. Beaumont up to me by the Success, 
in order that you and I may then treat on such other points as may be conducive to the 
... interests of you and my Employers the India Company. 
Bussora 
the 3rd October 177 4 H.M. 
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APPENDIX 79 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 202, pp.282-3) 
Reply from Shaikh N~ir to Moore insisting 
that Moore must take the first steps 
Translate of a letter from Shaik Nassir, received the 15th October 1774 per Success. 
After Compliments, 
I have received your letter to me by the Success, and perfectly understand the Con-
tents, which you have wrote me concerning Mr. Beaumont. I also understand the 
request you have made regarding him appears to me extraordinary after the letters I 
wrote you since my arrival from Schyrass. They fully explained to you every thing 
that had passed after my return from my last expedition. By Mr. Beaumonts and Mr. 
Greens desire I sent Mr. Green to Bussora, to inform you of every thing and in hopes 
of bringing affairs to a proper conclusion. Now without having done any_ thing in the 
business, you desire me to release Mr. Beaumont. I most solemnly swear to you I 
have no interest in the affair, I only want for your good to make you friends with the 
Vackeel [Karim Khan]. You must be very sensible that I am only a subject, that I can 
do nothing of myself. If you wanted now therefore to bring me to disgrace, and to 
draw on me the Vackeel's anger you would not have made the request that you have 
done. You write me that after Mr. Beaumont is returned you will talk with me. If 
you want to settle the business, you must do it now, before the Government again 
take notice of it, and the people there shall have an opportunity of representing my 
conduct in an unfavourable light to the Vackeel. After you have done this then ask 
me for Mr. Beaumont. I again most solemnly swear to you I want to make the 
English and the Vackeel friends and that I have no other views. If you think proper 
to write to the Vackeel, or to give me leave to send him your letter to me, and wait 
his answer, do so. If you· reason coolly you will be sensible of my good intentions, 
and will not give ear to any malicious people that may endeavour to give my actions 
to you an unfavourable turn. A good friend never requests any thing of his friend that 
may hurt him. Show me how I can serve you, without suffering the Vackeels anger, 
or giving room to my enemies to speak against me. All the promises that I made to 
the Vackeel when I got Mr. Beaumont and Green from Schhyras I made from a 
regard to you. To all the letters which I have since wrote you, hoping to put affairs 
on a proper footing the only answer you return is Release Mr. Beaumont. You should 
put yourself in my place, and consider whether this is in my power, without giving 
people an opportunity of speaking against me, and drawing on me the Vackeels dis-
pleasure. You will easily understand me - I need not therefore say any more. 
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APPENDIX 80 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 203, p.244) 
Karim Khan's faramiin to Garden for the 
re-establishment of the English Factory in Bushire 
Translate of Carim Caun's Phiramaund to Mr. Garden received by him 13th May 
1775. 
This is the Phiramaund to you Mr. Garden, Christian, Balios and greatest Chief 
amongst the English, my favour is towards you, be content. 
I have received your letter informing me of your being sent by the General of Bom-
bay, to know whether my favour was towards the English. You request that I will 
release Mr. Beaumont and Mr. Green. As soon as I received the General's letter to 
me requesting their release, I that moment gave orders that they should be delivered 
to you, and before you receive this they are with you. The General writes me· that the 
English were formerly settled at Bushire and other places in Persia, that they were 
friends with the Persians, and that the favour of the Kings of Persia was towards the 
English. As it was formerly so the General requests it may be now. I before wrote to 
your people, and I write to you now, that greater favour shall be shewn to your nation 
than ever was shewn before, and I have sent particular orders to that purport to 
Bush ire and all my other parts, that you may trade in my country, and not receive the 
least molestation. None of the Kings of Persia ever did your people the least harm. I 
shall now show you greater favour even than any of my Predecessors, and shall take 
care that you shall not receive the least molestation but that you may trade with the 
greatest security. Land your goods therefore in any part of my dominions carrying on 
your trade and if any person gives you the least hindrance inform me thereof. With 
respect to your house at Bussora [under Persian siege at the time] and the rest of the 
English effects there, I have given orders to Sadoo Caun [~adiq Khan] agreeable to 
your request to take care of them when he gets possession of the place and if you 
want any thing else from me, let me know. 
APPENDIX81 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 203, p.245) 
13 May 1775 
Karim Khan's jaramiin ordering the release 
of the Tyger 
Translate of Phiramaund to Meer Ali Governor of Bunderick 
Mr. Garden Chief Balius of the English being at present at Bushire where he has 
landed his goods, I desire that as soon as the service at Bussora is finished you will 
deliver him the vessel which you took last year, and take his receipt for her at the 
back of this Phiramaund, that is when the arrival at Bussora is finished. [the Tyger 
was then in the Persian fleet attacking Basrah] 
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APPENDIX82 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 203, p.121) 
The first consignment of cloth to 
Bushire after re-establishment 
Indent for Woollens for the use of Bushire Residency Vizt. 
2 Bales Superfine Medleys 30 Brought over 50 Bales perpets Vizt. 
8 Scarlet 
10 
10 
8 
Superfme Vizt. 
2 Scarlet 
2Wine 
2 French Green 
1 Purple 
1 Saxon Green 
1 Cinnamon 
1 Cherry 
Fines Vizt. 
2 Scarlet 
2 Aurora 
3 French Green 
3Wine 
Drabs Vizt. 
4 Cinnamon 
1 Purple 
2 Wine 
1 Scarlet 
30 Bales Carried forward 
Worsters Vizt. 
4 Scarlet 
3 Aurora 
3 Wine 
1 Grass Green 
2 Maz Blue 
2 Purple 
1 Cherry 
and Scarlet 
20 1 Cinnamon 
2 French Green 
1 Sky Blue 
50 Bales cloth 
7 Aurora 
12 Maz Blue 
7 Emerald Green 
3 Purple 
7 French Green 
2 Red 
1 Wine 
3 Popinjee 
50 Bales 
Busshire 16th May 1775 
John Beaumont 
George Green 
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APPENDIX83 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 203, p.39) 
Letter from Sadiq Khan threatening 
the English factory in Basrah 
Translate of a letter from Sadoq Caun the Persian General at Havezah to the English 
Agent and the English and Country Merchants at Bussorah, received the 1Oth March 
1775: 
No Compliments, 
By the order of the King my brother I am now arrived at Havezah in Arabia with our 
army of the Kings consisting of 30,000 Persians and 10,000 more are expected under 
the command of Sheik Nassir of Bushire, Masoon Caun of Bundereek, Mahomed 
Tayhee Caun and all the Cauns of Baghertan with all the people in the Persian Gulf 
with their armies and fleets. The foregoing forces with those of the Chaub [Ka'b] 
Arabs under Sheik Barakat are to join me by the way of the sea to attack and take 
Bussorah. About four days ago I arrived at Havezah; the only cause of my being 
ordered out with the army from Shiraz is to take Bussorah for the good of the place 
and the people of it. For this purpose you have now a letter from the Vackeel [Karim 
Khan]. On my arrival at this place it is necessary you should come out to meet me in 
order to show your obedience. On your arrival with me you will be all treated 
according to your stations and your merits. If you do not do what I here recommend 
to you, you will not do good for yourselves. I send these letters by two servants of 
the Vackeels, named Ibrahim Beg and Mahomet Raysin Beg. When you have read 
these letters, I recommend that some of the principal amongst you come out and meet 
me. It will be for your good and you may depend on good treatment. All your 
desires will be granted. Be not too proud but do what I desire of you, lest your blood 
and the blood of your families be the fruit of your disobedience. What is proper to do 
I have desired you, neglect not therefore my advice. If you do, repentance will not 
wait you. 
August 1775 
APPENDIX 84 
(Bombay Archives, Basrah Diaries, Diary no. 203, p.244) 
Faramiin from Karim Khan to Sadiq Khan 
ordering the safeguarding of Ene;lish property in Basrah 
Translate of copy of Phiramaund to Sadoq Caun. 
After Compliments, 
With respect to the English house at Bussora at this time Mr. Garden has come to 
Bushire by order of the General of Bombay from whom he forwarded me a letter of 
friendship- desiring that we may be on the same amicable terms as formerly. Mr. 
Garden also has wrote me a letter to inform me that he is come on the part of the 
General to settle a friendship between the English and me in the same manner as with 
the former King of Persia. We for this reason must shew the English every favour. I 
have given orders for the release of Mr. Beaumont and Green, and when you receive 
this Phiramaund and have taken Bussora, you must take care of the English factory 
there, the ... of the English, and the houses of their people. You must take care that 
no one does harm to them or touches their effects - you will then deliver them safe to 
Mr. Garden, in order that he may take possession of them as Chief, and carry on his 
trade there in the same manner as before. 
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APPENDIX 85 
(India Office Library and Records, R/15/1/2, p.36) 
? mid-1775 
Estimate of the market in Bushire for 
broadcloth and perpets 
Calculate of the Quantity, Sortments, Colours and C ... of Perpets and Broad Cloth 
that will sell Annually at the Bushire Market, Viz. 
Perpets 500 Bales or 5,000 Pieces, Viz. 
150 bales or 1,500 Pieces Scarlet in Grain Rupees 38,600 
100 do 1,000 do Mazarine blue ) 
50 do 500 do Sky blue ) 3,500 Pieces 59,200 
200 do 2,000 do Grass, Saxon ) 
Emerald or French Green) 
500 Bales or 5, 000 Pieces 97,800 
Colours ... In Perpets the above are most in esteem - a few bales may be included of 
Purple, Wine, Cherry, Clove and Good Browns excepting Snuff; if among the 
Remains - but these are not necessary. 
Green ... The Merchants always prefer the lightest, such as Grass &c. 
Crimson is not much liked. 
Aurora is taken reluctantly either in Perpets or Broad Cloth. 
But Red, Popinjay and especially Yellow or any colour tending to it, will not sell at 
Bushire at any rate. 
Broad Cloth 175 Bales or 1,050 Pieces, Viz. 
Superfine Medleys 10 Bales or 60 Pieces 
Coarse Medleys 70 do 420 do 
12,400 
40,660 
Fine Medleys will not suit this market, being Rupees 11h per Guz shaw dearer than 
the Coarse, and the difference not discemable by the Merchants. 
Colours ... Such. as are generally sent are liked, that is all Browns, dark (particularly 
Clove) light & the intermediate Shades. But Snuff Colour or any tinged with Yellow 
or Purple, are in no esteem. 
Fine Cloth 5 Bales or 30 Pieces Viz. 
2 Scarlet & Crimson 
~ Grass, Emerald & French Green 
5 
Coarse Cloth 70 Bales or 420 Pieces Viz. 
7 Scarlet 
3 Crimson 
30 Mazarine blue 
30 Grass, Emerald & French Green 
70 
383 
1,680 
27,000 
Worsters 20 Bales or 120 Pieces Viz. 
2 Scarlet 
1 Crimson 
5 Mazarine blue 
12 Grass, Emerald & French Green 
20 
Bales 175 or 1,050 Pieces 
N. B. Superfine Cloth & Drabs do not suit this Market. 
8,700 
90,440 
Rupees 188,240 
The above Valuation is agreeable to the Cost of the Woolens laden via Congoon 
Mr. John Beaumont 
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APPENDIX 86 
(India Office Library and Records, R/15/113, p.22) 
Manifest of Eearls and SEecie shiEEed 
from Bushire to Bombay on 2 May 1779 
Abstract Manifest of Treasure Pearl &ca. Freight laden at Bushire on the Success 
Ketch. Lieutenant Jonathan Twiss for Bombay &ca. Viz. 
By Whom Shipped To Whom Consigned 
Petrus Lucas Mary Cross 
Do Do 
John Beaumont for 
W. D La Touche Henry Moore Esqre. 
John Beaumont Mary Cross 
Do The Honble William 
Hornby Esqre. 
Do Andrew Ramsay Esq. 
for Daniel Seton 
Do Patrick Crawford 
Bruce 
Do John Griffith for 
Rawson Hart 
Boddam Esq 
Do John Griffith 
Do Pomdoojee Sevajee 
Do George Green & 
George Birch 
Yapreannos Zacka..-y Owen John 
Deduct the amount Freight free 
385 
Value 
12,500 
3,040 
5,200 
4,368 
1,190.2 
freight. free 
811.316 
freight. free 
700.47 
freight. free 
4002.2 
freight.free 
3797.2 
freight. free 
607 
2,800 
., t:.nn 
"''VVV 
41,617.4.3 
10,502.4.3 
31,115 
at 3 per cent 
Freight to 
be received 
at Bombay 
375 
91.1 
156 
131.4 
18.1.1 
84 
78 
933.2.5 
Rupees 
933.2.5 
Marks By Whom 
Shipped 
D.P. John Beaumont 
M.C.&P.A. Do 
H.I. Do 
R.HB Do 
A. Yapreanos 
B. Do 
c. Isaac Ibraim 
D. Hodjee Baba 
No. 57 p.Eagle 
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APPENDIX 87 
(India Office Library and Records, R/15/1/3, p.51) 
Manifest of pearls and specie shipped 
from Bushire to Bombay on 15 July 1780 
Manifest of Treasure, Pearls &ca Freight laden at Bushire on the Eagle Snow 
Lieutenant Joseph Alderson the l 5th July 1780 
To Whom Consigned 
Stephen Iveson 
of Dady Passenwanjee 
Mary Cross 
Hirjee Iwanjee 
John Griffith 
Coja Zackary 
Mary Cross 
Lewis Barretts 
Himself 
Where to be Quality 
delivered 
B'bay Silver 
do do 
do Gold 
do do 
do Gold& 
Silver 
do do 
do Gold 
do Gold& 
Silver 
Deduct the amount freight free 
Bushire 15th July 1780 Errors Excepted 
Quantity 
4 bags 
1 do 
1 do 
1 do 
4do 
3 do 
1 do 
8 do 
Rupees 
Pr/signed/Joseph Alderson Having received no part at Bushire 
of Rupees 1,034.2.18 freight money 
Value 
9,006 
2,969 
1,900 
527 
6,450 
5,080 
1,581 
7,500 
35,013 
527 
34,486 
Freight Freight Freight to be 
p. cent received pd. at B'bay 
at Bushire 
3 270.18 
do 89.7 
do 57 
freight free 
::1 193.2.10 
3 152.2 
3 47.2.3 
:I 225 
ut 3 p. Cent are Rupees 
Total 
Freight 
1,034. 
1,034. 
APPENDIX 88 
(Aitchison, C.U., A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads 
relating to India and neighbouring countries, vol.13, pp.44-5) 
Faramiin granted by Ja'far Khan 
in 1788 
18 January 1788 
In the name of the Almighty and Glorious God! 
This is exalted Firmana. 
After Compliments- And as we are always desirous that the merchants and Cofias [qtl.filas: caravans], 
who have occasion to pass backwards and forwards in our dominions, should do so in safety, that they 
should sleep in the cradle of security and confidence, and that they should transact all their business, as 
far as in us lies, without trouble or vexation:-
Therefore the high, exalted Firmana has been issued forth, containing the strictest mandates to all 
Governors and Commanders of our towns and castles, to all our Sirdars [Commanders], and to all Riot-
dars [guardians of the roads: poll-tax collectors], who receive customs on the roads, that they do show 
every favour to all persons employed by the English nation in our dominions for the purpose of mer-
chandize, whether it be for importation or exportation, and that they be constantly vigilant in protecting 
them and moreover that these our above-mentioned servants, upon no account or pretence whatsoever, 
require any customs, presents or money from the Agents of the English nation, but that it may so hap-
pen that from a confidence in us, and from a full persuasion of not receiving any insult or vexation, 
they, the English, may be induced to pass backwards and forwards and to trade in our dominions. And 
whenever they shall have disposed of the goods and merchandize which they may import for sale, they 
shall have full liberty to make their returns according to their own wishes. 
And it is therefore necessary that our most honoured friend, the English Balios at Bussora, should per-
fectly understand that in this way our favour is equal in magnitude to whatever he can hope or desire, 
and it is moreover necessary that in order to make trial thereof he should encourage his nation to trade 
into Persia, and he has again our word that they shall do so in the fullest and most perfect security. 
Again, whatever goods or merchandize the English nation shall import for sale there shall be no restric-
tions put upon the sale thereof, but after their Agents shall have completed the sales and fulfilled the 
design of their journey, they shall have every protection granted them on their return, and again upon 
our royal word there shall be no impositions laid upon them; for if ever, heretofore, there has been any 
impositions or vexations practised upon the English nation in Persia, it is our will that from this day 
they be abolished and forgotten. 
And being persuaded of the sincerity of our most honoured friend the Balios; we accept of his offer of 
services and request of him to purchase immediately such rarities as are procurable at Bussora, favour-
ing us at the same time with the amount cost thereof, in order that we may order the same to be repaid 
to the person who shall be sent with them. 
Let our friend, therefore, on all occasions rest satisfied of our favour and protection. Let him on all 
occasions make known to us his wishes, and wants, and let the above for ever remain a compact 
between us. 
Written on the eighth of the second month of Rabbee in the year of Hijiree one thousand two hundred 
and two, answering the I &h January 1788 
The Refuge of Supplicants Jaffir, the son of Mahomed Saduck 
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APPENDIX88 
(Aitchison, C.U., A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads 
relating to India and neighbouring countries, vol.l3, pp.44-5) 
Faramiin granted by Ja'far Khin 
in 1788 
18 January 1788 
In the name of the Almighty and Glorious God! 
This is exalted Firmana. 
After Compliments- And as we are always desirous that the merchants and Cofias [qafilas: caravans], 
who have occasion to pass backwards and forwards in our dominions, should do so in safety, that they 
should sleep in the cradle of security and confidence, and that they should transact all their business, as 
far as in us lies, without trouble or vexation:-
Therefore the high, exalted Firmana has been issued forth, containing the strictest mandates to all 
Governors and Commanders of our towns and castles, to all our Sirdars [Commanders], and to all Riot-
dars [guardians of the roads: poll:-tax collectors], who receive customs on the roads, that they do show 
every favour to all persons employed by the English nation in our dominions for the purpose of mer-
chandize, whether it be for importation or exportation, and that they be constantly vigilant in protecting 
them and moreover that these our above-mentioned servants, upon no account or pretence whatsoever, 
require any customs, presents or money from the Agents of the English nation, but that it may so hap-
pen that from a confidence in us, and from a full persuasion of not receiving any insult or vexation, 
they, the English, may be induced to pass backwards and forwards and to trade in our dominions. And 
whenever they shall have disposed of the goods and merchandize which they may import for sale, they 
shall have full liberty to make their returns according to their own wishes. 
And it is therefore necessary that our most honoured friend, the English Balios at Bussora, should per-
fectly understand that in this way our favour is equal in magnitude to whatever he can hope or desire, 
and it is moreover necessary that in order to make trial thereof he should encourage his nation to trade 
into Persia, and he has again our word that they shall do so in the fullest and most perfect security. 
Again, whatever goods or merchandize the English nation shall import for sale there shall be no restric-
tions put upon the sale thereof, but after their Agents shall have completed the sales and fulfilled the 
design of their jo\trney, they shall have every protection granted them on their re~.!m, and again upon 
our royal word there shall be no impositions laid upon them; for if ever, heretofore, there has been any 
impositions or vexations practised upon the English nation in Persia, it is our will that from this day 
they be abolished and forgotten. 
And being persuaded of the sincerity of our most honoured friend the Balios; we accept of his offer of 
services and request of him to purchase immediately such rarities as are procurable at Bussora, favour-
ing us at the same time with the amount cost thereof, in order that we may order the same to be repaid 
to the person who shall be sent with them. 
Let our friend, therefore, on all occasions rest satisfied of our favour and protection. Let him on all 
occasions make known to us his wishes, and wants, and let the above for ever remain a compact 
between us. 
Written on the eighth of the second month of Rabbee in the year of Hijiree one thousand two hundred 
and two, answering the 18th January 1788 
The Refuge of Supplicants Jaffir, the son of Mahomed Saduck 
387 
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APPENDIX 89 
(East India Company, Three reports of the Select Committee, appointed by the Court of Directors of the East India Company to take into consideration 
the export trade from Great Britain to the East Indies, China, Japan, and Persia,· laid before the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council, London 1793, 
p.102) 
1780/1 
Broad Cloth 
Lo:»Ells Sh oons 
·Total 
1781/2 
Broad Cloth 
Long Ells 
Total 
1782/3 
Broad Cloth 
Long Ells 
Total 
Quantity 
sold 
Bales Ps 
81 --
107 2 
2 
£ 
38 --
59 6 
£ 
23 3 
14 --
1783/4 None sold 
Calculate of the Profit or Loss on Sales of Woollens at BUSHIRE, from 1780/1 to 1789/90 
First Cost 
£ 
4,2457fs 
2,395'h 
297 1.4 
6,9385/s 
1,908 
1,291 
3,199 
1,271 
4017fs 
1,6727/s 
Ch~ges 
lD 
England 
at 
'h per Cent 
£ 
211.4 
IF/a 
1'h 
345/s 
16 
6% 
2 
8% 
Interest 
of Money, 
2 Years, at 
4 per Cent. 
per Annum 
£ 
3395/s 
1915fs 
23 3/4 
555 
255% 
lOP/a 
32 
1335fs 
Insurance 
at 
3 per Cent 
£ 
1273/s 
71% 
87/s 
208 
57-'A 
38% 
96 
38lfs 
12 
501/s 
Freight 
at £.10 
per Ton 
m Time 
of Peace 
£ 
101 1.4 
891/z 
10 
200% 
96'.4 
29% 
115fs 
41 
TOTAL 
£ 
4,835% 
2,760 1.4 
341 3/s 
7,937 
2,174% 
1,488 1.4 
3,663 1/s 
1,4461/z 
459'h 
1,906 
Sale at 
Bushire 
at 2hthe 
Rupee 
£ 
4,478'h 
2,4341/s 
311'/s 
7,224'h 
2,111% 
1,429% 
3,541 'h 
1,9777fs 
Warehouse 
Charges 
at 
2 per Cent 
£ 
891/z 
485fs 
6'.4 
144% 
42'.4 
28'h 
70% 
27 
12% 
PROFIT 
£ 
1517fs 
LOSS 
£ 
446% 
374% 
35% 
8561fs 
105% 
87 
1923/s 
119% 
39% 151 7/s 1193/s 
Gain 
or 
Loss per 
Cent. on 
First Cost 
101/z 
1511116 
1113116 
5'h 
6% 
6 
9% 
375/s 
Nett Profit, £.32'h, or 2 per Cent.nearly 
--·-··-·---·-·-·--------·.-----.o;o.-.-.-.--.·-----~-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1784/5 
Broad Cloth 70 --
'Long Ells 115 --
3,6253/s 
2,542'/s 
18lfs 
12% 
290 
203 3/s 
87'h 
95% 
4,129% 
2,9303/.1 
4,200% 
2,821% 
84 
563/s 
13lfs 
1653/s 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total £ 
1785/6 None sold 
178617 
Broad Cloth 
Long Ells 
Total 
178718 
Broad Cloth 
1788/9 
Broad Cloth 
·Long Ells 
Total 
44 --
30 --
1 --
18 --
67 --
£ 
1789/90 None sold 
TOTAL in 10 Years £ 
6,168 
2,027'.4 
7103!4 
2,738 
77% 
1,106% 
1,520'.4 
2,626-'/s 
23,420'h 
lOlfs 
3'h 
135/s 
__ 3" 
5'h 
75fs 
13lfs 
117 
493% 
162lfs 
56% 
2187fs 
88'h 
1215fs 
210lfs 
1,873 
185 
60% 
21'.4 
82 
2'.4 
33 1/s 
455fs 
78% 
7021/s 
55 
25 
80 
1'.4 
22'h 
55% 
7,060~~ 
2,315'.4 
817'.4 
3,132'h 
87% 
1,256 
1,7501fa 
3,006% 
26,793% 
7,022% 
2,404 
973 3/4 
3,377% 
93 3/s 
1,1991/s 
1,6453/s 
26,0817/s 
140:Ys 
67-'h 
F/s 
24 
327/s 
567/s 
521 1/s 
403!4 
137 
177% 
333% 
807fs 
138% 
1,566% 
21fii 
2 
195116 
Total Nett Loss, £.1,2325/s, or 5 1.4 per Cent on First Cost 
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APPENDIX 90 
(East India Company, Three reports of the Select Committee, appointed by the Court of Directors of the East India Company to take into consideration 
the export trade from Great Britain to the East Indies, China, Japan, and Persia,· laid before the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council, London 1793, 
p.101) 
Calculate of the Profit or Loss on Sales of Woollens at BUSSORA, from 1780/1 to 1789/90 
Quantity First Chl:ll'ges Interest Insurance Freight Turkish TOTAL Sale Bombay PROFIT LOSS Gaili 
sold Cost lD of Money, at at £.10 Customs at Warehouse or lm 
England 2 Years, 3 per Cent per Ton on Bussora, Charges, perCe 
at at 4 per Cent 1n Time Importation at 2/3 at on Fir 
'h per Cent per Annum of Peace the Rupee 2 per Cent Cost 
1780/1 Bales Ps £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ 
Broad 
Cloth 29 31h 1,919 91h 153 1h 57'h 367/s 59 2,235% 1,347'h 27 9147/s 47% 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------·---------~---------------------
1781/2 
Broad 
Cloth 122 -- 5,847% 29 1.4 467% 152 1h 175% 129% 6,802 6,1991h 124 726'h . 12711& 
Long Ells 113 
--
2,581 127/s 206'h 77% 94 1.4 45'A 3,017';.4 2,740';.4 547/s 331 7/s 121311 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8,428¥. 252% 246% 175 8,939% 1787/s 1.058¥1 12'h 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1782/3 None sold 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1783/4 
Broad 
Cloth 145 -- 6,537 'A 325/s 196lfs 1811.4 136 7,6061/s 6,652';.4 133 1,086% 163/4 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1784/S 
Broad 
Cloth 165 -- 7,642 1.4 
Long Ells 155 -- 3,559 
61P/s 
284% 
229 1.4 
106% 
205 
1291/s 
275 
62 
9,001lfs 
4,159¥. 
7,7321/s 
3,793'/s 
154'/s 
757/s 
1,4235/s 
441'/s 
185/s 
12¥s 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I 1,201 1.4 56 896lfs 336 334lfs 337 1,865';.4 165/s 
i785i6------------------------------------·-·-------·-~~·~-"'---------"'~-~------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~---------~~----
Broad 
Cloth 78 -- 4,113 201h 329 123¥. 97 1h 4,683% 3,583 '7F/s 1,172 1.4 28'1. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
178617 [None] sold 
1787/8 
Broad 
Cloth 141 -- 6,5507/a 
Long Ells 72 -- 1,619 
8,1697fs 
32% 
8 
40% 653'h 245 236';.4 171'/s 
7,625'1! 
1,891 ¥a 
9,517 
6,759 
1,464 
8,223 
1351/; 
29'A 
164¥1 
1,001% 
4565/s 
1,458¥1 1788i9-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Broad 
Cloth 6 -- 534lfl 2'/s 42% 16 7 1h 12'/s 616 6503/4 13 21 3/4 31st1• 
Long Ells 196 -- 4,7517/a 23% 380 1421h 163 1.4 71% 5,533 1/s 3,8777/a 77'h 1,732% 36711& 
5,286¥. 263fa 4223/4 158'h 170% 84¥s 6,1491/s 4,528'/s 90'h 2P/4 I ,7323/4 
Nett Loss, £1,711, or 32¥s per Cent i789i9o----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Broad 
Lo
CiothEII 65 -- 4,019 20 321 'h 1201h 90 81 'A 4,652'A 3,677% 72 1h 1,047 261120 
ng s 104 -- 2,530 12'/s 202¥. 757fs 86% 38 2,945'/s 1,994 397/s 99IIh 39lf, 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6,549 325/s 5231fs 196% 176% 1191.4 7,5971fs 5,671% 112% 2,038 1h 3II/s 
TOTAL in 10 Years 52,204lfs 4,1757/s 1,5655/s 1,480'A 60,7685/s 50,471'/s 1,008'h 11,327 1.4 
Total Nett Loss, £11 ,305'h, or 2111111 per Cent on First Cost 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX 91 
(Bombay Archives, Commercial Department Diary no. 7/1792, pp.409-1 0) 
Sales of woollens at Basrah, September 1792 
Woollens sold as follows to Coja Petrus Mellick for Coja Marcar Aviat of Bagdat, at 
a credit of 9 months, he being at liberty to make Payments on Account of the pur-
chase whenever it may suit his convenience to do so drawing a Discount thereon of 1 
p.Cent p.month viz•· 
Broad Cloth 29 Bales 171 Pieces viz•· 
Superfine Cloth 4 Bales 24 Pieces 4071h yards 543113 Guz. 
@ Mamoodies 40 p.Guz Ts 217.33.20 
Deduct damage in one Bale of Orange Color 682/3 G. d0 • 
27.46.80 
Carried over 189.86.40 
Brought over Ts 189.86.40 
Fine Cloath 8 Bales 48 pieces 822 yards 1096 Guz @ 
Mamoodies 22.10 242.21.60 
Coarse Cloath 5 Bales 29 pieces 665 yards 886213 Guz @ 
Mamoodies 14.95 132.55.72 
Worsters 12 Bales 70 Pieces 1810 yards 2414 Guz@ 
Mamoodies 18.85 455.03.90 
1019.67.62 
Perpetuances 30 Bales~ 300 Pieces @ Mamoodies 1. 75 p.piece 525.00.00 
Tomaunds 1544.67.62 
Bassora the 11th September 1792 
Errors Excepted 
Samuel Manesty 
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Year 
1801/2 
1802/3 
1803/4 
1804/5 
1805/6 
1806/7 
1807/8 
1808/9 
1809/10 
1810/11 
1811/12 
1812/13 
1813/14 
1814/15 
1815/16 
1816/17 
1817/18 
1818/19 
1819/20 
1820/21 
1821122 
APPENDIX 92 
(India Office Library, Bombay Commerce, Internal and 
External Reports, Range 419, vols. 39-57, 1801-21) 
Value of exports from Bombay to 
Persian Gulf and Red Sea, 1801-1822 
Persian Gulf 
Value in Rupees 
in Lacks** 
12,15,579 
12,36,207 
9,17,198 
10,41,586 
13,49,095 
17,64,852 
14,69,210 
17,94,113 
17,71,470 
10,21,953 
19,48,205 
18,13,119 
14,80,539 
15,18,243 
18,26,294 
15,06,779 
19,24,928 
23,18,072 
20,32,064 
28,39,193 
33,59,384 
Arabian Gulf* 
Value in Rupees 
in Lacks** 
3,04,259 
4,62,609 
3,71,630 
4,49,928 
6,54,891 
3,10,556 
3,02,128 
5,54,060 
4,80,759 
4,32,313 
3,64,831 
4,43,127 
5,77,382 
9,33,133 
5,75,206 
13,74,623 
12,79,580 
9,98,025 
10,73,089 
8,66,840 
12,03,820 
r... R 'I ,.. ...,.._ 1 0" "00, L.,. = eo ,:,ea: .,..,. = 1 u,u J 
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Year 
1801/2 
1802/3 
1803/4 
1804/5 
1805/6 
1806/7 
1807/8 
1808/9 
1809/10 
1810/11 
1811/12 
1812/13 
1813/14 
1814/15 
1815/16 
1816/17 
1817/18 
1818/19 
1819/20 
1820/21 
1821122 
APPENDIX 93 
(India Office Library, Bombay Commerce, Internal and 
External Reports, Range 419, vols. 39-57, 1801-21) 
V aloe of exports to Bombay 
from Persian Gulf and Red Sea, 1801-1822 
Persian Gulf 
V aloe in Rupees 
in Lacks** 
16,84,028 
17,74,469 
22,88,315 
20,47,017 
28,71,000 
33,74,821 
19,00,754 
30,28,784 
30,64,687 
22,38,814 
21,407240 
13,86,192 
13,58,836 
24,86,801 
36,41,611 
28,17,308 
36,99,059 
52,12,544 
29,80,639 
34,87,754 
33,85,197 
Arabian Gulf* 
Value in Rupees 
in Lacks** 
7,05,042 
12,70,147 
15,84,031 
32,37,272 
13,00,376 
14,60,878 
7,45,282 
6,27,632 
7,19,549 
6,56,863 
9,44,292 
11,17,543 
7,37,492 
12,44,047 
14,32,431 
20,78,072 
25,43,655 
16,94,753 
17,06,560 
18,63,817 
14,33,313 
[* = Red Sea: ** = 100,000] 
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Year 
1822/23 
1823/24 
1824/25 
1825/26 
1826/27 
1827/28 
1828/29 
1829/30 
1830/31 
1831/32 
1832/33 
1833/34 
1834/35 
1835/36 
1836/37 
1837/38 
1838/39 
1839/40 
1840/41 
1841/42 
1842/43 
1843/44 
1844/45 
1845/46 
1846/47 
1847/48 
1848/49 
1849/50 
1850/51 
1851/52 
1852/53 
1853/54 
1854/55 
1855/56 
1856/57 
1857/58 
APPENDIX 94 
(India Office Library, Bombay Commerce, Internal and 
External Reports, Range 419, vols. 58-106, 1822-58) 
Value of exports from Bombay to 
Persian Gulf and Red Sea, 1822-1858 
Persian Gulf 
Value in Rupees 
in Lacks** 
Arabian Gulf* 
Value in Rupees 
in Lacks** 
30,91 '782 12,59,814 
41,59,485 8,35,123 
37,15,960 6,58,905 
43,43,780 8,29,634 
41,91,821 7,41,105 
33,66,175 5,14,439 
45,12,274 6,60,294 
55,62,260 8,90,145 
45,60,266 11 ,00,850 
36,01,947 8,62,377 
27,35,720 8,83,740 
31,29,110 11,86,107 
21,87,338 11,42,997 
38,67,586 _16,54,404 
35,00,241 12,65,130 
37,33,125 15,21,580 
24,13,961 16,28,946 
28,60,827 16,46,930 
37,42,975 19,93,296 
42,76,538 18,04,345 
49,60,143 15,07,447 
53,17,064 20,54,777 
45,72,282 18,14,310 
40,998,61 25,76,432 
50,27,454 26, 7i ,490 
Persian and Arabian Gulfs combined: 78,85, 700 
Persian and Arabian Gulfs combined: 67,79,522 
Persian and Arabian Gulfs combined: 72,64,346 
Persian and Arabian Gulfs combined: 63,12,089 
51,541,82 16,455,14 
57,700,32 18,493,70 
so, 70,554 17,95,476 
56,74,424 23,24,299 
59,13,775 18,27,099 
66,29,705 22,53,621 
64,31,170 22,40,140 
[* = Red Sea: ** = 100,000] 
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GLOSSARY 
The entries in this glossary are shown in bold italics on first mention in each Chapter 
or Appendix. Thereafter, only the foreign words used as such continue to be in 
italics. The remaining words have all appeared at one time or another in English dic-
tionaries. 
Certain works have been valuable in compiling this glossary. Pre-eminent among 
them is Hobson-Jobson: a glossary of colloquial Anglo-Indian words and phrases (see 
the end note). Others have been The Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea, edited 
by Peter Kemp (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), the Encyclopaedia Britan-
nica, and a wide range of contemporary travel accounts. Those listed in the Biblio-
graphy are by no means all of them. · 
Abba Arabic: 'abli'a; a cloak-like outer wrap. Also written 
abaya in some English dictionaries. 
Alum In this context probably aluminium hydroxide, used as a 
mordant (binder) in dyeing. 
Arrack/ Arak Arabic: 'araq; alcoholic spirit made variously from dates, 
palm sap, grapes or rice, and sometimes flavoured with 
aniseed. 
Arzee Arabic: 'art}; petition. 
Asafoetida (Also Hindi: hing) Foul-smelling gum-resin, used in Indian 
cooking: reputedly a cure for flatulence. Sometimes found 
in Western cuisine also. 
Barta Persian: btifta; woven. A calico (q.v.) for which Broach 
was specially renowned, but bafta was later also used for 
silk cloth. 
Baghala Twin-masted Arabian sailing vessel with arched, and finely 
carved, windowed transom, reminiscent of the galleon or the 
Indian Kotia. None now in use. 
Balios/Bailos Italian: bailolbaglio; the term first used of Venetian 
envoys to the Porte; applied throughout the Gulf to senior 
British representatives. 
Banian A Hindu Indian merchant, usually from Gujarat, residing in 
the Arabian peninsula or Persia. 
Batil Twin-masted Arabian sailing vessel with fme lines and fast 
through the water. None now in use, and not to be confused 
with the Indian types, Batel and Batella. 
Benzoin Arabic: lublinjliwi [Java frankincence]. Also appears in 
archaic English as benjamin. An incense from trees of the 
Styrax family. 
Bdellium A gum resin, related to myrrh, from trees of the 
Commiphora spp. Also called balm (of Gilead). A 
local variety was called gugal/gogul. 
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Bezoar A stony concretion from the stomachs of animals -
especially wild goats of the same name - used in folk 
medicine. 
Bitter apples Citrullus colocynthis, a cultivated gourd with a 
bitter pulp, used as a purgative. 
Blue vitriol Copper sulphate crystals, used medicinally at the time. 
Bomb-ketch A ketch ( q. v.) fitted with one or two heavy mortars for 
bombarding targets on shore. Sometimes called simply 
'Bomb'. 
Boutida A type of bafta ( q. v.) from Surat. Also bootidar. 
Brig Twin-masted vessel, square-rigged on both fore and main 
masts. 
Brigantine Twin-masted vessel, square-rigged on the foremast but with 
its mainmast rigged fore and aft. 
Brimstone Sulphur. 
Calico A fine cotton fabric, originating in Calicut, printed with 
coloured designs. 
Camphire See Camphor. 
Camphor Arabic: kilftlr. Gummy aromatic crystals from the tree 
Onnamomum camphora. Sometimes written camphire. 
Cassia In this context, probably 'Chinese cinnamon' -the bark of 
Cinnamomum cassia. 'Cassia buds' were the dried immature 
fruit of the tree. True cinnamon came from C. 
zeylanicum. 
Chabdir Persian: 'Keeper of the keys'; an attendant on Indian or 
Persian nobles. 
Chappa An unidentified piece good (q.v.). 
Chints(z) An Indian printed or painted cotton fabric, often a highly 
glazed, painted calico (q.v.). From the Hindi word for 
'spotted'. 
Choppar See Chabdar. 
Churl Spanish: churlalo; the traditional cow-hide wrapping for 
indigo shipments. 
Coja Persian: khwlija; a title of respect. 
Corge Arabic: khirqa; a lot or bale of 20 pieces of cloth. 
Cossa A fine, close-weaved muslin. Probably from Arabic: 
khli~~a; special. 
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Curcuma 
Cutter 
Dhow 
Dinghi 
Drab 
Ducat 
Ell (Long) 
Earth (Red) 
Arabic: kurkum; turmeric. A family of plants yielding 
several dyes and spices, most notably turmeric, from 
Curcuma longa syn. C. domestica, but also arrowroot. 
Applied variously to different kinds of small, fast sailing 
vessels with one mast, or to ship's boats of a dozen or so 
oars and two lugsails. 
This was not the generic term now in usage for any local 
craft. It describes the largest lateen-rigged Arab or 
Indian ships of the time. 
Hindi: a considerably bigger boat than the modern dinghy, 
from western India. With two masts and two outboard sails, 
plus jib and trysail. Not to be confused with the Dhangi -
a double-ended deep-sea dhow from the Gulf of Ku~ch. 
A dull grey or brown cloth. 
A gold coin, originally Venetian but used also in Holland 
and elsewhere in Europe. The preferred gold coin of the 
Ottoman Empire. 
The ell was the classic measure, albeit variable, for 
woollens since the Middle Ages. The English ell was 45", 
but in the region of this study usually about 36". 
Red ochre. Red oxide of iron (ferric oxide), found in 
natural deposits (including the Sharjah island of Abu 
Musa). 
Dye-wood/roots If not otherwise specified, usually, if not invariably, 
madder (Rubia tinctorum or cordifolia), giving a red dye 
(alizarin). 
Faraman 
Galban om 
Galingale 
Gall-nuts 
Galley 
Galli vat 
Ghee 
Arabic (in Persianfarmiin): an order or decree from the 
Shah. · 
Bitter aromatic resin used in incense and derived 
from plants of the Ferula spp. 
Aromatic root, ginger flavoured, of a sedge, Cyperus 
longus. Used in perfumes. 
Galls from the oak tree, yielding tannic acid for use as a 
mordant (binder) to produce a black dye. 
In this context nearer to the galleass, i.e. a large vessel 
(up to 150ft) with two or three masts and a bank of oars. 
The origin of the word is disputed: although it shares its 
derivation with jolly-boat and gellywatte it was much 
bigger than both. It was rather a galliot, a smaller, 
single-masted galley specially adapted to boarding other 
boats. NOT the small dhow from the Gulf known as jalbut. 
Hindi ghl; clarified butter. 
404 
Gillopdar 
Gogul 
Grab 
Persian: jalavdiJ.r; a leader of mules or pack-horses. A 
caravan boss. More usually gelabdar. 
See bdellium. 
Arabic: ghurlib (a crow); a coasting vessel ranging up to 
300 tons, with one or two lateen-rigged masts according to 
size: smaller ones also carried oars. 
Gum ammoniac Aromatic gum resin from the Persian plant Dorema 
ammoniacum, used in medicines. 
Gunny 
Guz/Gaz 
Humhum 
Hurtaul 
Hyacinth 
Jujube 
Kalanthar 
Kath 
Ketch 
Kia/Kaya 
Kismis 
Labdanum 
Marathi: gonl; coarse jute sacking, or sack. The term is 
still used in the area. 
An ancient Indian unit of measurement. Under the Moguls 
standardised at 33 inches. At the beginning of the period 
under study it was 371h" for cloth and 27" for silks and 
carpets. By the end of the period it was evidently equal 
to 27 inches for all purposes, while the Guz Shaw (q.v.) 
was about 38". 
A thick, strong cloth used as a wrap in the cold season. 
From Arabic: l}ammiim; Turkish bath (commonly 'hummum'), 
where it supposedly originated. 
Hindi: hartlil; orpiment (arsenic trisulphide), a bright 
yellow deposit from hot springs used for dyeing and as an 
artists' pigment. 
Jacinth: the yellow/orange/red variety of zircon. 
The fruits of Ziziphus spp. (in this context Z. 
mauritiana from India). The sweeter Chinese variety 
comes from Z. jujuba. Used in sweetmeats and 
medicines. 
Persian: kalllntar; a senior local official or magistrate in 
Persia, especially in the Armenian communities. 
Hindi; an astringent extract from Acacia spp. which are 
natives of India. Used in dyeing and tanning. Usually 
called cutch or cashoo at the time, and admitted to English 
dictionaries as catechu. 
Twin-masted sailing vessel. The smaller (mizzen) mast 
being aft of the main mast, this left a large open space 
forward, which served to accommodate heavy mortars in some 
vessels (see Bomb-ketch). 
A senior Ottoman official. 
Or Kishmish. A small, stoneless, sweet raisin or fresh 
grape. 
Variant spelling of ladanum ( q. v. ). 
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Lac 
Ladanum 
Lakh 
Lapis tutle 
Lascar 
Lung hi 
i) The Indian measurement, still current, of 100,000 
ii) A red resin used for dyeing and varnishing ( cf. 
shellac, lacquer, and the colour lake). 
Dark and fragrant gum resin from the rock rose, 
Cistus ladanifer, used in perfumes. 
See Lac (i). 
Lapis tutiae, a latinised form of Persian and Arabic: 
tatiyli; zinc. Usually called tutty- a zinc ore or 
oxide mixed with clay. Produced in Kirman. See 
also tutenague. 
Arabic: 'askar; most commonly a native sailor but, at that 
time, also a native soldier or artilleryman. 
Hindi: lungl; length of cotton worn as a loincloth or 
sarong. National dress in Burma. Still part of the Gulrs 
lingua franca. 
Mahm/oodi/udi A Persian silver coin (Mal)madi). 100 Mahmudis = 1 Toman 
(q.v.). In 1721 one Bombay Rupee (q.v.) = 4 Mahmudis; in 
1758 = 5-6 Mahmudis; in 1791-6 = 10 Mahmudis; in 1812 = 81A 
Mahmudis. 1 Mahmudi = 2 Shahis (q.v.). Usually regarded 
in EIC accounts as worth 8d. 
Maund/Maun Hindi: man; the commonest West Asian weight. Very 
variable: the Tabrizi maund was round about 7 lb, the maund 
Shaw (q.v.) double that, the Bengal (standard) maund about 
82 lb. The Bombay maund was 28 lbs. 
Mogadooti Cloth made of mooga (Bengali:maga; wild silk) from Assam. 
Moorah A measure of weight equal to 4 candies: roughly 2,000 lbs 
or a ton. 
Mulmull Hindi; malmal; muslin. 
Muramath An unidentified piece good (q.v.). 
Muster Portuguese: mostra; sample, pattern. 
Nakhoda Persian: niikhuda; the skipper of any native or country 
craft in the Gulf. 
Naphtha Arabic: naft.; petroleum. Not the hydrocarbon now 
known as naphtha, but the naturally occurring seepage 
of a volatile oil in Persia and Azerbaijan. A 
component in Greek fire. 
Olibanum Frankincense, from trees of Boswellia spp. in 
southern Arabia. 
Pal(l)ampore Hand-painted or stencilled chintz fabric from India, used 
especially as a bed-cover. More usually palempore. 
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Pat tamar 
Perpet 
Piece goods 
Raqam 
i) Fast-sailing twin-masted dhow from western India with 
open hull and additional outboard stem-sail. Used for 
fast communication at the time. 
ii) By extension from i), -the messenger who travelled 
on such a vessel. 
A hard-wearing (hence its derivation) woollen twill much 
exported from England in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
Sometimes called perpetuance. 
Originally, Indian exports of cotton cloths in standard 
lengths. Their types were legion: in 1886 the classic 
Anglo-Indian glossary, Hobson-Jobson, noted 'Nothing is 
harder than to find intelligible explanations of the 
distinction between the numerous varieties of cotton stuffs 
formerly exported from India to Europe under a still 
greater variety of names; names and trade being generally 
alike obsolete. 'I 
Persian: an Imperial decree. 
Real/Riyal/Rial The Maria Theresa Dollar. Sometimes referred to as a 
Thaler, Spanish dollar or German Crown. The preferred 
currency of Arabia until the 1960s at least. 
Rupee Hindi: rapiya. For centuries the standard currency of the 
Mogul Empire and British India - and now of modem India. 
Of varying types and values at the time, but ten Bombay 
Rupees (Rs) equated roughly to £1. 
Sal ammoniac Ammonium chloride. Its many uses include cold and cough 
remedies. 
Sannas 
Scammony 
Schooner 
Ser/Sear 
Sepoy 
Shih ban dar 
Shihi 
Shalloon 
Sannoes (sic) were Bengali piece goods (q.v.) of a type 
exported to England. 
The dried roots of Convolvulus scammonia, used as a 
(strong) purgative. 
A sailing vessel with fore-and-aft sails on two or more 
masts (most had two). At the time in question t..'ley also 
carried square topsails. 
Hindi: ser; an Indian unit of weight equal to 2.057 lbs. 
There were 40 sers in one standard maund (q.v.). Used also 
as a liquid measure of about one litre. 
Persian: siplihl; a native soldier. 
Persian: harbour-master or chief of Customs. 
Persian currency: 200 Shahis usually equalled 1 Toman 
(q. v.). See also Shaw. 
Named after Chalons-sur-Mame (France): a lightweight 
twilled fabric of wool or worsted. Used mainly as 
linings. 
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Shaw 
Shroff 
Sloop 
Snow 
Persian: shahl; royal. Indicating a greater than standard 
measurement (cf. 'king-size'). 
Arabic: ~arrtif, money changer. 
During the period under study, an indiscriminate term for a 
smaller, square-rigged warship, usually of two masts. 
A merchant ship; the largest two-masted ship of the period, 
rigged as a brig ( q. v.) but with an additional trysail 
mast. 
Syrang/Serang Persian: sarhang; overseer. Navigator or boatswain on 
Indian vessels. 
Tabbies/tabby Arabic: 'atttiblya; a quarter of Baghdad where the cloth 
originated. Tabby was a striped or watered fabric, usually 
silk. 
Tindal 
Toman 
To pass 
Trankey 
Tutenague 
Vermeil or 
Vermillion 
Wakil 
Wormseed 
Zap pan 
Malayalam: ta1}rjal; the head seaman on an Indian vessel. 
Persian: tamiin; still the currency of Iran. During the 
period of this study its value declined from about £3 7s to 
about £1. Its worth locally was generally held to be about 
£3 or Rupees (q.v.) 30. See Shahi and Mal).miidi. 
Indo-Portuguese Christian. 
Probably derived from Persian: the Portuguese in the 16th 
century used te"anquim. The common name at the time for 
different kinds of close-winded fast boats with fine lines, 
and usually with one huge lateen sail. Displacing upwards 
of 100 tons and capable of carrying 200 men: often equated 
with a batil (q.v.). 
In part from Arabic: tatiyli; zinc. Strictly an alloy of 
zinc, copper and nickel. Used loosely in the India trade 
for zinc or pewter. See also lapis tutle. 
Silver gilt: also gilded bronze. 
Arabic: an agent, attorney or deputy. Also the title used 
by Karim Khan, who did not assume the style of Shah. 
Seeds with anthelmintic (worm-expelling) properties. 
From Santonica (Artemisia maritima), one of the 
worm woods. 
A (red) dye-wood more commonly known as Sappan or Brazil 
-wood (Caesalpina sappan). 
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